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Abstract	
This	 study	 examines	 the	 practice	 of	 how	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party’s	 history	was	 written	 from	 the	 late	 1930s	 to	 the	 present	 through	 the	 case	 study	 of	 the	Western	Route	Army	(1936-1937).		 	 The	CCP	is	a	Leninist	organization	that	has	strict	principles	of	confidentiality.	In	the	 Mao	 Era,	 the	 outside	 world	 had	 to	 rely	 greatly	 on	 the	 information	 that	 the	Party	revealed	in	order	to	gain	understanding	on	intra-Party	affairs.	In	this	regard,	before	 the	 1980s,	 so-called	 Party	 History	 was	 in	 fact	 the	 official	 Party	 History	authorized	 by	 the	 Party	 leadership.	 It	 has	 only	 been	 since	 the	 1980s	 that	 other	people	 besides	 Party	 theorists	 or	 Party	 historians	 started	 to	 write	 alternative	versions	 of	 Party	History,	 or	 as	 they	 could	 be	 called,	 unofficial	 versions	 of	 Party	History.	The	first	part	of	this	thesis	deals	with	the	Party	historiography	of	the	Mao	Era,	exploring	how	the	official	 interpretations	of	historical	events	were	produced	and	where	they	were	situated	in	the	official	historical	framework.	The	second	part	examines	 the	 new	 interpretations	 of	 and	 the	 newly	 emerging	ways	 to	 represent	the	history	of	the	Party	in	the	Post-Mao	Era.		 	 With	seven	chapters,	this	thesis	investigates	five	watershed	periods	essential	in	the	making	of	Party	History	and	explores	the	role	that	four	groups	of	people—the	CCP	leaders,	senior	cadres,	historians	and	nonprofessional	writers—played	in	each	period.	 Concerning	 Party	 historiography	 in	 contemporary	 China,	 based	 on	interviews	 and	 on-site	 investigation,	 this	 thesis	 not	 only	 focuses	 on	 the	 central	level,	 revealing	how	 state	 organs	write	 and	propagandize	Party	history,	 but	 also	pays	 attention	 to	 the	 representation	 of	 Party	 history	 by	 local	 governments	 and	institutions.	 In	doing	 so,	 this	 research	 aims	 to	 establish	 a	 broad	picture	 of	 Party	historiography.	 	
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Introduction	In	April	2013,	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	(CCP)	sent	an	 order	 down	 through	 the	 Party	 hierarchy,	 asking	 all	 units	 to	 pay	 particular	attention	 to	 certain	 issues	 concerning	 ideology.	 In	 this	 confidential	 document,	known	as	“Document	No.	9,”	“attempts	to	deny	the	CCP’s	and	the	People’s	Republic	of	China’s	 (PRC)	history,”	was	 listed	as	one	of	 the	 seven	most	 serious	erroneous	trends	of	thought.1	 Two	years	later,	 in	September	2015,	before	dozens	of	foreign	politicians	and	scholars,	Wang	Qishan	 王岐山	 (1948-	),	a	member	of	the	standing	committee	of	 the	politburo	of	 the	CCP,	 stated,	 “the	CCP	has	gained	 its	 legitimacy	from	 history”	 (中國共產黨的合法性源自於歷史).2	 This	 was	 the	 first	 time	 that	 a	Chinese	leader	had	spoken	about	the	issue	of	legitimacy.	That	Wang	attributed	the	Party’s	 legitimacy	 to	 history	 was	 unsurprising,	 as	 the	 combination	 of	 Chinese	tradition	 and	Marxist	 theory	made	 history	 particularly	 important	 to	 the	 Chinese	Communists.3	 Nonetheless,	the	remark	was	thought	provoking.		 	 The	 two	 events	 above,	 and	 the	 continued	 debates	 among	 intellectuals,	 cadres,	and	ordinary	readers	over	the	past	few	years	about	various	issues	in	the	history	of	the	CCP,	indicate	that	we	are	now	living	in	an	era	in	which	the	way	that	we	relate	stories	about	the	Party’s	past	is	a	key	issue.	This	prompts	the	following	questions:	After	nearly	seven	decades	of	 firm	control,	why	does	the	Party	 leadership	feel	so	strongly	that	assessments	and	narratives	of	the	Party’s	history	are	still	important?	If	 the	 Party	 leadership	 has	 detected	 a	 certain	 vulnerability	 with	 respect	 to	 this	issue,	 from	where	 does	 this	 vulnerability	 come?	These	 are	 the	 central	 questions	that	provoke	this	thesis.		 	 The	answers	to	these	questions	lie	not	only	in	the	recent	history	of	China	and	the	Party,	but	are	linked	to	the	long,	tortuous,	and	dramatic	story	of	writing	the	history																																																									1	 Zhonggong	 zhongyang	 bangongting 中共中央辦公廳	 (The	 General	 Office	 of	 the	 CCP	 Central	Committee),	 “Guanyu	dangqian	 yishixingtai	 lingyu	 qingkuang	de	 tongbao	 關於當前意識形態領域
情況的通報”	 (Notification	 on	 the	 current	 situation	 of	 ideology),	 Mingjing	 明鏡,	 2013(43),	 pp.	86-92.	2	 “Wang	Qishan	huijian	chuxi	‘2015	Zhongguo	gongchandang	yu	shijie	duihua	hui’	waifang	daibiao	
王岐山會見出席‘2015 中國共產黨與世界對話會’外方代表”	(Wang	Qishan	met	foreign	delegates	of	“The	Party	and	the	World	Dialogue	2015”),	Renmin	ribao	 人民日報,	September	10,	2015,	p.	1.	3	 As	Raymond	F.	Wylie	pointed	out,	for	most	of	the	Chinese	people,	the	study	of	history	was	no	less	than	the	study	of	the	universal	laws	that	governed	the	rise	and	fall	of	civilizations,	and	the	destiny	of	 man	 himself.	 For	 a	 Marxist,	 history	 is	 the	 laboratory	 of	 the	 social	 scientist,	 the	 fundamental	source	to	which	one	turns	in	the	search	for	basic	truths	of	individual	and	social	behavior.	Raymond	F.	Wylie,	The	Emergence	 of	Maoism:	Mao	Tse-tung,	 Ch’en	 Po-ta	 and	 the	 Search	 for	 Chinese	 Theory	
1935-1945.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1980,	p.	226.	
	2	of	 the	Party.	Through	a	case	study	of	 the	Western	Route	Army	(1936-1937),	 this	work	examines	the	way	in	which	the	CCP’s	history	has	been	written	from	the	late	1930s	to	the	present.	 	
The	History	of	the	Party,	Party	History,	and	Party	Historiography	 		 	 The	 Chinese	 phrase	 Zhonggong	 dangshi	 中共黨史	 has	 two	 meanings,	 “the	history	of	the	CCP,”	and	“the	written	history	of	the	CCP.”	These	two	meanings	will	be	 referred	 to	 in	 this	 thesis	 as	 “Party	history”	 and	 “Party	History,”	 respectively.4	The	concept	of	 “Party	historiography”5	 means	at	 least	 three	things.	The	 first	and	primary	meaning	 is	 the	history	of	historical	studies	concerning	the	CCP’s	past.	 In	addition	to	this	basic	meaning,	the	concept	also	refers	to	“historical	theories,”	or	to	the	“philosophy	of	history,”	in	an	applied	form.	Thus,	it	refers	to	the	ways	in	which	historians	 or	writers	 look	 at	 the	 history	 of	 the	CCP,	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	 they	write	 Party	 History.	 The	 persons	 who	 participated	 in	 writing	 or	 disseminating	Party	History	also	must	be	included	in	any	study	of	Party	historiography.		 	 The	 history	 of	 the	 CCP	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 two	 periods,	 in	which	 1949	was	 a	watershed.	 From	 a	 historiographical	 perspective,	 pre-1949	 Party	 history	 is	 an	aspect	of	modern	Chinese	history,	while	post-1949	Party	history	overlaps	 largely	with	 the	 history	 of	 the	 PRC.	 Immediately	 after	 the	Red	Army	 troops	 led	 by	Mao	Zedong	 毛澤東	 (1893-1976)	 finished	 their	 Long	 March	 in	 1936,	 Mao	 urged	propaganda	workers	to	collect	and	promote	stories	of	the	Long	March	in	order	to	present	it	as	one	of	the	Party’s	great	triumphs.6	 This	point	marks	the	beginning	of	the	 CCP’s	 conscious	 attempts	 to	 write	 official	 Party	 History.7	 As	 the	 CCP	 is	 a																																																									4	 When	“history”	refers	to	both	of	these	two	meanings,	“history”	with	a	lower	case	“h”	will	be	used,	such	as	“the	writing	of	Party	history”.	 	5	 There	are	different	opinions	about	the	Chinese	translation	of	“historiography”.	Chinese	scholars	use	“Zhonggong	dangshi	xue	shi	 中共黨史學史”	and	“Zhonggong	dangshi	bianzuanxue	 中共黨史編
纂學”	to	refer	to	the	studies	of	Party	historiography.	6	 For	more	information	about	the	CCP’s	project	of	collecting	and	writing	the	stories	about	the	Long	March,	see	Gao	Hua	 高華,	“Hongjun	changzheng	de	lishi	xushi	shi	zenyang	xingcheng	de	 紅軍長征
的歷史敘事是怎麼形成的”	 (How	were	 the	narratives	about	 the	Long	March	created?),	Yan-Huang	
chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	2006(10),	pp.	27-32.	7	 Before	this	point,	there	were	some	earlier	works	about	the	history	of	the	Party，but	none	of	them	were	 officially	 authorized.	 For	 example,	 one	 of	 the	 founders	 of	 the	 CCP,	 Chen	 Gongbo	 陳公博	(1892-1946),	 finished	his	Master’s	 thesis	at	Columbia	University	 in	1924	on	 the	establishment	of	the	CCP.	See	Ch’en	Kung-po	(Chen	Gongbo),	The	Communist	Movement	in	China:	An	Essay	Written	in	
1924	 by	 Ch’en	Kung-po.	 Octagon	Books,	 1966.	 Cai	Hesen	 蔡和森	 (1895-1931)	 had	written	 about	the	CCP’s	history	as	early	as	in	the	mid-1920s.	See	Zhou	Yiping	 周一平,	Zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	
de	kaituozhe:	Cai	Hesen	 中共黨史研究的開拓者：蔡和森	 (A	pioneer	of	Party	history	research:	Cai	Hesen).	Shanghai:	Shanghai	shehui	kexue	chubanshe,	1994.	Some	Chinese	scholars	mistakenly	take	Li	Dazhao’s	writing	of	Chinese	history	as	the	starting	point	of	Party	historiography.	Although	Li	was	
	 3	Leninist	organization	that	has	strict	principles	of	confidentiality,	in	order	to	learn	about	 intra-Party	affairs	 in	 the	Mao	era,	 the	outside	world	had	 to	rely	greatly	on	information	that	the	Party	revealed,	and	Party	History	was	written	exclusively	by,	or	under	 the	supervision	of,	Party	 leaders.	Therefore,	before	 the	1980s,	so-called	Party	 History	 was,	 in	 fact,	 that	 which	 was	 authorized	 officially	 by	 the	 Party	leadership.	It	has	only	been	since	the	1980s	that	people	other	than	Party	theorists	or	historians	have	begun	to	write	other	versions	of	Party	History,	or,	as	we	should	call	them,	unofficial	versions	of	Party	History.	In	summary,	investigations	of	official	Party	History	 should	 cover	 the	 period	 from	 the	 late	 1930s	 to	 the	 present,	while	surveys	of	unofficial	Party	History	should	include	the	period	after	the	early	1980s.	 		 	 Since	the	 late	1930s,	writing	Party	history	has	been	one	of	the	few	issues	over	which	the	Party	leadership	has	not	dared	to	lose	control.	Party	history	is	not	only	an	 indispensable	 tool	 for	 the	 leadership	 during	 intra-Party	 power	 struggles,	 but	also	for	its	function	as	a	legitimizing	device.	As	an	inseparable	part	of	the	history	of	the	 CCP,	 Party	 historiography	 deserves	 systematic	 research,	 and	 the	 following	questions	should	take	center-stage:	Who	wrote	the	official	version	of	Party	History	during	the	Mao	era?	During	this	period,	how	were	the	political	needs	of	the	Party	Center	 reflected	 in	 official	 Party	 History?	 What	 changes	 took	 place	 in	 official	historical	 narratives	 after	 1976?	 To	 what	 extent	 was	 official	 Party	 History	challenged	 by	 alternative	 versions	 that	 have	 emerged	 since	 the	 early	 1980s?	Currently,	the	CCP	is	believed	to	be	losing	control	over	its	propaganda	machine.	If	this	is	the	case,	then	what	is	the	real	status	of	Party	history	propaganda	in	today’s	China?	Recording,	writing,	 and	propagandizing	Party	history	 is	 an	uninterrupted	thread	that	runs	 through	all	of	 the	CCP’s	history,	and	 investigation	of	 this	 thread	will	 deepen	 our	 understanding	 of	 a	 political	 party	 that	 rules	 1.3	 billion	 Chinese	people.	 		 	 The	 Party	 leadership	 observes	 closely,	 and	 to	 a	 great	 degree,	 controls	 the	writing	of	Party	History.	Nevertheless,	since	at	least	the	early	1980s,	Party	history	has	also	served	as	an	academic	field	of	inquiry	in	which	historians	have	acted	and	debated	 according	 to	 academic	 rules	 rather	 than	 political	 pressure.	 As	 a	 result,	there	 are	 more	 questions	 that	 should	 be	 resolved:	 What	 role	 did	 professional																																																																																																																																																																			one	 of	 the	 founders	 of	 the	 CCP,	 and	 advocated	 rewriting	 Chinese	 history	 according	 to	 Marxist	criteria,	he	did	not	write	anything	about	the	history	of	the	CCP.	As	a	result,	his	writings	marked	the	beginning	 of	 Marxist	 scientific	 analysis	 of	 Chinese	 historiography,	 rather	 than	 the	 beginning	 of	Party	historiography.	 	
	4	historians	play	in	writing	Party	history	during	the	Mao	era?	Did	they	ever	intend	to	transform	 Party	 history	 into	 an	 academic	 discipline?	 How	 did	 the	 roles	 and	self-identities	 of	 professional	 historians	 who	 wrote	 Party	 history	 change	 after	1976?	 What	 about	 after	 1989?	 As	 will	 be	 discussed	 later,	 because	 of	 its	 close	relationship	 to	 politics,	 Party	 historiography	 is	 considered	 to	 have	 a	 relatively	special	 nature,	 and	 therefore,	 its	 political	 function	 has	 always	 been	 emphasized,	while	its	academic	aspects	have	been	overlooked.	The	exploration	of	professional	historians’	 works	 serves	 not	 only	 as	 another	 perspective	 to	 investigate	 Party	historiography,	but	also	helps	to	fill	the	gaps	in	the	field	of	Chinese	historiography.	 		 	 The	 topic	 of	 the	writing	of	 the	CCP’s	history	 leads	naturally	 to	 a	 controversial	theoretical	problem,	whether,	or	the	extent	to	which,	reality	can	be	represented	by	the	writing	of	history.	Some	historians	used	to	believe	that	there	was	an	objective	reality	 that	 could	 be	 discovered	 through	 research.	 According	 to	 this	 reasoning,	misinterpretations	 of	 the	CCP’s	 history	 can	be	 removed	 and	 replaced,	 as	 long	 as	historians	use	scientific	methods	in	their	studies.	Nevertheless,	few	historians	now	still	 cling	 to	 this	 outdated	 theory	 of	 history.	 Recently,	 the	 idea	 that	 objective	historical	 research	 is	 impossible	because	 there	 is	no	objective	reality,	has	gained	increasing	popularity.	As	Hayden	White	and	other	recent	theorists	of	history	have	pointed	 out,	 to	 place	 facts	 or	 events	 that	 have	 been	 validated	 empirically	 in	 a	coherent	 story	 necessarily	 requires	 imaginative	 steps.	 Therefore,	 history	 is	connected	more	closely	to	literature	than	it	is	to	science.	This	post-modern	notion	has	challenged	the	very	assumptions	on	which	modern	historical	scholarship	has	rested,	 and	 appears	 especially	 compelling	 when	 it	 is	 applied	 to	 Party	historiography.	 Post-modern	 theorists	 eliminate	 not	 only	 the	 boundary	 between	historical	 discourse	 and	 fiction,	 but	 also	 that	 which	 lies	 between	 honest	scholarship	 and	 propaganda.8	 From	 this	 point	 of	 departure,	 looking	 at	 Party	historiography,	 which	 has	 always	 been	 considered	 to	 be	 much	 more	 like	propaganda	 than	 serious	 scholarship,	 the	 tension	 between	 its	 explicit	 political	nature	and	its	semi-academic	appearance	disappears.	Thus,	one	question	that	this	thesis	 discusses	 is	 whether	 the	 relationship	 between	 written	 Party	 History,	regardless	of	whether	the	writers	are	Party	officials	or	professional	historians,	and	Party	 history,	 as	 the	 reality	made	 and	 experienced	by	people,	 involves	 complete	discontinuity,	or	whether	some	continuity	exists.	Is	it	true	that	the	official	version																																																									8	 Georg	 G.	 Iggers,	 Historiography	 in	 the	 Twentieth	 Century:	 From	 Scientific	 Objectivity	 to	 the	
Postmodern	Challenge.	Middletown,	Connecticut:	Wesleyan	University	Press,	1997,	pp.	9-16.	
	 5	of	Party	History	is	a	complete	fabrication	that	has	nothing	to	do	with	what	really	did	 happen?	 Is	 unofficial	 Party	History	 closer	 to	 historical	 reality	 than	 is	 official	History?	 	
Marxist	Historiography,	Historiography	in	Communist	China	and	
Party	Historiography:	A	Literature	Review		 	 Marxism,	the	theoretical	system	that	the	CCP	has	claimed	as	its	guiding	principle	for	 eighty-five	 years,	 offers	 a	 distinct	 framework	 and	 method	 to	 observe	 and	analyze	the	past,	present,	and	future	of	the	world.	From	as	early	as	the	late	1910s,	Chinese	 Marxists	 had	 begun	 to	 apply	 Marxist	 theories	 to	 rewrite	 Chinese	 and	world	history.	Their	historical	interpretations	in	subsequent	years	not	only	played	an	important	role	in	justifying	the	CCP’s	status	as	the	ruling	party	in	China,	but	also	reflected	 the	 CCP’s	 ability	 to	 shape	 the	 thinking	 of	 intellectuals	 and	 ordinary	Chinese	people.	Thus,	Western	scholars	have	paid	much	attention	to	how	Chinese	history	 has	 been	 written	 and	 rewritten	 over	 the	 past	 one	 hundred	 years	 since	Marxist	historiography	emerged	in	China.	 		 	 There	are	several	pieces	of	 research	on	Chinese	Marxist	historiography	during	the	period	 from	 the	 late	1910s	 to	1949.	 In	his	book,	Revolution	and	History,	Arif	Dirlik	demonstrated	 that	 the	Nationalist	 revolution	of	1924-1927	was	 the	key	 to	the	origins	of	Marxist	historiography.	By	examining	the	Social	History	Controversy	(shehuishi	 lunzhan	 社會史論戰)	 from	 1929	 to	 1933,	 Dirlik	 showed	 the	 ways	 in	which	 the	 question	 of	 the	 revolution’s	 future	 inspired	 an	 upsurge	 in	 the	controversy	 over	 China’s	 social	 history. 9 	 Mechthild	 Leutner	 investigated	historians	 who	 played	 a	 decisive	 role	 in	 the	 process	 of	 developing	 Marxist	historiography	 from	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	 1930s	 to	 the	 1940s,	 arguing	 that	 the	different	 opinions	 of	 some	 historians	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 particularities	 of	 the	Chinese	revolution	conveyed	political	nuances	 that	were	expressed	by	 influential	persons	 in	 the	 CCP.10	 Much	more	 research	 on	 Chinese	 historiography,	 however,																																																									9	 Arif	Dirlik,	Revolution	and	History:	Origins	of	Marxist	Historiography	of	China	1919-1937.	Berkeley,	CA:	University	of	California	Press,	1978.	10	 Luo	 Meijun	 羅梅君	 (Mechthild	 Leutner),	 translated	 by	 Sun	 Lixin	 孫立新,	 Zhengzhi	 yu	 kexue	
zhijian	de	lishi	bianzuan:	30	he	40	niandai	Zhongguo	Makesi	zhuyi	lishixue	de	xingcheng	 政治與科學
之間的歷史編纂：30	 和 40 年代中國馬克思主義歷史學的形成	 (Historiography	 between	 politics	and	 science:	 the	 formation	 of	 Chinese	 Marxist	 historiography	 in	 the	 1930s	 and	 1940s).	 Jinan:	Shandong	 jiaoyu	 chubanshe	 山東教育出版社 ,	 1997.	 The	 German	 version	 of	 this	 book	 is:	
Geschichtsschreibung	 zwischen	 Politik	 und	 Wissenschaft:	 Zur	 Herausbildung	 der	 chinesischen	
marxistischen	Geschichtswissenschaft	in	den	30er	und	40er	Jahren.	Wiesbaden:	Harrassowitz,	1982.	 	 	
	6	has	 focused	 on	 the	 period	 after	 1949,	 when	 the	 Marxist	 paradigm	 claimed	 the	dominant	position	as	the	Communist	Party	assumed	national	power.	 	
	 	 Historiography	in	Mao’s	China		 	 From	the	1960s	to	 the	early	1980s,	a	number	of	authors	wrote	on	the	topic	of	historiography	 in	 communist	 China.11	 Focusing	 on	 certain	 top	 historians’	 work	during	 the	 new	 regime,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 historical	 curricula,	 scholars	 writing	 in	English,	German	and	Japanese	examined	the	historiography	of	various	significant	events	 in	 Chinese	 history,	 such	 as	 the	 Xinhai	 Revolution	 (1911),12 	 and	 the	December	9	Movement	(1935),13	 as	well	as	some	essential	historical	issues,	such	as	 peasant	 rebellions,14	 and	 the	 origins	 and	 founding	 of	 the	 Chinese	 empire.15	Although	 each	 of	 these	 studies	 focused	 only	 on	 one	 aspect	 of	 Chinese	historiography,	 together	 they	 present	 a	much	more	 comprehensive	 landscape	 of	how	the	Marxist	regime	rewrote	history.		 	 Western	 scholars	 have	 placed	 a	 major	 emphasis	 on	 the	 influence	 of	 Marxist	thought	on	historical	research	and	writing,	but	later	found	that	historical	writings	in	China	deviated	gradually	from	Marxist	theories,	and	that	Mao	Zedong	Thought	had	become	increasingly	influential	in	the	practice	of	rewriting	Chinese	history.16	As	 James	 Harrison	 wrote	 in	 the	 1960s,	 at	 the	 time,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 PRC’s	historical	 profession	 was	 writing	 history	 “in	 a	 way	 which	 accords	 with	 current	Chinese	 pronouncements	 but	 very	 little	 with	 traditional	 Marxist	 views	 of	 the	
																																																								11	 When	 Franklin	 Parker	 in	 1986	 annotated	 books	 and	 journals	 articles	 that	 had	 examined	 the	writing	 and	 teaching	 of	 history	 in	 China	 since	 1949,	 78	 pieces	 of	 works	 in	 total	 were	 included.	Franklin	 Parker,	 “Historiography	 in	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China:	 Annotated	 Bibliography	(Historians,	History	Teaching,	History	Writing)”,	1986.	 	http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED269307.pdf	 (last	 visited	 on	November	 7,	 2015).	 Several	works	edited	 by	 Albert	 Feuerwerker	 and	 others	 contain	 articles	 illustrating	 the	 interplay	 between	ideology	 and	 the	 rewriting	 of	 Chinese	 history.	 For	 example:	 Albert	 Feuerwerker	 and	 S.	 Cheng,	
Chinese	 Communist	 Studies	 of	 Modern	 Chinese	 History.	 Harvard	 University	 Press,	 1963.	 Albert	Feuerwerker	et	al.,	Approaches	to	Modern	Chinese	History.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1967.	Albert	Feuerwerker,	History	in	Communist	China.	M.I.T.	Press,	1969.	 	12	 Winston	Hsieh,	Chinese	Historiography	on	the	Revolution	of	1911:	A	Critical	Survey	and	a	Selected	
Bibliography .	Hoover	 Institution	Press,	Stanford	University,	1975 .	  	Edmund	S.	K.	Fung,	 “Post-1949	Chinese	 Historiography	 on	 the	 1911	 Revolution”,	Modern	 China,	 Vol.	 4,	 No.	 2	 (April	 1978),	 pp.	181-214.	13	 John	Israel,	"The	December	9th	Movement:	A	Case	Study	in	Chinese	Communist	Historiography",	
The	China	Quarterly,	Vol.	23	(July-	September	1965),	pp.	140-69.	14	 James	P.	Harrison,	The	Communists	and	Chinese	Peasant	Rebellions:	A	Study	 in	 the	Rewriting	of	
Chinese	 History.	 New	 York:	 Atheneum,	 1968.	 James	 P.	 Harrison,	 “Chinese	 Communist	Interpretations	of	the	Chinese	Peasant	Wars”,	in	Albert	Feuerwerker,	ed.,	1969,	pp.	189-215.	15	 A.	 F.	 P.	 Hulsewé,	 “Chinese	 Communist	 Treatment	 of	 the	 Origins	 and	 the	 Foundation	 of	 the	Chinese	Empire”,	The	China	Quarterly,	Vol.	23	(September	1965),	pp.	78-105.	 	16	 In	the	author’s	opinion,	Party	history	is	the	field	that	has	been	most	seriously	influenced	by	Maoism.	This	point	will	be	discussed	in	the	Conclusion	section.	
	 7	subject.”17	 Consequently,	 since	 the	 1970s,	 more	 emphasis	 has	 been	 placed	 on	exploring	 the	 correlation	 between	 scholarship	 in	 Chinese	 history	 and	 shifts	 in	political	policy,	 in	order	to	determine	how	scholars’	motivations	in	narrating	and	explaining	 Chinese	 history	 derived	 from	 the	 urgent	 needs	 in	 domestic	 and	international	 politics	 of	 the	 time.	 The	 enthusiasm	 for	 research	 on	 Chinese	historiography	 from	 this	 perspective	 was	 stimulated	 further	 by	 Mao’s	 famous	axiom	“use	the	past	to	serve	the	present”	(guwei	jinyong	 古為今用).18	 In	Jonathan	Unger’s	1993	collection	of	the	same	title,	the	politically	contentious	historiography	of	the	PRC	was	illustrated	through	case	studies.19		 	 Western	 scholars	 have	 done	 much	 to	 reveal	 the	 experiences	 of	 the	 Mao-era	historians	 who	 produced	 these	 historical	 writings,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 analyze	 the	political	context	in	which	they	conducted	their	work.	In	the	1960s,	some	believed	generally	that	Chinese	historians	lived	under	a	reign	of	terror	and	were	forbidden	to	think,	work,	or	write	freely.20	 This	observation,	however,	was	little	more	than	a	lament	 for	 their	 counterparts	 in	 a	 totalitarian	 state.	 Some	 scholars	 believe	 that	intellectuals	in	Maoist	China	were	highly	dependent	on	patron-client	relationships.	In	 this	relationship,	Party	 leaders	acted	as	patrons,	while	 intellectuals	responded	to	leaders’	demands	and	acted	as	their	clients.	In	the	early	1980s,	Merle	Goldman	divided	Chinese	intellectuals	of	the	Mao	era	into	“liberal	intellectuals”	and	“radical	intellectuals,”	with	historians	Jian	Bozan	 翦伯贊	 (1898-1968),	and	Wu	Han	 吳晗	(1909-1969)	 among	 the	 first	 group,	 while	 Qi	 Benyu	 戚本禹	 (1931-	 )	 and	 the	writing	 teams	during	 the	Cultural	Revolution	were	placed	 in	 the	second	group.21	Goldman	 noted	 this	 distinction	 among	 Chinese	 historians,	 but	 her	 approach	 in	characterizing	 the	 cooperation	 and	 tension	 between	 politics	 and	 academia	 as	 a	simple	 patron-client	 relationship	 is	 questionable.	 A	 seemingly	 compromised,	 but	more	 convincing,	 viewpoint	 about	 historians	 in	 Maoist	 China	 was	 favored	 only																																																									17	 Harrison,	1968,	pp.	214.	18	 For	more	 information	about	 the	origin	of	 the	adaptation	of	 this	phrase	 to	 the	study	of	history,	see	Geremie	Barmé,	“Using	the	Past	to	Save	the	Present:	Dai	Qing’s	Historiographical	Dissent”,	East	
Asian	History,	Vol.	1	(June	1991),	pp.	141-181.	For	Chinese	scholars’	explanation	of	this	phrase,	see	Li	Shu	 黎澍,	“Zhengque	lijie	 ‘gu	wei	jin	yong’	 正確理解‘古為今用’”	(The	correct	interpretation	of	 ‘using	 the	past	 to	 serve	 the	present’),	 in	Zaisi	 ji	 再思集	 (Essays	on	 rethinking	 things).	Beijing:	Zhongguo	shehui	kexue	chubanshe	 中國社會科學出版社,	1985,	pp.	34-37.	 	19 	 Jonathan	 Unger	 ed.,	 Using	 the	 Past	 to	 Serve	 the	 Present:	 Historiography	 and	 Politics	 in	
Contemporary	China.	Armonk,	N.	Y.:	M.	E.	Sharpe,	1993.	 	20	 Shee	Sung,	“The	Study	of	History	in	Communist	China”,	Chinese	Culture,	Vol.	X,	No.	4	(December	1969),	pp.	15-51.	21	 Merle	Goldman,	China’s	 Intellectuals,	 Advise	 and	Dissent.	 Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press,	1981.	
	8	after	 the	 1990s;	 that	 is,	 the	 co-existence	 of	 an	 “academic	 interest	 in	 objectively	recasting	 the	 past”	 and	 “political	 inclinations	 that	 tended	 to	 twist	 their	interpretations.”22	
	 	 Historiography	in	Post-Mao	China		 	 After	1978,	notable	changes	appeared	in	the	field	of	history,	especially	modern	Chinese	 history.	 Thus,	 comparisons	 between	post-Mao	 interpretations	 and	 those	created	during	the	Mao	era,	and	efforts	to	explain	those	changes	in	the	context	of	political	and	social	transformation	became	a	popular	subject	of	research.	There	are	four	important	changes	that	scholars	have	emphasized.		 	 First,	 and	 essentially,	 scholars	 noted	 that	 professional	 historians	 in	 China	 had	moved	 from	 Marxist	 theoretical	 positions	 towards	 more	 empirical	 and	 textual	work.	Li	Huaiyin’s	research	explored	the	competition	between	the	“revolutionary	paradigm”	and	 the	 “modernization	paradigm”	of	Chinese	modern	history	 studies	and	claimed	that	the	latter	had	overtaken	the	former.23		 	 Second,	 concerning	 research	 subjects,	 scholars	 pointed	 out	 that	 some	 events	that	had	scarcely	been	studied	in	the	Mao	era	became	popular	in	the	post-Mao	era.	The	Nanjing	Massacre	is	an	example.24	 		 	 Third,	 scholars	 noted	 that	 the	 Party’s	 position	 as	 the	 sole	 dispenser	 and	interpreter	 of	 historical	 wisdom	 was	 undermined,	 as	 more	 and	 more	 unofficial	narratives,	 in	the	forms	of	oral	history,	historical	 investigative	 journalism,	and	so	forth,	became	popular	among	Chinese	readers.25		 	 Fourth,	and	related	to	the	above	three	points,	some	scholars	claimed	that	“there	is	no	longer	a	CCP-designed	master	narrative	of	modern	Chinese	history,”	i.e.,	the	CCP	had	lost	its	control	over	historiography.26	
	 	 Party	Historiography		 	 A	survey	of	previous	studies	shows	 that	 there	was	a	sustained	 interest	 in,	and	literature	 on,	 Chinese	 historiography	 throughout	 the	 Mao	 and	 post-Mao	 eras.																																																									22	 Li	Huaiyin,	Reinventing	Modern	China:	Imagination	and	Authenticity	in	Chinese	Historical	Writing.	Honolulu:	University	of	Hawaii	Press,	2012,	pp.	3.	 	23	 Li	Huaiyin,	2012.	Li	Huaiyin,	“From	Revolution	to	Modernization:	The	Paradigmatic	Transition	in	Chinese	Historiography	 in	 the	Reform	Era”,	History	 and	Theory,	 No.	 49	 (October	 2010),	pp.	 336–360.	24	 Mark	Eykholt,	“Aggression,	Victimization,	and	Chinese	Historiography	of	the	Nanjing	Massacre”,	in	Joshua	A.	Fogel	ed.,	The	Nanjing	Massacre	in	History	and	Historiography.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2000,	pp.	11-69.	25	 Geremie	Barmé	contributed	a	detailed	case	study	on	unofficial	historiography:	“Using	the	Party	to	Save	the	Present:	Dai	Qing’s	Historiographical	Dissent”,	1991.	26	 Susanne	 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik,	 “In	 Search	 of	 a	 Master	 Narrative	 for	 20th	 Century	 Chinese	History,”	The	China	Quarterly,	Vol.	188	(December	2006),	pp.	1070-1091.	
	 9	Regrettably,	and	surprisingly,	however,	research	on	Party	historiography	is	sparse,	if	not	rare.	 		 	 In	 the	 early	 1980s,	 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik	 wrote	 the	 only	 paper	 to	 date	 that	focused	 on	 Party	 historiography,	 and	 provided	 a	 detailed	 exploration	 of	 the	organization	 of	 Party	 historiography	 in	 the	 early	 post-Mao	 period. 27 	 This	insightful	paper,	however,	is	some	thirty	years	old,	and	its	value	has	diminished	as	a	 result.	 Although	 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik	 has	 been	 committed	 to	 Chinese	historiography	 since	 the	 early	 1980s,	 she	 did	 not	 conduct	 further	 research	 on	Party	 historiography.	 In	 addition	 to	 her	 paper,	 some	 existing	 research	 on	 the	Chinese	 historiography	 of	 the	 post-Mao	 period	 also	 involves	 Chinese	 historians,	official	 agencies,	 or	 writers’	 narratives	 and	 assessments	 of	 post-1949	 Party	history.28	 In	 contrast,	 little	 research	 has	 addressed	 the	ways	 in	which	 pre-1949	Party	 history	was	written.29	 With	 respect	 to	 Chinese	 scholars’	 research	 of	 Party	historiography,	there	have	been	no	in-depth	studies	until	recent	years.30																																																									27	 Susanne	Weigelin-Schwiedrzik,	“Party	Historiography”,	in	Jonathan	Unger,	ed.,	Using	the	Past	to	
Serve	 the	 Present.	 Armonk,	 N.	 Y.:	 M.	 E.	 Sharpe,	 1993,	 pp.	 151-173.	 This	 paper	 was	 a	 part	 of	Weigelin-Schwiedrzik’s	PhD	thesis,	which	was	written	in	German.	 	28	 For	 example,	 since	 the	 early	 2000s,	 some	 scholars	 started	 to	 examine	 the	 writings	 and	narratives	about	the	Great	Famine,	China’s	 labor	camps,	the	Cultural	Revolution,	etc.	These	topics	can	be	considered	as	part	of	Party	history	in	a	broader	sense.	These	studies	not	only	focused	on	CCP	leaders	and	professional	historians,	but	also	paid	attention	 to	grassroots-level	historical	writings.	Klaus	Mühlhahn,	 “‘Remembering	a	Bitter	Past’:	The	Trauma	of	China’s	Labor	Camps,	1949-1978”,	
History	and	Memory,	Vol.	16,	No.	2	(Fall/Winter	2004),	pp.	104-139.	Susanne	Weigelin-Schwiedrzik,	“Trauma	 and	 Memory:	 The	 Case	 of	 the	 Great	 Famine	 in	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China	(1958-1961)”,	 in	Historiography	East	and	West.	Leiden:	Brill,	2003,	pp.	39-67.	Guo	Wu,	 “Recalling	Bitterness:	Historiography,	Memory,	and	Myth	 in	Maoist	China”,	Twentieth-Century	China,	Vol.	39,	No.	3	(October	2014),	pp.	245-268.	29	 The	 previously	 mentioned	 research	 about	 Dai	 Qing	 by	 Geremie	 Barmé	 includes	 cultural	 and	intellectual	purges	in	the	1940s.	Both	David	Holm	and	Ishikawa	Yoshihiro	studied	the	case	of	novel	
Liu	Zhidan,	the	key	issue	of	which	was	the	history	of	the	Northwest	Revolution	Region	in	the	1930s.	Their	 studies	 concern	 how	 the	 Party’s	 pre-1949	 history	was	written	 and	 rewritten.	David	Holm,	“The	Strange	Case	of	Liu	Zhidan”,	The	Australian	Journal	of	Chinese	Affairs,	No.	27	(January	1992),	pp.	77-96.	Ishikawa	Yoshihiro	 石川禎浩,	"Shōsetsu	'Ryū	Shidan'	jiken	no	rekishiteki	haikei"	“小説
『劉志丹』事件の歴史的背景”	(The	issue	of	the	novel	Liu	Zhidan	and	its	historical	background),	in	Ishikawa	 Yoshihiro,	 ed.,	 Chūgoku	 shakaishugi	 bunka	 no	 kenkyū	 中国社会主義文化の研究	(Research	 on	 socialist	 culture	 in	 China).	 Kyoto:	 Institutes	 for	 Research	 in	 Humanities	 of	 Kyoto	University,	2010,	pp.	153-214.	 	30	 In	 China,	 the	 most	 authoritative	 work	 about	 Party	 historiography	 is	 a	 monograph	 that	 was	published	in	1990,	written	by	Zhang	Jingru	 張靜如	 and	Tang	Manzhen	 唐曼珍,	two	scholars	at	the	Beijing	Normal	University.	(Zhongguo	dangshi	xue	shi	 中共黨史學史	 Party	Historiography.	Beijing:	Zhongguo	renmin	daxue	chubanshe	 中國人民大學出版社,	1990.)	 	 This	book	should	be	considered	as	an	official	piece	of	research	on	Party	historiography,	because	 it	 focuses	on	the	development	of	official	Party	History	and	the	contribution	of	Party	leaders	of	different	generations	to	it.	In	the	past	ten	 years,	 some	 Chinese	 scholars	 have	 started	 researching	 Party	 historiography	 from	 new	perspectives.	Wu	Zhijun	 吳志軍	 (The	Central	Party	History	Research	Office)	and	Geng	Huamin	 耿
化敏	 (School	of	Marxism	Studies	at	Renmin	University	of	China)	are	two	representatives.	Wu	has	published	 three	 papers	 on	 Party	 historiography	 of	 the	 period	 immediately	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	Cultural	Revolution.	Geng	wrote	a	biography	for	one	of	the	prominent	Party	historians	in	the	Mao	
	10		 	 Why	have	Western	scholars	 invested	great	effort	 in	exploring	many	aspects	of	Chinese	 historiography,	 but	 ignored	 Party	 historiography?	 The	 most	 obvious	reason	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 resources.	 During	 the	 years	 when	 foreign	 scholars	 were	limited	severely	by	travel	and	research	restrictions,	and	had	to	rely	on	Hong	Kong	refugees	and	scattered	documentary	sources	to	research	Mainland	China	and	the	CCP,	 it	 was	 almost	 unimaginable	 to	 make	 a	 detailed	 examination	 of	 the	 way	 in	which	 the	Party	wrote	History.	Only	 after	1978	did	 it	 become	possible	 to	 access	relevant	 materials,	 and	 interviews	 with	 Party	 historians,	 such	 as	 those	 that	Weigelin-Schwiedrzik	used	 in	 the	early	1980s.	The	second,	and	more	substantial	reason,	 is	that	Party	historiography	has	been	readily	dismissed	as	 lies	because	of	its	obvious	political	intentions	and	ongoing	entanglement	in	politics.	 		 	 In	 recent	 years,	 as	 many	 new	materials	 have	 been	 released,	 some	 previously	inaccessible	aspects	of	Party	history	are	now	ready	to	be	explored,	as	is	the	issue	of	how	official	Party	History	was	written.	Access	to	officials	and	historians	also	is	not	as	difficult	as	it	was	decades	ago.	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	potential	to	overemphasize	the	close	relationship	between	Party	historiography	and	politics	is	a	more	 serious	 limitation	 that	 prevents	 scholars	 from	 delving	 deeper	 into	 Party	historiography.	 If	we	deem	the	Party’s	past	to	be	a	malleable	resource	that	could	be	 manipulated	 rather	 freely	 by	 Party	 leaders	 for	 political	 purposes,	 then	 it	 is	natural	 to	 focus	 on	 Party	 elites	 and	 overlook	 other	 groups	 of	 people	 who	 also	played	 roles	 in	 writing	 Party	 history.	 It	 is	 also	 natural	 to	 interpret	historiographical	 phenomena	 merely	 as	 “serving	 the	 legitimacy”	 of	 the	 Party.31	Such	 an	 overemphasis	 on	 political	 exigency	 is	 dubious,	 because	 it	 alone	 can	scarcely	capture	the	complexity	of	the	issue.	 		 	 To	summarize,	Party	historiography	is	a	serious	blind	spot	in	our	understanding																																																																																																																																																																			Era,	 He	 Ganzhi,	 relying	 on	 internal	 archives	 and	 interviews.	 These	 works	 indicate	 that	 Chinese	scholars	 have	 started	 looking	 at	 Party	 historiography	 from	 other	 perspectives	 than	 the	 Party	leadership.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 above-mentioned	 works	 on	 Party	 historiography,	 there	 are	 also	several	remarkable	works	on	Party	history	that	emerged	in	recent	years.	Some	of	them	have	been	included	in	Bibliography	of	this	thesis.	31	 Since	the	1950s,	it	has	been	common	to	attribute	the	motivation	for	writing	historical	narratives	created	by	the	Communist	regime	as	serving	to	shore	up	the	legitimacy	of	the	Communist	Party.	A	recent	 example	 is	 Diana	 Lary’s	 paper	 “The	 Uses	 of	 the	 Past:	 History	 and	 Legitimacy”	 (in	 André	Laliberté	 and	 Marc	 Lanteigne,	 eds.,	 Chinese	 Party-state	 in	 the	 21st	 Century:	 Adaptation	 and	 the	
Reinvention	 of	 Legitimacy.	 OX:	 Routledge,	 2008,	 pp.	 130-145.),	 which	 attributes	many	 aspects	 of	historiography	 in	contemporary	China,	 from	the	revival	of	Confucius	 to	 the	official	History	of	 the	Qing	dynasty,	from	historical	programs	about	Han	Wudi	 漢武帝	 (BC.157-87)	to	the	symbolization	of	 Zheng	 Chenggong	 鄭成功 	 (1624-1662),	 to	 the	 Chinese	 authorities’	 pursuit	 of	 legitimacy.	Although	 it	 is	undeniable	 that	nowadays	 the	exploration	of	 the	relationship	between	History	and	legitimacy	is	still	valuable,	it	is	not	prudent	to	attribute	historiography	to	such	a	single	motivation.	
	 11	of	the	history	of	the	CCP	and	modern	Chinese	politics.	It	requires	research	from	a	broader	perspective,	other	than	that	of	establishing	a	relationship	between	certain	historical	 narratives	 and	 political	 needs	 during	 a	 certain	 period.	 Of	 the	 many	possible	ways	to	fill	this	gap,	a	feasible	and	sufficient	method	is	to	examine	Party	historiography	through	case	studies.	 		 	 The	 issue	of	 the	Western	Route	Army	(WRA:	Xilujun	 西路軍)	 is	one	of	 the	 few	historical	cases	that	allows	a	more	nuanced	and	better-informed	understanding	of	Party	 historiography.	 As	 this	 thesis	 is	 designed	 to	 investigate	 the	 Party	historiography	of	different	periods	since	the	late	1930s,	it	is	necessary	to	choose	as	its	major	 subject	 a	 historical	 issue	 that	 occurred	 before	 the	 Yan’an	 Rectification	Campaign—the	campaign	that	led	to	the	first	official	document	about	Party	history.	Although	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 historical	 issues	 that	 have	 been	 rewritten	 and	reassessed	after	 the	Yan’an	period,	only	a	 few	remain	attractive	 to	both	scholars	and	ordinary	audiences	 in	 today’s	China.	 The	 construction	and	 reconstruction	of	the	WRA’s	 history	 covers	 a	 long	 period	 from	 the	 late	 1930s	 to	 the	 present,	 and	sustained	attention	to	 this	historical	 issue	continues.	Further,	contributors	 to	 the	WRA’s	History	 include	Party	 leaders,	 senior	 cadres,	 ordinary	 commanders,	Party	historians,	 and	nonprofessional	writers.	Due	 to	 the	 complexity	of	 the	 case	of	 the	WRA,	and	the	length	of	time	over	which	its	history	stretched,	some	parts	of	its	case	are	 representative	 of	 aspects	 of	 other	 historical	 cases.	 The	 case	 of	 the	WRA	 has	allowed	us	 to	explore	 the	writing	of	Party	history	 in	different	periods	during	 the	past	eighty	years,	 and	examine	 the	various	groups	of	people	who	participated	 in	writing	 it.	 The	 historiographical	 significance	 of	 the	 case	 of	 the	WRA	 is,	 after	 all,	rooted	in	its	important	position	in	the	CCP’s	history.	Just	like	the	Long	March	and	the	Xi’an	Incident,	two	historical	events	that	revolved	around	the	operations	of	the	WRA,	the	failure	of	the	WRA	was	also	one	of	the	pivotal	points	in	the	CCP’s	history,	and	it	was	crucial	in	Mao’s	route	to	the	highest	level	of	leadership.	Therefore,	the	important	position	of	the	WRA	in	history	and	historiography	has	made	it	the	best	candidate	through	which	to	study	Party	historiography.32																																																									32	 In	a	list	of	the	most	popular	topics	in	Party	history	made	by	Han	Gang,	professor	at	the	Eastern	China	 Normal	 University,	 among	 the	 twenty	 topics	 listed,	 there	 are	 only	 five	 that	 belong	 to	 the	pre-1949	 category,	 one	 of	 which	 is	 the	 Yan’an	 Rectification	 Campaign	 itself.	 Issues	 such	 as	eliminating	 counterrevolutionaries	 in	 the	Central	 Soviet	Region,	 the	 secret	 cable	during	 the	Long	March,	 and	 the	 Northwest	 Revolutionary	 Base,	 also	 are	 candidates	 for	 case	 studies	 of	 Party	historiography.	These	issues,	however,	are	not	as	good	as	is	the	case	of	the	WRA,	because	although	they	 remain	 controversial,	 they	 have	 not	 been	 used	 as	 propaganda	 or	 as	 subjects	 of	commemoration.	Those	other	cases	that	have	been	propagandized	intensively	in	recent	years,	such	
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The	Western	Route	Army	as	a	Case	Study	 		 	 This	thesis	examines	the	construction	of	the	official	narratives	of	the	WRA	in	the	Mao	era,	as	well	as	the	various	ways	in	which	it	was	narrated	and	commemorated	subsequently.		 	 The	WRA	was	a	branch	of	the	CCP’s	Chinese	Red	Army	of	Workers	and	Peasants	(Zhongguo	 gongnong	 hongjun	 中國工農紅軍,	 or	 in	 short,	Hongjun	 紅軍).	 It	 was	established	officially	in	November	1936,	one	month	after	the	reunion	of	the	three	front	 armies	 (the	 First,	 Second,	 and	 Fourth	 Front	 Armies)	 in	 Gansu	 province	following	 the	 Long	March	 (1934-1936).	 The	22,000	 troops	 in	 the	WRA	marched	west	 along	 the	 Hexi	 Corridor	 in	 Gansu,	 fighting	 with	 local	 Muslim	warlords.	 By	April	 1937,	 more	 than	 15,000	 troops	 had	 been	 killed	 or	 captured;	 only	 400	soldiers	 finally	 arrived	 at	 their	 Xinjiang	 destination.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 loss	 of	personnel,	the	WRA	was	one	of	the	most	serious	military	defeats	in	the	history	of	the	CCP.	 		 	 From	 the	 CCP’s	 perspective,	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 WRA	 and	 its	 march	 to	Xinjiang	 was	 a	 significant	 military	 activity	 that	 resulted	 not	 only	 from	 power	struggles	 within	 the	 Party,	 but	 also	 from	 a	 series	 of	 complicated	 relationships	between	 the	 CCP	 and	 its	 allies,	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 Zhang	 Xueliang	 張學良	(1901-2001),	 as	 well	 as	 between	 the	 CCP	 and	 its	 enemy,	 the	 Nationalist	 Party	(Kuomintang).	 		 	 Equally	complicated	is	the	way	in	which	the	Party	wrote	and	rewrote	the	history	of	 the	WRA	over	 the	 following	 eighty	 years.	 From	1937	 to	 the	 early	1940s,	Mao	and	 his	 supporters	 succeeded	 in	 making	 all	 cadres	 and	 soldiers	 accept	 the	following	extremely	simplified	story.	The	WRA	was	established	according	to	Zhang	Guotao’s	 張國燾	 (1897-1979)	 personal	 orders	 rather	 than	 the	 Party	 Center’s	directive;	the	22,000	troops	crossed	the	Yellow	River	to	build	a	new	revolutionary	base	 for	 Zhang	 in	 Gansu;	 the	 WRA	 was	 defeated	 because	 it	 carried	 out	 an	erroneous	political	line,	the	“Zhang	Guotao	Line.”	After	1949,	although	the	history	of	 the	WRA	was	 included	 in	 official	 Party	 History,	 historians	 were	 forbidden	 to	research	 the	 topic.	 Due	 to	 the	 extreme	 ambiguity	 and	 simplification	 of	 official	narratives,	 few	 ordinary	 Chinese	 had	 knowledge	 of	 this	 issue.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																		as	the	Long	March,	are	not	as	controversial	as	is	the	case	of	the	WRA.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	the	WRA	has	been	chosen	to	be	the	case	of	this	thesis.	
	 13	issue	of	the	WRA	was	a	“black	hole”	in	official	Party	History.33	 In	the	early	1980s,	there	 emerged	 within	 the	 Party	 leadership	 another	 interpretation	 of	 the	 WRA,	according	 to	 which	 it	 had	 carried	 out	 Mao’s	 directions,	 and	 the	 purpose	 of	 its	activity	was	 to	 secure	military	 assistance	 from	 the	 Soviet	Union.	The	debates	on	this	historical	issue	continue	to	be	intense.	 	 		 	 Existing	English	Literature	about	the	WRA		 	 Before	explaining	the	significance	and	feasibility	of	this	project,	it	is	necessary	to	review	the	existing	English	literature	about	the	WRA.34	 Because	Chinese	literature	about	the	WRA	forms	the	material	that	will	be	analyzed	so	that	the	subject	of	this	thesis	 can	 be	 addressed,	 it	 is	 unnecessary	 to	 include	 Chinese	 literature	 in	 this	section.		 	 Among	the	branches	of	the	CCP’s	Red	Army,	the	First	Front	Army	(Diyi	fangmian	
jun	 第一方面軍,	 or	 the	 Central	 Red	 Army,	 Zhongyang	 hongjun	 中央紅軍)	 has	attracted	 the	most	 attention	 from	 historians,	 both	 foreign	 and	 domestic.	 On	 the	one	hand,	this	is	because	Mao	had	led	the	First	Front	Army	since	1935,	and	many	of	the	First	Front	Army	commanders	later	became	high-ranking	officials	in	the	PRC.	Thus,	 its	 history	 seems	 to	 be	 of	 more	 significance.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	imbalance	 in	 historians’	 attention	 also	 resulted	 from	 the	 CCP’s	 propaganda	strategies.	 Before	 1978,	 both	 the	 primary	materials	 that	 the	 Party	 had	 released,	and	 the	 Party’s	 propaganda	 about	 its	 revolutionary	 history,	 focused	 on	 the	 First	Front	 Army.	Hence,	 some	 researchers	who	were	 interested	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	(Disi	fangmianjun	 第四方面軍),	a	branch	of	the	Red	Army	from	which	most	of	 the	WRA	troops	came,	had	no	choice	but	 to	change	their	research	topics.35	 There	are	only	a	few	research	works	published	before	the	mid-1980s	that																																																									33	 As	 Geremie	 Barmé	 noted	 in	 his	 paper	 about	 Dai	 Qing,	 when	 scholars	 mentioned	 historical	lacunae	 created	 by	 shifts	 in	 policy	 and	 ideological	 struggles,	 they	 called	 them	 “black	 holes”	 or	“memory	holes”.	Vera	Tolz,	as	Barmé	cited	in	his	paper,	offers	the	following	summary	of	what	she	calls	“blank	spots”.	They	are:	1.	historical	events	that	are	never	written	about	in	the	Soviet	Union	or	are	mentioned	in	the	press	only	once	or	twice	without	any	details;	2.	events	that	are	treated	with	such	bias	that	the	facts	are	distorted;	and	3.	 important	historical	documents	whose	publication	is	proscribed.	(Geremie	Barmé,	1991,	pp.	141-181.)	34	 In	these	works	“Xilujun”	is	variously	translated	as	“the	Western	Legion”,	“the	West	Route	Army”	or	“the	Western	Route	Army”.	35	 Strictly	speaking,	three	separate	armies	were	part	of	the	Long	March,	which	lasted	from	1934	to	1936.	The	First	Front	Army	left	Jiangxi	Province	in	October	1934	and	reached	Shaanxi	Province	in	the	north-west	one	year	later.	Zhang	Guotao’s	Fourth	Front	Army	marched	from	Sichuan	to	join	the	First	Front	Army	on	the	Tibetan	border	in	1935.	A	year	later,	the	Second	Front	Army	under	He	Long	and	 Xiao	 Ke	 followed	 the	 same	 route	 as	 the	 First	 Front	 Army	 had,	 reaching	 Shaanxi	 in	 1936.	 It	should	be	pointed	out	 that	 scholarship	 in	English	also	omitted	 the	history	of	 the	WRA	 for	a	 long	time.	For	example,	 in	 the	most	popular	monograph	on	 the	CCP’s	history,	A	History	of	 the	Chinese	
	14	mentioned	 the	WRA.	Almost	 all	 of	 these	 accept	 that	 Zhang	 led	 the	 troops	 to	 the	other	side	of	the	Yellow	River	due	to	personal	ambition.36	 By	the	mid-1980s,	when	the	 new	 interpretation	 of	 the	 WRA	 emerged	 among	 Party	 leaders,	 the	 related	narratives	in	the	English-speaking	world	changed	as	a	consequence.	An	interesting	example	is	the	famous	book	published	by	Harrison	Salisbury,	The	Long	March:	the	
Untold	 Story.	 A	 year	 after	 Li	 Xiannian	 李先念	 (1909-1992)	 submitted	his	 report	about	the	WRA	to	the	Politburo	of	the	CCP,	Salisbury	interviewed	him	and	adopted	Li’s	 accounts	 about	 the	 WRA	 as	 his	 major	 resource	 to	 discuss	 this	 issue.37	Salisbury	 consequently	 became	 the	 first	 foreign	 channel	 through	 which	 Li	announced	the	new	interpretation	to	the	outside	world,	although	Salisbury	did	not	necessarily	know	that.38	 Following	the	argument	of	the	new	interpretation,	some	scholars	also	have	suggested	in	their	research	that	Mao	took	advantage	of	the	WRA	to	eliminate	Zhang’s	influence	within	the	Party.39		 	 Because	there	were	limited	channels	through	which	to	obtain	knowledge	about	the	history	of	the	CCP	from	the	1930s	to	the	1980s,	other	than	the	Party’s	official	organs,	it	was	quite	understandable	that	Western	scholars	and	writers	on	the	WRA	were,	to	a	great	degree,	influenced	by	Mao	Zedong’s	orthodox	interpretation	and	Li																																																																																																																																																																			
Communist	 Party	 1921-1949	 (Guillermaz,	 1968),	 the	 chapter	 on	 the	 Long	 March	 ends	 with	 the	Second	and	Fourth	Front	Armies	gathering	in	North	Shaanxi	(Shaanbei	 陝北)	in	October	1936	and	the	subject	of	the	next	chapter	is	the	Anti-Japanese	United	Front	(Kangri	tongyi	zhanxian	 抗日統一
戰線),	with	no	mention	of	the	WRA	at	all.	 	36	 For	instance,	Dick	Wilson	wrote:	“But	Chang	Kuo-tao	was	not	content	to	camp	in	Mao	Tse-tung’s	new	and	enlarged	compound.	He	decided	to	march	on,	still	set	on	his	old	plan	to	establish	a	soviet	base	 in	 the	 far	north-west,	 in	 or	near	 Sinkiang,	 in	 contact	with	his	Russian	 friends	 and	patrons.”	Dick	Wilson,	The	Long	March	1935:	the	Epic	of	Chinese	Communism’s	Survival.	New	York:	Penguin,	1982,	p.	242.	37	 Salisbury	interviewed	Li	Xiannian	on	June	15,	1984	and	cited	Li’s	following	accounts	in	his	book:	“This	 was	 a	 different	 case	 from	 the	 earlier	 efforts	 by	 Zhang	 to	 split	 the	 Red	 Army	 forces.	 The	crossing	was	 in	 conformity	with	 specific	orders	of	 the	Central	Committee.”	Harrison	E.	 Salisbury,	
The	Long	March:	The	Untold	Story.	New	York:	Harper	&	Row,	1985,	p.	319.	38	 There	are	also	some	non-academic	works	that	included	narratives	about	the	WRA.	For	example:	Sun	 Suyun,	 The	 Long	 March:	 The	 True	 History	 of	 Communist	 China’s	 Founding	 Myth.	 New	 York:	Doubleday,	 2006,	 pp.	 219-244.	 Among	 those	 English	 works	 about	 the	 Long	 March	 and	 the	 Red	Army,	 there	 are	 several	 books	 that	 concentrate	 on	 female	 commanders	 and	 soldiers.	 In	 the	following	three	most	popular	books	that	have	female	Red	Army	commanders	and	soldiers	as	their	subjects,	authors	paid	considerable	attention	to	female	figures	in	the	WRA:	(1)	Lily	Xiao	Hong	Lee	and	Sue	Wiles,	Women	of	the	Long	March:	the	Never	Before	Told	Story.	Sydney:	Allen	&	Unwin,	1999.	(2)	 Dean	 King,	 Unbound:	 A	 True	 Story	 of	 War,	 Love,	 and	 Survival.	 New	 York:	 Little,	 Brown	 and	Company,	2010.	(3)	Helen	Praeger	Young,	Choosing	Revolution:	Chinese	Women	Soldiers	on	the	Long	
March.	 Champaign:	 University	 of	 Illinois	 Press,	 2007.	 One	 of	 the	 three	 female	 Communists,	 on	whom	Lee	 and	Wiles’	 book	 is	 centered,	 is	 a	WRA	 commander,	Wang	Quanyuan.	 The	 suffering	 of	female	WRA	soldiers	is	a	new	theme	in	the	CCP’s	propaganda	of	the	WRA,	and	Wang	Quanyuan	is	a	typical	example	of	someone	who	has	been	frequently	praised	(see	Chapter	7).	39	 “After	the	Long	March,	Mao	saw	an	opportunity	to	solve	the	problems	between	his	and	Zhang’s	troops.”	Li	Xiaobing,	A	History	of	the	Modern	Chinese	Army.	Lexington:	University	of	Kentucky	Press,	2007,	p.	63.	
	 15	Xiannian’s	 new	 interpretation.	 Benjamin	 Yang’s	 1990	 book,	 however,	 is	 an	exception,	as	it	provides,	by	far,	the	most	detailed	and	precise	analysis	of	the	CCP’s	military	 operations	 and	 intraparty	 power	 struggles	 from	 1934	 to	 1937.	 Also	relying	on	materials	released	in	the	1980s,	most	of	which	were	in	favor	of	the	new	interpretation	of	 the	WRA,	Yang	pointed	out	wisely	that	 the	establishment	of	 the	WRA	“was	not	 just	a	conspiracy	Zhang	[Guotao]	 framed	in	Mao’s	 ignorance,”	and	neither	 did	 it	 result	 from	Mao’s	 idea	 of	 sacrificing	 Zhang’s	 troops.	 Instead,	 Yang	argued	that	the	WRA	was	a	result	of	the	selfish	objectives	of	both	men.40	 		 	 Concerning	 the	 CCP’s	 assessment	 of	 the	 WRA,	 Western	 writers	 also	 have	followed	 the	 popular	 explanation	 found	 in	 China,	 arguing	 that	 when	 Mao	controlled	everything,	 this	 subject	was	not	 a	matter	 for	discussion,	 and	 that	 it	 is	only	 since	 the	 1980s	 that	 “the	 truth	 is	 beginning	 to	 emerge.”41	 Searching	 in	Chinese	databases,	we	can	find	dozens	of	articles	about	the	historiography	of	the	WRA.	 The	 majority	 of	 these	 tell	 the	 same	 story:	 that	 the	 WRA	 had	 been	misinterpreted	 since	 1937,	 and	 was	 rehabilitated	 in	 the	 1980s.42	 These	 articles	did	not	examine	different	interpretations	of	the	WRA	critically,	nor	did	they	frame	the	issue	within	the	overarching	narrative	of	Party	historiography.		 	 This	 thesis	 will	 chart	 the	 history	 of	 the	 WRA,	 and	 then	 examine	 its	historiography	comprehensively	for	the	first	time.	The	goal	of	this	thesis,	however,	is	not	only	to	document	the	evolving	historical	evaluations	and	politicized	debates	about	the	WRA,	but	more	importantly,	by	examining	this	case	study,	to	show	how	Party	History	was	written.	 		 	 In	 the	past	eight	decades,	 the	history	of	 the	WRA	has	been	used	repeatedly	 to	support	 political	 positions.	 Some	 contributors	 to	 the	 historiography	 of	 the	WRA																																																									40	 Benjamin	 Yang,	 From	 Revolution	 to	 Politics:	 Chinese	 Communists	 on	 the	 Long	 March.	 Boulder:	Westview	Press,	1990,	pp.	228-237.	 	41	 Sun	Shuyun,	2006,	p.	220.	42	 A	 survey	 on	 Chinese	 literature	 database	 Zhongguo	 zhiwang	 中國知網	 (cnki.net)	 shows	 that	there	are	dozens	of	articles	about	the	rewriting	of	the	history	of	the	WRA	in	the	1980s.	There	is	also	a	Master	dissertation	on	this	topic:	Wang	Qiang	 王強,	“Zhonggong	lingdaoren	yu	Xilujun	wenti	de	boluan	fanzheng	 中共領導人與西路軍問題的撥亂反正”	(CCP	 leaders	and	the	rehabilitation	of	 the	WRA).	MA	Dissertation,	Tianjin	University,	2010.	By	comparing	these	articles	and	dissertation,	we	can	see	that	almost	all	the	narratives	about	the	rewriting	of	the	history	of	the	WRA	emerged	from	the	following	two	articles.	The	first	was	written	by	Cong	Jin,	a	researcher	who	personally	took	part	in	 rewriting	 the	 WRA’s	 history.	 The	 other	 was	 written	 by	 an	 editor	 of	 Beijing	 ribao	 北京日報	(Beijing	Daily),	who	once	 interviewed	some	of	 the	people	 involved	 in	rewriting	this	history.	Cong	Jin	 叢進,	 “Xilujun	wenti	de	tichu	he	jiejue	 西路軍問題的提出和解決”	(The	origin	and	resolving	of	the	 issue	of	WRA),	Yan-Huang	 chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	 2005(5),	 pp.	 28-31.	 Li	Qingying	 李慶英,	 “Hong	jun	 Xilujun	 lishi	 zhenxiang	 chengqing	 shimo	 紅軍西路軍歷史真相澄清始末”	 (The	whole	 story	 of	how	the	historical	truth	of	the	WRA	was	clarified),	Dangshi	wenyuan	 黨史文苑,	2005	(19),	pp.	4-11.	 	
	16	were	 high-ranking	 officials	 themselves.	 Therefore,	 a	 considerable	 portion	 of	 the	chapters	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	 devoted	 inevitably	 to	 explaining	 how	 historical	interpretations	were	related	to	the	power	struggle	of	political	 factions	within	the	CCP,	 and	 the	 Party	 leadership’s	 needs	 during	 particular	 periods.	 This	 thesis,	however,	 does	 not	 restrict	 itself	 to	 political	 elites,	 but	 investigates	 a	 variety	 of	contributors	 to	 Party	 historiography.	 In	 this	 way,	 it	 steps	 outside	 of	 the	perspective	 of	 understanding	 Party	 historiography	 by	 simply	 connecting	 it	 to	political	needs.	
Significance	 		 	 Clearly,	a	project	about	 the	writing	and	rewriting	of	 the	CCP’s	history	over	the	past	 eighty	 years	 will	 broaden	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 study	 of	 modern	 Chinese	historiography.	Moreover,	this	thesis	also	is	significant	for	other	reasons.		 	 Western	 scholars’	 main	 concerns	 about	 the	 CCP	 revolve	 around	 three	 basic	questions:	Why	was	the	CCP	able	to	take	power	in	1949?	Why	was	the	CCP	able	to	continue	 its	 rule	 after	 the	 legitimacy	 crisis	 of	 1989?	 What	 is	 the	 future	 of	 this	Communist	 Party?	 It	 is	 disingenuous	 to	 claim	 that	 research	 about	 Party	historiography	will	 help	 answer	 the	 above	 three	 questions	 clearly—no	 research	can.	 However,	 a	 project	 that	 explores	 the	 history	 of	 the	writing	 of	 Party	 history	helps	 us	 think	 deeply	 about	 these	 questions,	 because	 such	 a	 project	 not	 only	provides	 new	materials,	 but	 also	 offers	 new	 perspectives	 that	 will	 help	 readers	decipher	 some	 of	 the	 CCP’s	 mysteries	 and	 comprehend	 the	 past,	 present,	 and	future	of	this	party	more	clearly.		 	 By	exploring	one	of	the	least	examined	aspects	of	the	history	and	politics	of	the	CCP,	 Party	 historiography,	 this	 research	 will	 offer	 new	 perspectives	 on	 some	essential	 historical	 questions	 about	 this	 Marxist	 political	 party,	 such	 as	 the	emergence	 of	 “Mao	Zedong	Thought,”	 the	power	 struggles	 between	Mao	 and	his	rivals,	 and	 the	 ideological	 transformation	 under	 Deng	 Xiaoping’s	 鄧 小 平	(1904-1997)	 rule,	 in	 all	 of	which,	 the	writing	 of	 Party	 history	 played	 significant	roles.	In	short,	this	thesis	helps	explain	why	the	CCP	is	what	it	is	now.	Because	this	project	 examines	 historical	 studies	 by	 specialists	 in	 Party	 history—a	 group	 of	intellectuals	 about	 whom	 research	 is	 rare—it	 also	 will	 shed	 new	 light	 on	 the	relationship	 between	 intellectuals	 and	 the	 Party,	 one	 of	 the	 keys	 to	 our	understanding	of	the	politics	and	culture	of	modern	China.	 		 	 More	importantly,	this	research	also	helps	deepen	our	understanding	of	China’s	
	 17	politics	 in	recent	years.	This	point	can	be	explained	 from	two	perspectives.	First,	one	 of	 the	 greatest	 obstacles	 to	 China’s	 political	 reform	 lies	 in	 the	 Party	leadership’s	 hesitation	 to	 reassess	 its	 history	 and	 that	 of	 former	 leaders.	 Only	when	we	have	a	 thorough	understanding	of	 the	way	 in	which	Party	History	was	written	can	we	situate	the	current	leadership’s	concern	in	the	political	context	of	contemporary	China	and	capture	the	real	import	of	many	of	the	unique	statements	that	were	made.	In	this	way,	we	will	gain	a	better	understanding	of	the	prospects	for	China’s	political	reform.	Second,	after	1989,	the	CCP’s	control	over	ideology	has	become	quite	 confusing.	While	 the	 Chinese	word	 xuanchuan	 宣傳	 (propaganda)	has	 been	 considered	 widely	 to	 be	 synonymous	 with	 fabrication,	 the	 official	propaganda	 about	 the	 Party’s	 glorious	 past	 still	 holds	 considerable	 currency.	Further,	while	many	myths	about	Party	history	that	were	popular	in	the	Mao	era	now	have	been	challenged	seriously,	it	seems	that	the	Party	still	occupies	a	central	position	in	the	story	about	China’s	recent	past	that	the	majority	of	Chinese	people	accept.	These	contradictions	require	research	about	the	strategies	and	motivations	of	the	CCP’s	propaganda	in	recent	years.	Many	analysts	have	suggested	that	during	the	 post-Tiananmen	 period,	 the	 CCP	 drew	 on	 nationalism	 and	 patriotism	 as	 an	ideological	 replacement	 for	 communism	 in	 order	 to	 augment	 its	 support	 from	disaffected	 members	 of	 the	 population.	 The	 patriotic	 sentiment	 of	 the	 Chinese	people	 has	 become	 an	 increasingly	 important	 factor	 in	 China’s	 international	relations.43	 Another	concept	that	related	to,	and	sometimes	overlapped	with,	 the	idea	of	patriotism	is	that	of	“loving	the	Party”	(ai	Dang	 愛黨),	which	is	also	a	focus	of	 the	 Party’s	 education	 and	 propaganda,	 but	 can	 be	 easily	 ignored.	 Mining	 the	Party’s	 revolutionary	 past	 has	 been	 part	 of	 the	 Party	 leadership’s	 efforts	 to	promote	 patriotism	 and	 conduct	 ideological	 reeducation.	 By	 examining	 the	 real	process	of	the	creation	of	the	popular	interpretations	about	the	history	of	the	CCP,	this	 study	will	 enhance	our	understanding	of	China’s	 fascination	with	history,	 as	well	as	Chinese	people’s	attitudes	about	political	issues	and	foreign	affairs.	In	this	sense,	 the	 significance	 of	 this	 project	 goes	 beyond	 elite	 politics,	 because	 it	 also	helps	 explain	 some	 prominent	 aspects	 of	 social	 phenomena	 in	 contemporary	China.	
																																																								43	 Peter	Hays	Gries,	China’s	New	Nationalism:	Pride,	Politics,	and	Diplomacy.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	 Press,	 2004.	 Zheng	Yongnian,	 Discovering	 Chinese	Nationalism	 in	 China:	Modernization,	
Identity,	and	International	Relations.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999.	
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Sources	and	Outline	of	the	Thesis	 	
	 	 Sources		 	 The	nature	of	the	CCP’s	historiography	was	a	highly	secret	and	sensitive	matter	in	Mao’s	China.	This	characteristic	has	continued	into	the	post-Mao	era,	and	even	continues	 today,	because	narratives	 that	differ	 from	official	explanations	are	still	considered	 as	 challenges	 to	 the	 Party’s	 authority.	 The	 WRA	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	controversial	issues	in	the	history	of	the	CCP,	and	hence,	has	been	a	difficult	topic	to	research.	 		 	 To	collect	 the	necessary	materials,	 the	completion	of	 this	project	relied	 largely	on	three	channels.	First,	I	followed	the	same	route	as	the	WRA,	from	Jingyuan	 靖遠	to	 Anxi	 安西	 (now	 Guazhou	 瓜州)	 in	 Gansu,	 1,100	 kilometers	 along	 the	 Hexi	Corridor,44	 visiting	almost	all	of	the	counties	 in	which	the	WRA	was	stationed	or	fought	eighty	years	ago.	I	did	so	to	discover	as	much	as	I	could	about	the	realities	that	lay	behind	the	myths,	as	well	as	the	way	in	which	people	have	commemorated	this	 history.	 There	 are	 not	 many	 extant	 primary	 materials,	 but	 the	 internal	publications	produced	by	local	agencies	have	provided	valuable	help	in	conducting	this	research.	 		 	 Second,	 I	 was	 fortunate	 early	 in	 this	 project	 to	 build	 relationships	with	 some	important	 figures	 involved	 in	 rewriting	 the	 WRA’s	 history	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 I	managed	to	conduct	interviews	with	historians,	officials	at	different	levels,	and	the	families	of	some	of	the	WRA	commanders.	These	interviews	helped	me	trace	some	of	the	main	changes	in	Party	historiography	during	the	post-Mao	era	that	had	not	been	 described	 fully	 before	 in	 English	 language	 materials.	 Moreover,	 these	interviews	also	helped	me	target	the	key	problems	that	I	had	to	solve	in	this	thesis,	and	enabled	me	to	locate	other	sources	of	materials.	 		 	 I	used	both	primary	and	secondary	materials	intensively	in	this	thesis,	including	memoirs,	compilations	of	telegrams	and	documents	of	the	Party	and	the	Red	Army,	as	 well	 as	 previous	 research	 on	 Party	 history	 that	 was	 conducted	 by	 officials,	scholars,	 and	 writers	 of	 various	 periods.	 These	 materials	 not	 only	 provided	supplementary	sources	to	examine	the	issue	of	the	WRA,	but	also	helped	establish	a	foundation	on	which	to	understand	Party	historiography	thoroughly	during	both																																																									44	 Theoretically	speaking,	 the	WRA’s	route	 finished	 in	Xingxingxia	 星星峽	 in	Xinjiang,	about	230	km	northwestern	to	Guazhou.	Furthermore,	after	the	WRA	was	almost	destroyed	in	Nijiayingzi	 倪
家營子,	the	remainders	of	the	WRA	hid	in	the	Qilian	Mountains	for	a	couple	of	months.	As	a	result,	the	distance	that	the	WRA	marched	in	1936	and	1937	is	much	longer	than	that	of	my	route.	
	 19	the	Mao	and	post-Mao	eras.		 	 In	 summary,	 this	 thesis	 is	 based	 on	 a	 previously	 unexplored	 genre	 of	 internal	publications,	interviews	with	various	groups	of	people	who	have	been	involved	in	writing	 or	 propagandizing	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Party,	 on-site	 observations,	 and	detailed	secondary	source	research.	 	
	 	 Thesis	Outline		 	 This	thesis	 is	divided	into	two	sections:	 the	first	 three	chapters	 form	Part	One,	and	the	other	four	form	Part	Two.	These	two	parts	deal	with	the	historiography	of	WRA	in	the	Mao	and	post-Mao	eras,	respectively.		 	 The	subject	of	Chapter	1	 is	 the	history	of	 the	WRA.	The	 first	 reason	 to	 include	the	history	of	the	WRA	in	this	thesis	is	that	only	when	we	have	an	alternative	(and	factually	more	 objective)	 account	 can	we	 determine	what	 has	 been	 omitted	 and	what	 has	 been	 emphasized	 in	 official	 narratives.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	examine	 the	 history	 of	 the	WRA,	 because	 its	 evaluation	 began	while	 it	 was	 still	fighting	on	the	battlefield.	 		 	 Chapter	2	deals	with	 the	process	by	which	Mao’s	explanation	of	 the	WRA	was	accorded	 intra-Party	 consensus	 in	 the	 period	 from	 the	 late	 1930s	 to	 the	 early	1940s,	emphasizing	 the	role	 that	Party	history	played	 in	Mao’s	seizure	of	power,	and	analyzing	the	methods	he	used	to	achieve	that	goal.		 	 Chapter	3	delves	into	the	finalization	of	official	Party	History	in	the	1950s,	when	professional	 historians	 and	 Party	 theorists	 placed	 certain	 historical	 events,	including	that	of	the	WRA,	into	the	official	historical	framework.		 	 Chapter	4	explores	 the	rewriting	of	official	Party	History	after	1978,	analyzing	the	motivations	of	different	groups	of	people	who	were	involved	in	the	issue	of	the	WRA,	and	their	attitudes	on	this	issue.		 	 Chapter	5	examines	professional	historians’	research	on	the	history	of	 the	CCP	after	1976.	It	reveals	the	process	that	these	historians	underwent,	from	serving	the	Party	 leadership	 through	 solidarity,	 to	 finally	 splitting	 into	 two	 groups,	 one	 of	which	emphasized	that	Party	History	should	be	academic,	while	the	other	clung	to	the	view	that	Party	History	should	“serve	politics.”		 	 Chapter	 6	 addresses	 the	 debates	 about	 the	WRA	 in	 recent	 years,	 which	 took	place	among	some	nonprofessional	historians,	and	examines,	 through	this	case,	a	part	 of	 Party	 historiography	 previously	 unexplored—“quasi-official	 Party	historiography.”	This	chapter	then	attempts	to	explain	the	motivation	and	purpose	
	20	of	the	Party	leadership’s	criticism	of	“historical	nihilism.”	 	 		 	 Chapter	7	examines	the	ways	in	which	local	officials	and	the	populace	of	Gansu	have	narrated	and	 commemorated	 the	WRA	since	 the	 early	1980s.	By	 surveying	Party	 historiography	 at	 the	 local	 level,	 this	 chapter	 provides	 a	 different	 lens	through	which	to	understand	the	CCP’s	ideology.	
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Part	One:	The	Western	Route	Army	in	the	Mao	Era	
Chapter	1:	The	Western	Route	Army	in	the	History	of	the	CCP	
Introduction	This	 chapter	 is	 designed	 to	 reveal	 the	 entire	 course	 of	 the	 WRA,	 as	 well	 as	 to	analyze	its	mission	and	the	reasons	for	its	failure.	 		 	 The	WRA	was	 established	 in	November	1936.	However,	 there	 is	 an	 important	prelude	to	this—the	Party’s	split	in	1935.	For	this	reason,	the	time	spanned	in	this	chapter	is	from	June	1935,	when	the	Fourth	Front	Army	met	the	Party	Center	and	the	First	Front	Army	 in	 the	Tibetan	 inhabited	northwestern	Sichuan	 frontiers,	 to	April	 1937,	when	 the	 remnants	 of	 the	 defeated	WRA	 troops	 escaped	 from	 their	enemy’s	 territory	 and	 arrived	 at	 the	 Gansu-Xinjiang	 border.	 This	 chapter	 will	reveal	the	subtlety	of	the	power	relationship	between	the	Party	Center	controlled	by	 Mao	 Zedong,	 and	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 led	 by	 Zhang	 Guotao	 after	 their	separation	 in	 September	 1935.	 This	 complexity	 is	 absent	 in	 the	 Party’s	 official	historical	narratives.	Instead,	the	Party	indicated	simply	that	Zhang	split	with	the	Party	from	September	1935	to	June	1936,	and	then	surrendered	and	was	obedient	to	the	Party	Center	after	 June	1936.	As	this	chapter	will	argue,	during	the	period	concerned,	 both	Mao’s	 and	 Zhang’s	 camps	 considered	 each	 other	 to	 be	 useful	 in	various	ways,	and	cooperated	with	each	other	for	their	mutual	benefit.	The	WRA’s	establishment	 was	 due,	 largely,	 to	 this	 competitive,	 but	 nonetheless	 mutually	beneficial,	relationship.	The	foundation	of	their	cooperation,	however,	was	fragile.	Changing	situations	on	 the	battlefields	provided	both	sides	with	opportunities	 to	advance	 their	self-interests	at	 the	expense	of	 their	 intra-Party	rivals.	This	rivalry	had	a	negative	effect	on	communication	between	 the	WRA	and	 the	Party	Center,	and	 led	 to	 the	 WRA’s	 defeat	 in	 Gansu.	 This	 chapter	 will	 also	 reveal	 that	 the	competition	in	explaining	the	establishment,	goals,	and	later,	the	defeat	of	the	WRA,	was	an	 important	 factor	 that	affected	 the	relationship	between	 the	WRA	and	 the	Party	Center.	 		 	 In	 most	 cases,	 materials	 released	 by	 the	 CCP	 constitute	 the	 main	 source	 for	research	 on	 the	 Party’s	 history.	 However,	 as	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	 following	chapters,	 the	 authenticity	 of	 these	 materials	 is	 questionable.	 In	 using	 these	materials	 to	 study	 the	 WRA’s	 history,	 this	 chapter	 adopted	 two	 methods	 to	minimize	 the	 negative	 influence	 of	 the	 less-than-reliable	 materials.	 First,	 to	 the	
	22	extent	possible,	 the	chapter	employed	primary	materials.	Although	 it	 also	makes	several	 references	 to	 memoirs	 and	 other	 secondary	 sources,	 all	 of	 the	 key	conclusions	of	this	chapter	are	drawn	from	original	telegrams	released	by	the	CCP.	Second,	due	to	the	limitations	inherent	in	using	telegrams	as	a	primary	source	(this	point	will	 be	 detailed	 in	 Chapter	 4),	 this	 chapter	 avoids	 over-interpreting	 single	telegrams,	but	draws	discrete	conclusions	on	the	basis	of	an	understanding	of	the	contradictions	 between	 them.	 The	 two	 points	 above	 lend	 this	 chapter	 greater	fidelity	to	historical	reality	than	do	the	four	interpretations	that	will	be	introduced	in	the	following	chapters.	
1.1	The	Split	of	the	CCP	and	the	Red	Army	in	1935	and	1936	
1.1.1	Two	“Party	Centers”	 		 	 From	the	 late	1920s	 to	 the	early	1930s,	 the	CCP	and	 its	Red	Army	established	several	 revolutionary	bases	 (Soviet	 regions)	 that	were	 scattered	 in	mountainous	areas.	When	the	Party	Center	began	the	Long	March	in	October	1934,	thousands	of	miles	 separated	 the	 two	 most	 powerful	 branches	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Red	 Army	 of	Workers	 and	 Peasants.	 The	 First	 Front	 Army,	 composed	 of	 more	 than	 100,000	troops,	was	located	in	the	southeast	province	of	Jiangxi,	and	was	under	the	direct	authority	of	the	Party	Center.1	 The	Fourth	Front	Army,	consisting	of	some	80,000	troops,	had	left	its	Er-yu-wan	Revolutionary	Base	two	years	earlier	and	built	a	new	base	on	the	Sichuan-Shaanxi	border.2	 Zhang	Guotao	had	led	the	Er-yu-wan	Bureau	of	the	CCP	and	the	Er-yu-wan	Revolutionary	Military	Committee	since	1931,	when	the	Party	Center	dispatched	him	from	Shanghai	to	Hubei.	Although	Zhang’s	official	title	changed	several	times,	he	and	his	supporters	held	firm	control	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	for	five	years.3		 	 The	 Party	 Center	 and	 the	 First	 Front	 Army	 met	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 in																																																									1	 Junshi	kexue	yuan	junshi	 lishi	yanjiusuo	 軍事科學院軍事歷史研究所	 (Military	History	Institute	of	 PLA	Military	 Science	 Academy),	 ed.,	 Zhongguo	 renmin	 jiefangjun	 zhanshi	 中國人民解放軍戰史	(Military	history	of	the	PLA).	Beijing:	Junshi	kexue	chubanshe	 軍事科學出版社,	1987,	p.	243.	2	 Zhongguo	 gongnong	 hongjun	 disi	 fangmianjun	 zhanshi	 bianji	weiyuanhui	 中國工農紅軍第四方
面軍戰史編輯委員會,	Zhongguo	gongnong	hongjun	disi	 fangmianjun	zhanshi	 中國工農紅軍第四方
面軍戰史	 (Military	 history	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Red	 Army	 of	Workers	 and	Peasants,	hereafter	MHFF).	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	1989,	p.	262.	3 	 In	 the	 Sichuan-Shaanxi	 base,	 Zhang	 Guotao	 was	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Sichuan-Shaanxi	Revolutionary	 Military	 Committee	 and	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Sichuan-Shaanxi	 Soviet	 Region.	 The	Fourth	Front	Army	left	the	Sichuan-Shaanxi	Revolutionary	Base	in	March	1935.	On	May	18,	1935,	the	above	two	institutions	were	renamed	as	the	Northwest	Special	Zone	Committee	of	the	CCP	and	the	Northwest	Revolutionary	Military	Committee.	Zhang	Guotao	was	still	the	chairman	of	these	two	committees.	
	 23	Maogong	 懋功	 in	 Sichuan	 Province	 in	 June	 1935,	 after	 eight	 months’	 of	 fierce	fighting	 during	 the	 Long	March.	 Because	 the	 First	 Front	 Army	 had	 fewer	 troops	than	did	the	Fourth	at	the	time,4	 approximately	3,700	troops	were	transferred	to	the	First	Front	Army	 to	balance	 its	military	power.	Meanwhile,	 several	 cadres	of	the	 First	 Front	 Army	 were	 appointed	 as	 chiefs	 of	 staff	 or	 directors	 of	 political	departments	in	branches	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army.5	 In	early	August	1935,	the	Red	Army,	 which	 had	more	 than	 100,000	 troops,	 was	 divided	 into	 two	 groups—the	Right	and	 the	Left	Route	Army—and	proceeded	north	along	 two	different	routes	(Table	 1-1). 6 	 The	 Party	 Center	 was	 to	 march	 with	 the	 Right	 Route	 Army,	commanded	 by	 Xu	 Xiangqian	 徐向前	 (1901-1990)	 and	 Chen	 Changhao	 陳昌浩	(1906-1967),	Zhang’s	closest	colleagues	in	the	Fourth	Front	Army.7	 		 	 At	dawn	on	September	10,	1935,	when	the	Right	Route	Army	was	stationed	near	Baozuo	 包座,	the	Party	Center	secretly	ordered	the	First	Front	Army	troops	in	the	Right	Route	Army—consisting	of	the	First	and	Third	Armies—to	march	northward	quickly,	informing	neither	Xu	nor	Chen	of	this.8	 There	are	two	extremely	divergent	interpretations	 of	 why	 this	 happened.	 According	 to	 the	 CCP’s	 official	historiography,	 the	 Party	 Center	 persisted	 correctly	 to	 march	 northward,	 while	Zhang	 insisted	 on	 retreating	 to	 the	 southern	 regions.	 To	 achieve	 his	 goal,	 Zhang	“attempted	 to	 split	 and	 jeopardize	 the	 Party	 Center.”	He	 secretly	 sent	 a	 cable	 to	Chen	 Changhao	 on	 September	 9,	 asking	 him	 to	 lead	 the	 Right	 Route	 Army	southward.	 Ye	 Jianying	 葉劍英	 (1897-1986)	 read	 the	 cable	 accidentally	 and	reported	 it	 to	Mao	 immediately.	To	avoid	conflict	within	 the	Red	Army,	Mao	and	other	 leaders	 decided	 to	 march	 northward	 in	 secret.9	 According	 to	 Zhang,	 Mao	took	advantage	of	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	 to	open	a	 route	 to	 the	north	 and	 then																																																									4	 The	CCP’s	official	history	books	do	not	record	of	 the	exact	size	of	 the	First	Front	Army	when	 it	met	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 in	Maogong.	Many	 books	 have	 cited	 Zhou	 Enlai’s	 conversation	with	Zhang	Guotao	in	Maogong	that	the	First	Front	Army	had	30,000	troops	when	they	stayed	in	Zunyi	five	months	before.	But	a	number	of	recollections	have	suggested	that	the	First	Front	Army	had	less	than	10,000	troops	in	June	1935.	5	 MHFF,	p.	329.	6	 The	Fourth	Army	and	the	Thirtieth	Army	joined	together	with	the	major	force	of	the	First	Front	Army	and	was	called	the	Right	Route	Army.	The	Fifth	Army	and	the	Thirty-second	Army	of	the	First	Front	Army	combined	with	the	other	three	armies	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army—the	Ninth	Army,	the	Thirty-first	 Army	 and	 the	 Thirty-third	 Army	 to	 be	 known	 as	 the	 Left	 Route	 Army.	 For	 a	 full	explanation	of	the	detail	of	the	combination	that	occurred,	see	Table	1-1.	7	 MHFF,	p.	330.	See	Table	1-1.	8	 MHFF,	p.	338.	 	9	 Zhonggong	zhongyang	dangshi	yanjiushi	 中共中央黨史研究室,	Zhongguo	gongchandang	lishi	 中
國共產黨歷史,	 第一卷（上）	 (The	Chinese	Communist	Party’s	history,	Volume	1,	Part	1).	Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	2011,	p.	393.	
	24	escaped	secretly	to	save	his	own	troops.10	 Debate	on	this	issue	still	rages	in	China	today.	 In	 any	 case,	 the	CCP’s	 authority	 and	 the	Red	Army	were	divided	 into	 two	groups	thereafter.	 		 	 After	 the	 split	between	 the	First	 and	Fourth	Front	Armies,	Mao’s	Party	Center	immediately	convened	a	conference	 in	Ejie	 俄界	 to	accuse	Zhang	of	 splitting	 the	Red	Army.11	 Zhang’s	Fourth	Front	Army	also	held	a	conference	in	Zhuomudiao	 卓
木碉	 to	dismiss	Mao,	Zhou	Enlai	 周恩來	 (1898-1976),	Bo	Gu	 博古	 (1907-1946)	and	 Zhang	 Wentian	 張聞天	 (1900-1976)	 from	 the	 Central	 Committee	 and	 the	Party,	and	to	list	them	as	wanted.	The	alternative	Central	Committee,	the	Politburo,	and	the	Military	Council	were	established	during	this	conference.12		 	 Given	 that	 there	were	 two	 “Party	 Centers”	 during	 the	 following	 eight	months,	and	 that	 this	 thesis	 adopts	 a	 neutral	 perspective	 concerning	 power	 struggles	within	the	CCP,	Mao’s	and	Zhang’s	Party	Centers	will	be	referred	to	as	the	“Shaanxi	Party	Center”	and	the	“Sichuan	Party	Center,”	respectively.13	 		 	 In	the	CCP’s	official	Party	History,	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	led	by	Mao	was	the	sole	 legitimate	 leadership,	 and	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army’s	 compliance	 with	 its	directives	was	non-negotiable.	Despite	reaching	different	conclusions,	most	extant	publications	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 Zhang	 and	 Mao	 are	 based	 on	 this	premise,	 which	 prevents	 us	 from	 fully	 understanding	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 Red																																																									10	 Zhang	 Guotao	 張國燾,	 Wo	 de	 huiyi	 我的回憶	 (My	 memoirs),	 Volume	 2.	 Beijing:	 Dongfang	chubanshe	 東方出版社,	2004,	p.	418.	11	 “Zhonggong	zhongyang	guanyu	Zhang	Guotao	tongzhi	de	cuowu	de	jueding	(Ejie	huiyi)	 中共中
央關於張國燾同志的錯誤的決定（俄界會議）（1935 年 9 月 12 日）”	(The	CCP	Central	Committee’s	resolution	on	Comrade	Zhang	Guotao’s	errors	issued	at	the	Ejie	Conference	on	September	12,	1935).	Zhongguo	renmin	jiefangjun	junshi	kexue	yuan	 中國人民解放軍軍事科學院	 (PLA	Military	Science	Academy)	and	Zhongyang	dang’an	guan	 中央檔案館	 (Central	Archives),	eds.,	Hongjun	Changzheng	
wenxian	 紅軍長征·文獻	 (Reference	 on	 the	 Red	 Army’s	 Long	 March,	 hereafter	 RRAL).	 Beijing:	Jiefangjun	 chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	 1995,	 pp.	 683-684.	 This	 resolution	 was	 conveyed	 to	 the	members	 of	 the	 Central	 Committee	 after	 the	 Ejie	 Conference,	 but	 was	 not	 circulated	 within	 the	Party	until	 January	1936.	See	 “Zhongyang	zhengzhiju	guanyu	Zhang	Guotao	 tongzhi	 chengli	 ‘di’er	zhongyang’	de	jueding	 中央政治局關於張國燾同志成立「第二中央」的決定（1936 年 1 月 22 日）”	(The	 CCP	 Politburo’s	 decision	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 ‘alternative	 Party	 Center’	 by	 Comrade	Zhang	Guotao,	on	January	22,	1936),	in	Zhongguo	gongnong	hongjun	disi	fangmianjun	zhanshi	ziliao	
xuanbian,	Changzheng	 shiqi	 中國工農紅軍第四方面軍戰史資料選編·長征時期	 (Selected	materials	on	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Front	Army	 in	 the	 Chinese	Red	Army	of	Workers	 and	Peasants,	 the	Long	March	period,	hereafter	SMHF).	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	1992,	p.	328.	12	 “Zhang	Guotao	 ling	 li	 ‘zhongyang’	de	zuzhi	 jueyi	 張國燾另立「中央」的組織決議（1935 年 10
月 5 日於卓木碉）”	(Zhang	Guotao’s	organizational	resolution	on	establishing	an	alternative	“Party	Center”,	in	Zhuomudiao	on	the	October	5,	1935),	in	SMHF,	p.	230.	 	13	 In	early	June	1936	the	Sichuan	side	concealed	their	“Party	Center”	but	they	did	not	recognize	the	Shaanxi	side	to	be	the	legal	Party	Center	until	late	September.	So	in	this	thesis,	when	dealing	with	the	period	from	June	to	September	1936,	the	two	sides	are	referred	to	as	the	“Shaanxi	Party	Center”	and	the	“Fourth	Front	Army”	respectively.	 	 	
	 25	Army	 during	 this	 period.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 analyze	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 Shaanxi	 and	 Sichuan	 sides	 of	 the	 CCP	 before	 discussing	 the	 Red	Army’s	military	operations.		 	 The	Relationship	between	the	Two	Party	Centers		 	 When	they	divided	initially,	each	side	asserted	that	it	was	the	real	Party	Center,	and	insisted	that	the	other	side	should	defer.14	 In	this	situation,	support	from	the	Communist	International	(Comintern)	would	have	been	a	decisive	factor	that	could	have	 legitimized	 the	 leadership	of	 the	CCP	of	one	of	 the	 two	sides.	However,	 the	Comintern	had	lost	radio	contact	with	the	CCP	for	more	than	two	years,	since	the	Party	 Center	 left	 Shanghai	 in	 1933.	 In	 November	 1935,	 Lin	 Yuying	 林育英	(1897-1942),	 one	 of	 the	 CCP’s	 representatives	 in	 the	 Comintern,	 arrived	 in	northern	Shaanxi	with	oral	directives	from	Stalin,	as	well	as	a	new	code	system	to	re-establish	 radio	 links	 between	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center	 and	 Moscow.	 In	 the	following	months,	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center	 allowed	 Lin	 to	 act	 as	 a	mediator	 to	solve	the	problem	of	the	Party’s	split.	During	this	period,	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	took	 full	 advantage	 of	 Lin’s	 position	 as	 a	 representative	 from	 the	 Comintern	 to	persuade	the	Sichuan	Party	Center	to	cooperate	with	them.	However,	this	did	not	work	well	 initially.15	 Although	 Zhang	Guotao	 and	 his	 colleagues	 announced	 that	they	 would	 cooperate	 with	 the	 Comintern,16	 they	 did	 not	 openly	 change	 their	attitudes,	 and	 the	 two	 Party	 Centers	 and	 their	 armies	 continued	 to	 operate	independently,	 and	without	 any	 strategic	 cooperation.17	 Cables	between	Lin	and	the	Sichuan	Party	Center	indicate	that	Zhang	insisted	at	that	time	that	both	sides																																																									14	 The	Shaanxi	Party	Center	ordered	 the	Sichuan	Party	Center	 to	 stop	using	 the	 title	of	 the	 “Red	Army	Headquarters”.	See	Cable	3;	Cable	5;	Cable	7	(Appendix).	The	Sichuan	Party	Center	 insisted	that	 the	Shaanxi	Party	Center,	 the	 institutions	and	armies	 in	Shaanxi	should	be	referred	to	as	 the	“North	 Bureau”,	 “The	 Shaanxi-Gansu	 Government”	 and	 the	 “Northern	 Route	 Army”	 respectively.	See	Cable	1;	Cable	2.	 	15	 Because	 the	 Shaanxi	 side	 used	 ambiguous	 words	 in	 cables	 and	 did	 not	 convey	 any	 specific	directives	from	the	Comintern,	Zhang	Guotao	was	quite	suspicious	and	wrote	to	Lin	Yuying	to	ask	whether	he	“communicated	with	Comintern	frequently”.	See	Cable	10.	16	 Cable	4.	17	 In	March	1936,	Zhang	Guotao	changed	his	strategy	of	controlling	southern	regions	and	planned	to	go	northward	to	build	an	anti-Japanese	base	in	northwest	China.	Because	the	CCP’s	official	Party	historiography	and	other	popular	reading	materials	describe	 the	conflicts	between	Zhang	Guotao	and	the	 legal	Party	Center	as	a	divergence	between	“going	southward”	(nan	xia	 南下)	and	“going	northward”	(bei	shang	 北上),	Zhang	Guotao’s	decision	to	“go	northward”	in	March	1936	is	easily	to	be	 taken	 as	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center’s	 strategies,	 and	 even	 as	 a	 gesture	 of	compliance	with	 the	Shaanxi	 side.	For	 instance,	The	History	of	 the	Red	Army’s	Long	March	by	 the	Central	 Party	 History	 Research	 Office	 holds	 this	 point	 of	 view.	 (Bejing:	 Zhonggong	 dangshi	chubanshe,	2006,	p.	319.)	The	 fact	 is	 that	although	both	sides	 intended	to	make	northwest	China	their	revolutionary	base,	they	did	not	cooperate	with	each	other	and	at	the	time	their	knowledge	of	the	other	side’s	intentions	was	limited.	 	
	26	be	 referred	 to	 simultaneously	 as	 “bureaus,”	 and	 led	 by	 the	 Comintern.18	 The	Shaanxi	 side	 suggested	 that	 the	Party’s	branches	 in	Sichuan	would	be	 instructed	directly	by	the	CCP’s	representatives	in	the	Comintern,	and	that	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center,	 as	 the	 sole	 legal	 Party	 Center,	 would	 control	 all	 other	 branches.19	 The	tremendous	differences	on	 this	 fundamental	 issue	 caused	Lin’s	mediation	efforts	to	stagnate	for	months.		 	 The	CCP	leadership	problem	still	had	not	been	resolved	by	late	May	1936,	when	the	Second	and	the	Sixth	Army	Corps,	 led	by	Ren	Bishi	 任弼時	 (1904-1950)	and	He	 Long	 賀龍	 (1896-1969),	 who	 were	 completely	 unaware	 of	 the	 Party’s	 split,	were	about	to	meet	the	Fourth	Front	Army	in	Sichuan.	As	the	most	powerful	force	other	 than	 the	First	 and	Fourth	Front	Armies,	 their	 opinions	 on	Party	 and	 army	affairs	 could	 break	 the	 deadlock	 between	 the	 Shaanxi	 and	 Sichuan	 factions.	Consequently,	 both	 factions	 felt	 it	 was	 urgent	 to	 decide	 how	 to	 define	 the	relationship	 between	 the	 two	 corps	 and	 the	 Sichuan	 Party	 Center.20	 Zhang	 took	this	opportunity	to	assess	Lin’s,	or	the	Comintern’s,	attitude	by	inquiring	whether	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	had	changed	its	title	to	“The	North	Bureau.”21	 One	week	later,	 cables	 from	the	Sichuan	side	claimed	 that	both	 it	and	 the	Shaanxi	 side	had	stopped	 calling	 themselves	 “the	 Party	 Center.”22	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 Sichuan	side	 began	 to	 call	 the	 Shaanxi	 side	 the	 “colleagues	 of	 the	 North	 Bureau.”23	Accessible	 resources	 provide	 no	 evidence	 of	 Lin’s	 reply,	 so	 the	 response	 from	Sichuan	can	be	explained	 in	at	 least	 two	alternative	ways.	One	possibility	 is	 that	the	Shaanxi	 side	compromised	and	agreed	 to	 the	degradation	of	 the	bureaus.	An	almost	equally	reasonable	explanation	 is	 that	 it	was	only	wishful	 thinking	on	the	part	of	the	Sichuan	side.	Until	more	documents	are	released,	we	cannot	determine	which	 one	 is	 the	most	 likely.	 In	 any	 case,	 at	 least	 one	 thing	 is	 certain	 from	 the																																																									18	 Cable	7.	19	 Cable	6.	20	 In	 July	 1936,	 the	 Second	 Army	 Corps	 combined	with	 the	 Sixth	 Army	 Corps	 to	 be	 the	 Second	Front	 Army.	 There	 are	 different	 interpretations	 on	 the	 role	 that	 the	 Second	 Front	 Army	 leaders	played	in	this	period.	The	Central	Party	History	Research	Office	said	that	Zhang	Guotao	attempted	to	make	 the	Second	Front	Army	 leaders	his	 supporters,	but	was	 firmly	 refused	by	 them.	See	The	
Chinese	 Communist	 Party’s	 History,	 Volume	 1,	 Part	 1,	 p.	 399.	 Zhang	 Guotao’s	 account	 is	 that	 Ren	Bishi	wanted	to	be	mediator	and	believed	both	sides	had	made	some	mistakes.	See	Zhang	Guotao,	2004,	Volume	2,	pp.	449-450.	21	 Cable	10.	22	 “Zhang	 Guotao	 zai	 zhongyang	 zongdui	 huodong	 fenzi	 hui	 shang	 baogao	 beipo	 xuanbu	 quxiao	‘dier	zhongyang’	 張國燾在中央總隊活動分子會上報告被迫宣布取消“第二中央”（1936年 6月 6日）”	(Zhang	 Guotao	was	 forced	 to	 announce	 the	 concealment	 of	 the	 “alternative	 Party	 Center”	 at	 the	Central	Column’s	meeting,	on	June	6,	1936),	in	SMHF,	pp.	533-540.	23	 Cable	11.	
	 27	correspondence	at	the	time—the	Sichuan	side	did	not	believe	that	the	Shaanxi	side	should	lead	them;	on	the	contrary,	it	believed	that	it	was	the	legitimate	leadership	to	whom	the	other	side	should	report,	and	from	whom	it	should	ask	for	advice.	It	was	 only	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 Party	 unity	 that	 the	 Sichuan	 gave	 up	 its	 title	 of	 Party	Center	 and	 adopted	 a	 negotiation	 strategy	 regarding	 inner-Party	 affairs	 and	military	operations.24	 In	order	to	show	its	authority,	each	side	sent	cables	to	guide	the	 other	 side’s	 work,	 especially	 regarding	 military	 arrangements,	 even	 though	both	sides	understood	clearly	that	these	“directives”	had	no	influence	at	all.	Some	of	these	cables	have	been	released,	but	only	those	that	demonstrate	the	authority	of	 the	 Shaanxi	 side	 over	 the	 Sichuan	 side	 have	 been	 cited	 frequently	 in	publications.		 	 In	summary,	the	relationship	between	the	two	sides	was	complicated	and	murky,	and	cooperation	would	only	occur	if	both	sides	benefited	from	it,	rather	than	one	side	 complying	 with	 the	 other’s	 orders.	 Fortunately,	 the	 Shaanxi	 side’s	 plan	 to	secure	a	connection	with	the	Soviet	Union	was	in	the	interests	of	both	sides.	
1.1.2	One	Step	towards	Party	Reunion		 	 For	 three	 reasons,	 since	 early	 1936,	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center	 had	 prioritized	securing	Soviet	military	assistance	as	one	of	its	most	urgent	tasks.	First,	with	their	sparse	 populations	 and	 infertile	 land,	 the	 areas	 in	 northern	 Shaanxi	 that	 they	occupied	could	not	support	the	thousands	of	Red	Army	soldiers	positioned	there.	More	 critically,	 they	 were	 short	 of	 munitions.25	 Second,	 Stalin’s	 oral	 message,	which	 Lin	 delivered	 to	 northern	 Shaanxi,	 recommended	 that	 the	majority	 of	 the	Red	Army	go	to	northern	or	northeastern	China,	and	that	he	would	not	oppose	the	Red	 Army’s	 approach	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union.26	 Third,	 in	 negotiations	 with	 local	warlords,	 the	 Party	 leadership	 in	 Shaanxi	 realized	 gradually	 that	 the	 strategy	 of																																																									24	 The	Shaanxi	 camp	wrote	 in	a	 telegram	 that	 it	 “acknowledged	 the	negotiated	 relationship	with	Guotao”.	 See	 Cable	 9.	 The	 Sichuan	 camp	 said	 it	 was	 unnecessary	 to	 “order”	 the	 colleagues	 in	Shaanxi	and	it	was	acceptable	to	negotiate	with	them.	See	SMHF,	pp.	533-540.	25	 Cable	17.	26	 Cable	8.	For	more	about	the	CCP’s	attempts	to	connect	with	the	Soviet	Union,	see	Yang	Kuisong	
楊奎松,	Xi’an	shibian	xintan:	Zhang	Xueliang	yu	Zhonggong	guanxi	zhi	mi	 西安事變新探：張學良與
中共關係之謎	 (The	 Xi'an	 Incident	 revisited:	 a	 study	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 Zhang	 Xueliang	and	the	CCP).	Nanjing:	 Jiangsu	renmin	chubanshe	 江蘇人民出版社,	2010,	pp.	13-15.	According	to	Yang,	proposals	about	marching	 to	 the	Sino-Soviet	borders	had	been	made	occasionally	after	 the	late	 1920s,	 especially	 when	 the	 CCP	 met	 serious	 difficulties.	 These	 proposals,	 however,	 were	immediately	 rejected	 because	 of	worries	 about	 negative	 consequences	 for	 the	 Soviet	 Union.	 The	main	concern	of	the	opponents	was	that	this	would	place	diplomatic	pressure	on	the	Soviet	Union	and	might	even	a	pretext	 for	 the	 Japanese	 to	 invade	Mongolia.	This	 time,	Stalin’s	message	 turned	this	former	politically	incorrect	proposal	into	a	reasonable	plan.	
	28	these	 warlords	 was	 to	 gain	 the	 Soviet	 Union’s	 support	 via	 the	 CCP,	 rather	 than	merely	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	 Chinese	 Communists.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 task	 of	obtaining	the	Soviet	Union’s	assistance	was	not	only	important	to	the	Red	Army’s	ability	 to	 replenish	 its	 armaments,	 but	 also	 was	 the	 key	 to	 implement	 the	Comintern’s	order	 to	 “unite	all	 forces	which	could	be	united.”	Among	 these	 local	warlords,	 Zhang	Xueliang,	 the	marshal	 of	 the	Northeast	Army	 (or	 the	Manchuria	Army,	Dongbei	jun	 東北軍)	and	then	Deputy	Commander	in	Chief	of	the	Northwest	Anti-Communist	 General	 Headquarters,	 played	 the	 most	 important	 role	 in	implementing	the	plan.27	 		 	 There	 is	no	evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	 first	 considered	inviting	the	Sichuan	side	to	join	in	their	plan	to	secure	assistance	from	the	Soviet	Union.	 Presumably,	 it	 made	 this	 decision	 partly	 due	 to	 Zhang	 Xueliang’s	ever-changing	 ideas	 in	 negotiations	 with	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center,	 which	convinced	 the	 Shaanxi	 side	 that	 if	 it	 was	 determined	 to	 obtain	 assistance,	 the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	participation	would	be	necessary.	 		 	 An	 essential	 reason	 that	 the	 Sichuan	 side	 found	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center’s	invitation	 attractive	was	 that	 the	 plan	was	 related	 closely	 to	 the	 Comintern.	 Lin	conveyed	Stalin’s	oral	message	 to	Zhang	as	early	as	 January	1936,	but	Zhang	did	not	 respond	 positively.	 On	 July	 6,	 1936,	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center	 told	 their	colleagues	 in	 Sichuan	 that	 they	had communicated	with	 the	Comintern	by	 radio,	and	had	forwarded	a	cable	from	Moscow	to	Sichuan	immediately.28	 This	cable	has	not	been	released,29	 but	one	can	assume,	based	on	 the	 responses	of	 the	Sichuan	Party	Center,	that	it	was	very	likely	to	have	been	a	decisive	factor	in	making	them	agree	to	go	north	to	cooperate	with	the	First	Front	Army.30	 By	then,	after	months																																																									27	 For	more	about	the	relationship	between	Zhang	Xueliang	and	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	see	Yang	Kuisong,	2010.	28	 According	 to	 Yang	 Kuisong’s	 research	 based	 on	 archives	 of	 the	 Comintern,	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	Center	succeeded	in	communicating	with	the	Comintern	on	June	16,	1936.	On	July	2,	1936,	Zhang	Wentian	sent	another	cable	to	the	CCP	representatives	in	the	Comintern.	(See	Yang	Kuisong,	2010,	pp.	111-113.)	 It	 is	 thus	clear	 that	 the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	deceived	 the	Sichuan	Party	Center	on	this	issue.	 	29	 The	 Sichuan	 Party	 Center	 asked,	 “what	 the	 Comintern’s	 directives	 were”,	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	Center	replied	two	days	later	to	say:	“Besides	the	cable	that	we	had	already	forwarded	to	you,	the	Comintern	did	not	send	any	directives	on	issues	concerning	the	Second	Front	Army	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army.”	See	Cable	14;	Cable	15.	30	 The	Shaanxi	Party	Center	attempted	to	persuade	the	Fourth	Front	Army	and	the	Second	Front	Army	to	join	the	First	Front	Army	in	Shaanxi	and	Gansu	several	times.	See	“Qingzhu	er	si	fangmian	jun	shengli	huishi	 慶祝二、四方面軍勝利會師（1936 年 7 月 1 日）”	(Celebrating	the	union	of	the	Second	Front	Army	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	on	July	1,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	569;	Cable	12;	Cable	13.	The	Sichuan	Party	Center’s	response,	however,	was	just	promises	to	“cooperate	with	the	First	Front	Army”.	See	Cable	11.	Not	until	August	1	did	Zhang	Guotao	and	his	men	agree	to	meet	the	First	
	 29	of	 negotiation,	 the	 two	 split	 Party	 leaderships	 agreed	 to	 cooperate	 for	 the	 first	time.		 	 On	August	12,	1936,	 the	Shaanxi	 side	 included	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	 in	 their	formal	military	plan	of	operations.	Zhang	Xueliang’s	Northeast	Army	was	still	the	main	force	in	this	plan	to	occupy	western	Gansu	and	connect	with	the	Soviet	Union	through	Xinjiang.	The	 Second	 and	Fourth	Front	Armies	were	 supposed	 to	 attack	the	 Nationalist	 Central	 Army	 and	 the	 Gansu	 local	 force	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 the	Northeast	 Army	 with	 an	 opportunity	 to	 take	 over	 the	 strategically	 significant	Lanzhou	 蘭州 and	western	 Gansu.	 The	 First	 Front	 Army	was	 to	 occupy	 Ningxia	and	connect	with	the	Soviet	Union	through	Mongolia.31	 Given	the	fact	that	Zhang	Xueliang	had	failed	to	execute	his	cooperative	plans	with	the	Communists,	 it	was	not	a	surprise	that	two	weeks	later,	when	the	second	plan	to	take	over	Ningxia	and	western	 Gansu	 was	 finalized,	 the	 significant	 role	 of	 the	 Northeast	 Army	 was	withdrawn.	 Instead,	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 was	 to	 march	 directly	 to	 the	 Hexi	Corridor	through	Qinghai	and	then	arrive	at	Suzhou	 肅州	 (now	Jiuquan	 酒泉)	in	the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 following	 year,	 while	 the	 First	 Front	 Army	 was	 to	 occupy	Ningxia.	 This	 plan	 was	 submitted	 to	 Wang	 Ming	 王明	 (1904-1974),	 the	 then	representative	of	the	CCP	in	the	Comintern,	on	August	25.32	
	 	 The	Two	Routes	to	Connect	with	the	Soviet	Union		 	 From	 the	 location	 of	 the	 main	 forces	 of	 the	 Red	 Army,	 there	 were	 only	 two	routes	 to	 connect	 with	 the	 Soviet	 Union:	 one	 was	 to	 pass	 through	 Ningxia	 and	Suiyuan	 綏遠,33	 while	 the	 other	was	 to	 take	 the	Hexi	 Corridor	 to	 Xinjiang.	 Both	routes	 had	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages.	Mao	 once	 calculated	 that	 the	 Ningxia	route	 was	 shorter	 and	 had	 natural	 and	 economic	 conditions	 that	 were	 more	favorable,	 while	 the	 Gansu	 route	 was	 easier	 to	 retain	 in	 the	 long	 term.34	 In	addition	 to	 these	 factors,	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 distinction	 between	 the	 two	routes:	the	Japanese	Kwantong	Army	controlled	a	part	of	Mongolia	far	from	Gansu.																																																																																																																																																																			Front	Army.	See	Cable	14.	31	 Cable	16.	32	 Cable	17.	33	 Suiyuan	was	a	province	of	China	in	the	Republican	period.	Abolished	in	1954,	its	territory	now	forms	part	of	the	Inner	Mongolian	Autonomous	Region.	 	34	 Mao	 Zedong,	 “Hongjun	 jiejin	 Sulian	 de	 daolu	 he	 shiji	 wenti	 紅軍接近蘇聯的道路和時機問題
（1936 年 6 月 29 日）”	 (About	 the	 route	 and	 timing	of	 the	Red	Army	approaching	 to	 the	 Soviet	Union,	on	June	29,	1936),	in	Mao	Zedong	junshi	wenji	 毛澤東軍事文集	 (Selected	military	works	of	Mao	 Zedong),	 Volume	 1.	 Beijing:	 Junshi	 kexue	 chubanshe	 軍事科學出版社 	 and	 Zhongyang	wenxian	chubanshe	 中央文獻出版社,	1993,	pp.	551-552.	 	
	30	Further	differences	derived	from	this	major	distinction.	On	the	one	hand,	once	the	Gansu	route	was	traversed	successfully,	it	would	become	“a	permanent	route	free	of	the	Japanese	threat.”	In	this	sense,	Mao	believed	that	with	respect	to	connecting	with	the	Soviet	Union,	occupying	Ganzhou	 甘州	 (now	Zhangye	 張掖),	Liangzhou	
涼州 	 (now	 Wuwei	 武威 )	 and	 Suzhou—three	 large	 cities	 along	 the	 Hexi	Corridor—was	 more	 important	 than	 occupying	 Ningxia;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	marching	 towards	 Mongolia	 was	 more	 advantageous	 politically,	 and	 would	facilitate	propaganda	and	mobilization	significantly.	As	a	 result,	 the	Party	Center	decided	to	connect	with	the	Soviet	Union	from	two	directions,	attempting	to	take	advantage	of	the	propaganda	value	of	the	Ningxia-Mongolia	route	and	maintain	the	Gansu-Xinjiang	route	permanently.35		 	 From	 the	 perspectives	 of	 both	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center	 and	 the	 Fourth	 Front	Army,	 the	plan	 to	 take	over	 these	 two	 routes	was	 acceptable.	The	Shaanxi	Party	Center’s	 priority	 was	 to	 obtain	 Soviet	 military	 assistance;	 in	 fact,	 Mao	 once	explained	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 Peng	 Dehuai	 彭德懷	 (1898-1974)	 that	 the	 First	 Front	Army	 rather	 than	other	Red	Army	branches	had	 to	undertake	 this	 task.36	 As	 for	the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army,	 there	 are	 at	 least	 three	 reasons	 that	 explain	 its	 leaders’	preference	 for	 connecting	 with	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 independently	 through	 Gansu.	First,	 they	understood	clearly	 that	 intra-Party	struggles	were	 inevitable	after	 the	reunion	with	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center.	They	were	unsure	whether	the	Comintern’s	attitude	 to	 this	 issue	 supported	 them,	 and	 believed,	 therefore,	 that	 it	 would	 be	better	 to	 postpone	 the	 impending	 reunion	 with	 the	 Shaanxi	 side.	 Second,	 they	acknowledged	fully	that	if	the	Fourth	Front	Army	did	not	have	its	own	base,	then	its	 supplies	 would	 have	 to	 depend	 on	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center,	 which	 was	unacceptable.	Third,	 they	 intended	 to	preserve	 the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	strength	by	 avoiding	 a	 fight	 with	 the	 powerful	 Nationalist	 Central	 Army.	 Overall,	 they	believed	they	would	have	more	leverage	in	future	negotiations	or	competition	with	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	 if	 they	succeeded	 in	building	new	bases	and	expanding																																																									35	 “Zhang	Wentian,	Zhou	Enlai,	Bo	Gu,	Mao	Zedong	gei	Zhang	Xueliang	de	yi	feng	xin	 張聞天、周恩
來、博古、毛澤東給張學良的一封信（1936 年 8 月 9 日）”	(A	letter	by	Zhang	Wentian,	Zhou	Enlai,	Bo	Gu	and	Mao	Zedong	to	Zhang	Xueliang,	on	August	9,	1936),	in	Hao	Chengming	 郝成銘	 and	Zhu	Yongguang	 朱永光,	eds.,	Zhongguo	gongnong	hongjun	Xilujun	(wenxian	juan)	 中國工農紅軍西路軍
（文獻卷）(The	WRA	of	 the	Chinese	Red	Army	of	Workers	and	Peasants:	 references),	Volume	2.	Lanzhou:	Gansu	renmin	chubanshe	 甘肅人民出版社,	2004,	pp.	97-104.	36	 Mao	Zedong,	“Hongjun	jiejin	Sulian	de	daolu	he	shiji	wenti”	(About	the	route	and	timing	of	the	Red	Army	approaching	to	the	Soviet	Union),	in	Mao	Zedong	junshi	wenji	(Selected	military	works	of	Mao	Zedong),	Volume	1,	pp.	551-552.	
	 31	their	military	power.37	 By	early	September	1936,	the	Fourth	Front	Army	had	been	preparing	 for	 its	 planned	 and	mutually	 beneficial	march	 to	 Xinjiang	 through	 the	Hexi	Corridor,	until	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	changed	its	position.	
1.1.3	New	Conflicts		 	 The	 new	 plan	 that	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center	 made	 on	 September	 14,	 1936	included	 three	 steps:	 first,	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 would	 control	 the	 line	 of	transport	connecting	Xi’an	 西安	 and	Lanzhou,	thereby	preventing	the	Nationalist	Central	 Army,	 led	 by	 Hu	 Zongnan	 胡宗南	 (1896-1962),	 from	 marching	 farther	west.	The	Second	Front	Army	was	to	cooperate	with	the	Fourth	Front	Army.	The	First	 Front	 Army	would	 take	 this	 opportunity	 to	 rebuild	 itself.	 The	 second	 step	involved	 the	 First	 and	 Fourth	 Front	 Armies	 taking	 over	 northern	 and	 southern	Ningxia,	respectively,	while	the	Second	Front	Army	would	fight	with	Hu	Zongnan’s	forces.	 Lastly,	 the	 First	 Front	 Army	 would	 secure	 Soviet	 military	 assistance	through	 the	 Ningxia	 route.38	 As	 for	 the	 Gansu	 route	 towards	 the	 Sino-Soviet	border,	 under	 the	 new	 plan,	 it	 would	 be	 connected	 when	 there	 was	 an	opportunity.39		 	 The	only	fact	that	can	explain	why	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	changed	its	mind	is	the	completely	unexpected	speed	with	which	Hu	Zongnan’s	 troops	were	moving.	At	 the	 time,	 Hu’s	 major	 force	 was	 marching	 towards	 Lanzhou,	 a	 city	 that	 was	strategically	significant	in	the	overall	plan	to	connect	with	the	Soviet	Union.40	 This	meant	that	if	the	CCP	adhered	to	the	old	plan,	then	the	First	Front	Army	was	very	likely	 to	 be	 pursued	by	Hu	when	 it	 advanced	 towards	Mongolia	 though	Ningxia.	Mao	and	his	men	preferred	to	force	Hu’s	troops	to	stop	moving	farther	north	while	taking	 Ningxia,	 but	 alone,	 they	 were	 unable	 to	 achieve	 these	 two	 goals	simultaneously.	This	explains	why	they	asked	the	Fourth	and	Second	Front	Armies	to	resist	Hu’s	troops.	 		 	 The	Shaanxi	Party	Center	received	a	cable	from	the	Comintern	on	September	11,	1936,	 which	 “firmly	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 Red	 Army	 must	 not	 advance	 towards																																																									37	 Zhang	Guotao’s	memoirs	refer	to	some	of	these	considerations.	Zhang	would	not	have	been	the	only	one	in	the	Fourth	Front	Army	who	held	such	concerns,	but	in	the	CCP’s	official	narratives,	all	other	commanders	are	portrayed	as	opposing	Zhang’s	selfish	concerns	and	were	eager	to	join	with	the	Party	Center.	38	 The	 plan	 did	 not	 explicitly	 state	 that	 the	 First	 Front	 Army	 would	 secure	 this,	 but	 it	 was	 an	obvious	 conclusion	 given	 the	 First	 Front	 Army	would	 take	 over	 north	 Ningxia	 while	 the	 Fourth	Front	Army	would	take	over	south	Ningxia.	 	39	 Cable	19.	40	 Ibid.	
	32	Xinjiang,	to	make	sure	the	Red	Army	won’t	leave	China	proper,”	and	informed	the	CCP	 that	 military	 assistance	 should	 be	 obtained	 along	 the	 Ningxia-Mongolia	route.41	 Three	 days	 later,	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center	 finished	 its	 new	 plan	 to	concentrate	its	forces	to	take	Ningxia.	As	a	result,	some	scholars	have	assumed	that	the	Party	Center	had	abandoned	its	old	plan	created	in	August	1936	in	response	to	the	Comintern’s	directive.42	 This	assumption	neglects	two	basic	facts.	First,	in	the	same	cable,	the	Comintern	approved	the	CCP’s	plan	to	occupy	Ningxia	and	western	Gansu.	 Second,	 in	 March	 1936,	 the	 local	 Xinjiang	 warlord,	 Sheng	 Shicai	 盛世才	(1897-1970),	 wrote	 to	 the	 Comintern	 to	 express	 his	 willingness	 to	 assist	 in	transporting	 the	 Soviet	 Union’s	 military	 assistance	 secretly	 to	 Gansu,43	 which	meant	that	the	Comintern	definitely	knew	that	the	Chinese	Red	Army	could	receive	assistance	without	entering	Xinjiang.	Thus,	the	Comintern’s	order	that	the	CCP	not	march	 farther	 to	 Xinjiang	 did	 not	 amount	 to	 requiring	 the	 CCP	 to	 abandon	 the	Gansu-Xinjiang	 route.	 The	 cable,	 however,	 did	 provide	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center	with	an	excuse	to	persuade	the	Fourth	Front	Army	to	join	it	in	occupying	Ningxia.	The	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 raised	 a	 series	 of	 concerns	 about	 the	 new	 plan,44	 and	proposed	 an	 alternative	 plan	 in	 which	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 would	 cross	 the	Yellow	 River	 in	 southern	 Gansu,	 which	 meant	 that	 the	 First	 Front	 Army	 would	have	 to	 fight	 Hu	 Zongnan’s	 troops	 alone.	 In	 response	 to	 these	 concerns,	 the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	had	to	play	the	Comintern	card	again,	telling	the	Fourth	Front	Army	that	Moscow	said	they	would	receive	assistance	only	if	 they	kept	marching	northward,	rather	than	westward.45	 This	excuse	was	obviously	insufficient.		 	 Given	the	relationship	between	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	the	former	definitely	had	difficulty	in	persuading	the	latter	to	risk	sacrificing	themselves	 in	 order	 to	 guarantee	 that	 the	 First	 Front	 Army	 could	 march	northward	 smoothly.	 Consequently,	 there	 were	 clashes	 over	 whether	 it	 should	stop	Hu’s	troops	in	the	first	place,	and	if	so,	how	this	should	be	accomplished.	This																																																									41	 Cable	18.	42	 For	 instance:	 Qin	 Sheng 秦生,	 Hong	 Xilujun	 shi	 紅西路軍史	 (History	 of	 the	 WRA).	 Beijing:	Zhongguo	shehui	kexue	chubanshe	 中國社會科學出版社,	2011,	p.	27.	43	 “Sheng	Shicai	gei	Wang	Ming	de	xin	 盛世才給王明的信（1936 年 3 月 15 日於烏魯木齊）”	(Sheng	Shicai’s	 letter	 to	Wang	Ming	on	March	15,	1936,	 in	Urumqi),	 in	Liangong	 (bu),	gongchan	guoji	 yu	
Zhongguo	 suweiai	 yundong	 (1931-1937)	 聯共（布）、共產國際與中國蘇維埃運動（1931-1937）(Communist	Party	of	 the	Soviet	Union	(Bolshevik),	 the	Comintern	and	China’s	Soviet	movements,	1931-1937).	Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	2007,	p.	171.	44	 They	asked:	 “which	 is	our	 focus,	Ningxia	or	western	Gansu?”	 “what	 is	 the	enemy’s	situation	 in	Ningxia?”	45	 Cable	21.	
	 33	was	the	main	source	of	conflict	between	the	two	sides	from	mid-September	to	late	October	1936.	Further,	there	were	disagreements	within	the	Fourth	Front	Army46	that	 increased	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 situation	 and	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center’s	difficulty	in	predicting	the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	actions.	 		 	 After	 receiving	a	 cable	 from	Shaanxi	on	September	14,	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	held	 a	 three-day	 conference	 in	Minzhou	 岷州,	 during	which	an	accusatory	 letter	was	 sent	 to	 Shaanxi	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 Committee.	 The	resolution	of	this	conference,	however,	was	in	accordance	with	the	Party	Center’s	order—the	Fourth	Front	Army	would	fight	Hu	Zongnan’s	troops	in	Jingning	 靜寧	and	Huining	 會寧.47	 Three	days	later,	the	Fourth	Front	Army	leaders	held	another	conference	 in	 Zhangxian	 漳縣	 and	 changed	 the	 plan	 above	 completely,	 deciding	instead	to	cross	the	Yellow	River	hundreds	of	miles	west	of	 Jingning,	 in	Yongjing	
永靖	 and	 Xunhua	 循化.48	 They	 informed	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center	 that	 they	would	 divide	 their	 troops	 into	 three	 groups,	 one	 occupying	 Yongdeng	 永登	 and	surrounding	 areas	 on	 the	west	 bank	of	 the	 river,	 one	 holding	 the	 ferry,	 and	one	drawing	 the	 Nationalist	 Central	 Army’s	 attention	 to	 the	 east	 bank	 of	 the	 Yellow	River	while	assisting	the	First	Front	Army	to	cross	the	river.49	 The	Shaanxi	Party	Center,	however,	 could	not	help	being	 suspicious.	Peng	Dehuai	wrote	 in	 a	 secret	letter	to	Mao	and	Zhou	Enlai	that	the	plan	was	“nonsense,”	firmly	believing	that	the	Fourth	Front	Army	would	not	assist	the	First	 in	seizing	Ningxia.	He	believed	that	Zhang’s	 intention	 instead	was	 to	control	 the	Second	Front	Army	by	preventing	 it	from	joining	the	First.50	 		 	 Several	rounds	of	negotiations	between	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army	took	place	from	September	22	to	September	27	regarding	the	issue	of	whether	the	Fourth	Front	Army	should	go	northward	to	join	the	First,	or	cross	the	Yellow	River	to	the	west	bank	in	southern	Gansu.	At	issue	was	whether	the	Fourth	Front	Army	was	to	fight	Hu’s	troops.	This	was	resolved	when	Zhang	and	his	men																																																									46	 Because	of	the	reorganization	in	August	1935,	some	former	First	Front	Army	commanders	went	with	Zhang	Guotao’s	troops.	Zhu	De,	the	Chief	Director	of	the	Red	Army,	worked	with	Zhang	Guotao	from	August	1935	 to	November	1936.	The	CCP’s	official	narratives	 say	 these	commanders	 firmly	supported	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	and	Mao	Zedong,	and	struggled	against	Zhang	Guotao.	Although	it	 is	 exaggerated,	 accessible	materials	 show	 that	 in	 some	 cases	 Zhang	Guotao	 could	 not	 have	 his	orders	implemented	without	any	resistance.	47	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Minzhou	 Conference	 岷州會議	 the	 “Outline	 of	 the	 Jingning	 and	 Huining	Campaign”	 靜寧會寧戰役綱領	 was	passed.	See	Cable	20.	48	 Cable	22.	49	 Cable	23.	50	 Cable	24.	
	34	found	that	the	natural	conditions	in	deep	autumn	did	not	allow	them	to	cross	the	river	in	the	area	preferred.51	 On	September	27,	the	Fourth	Front	Army	gave	up	the	plan	 of	 crossing	 the	 river	 and	 turned	 north.	 After	 months	 of	 negotiation,	bargaining,	 and	 even	 deception,	 the	 First	 Front	 Army	 finally	 met	 their	comrades-in-arms	in	Huining,	Gansu	(Table	1-2).52		 	 A	 careful	 examination	 of	 both	 the	 Shaanxi	 Party	 Center	 and	 the	 Fourth	 Front	Army’s	arrangements	reveals	that	the	two	sides	were	engaged	in	a	strategic	game	of	 investigating	 each	 and	 every	 action	 in	 order	 to	 predict	 the	 other’s	 intentions,	and	 then	planning	 their	own	actions	 accordingly.	 In	 general,	 each	 side’s	primary	goal	 was	 to	 preserve	 and	 expand	 its	 own	 power.	 It	 was	 this	 relationship	 of	ostensibly	discussing	and	cooperating	with	each	other,	while	actually	distrusting	each	other,	that	made	military	orders	in	October	1936	quite	confusing.	
1.2	The	Western	Route	Army	and	the	Party	Center	
1.2.1	The	Establishment	of	the	Western	Route	Army		 	 Since	September	27,	when	the	Fourth	Front	Army	decided	finally	to	go	north	to	join	the	First	Front	Army,	Zhang	had	acknowledged	that	the	Shaanxi	side	was	the	Party	Center,	and	stopped	calling	them	“our	colleagues	of	the	North	Bureau.”	This	gesture,	however,	did	not	indicate	his	absolute	compliance.	Mao	and	his	confidants	knew	 this	 very	well,	 so	 they	adopted	 two	measures	 to	make	 sure	Zhang’s	 forces	would	 operate	 according	 to	 their	 orders.	 One	 was	 to	 assign	 Zhu	 De	 朱德	(1886-1976)	and	Zhang	as	the	Chief	Commander	and	Chief	Commissar	of	the	Red	Army,	 respectively.	 These	 were	 two	 important	 positions	 that	 were	 supposed	 to	“direct	 the	 three	 front	 armies	 according	 to	 the	 Central	 Military	 Council’s	decisions.”53	 The	 Party	 Center	 believed	 this	 measure	 would	 help	 it	 control	 the	Fourth	Front	Army.54	 The	other	measure	was	 to	 send	Lin	 to	work	 in	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	for	the	purpose	of	“achieving	political	unity.”55	 It	is	difficult	to	assess																																																									51	 Fu	Zhong	 傅鐘,	Xibeiju	de	guangrong	shiming	 西北局的光榮使命	 (The	glorious	missions	of	the	Northwest	Bureau),	in	SMHF,	p.	785.	52	 In	the	CCP’s	official	narratives,	the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	attempt	at	crossing	the	Yellow	River	in	southern	Gansu	is	called	the	“Gannan	fengbo”	 甘南風波	 (an	episode	in	southern	Gansu).	The	word	
fengbo	 風波	 implies	it	was	illegal.	53	 Cable	25.	54	 Zhang	 Peisen 張培森,	 ed.,	 Zhang	 Wentian	 nianpu	 張聞天年譜	 (Chronological	 biography	 of	Zhang	Wentian),	Volumn	1.	Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	2000,	p.	378.	55	 Zhonggong	 zhongyang	 wenxian	 yanjiushi	 中共中央文獻研究室	 (The	 CCP	 Central	 Literature	Research	Center),	Mao	Zedong	nianpu	 毛澤東年譜	（1893-1949）	 (Chronological	biography	of	Mao	Zedong,	 from	 1893	 to	 1949),	 Volume	 1.	 Beijing:	 Renmin	 chubanshe	 人民出版社,	 Zhongyang	
	 35	the	effectiveness	of	these	two	measures.	However,	they	reflected	the	strong	lack	of	confidence	the	Party	Center	had	in	its	ability	to	control	the	Fourth	Front	Army.	 		 	 It	 had	 been	 more	 than	 a	 month	 since	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 expressed	 its	preference	 to	 occupy	 areas	 along	 the	Hexi	 Corridor	 independently.	Although	 the	situation	 had	 changed	 considerably	 due	 to	 the	 Nationalist	 Central	 Army’s	 rapid	advance,	the	priority	of	the	Party	Center	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army	did	not	change,	as	 the	 Party	 Center	 still	 intended	 to	 secure	 Soviet	 assistance,	 while	 the	 Fourth	Front	Army	still	attempted	to	avoid	either	rejoining	or	sacrificing	itself	for	the	First	Front	Army.	In	such	an	atmosphere,	allowing	the	Fourth	Front	Army	leader,	Zhang	Guotao,	 to	co-lead	the	Red	Army	Headquarters	with	Zhu	De	would	actually	make	united	military	operations	even	more	difficult.		 	 On	October	11,	1936,	the	day	after	the	three	branches	of	the	Red	Army	joined	in	Huining,	the	Party	Center	issued	an	updated	plan	for	taking	over	Ningxia,	entitled	“Outline	 of	 Military	 Plan	 for	 October”	 (known	 as	 the	 “Ningxia	 Campaign	 Plan”),	with	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 receiving	 Soviet	 military	 assistance	 on	 the	 borders	 of	Mongolia.	According	to	this	plan,	the	Fourth	Front	Army	would	need	to	be	divided	into	 two	 parts.	 One	would	 prevent	 the	 Nationalist	 Central	 Army	 from	marching	northward,	while	the	other	would	cross	the	Yellow	River	in	advance	to	assist	the	First	 Front	 Army	 in	marching	 to	 the	west	 bank	 of	 the	 river;	 thereafter,	 the	 two	Front	Armies	would	attack	Ningxia	 together.56	 No	 further	details	were	provided,	but	a	later	plan	submitted	by	Peng	Dehuai	implied	that	it	was	still	the	First	Front	Army	that	would	receive	Soviet	assistance,	while	the	Fourth	would	be	in	charge	of	attracting	 Ningxia	 local	 warlord,	 Ma	 Hongkui’s	 馬鴻逵	 (1892-1970)	 troops.57	There	were	at	least	two	aspects	of	this	plan	that	the	Fourth	Front	Army	would	try	its	 best	 to	 avoid:	 decentralizing	 its	 main	 force,	 and	 covering	 for	 the	 First	 Front	Army.	 The	 solution	 to	 these	 two	 problems	was	 to	 allow	 the	 entire	 Fourth	 Front	Army	 to	 cross	 the	 Yellow	 River	 to	 the	 west	 bank	 before	 Hu’s	 troops	 arrived.	According	 to	 Chen	 Changhao’s	 recollection,	 written	 in	 September	 1937,	 after	arriving	 at	 Huining,	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 barely	 engaged	 in	 any	 military	preparation,	other	than	collecting	timber	for	boat	building.58	 The	Party	Center	was																																																																																																																																																																			wenxian	chubanshe	 中央文獻出版社,	1993,	p.	649.	56	 Cable	26.	57	 Wang	Yan 王焰,	ed.,	Peng	Dehuai	nianpu	 彭德懷年譜	 (Chronological	biography	of	Peng	Dehuai).	Beijing:	Renmin	chubanshe	 人民出版社,	1998,	p.	161.	58	 “Chen	 Changhao	 guanyu	 Xilujun	 shibai	 de	 baogao 陳昌浩關於西路軍失敗的報告”	 (Chen	Changhao’s	report	on	the	WRA’s	failure),	in	SMHF,	pp.	977-978.	
	36	aware	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army’s	 concerns.	 Therefore,	 although	 Zhu	 and	 Zhang	both	 expressed	 their	 full	 agreement	 with	 the	 “Outline	 of	 Military	 Plan	 for	October,”59	 Mao	repeatedly	urged	the	Fourth	Front	Army	to	make	it	a	priority	to	block	 the	 enemy	 that	 was	 approaching	 from	 the	 south, 60 	 and	 deliberately	reminded	 Peng	 to	 “pay	 sufficient	 attention	 to	 certain	 comrades’	 wavering”	 and	prepare	 to	 implement	 the	plan	 independently.61	 To	be	 fair,	not	 to	mention	other	influential	 factors,	 including	 the	 enemy’s	 rapidly	 changing	 situation,	 or	 its	 own	limited	intelligence-gathering	capability,	the	conflicts	within	the	Party	alone	would	have	prevented	 the	CCP	 from	conducting	any	 large-scale	 campaign	 that	 required	the	cooperation	of	all	three	Front	Armies.62	 It	was	under	these	circumstances	that	the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 began	 to	 cross	 the	 Yellow	River	 in	 order	 to	 conduct	 the	Ningxia	Campaign	Plan	issued	on	October	11,	1936.	 	
	 	 Crossing	the	Yellow	River		 	 At	midnight	 on	October	24,	 1936,	 the	 vanguard	of	 the	Thirtieth	Army	 crossed	the	 Yellow	 River	 at	 the	 Hubaokou	 虎豹口	 ferry.	 This	 pleased	 the	 Party	 Center,	because	the	First	Front	Army	would	have	to	rely	on	the	Thirtieth	Army	to	cross	the	river	 on	 its	 way	 to	 Ningxia.	 The	 following	 day,	 however,	 when	 the	 Ninth	 Army	began	to	cross	the	river,	differences	of	opinion	broke	out.		 	 As	 the	 commanders	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army,	 Xu	 Xiangqian	 and	 Chen	Changhao’s	major	concern	was	not	to	divide	their	troops,	and	thus,	they	proposed	that	 all	 of	 the	 other	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 troops	 follow	 the	 Thirtieth	 Army	 to	 the	west	 bank.	 From	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 perspective,	 the	 Red	 Army’s	 priority	was	 to	prevent	 the	 Nationalist	 Central	 Army	 from	 marching	 farther	 north,	 so	 they	preferred	that	only	a	part	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	go	westward,	while	the	main	force	 stay	 on	 the	 east	 bank.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 Red	 Army	Headquarters,	Zhu	and	Zhang,	who	kept	sending	orders	together	under	the	name	of	“Zhu	and	Zhang,”	disagreed	with	each	other	occasionally.	The	three	sides	above	sent	conflicting	telegrams	and	sometimes	contradicted	themselves.	What	occurred	over	the	next	week	illustrates	the	confusion	and	lack	of	direction	that	would	later	doom	each	of	the	quarrelling	sides.	 		 	 On	October	 24,	 Chen	 and	Xu	wrote	 to	 the	Red	Army	Headquarters,	 proposing																																																									59	 Cable	28.	60	 Cable	29;	Cable	30.	61	 Cable	27.	62	 The	“Haida	campaign	plans”	 海打戰役計劃	 later	made	by	Peng	Dehuai	was	spoiled	for	similar	reasons.	
	 37	that	the	Thirtieth,	Thirty-first,	and	Ninth	Armies	cross	the	river	in	succession.	The	Red	Army	Headquarters	approved	this	the	following	day.63	 On	the	same	day,	Mao	and	Zhou	ordered	 that	one	more	unit	of	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	should	cross	 the	river	after	the	Thirtieth	Army,	but	the	Ninth	Army	should	stay	on	the	east	bank.64	Early	on	the	morning	of	the	26th,	Mao	and	Zhou	ordered	the	Fourth	Front	Army	to	spend	 two	 or	 three	 days	 observing	 the	 Nationalist	 Central	 Army’s	 intentions	before	 allowing	one	more	army	 to	 cross	 the	 river.65	 On	 the	 same	day,	 the	Ninth	Army	initiated	their	river	crossing	operation.66		 	 At	5	a.m.	on	October	27,	Zhu	and	Zhang	ordered	all	Fourth	Front	Army	troops,	except	the	Thirtieth	and	Ninth	Armies,	which	had	been	on	the	west	bank,	to	stop	crossing	 the	 river.67	 On	 the	 same	 day,	 Xu	 and	 Chen	 proposed	 that	 the	 whole	Fourth	Front	Army	should	 cross	 the	 river,	 as	 they	had	 found	enemy	planes	near	the	 ferry.68	 At	12	p.m.	on	 the	28th,	 the	Party	Center	declared	 that	 it	 agreed	with	Zhu	and	Zhang’s	arrangements	made	at	5	a.m	that	day.69	 At	4	p.m.	the	same	day,	Zhu	and	Zhang	sent	a	telegram	to	Xu	and	Chen,	telling	them	that	they	could	allow	the	Thirty-first	Army	to	cross	the	river	at	8	a.m.	the	next	day	unless	they	received	orders	from	the	Party	Center	beforehand	directing	them	not	to	do	so.70	 At	7	p.m.,	Zhu	 and	 Zhang	 ordered	 the	 Thirty-first	 Army	 to	 move	 to	 Dalachi	 打拉池	 fifty	kilometers	east	of	the	Yellow	River.71	 At	7:15	p.m.,	Zhu	and	Zhang	cabled	the	Party	Center	 and	 Xu	 and	 Chen,	 proposing	 that	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 should	 take	Dingyuanying	 定遠營	 after	they	controlled	the	west	bank	of	the	Yellow	River.	To	realize	this	plan,	 the	Thirty-first	Army	was	to	cross	the	river	as	soon	as	possible,	while	 the	 Fifth	 Army	 should	 rest,	 and	 the	 Fourth	 Army	 should	 fight	 with	 any	enemy	pursuing	them.	Zhu	and	Zhang	ordered	Xu	and	Chen	to	carry	on	with	this	plan	if	they	did	not	receive	the	Party	Center’s	reply	by	midnight.72	 At	8	p.m.,	Zhu	and	Zhang	ordered	Xu	and	Chen	 to	arrange	 for	 the	Fifth	Army	 to	cross	 the	 river	after	they	had	drawn	out	the	enemy,	while	the	Ninth	and	Thirtieth	Armies	should																																																									63	 These	two	telegrams	have	not	been	released,	but	the	content	is	implied	in	a	telegram	sent	by	Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao	on	October	26.	See	Cable	32.	64	 Cable	30.	65	 Cable	31.	66	 Cable	32.	67	 Cable	33.	68	 Cable	34.	69	 Cable	35.	70	 Cable	36.	71	 Cable	37.	72	 Cable	38.	
	38	march	north	to	take	Dingyuanying,	and	the	Fourth	and	Thirty-first	Armies	should	march	 east	 to	 Dalachi	 to	 fight	 the	 Nationalist	 Central	 Army.73	 At	 12	 a.m.	 on	October	29,	Mao	and	Zhou	ordered	the	Thirty-first	Army	to	cross	the	Yellow	River	immediately,74	 and	 then,	 on	 October	 30,	 they	 reversed	 themselves	 and	 ordered	the	Thirty-first	Army	not	 to	 cross	 the	 river.75	 Following	 the	orders	 listed	 above,	the	Thirty-first	Army	arrived	on	the	east	bank	of	the	Yellow	River	on	October	29,	and	 the	 Directly	 Affiliated	 Squad	 began	 to	 cross.	 The	 next	 day,	 according	 to	 the	new	orders,	the	troops	who	had	arrived	already	on	the	west	bank	returned	to	the	east.76		 	 The	Fifth	Army’s	experience	was	not	as	dramatic	as	that	of	the	Thirty-first	Army,	but	was	still	quite	confusing.	At	3	p.m.	on	October	29,	the	day	after	Zhu	and	Zhang	ordered	 the	 Fifth	 Army	 to	 cross	 the	 river	 after	 it	 had	 fulfilled	 its	 task,	 Zhu	 and	Zhang	 cabled	Xu	 and	Chen	 again,	 but	 this	 time	 to	 rescind	 the	 order	 to	 cross	 the	river.77	 However,	at	10:30	a.m.	on	October	30,	Zhu	and	Zhang	told	them	that	they	had	already	ordered	the	Fifth	Army	to	cross	the	river.78	 By	November	1,	the	Fifth	Army	had	succeeded	in	doing	so.	By	then,	all	three	Armies	that	later	comprised	the	WRA	had	reached	the	west	bank	of	the	Yellow	River.		 	 Many	 of	 the	 orders	 conveyed	 in	 the	 telegrams	mentioned	 above	 contradicted	each	other,	and	some	contradictory	orders	were	 issued	over	a	period	as	short	as	fifteen	minutes.	All	information	released	from	the	Party	archives	indicates	only	the	content	 and	 time	 of	 the	 telegrams—there	 is	 no	 indication	 whether	 or	 when	 a	telegram	was	 received	and	decoded	 successfully.	Overall,	 too	many	pieces	of	 the	mosaic	 have	 been	 lost	 or	 erased	 deliberately.	 Despite	 this	 obvious	 defect,	 a	 few	decades	later,	Party	historians	who	held	a	range	of	opinions	used	these	telegrams	to	 support	 their	 own	 arguments	 about	 the	 WRA.	 Regardless	 of	 whom	 they	supported	 or	 criticized—the	 Party	 Center,	 Zhang,	 or	 the	 commanders,	 Xu	 and	Chen—all	 of	 them	 derived	 their	 conclusions	 from	 the	 same	 time	 of	 the	 river	crossing.	The	reason	for	their	focus	on	why	and	how	the	WRA	crossed	the	Yellow	River	 lies	 in	 their	 common	understanding	 that	 crossing	 the	 river	 confirmed	 that	the	 troops	were	marching	 towards	 Xinjiang	 along	 the	 Hexi	 Corridor,	which	was																																																									73	 Cable	39.	74	 Cable	40.	75	 Cable	42.	76	 Qin	Sheng,	2011,	p.	338.	77	 Cable	41.	78	 Cable	43.	
	 39	tantamount	 to	 sending	 the	 troops	 to	 their	 deaths.	 Consequently,	 these	 Party	historians	 drew	 their	 conclusions	 with	 respect	 to	 such	 questions	 as	 who	 was	strategically	correct,	or	who	should	 take	 the	responsibility	 for	 the	WRA’s	 failure.	Nevertheless,	 during	 the	 period	 discussed	 in	 this	 subsection,	 neither	 the	 Party	Center	nor	the	Red	Army	Headquarters	knew	the	route	these	22,000	troops	were	marching	and	the	difficulties	they	would	face	in	the	future.	In	the	author’s	opinion,	between	 the	 period	 when	 Zhang	 and	 his	 supporters	 agreed	 to	 go	 north	 to	 join	Mao’s	 Party	Center	 in	 July	 1936,	 and	when	 the	 three	Armies	 crossed	 the	Yellow	River	successfully	is	remarkably	revealing,	because	the	attitudes	and	actions	of	the	different	 parties	 during	 this	 period	 demonstrated	 clearly	 the	 complicated	relationship	 between	 the	 Party	 Center	 and	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 and	 the	complexity	of	the	related	decision-making	process.		 	 “The	Western	Route	Army”		 	 From	November	1,	1936,	when	Hu’s	troops	seized	control	of	ferries	on	the	east	bank	of	the	Yellow	River,	the	Red	Army	was	divided	into	two	parts.	The	Fifth,	Ninth,	and	Thirtieth	Armies	of	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	were	stranded	on	the	west	bank,	while	the	Fourth	and	Thirty-first	Armies	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	and	almost	all	troops	 of	 the	 First	 and	 Second	 Front	 Armies,	 remained	 on	 the	 east	 side.	 Under	these	 circumstances,	 the	 Red	 Army	 had	 only	 a	 slim	 chance	 to	 regroup	 and	concentrate	 on	 taking	 Ningxia.	 Moreover,	 two	 days	 later,	 a	 cable	 from	 the	Comintern	reached	the	Party	Center,	and	stated	that	it	had	decided	not	to	extend	military	assistance	from	the	Mongolian	direction.79	 This	decision	was	unexpected,	and	 the	 Party	 Center	 realized	 that	 its	 Ningxia	 Campaign	 plan	 was	 not	 only	impossible,	but	unnecessary.	As	a	result,	 the	Party	Center	issued	a	new	plan.	The	Red	 Army	 was	 to	 be	 divided	 into	 three	 parts,	 with	 the	 First	 and	 Second	 Front	Armies	 forming	 the	 Southern	Route	Army,	 the	 Fourth	 and	Thirty-first	 Armies	 of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	forming	the	Northern	Route	Army,	and	troops	on	the	west	bank	of	 the	Yellow	River	 forming	 the	Western	Route	Army	 (WRA).	According	 to	this	 new	 plan,	 over	 the	 following	 one	 or	 two	 years,	 the	 Southern	 and	 Northern	Route	Armies	would	move	 eastward	 first,	 and	 later	might	move	 to	 the	 southern	provinces,	while	the	WRA	would	“build	revolutionary	bases	and	connect	with	the	Soviet	 Union	 [to	 obtain	 Soviet	 assistance]	 directly.” 80 	 In	 short,	 this	 plan	abandoned	 the	 idea	 of	 establishing	 bases	 in	 the	 Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia	 border																																																									79	 Cable	45.	80	 Cable	46.	
	40	regions,	and	focused	instead	on	moving	the	divided	Red	Army	to	the	eastern	and	western	regions,	respectively.	Given	the	proposed	marching	distances	in	this	plan,	and	 the	 time	 it	 would	 take,	 it	 is	 no	 exaggeration	 that	 the	 entire	 plan	 was	tantamount	to	proposing	a	new	Long	March.	Although	the	plan	was	not	executed	fully,	 it	did	 indicate	 that	 the	Party	Center	had	abandoned	 the	 idea	of	 focusing	all	forces	on	one	target.	 It	also	was	 in	this	plan	that	the	troops	on	the	western	bank	were	named	 “the	WRA”	officially.	Three	days	 later,	 the	WRA	Military	Committee	and	 WRA	 Headquarters—two	 institutions	 in	 charge	 of	 military	 and	 political	affairs—were	 established.81	 It	 was	 then	 that	 the	WRA	 began	 to	 march	 towards	Xinjiang	as	a	relatively	independent	part	of	the	Red	Army.	 	
1.2.2	The	Tensions	between	the	WRA	and	the	Party	Center		 	 Party	 historians	 in	 Mainland	 China	 view	 June	 6,	 1936,	 the	 date	 when	 Zhang	announced	 that	 the	 Sichuan	 side	 would	 no	 longer	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 “the	 Party	Center,”	as	a	milestone	in	the	Party’s	reunion.	As	analyzed	in	the	previous	part	of	this	 chapter,	 this	 conclusion	was	 based	 on	 a	 selective	 interpretation	 of	 primary	materials.	 In	 the	 author’s	 opinion,	 whether	 the	 Party	 was	 still	 split	 should	 be	evaluated	by	whether	the	Party	Center	could	exert	absolute	and	sole	influence	on	its	army.	 		 	 On	 November	 1,	 1936,	 the	 commanders	 of	 the	 three	 front	 Armies,	 Peng,	 Zhu,	Zhang,	He,	 and	Ren,	met	 at	 the	Red	Army	Headquarters	 in	Guanqiaobao	 關橋堡.	According	 to	 the	 telegram	 Peng	 sent	 to	 the	 Party	 Center,	 all	 attendees	 agreed	firmly	 that	 the	 Red	 Army	 should	 be	 commanded	 uniformly	 by	 the	 Chief	Commander	 of	 the	 Front	 (Zong	qianxian	 zhihui	 前線總指揮)	 and	Zhu	 and	Zhang	would	 not	 intervene.82	 On	 November	 26,	 the	 Central	Military	 Committee	 issued	the	 following	 order:	 “Comrade	 Peng	 Dehuai	 has	 been	 appointed	 as	 Chief	Commander	 of	 the	 Front;	 Comrade	 Ren	 Bishi	 has	 been	 appointed	 as	 the	 Chief	Commissar.	Apart	from	the	WRA,	all	troops	of	the	First,	the	Second,	and	the	Fourth	Front	Armies,	other	army	corps	and	people’s	armed	forces	are	under	the	command	of	 the	 General	 Headquarters	 of	 the	 Front.”83	 At	 the	 end	 of	 November,	 Zhu	 and	Zhang	travelled	to	Baoan	 保安	 to	 join	the	Party	Center.	The	situation	during	the	
																																																								81	 Cable	47.	82	 Cable	44.	83	 Ren	 Bishi	 nianpu	 任弼時年譜 	 (Chronological	 Biography	 of	 Ren	 Bishi).	 Beijing:	 Zhongyang	dangshi	wenxian	chubanshe	 中央黨史文獻出版社,	2004,	p.	305.	
	 41	previous	 few	 months	 with	 the	 Party	 Center	 and	 the	 Red	 Army	 Headquarters’	sending	different,	even	opposing,	orders	to	the	front	simultaneously	would	not	be	repeated.	 Indeed,	 as	 early	 as	 two	 weeks	 previously,	 when	 the	 Fourth	 and	Thirty-first	 Armies	 took	 part	 in	 the	 Shanchengbao	 山城堡	 Battle,	 united	 and	coordinated	military	operations	had	been	restored	already.		 	 Meanwhile,	on	the	other	side	of	the	Yellow	River,	the	WRA	inherited	the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	tensions	with	the	Party	Center.	On	the	one	hand,	they	consulted	each	other	 on	 military	 operations,	 but	 on	 the	 other,	 they	 distrusted	 each	 other.	 The	hostility	 between	 them	 became	more	 and	more	 obvious	 as	 the	WRA’s	 situation	deteriorated.	When	the	WRA	began	losing	battles	in	the	Hexi	Corridor,	its	leaders	complained	 that	 the	 Party	 Center	 did	 not	 provide	 them	 with	 sufficient	information84 	 and	 did	 not	 dispatch	 any	 reinforcements. 85 	 The	 Party	 Center	criticized	 the	 WRA	 for	 relying	 on	 external	 assistance,	 and	 for	 lacking	 the	confidence	 necessary	 to	 defeat	 the	 enemy	 by	 itself.86	 In	 the	 final	 period	 of	 the	WRA’s	 fighting	 in	western	Gansu,	both	sides	used	historical	 issues	 to	attack	each	other’s	 legitimacy,	 which	 made	 the	 debates	 between	 the	 two	 sides	 even	 more	acrimonious.	The	WRA	leadership	used	the	fact	that	the	Party	Center	had	given	up	the	 Central	 Soviet	 Region	 in	 1934	 as	 evidence	 to	 argue	 that	 retreating	 did	 not	necessarily	mean	“retreatism;”	 further,	 they	denied	 the	Party	Center’s	accusation	that	 they	 did	 not	 try	 their	 best	 to	 fight	 the	 enemy.87	 The	 Party	 Center	 became	increasingly	 angry	with	 the	WRA,	 and	argued	 that	 they	had	 committed	 so-called	errors	 of	 “right-wing	 retreatist	 opportunism.” 88 	 In	 the	 end,	 at	 the	 Shiwo	Conference	 held	 in	March	 1937,	 the	WRA	Military	 Committee	 decided	 to	 permit	two	leaders,	Chen	and	Xu,	to	return	to	Yan’an	to	“struggle	with	the	Party	Center.”89	This	was	a	measure	of	the	depth	of	their	mutual	animosity.		 	 In	 the	 months	 before	 the	 WRA’s	 establishment	 in	 November	 1936,	 serious	conflicts	of	interest	arose	between	the	Sichuan	and	the	Shaanxi	Party	Centers	(or	between	 the	 Fourth	 Front	Army	 and	 the	 Party	 Center).	 The	 root	 cause	was	 that	both	were	competing	for	the	same	strategic	 interest,	namely,	 to	be	the	sole	army	responsible	 for	 securing	 the	 Soviet	 Union’s	 military	 assistance,	 while																																																									84	 For	instance:	Cable	59;	Cable	60.	85	 Cable	61;	Cable	68.	86	 Cable	62.	87	 Cable	68.	88	 Cable	70.	89	 Xu	Xiangqian	 徐向前,	Lishi	de	huigu	 歷史的回顧	 (Looking	back	on	history),	Volume	2.	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	1985,	p.	549.	
	42	simultaneously	 avoiding	 fighting	 the	 Nationalists’	 Central	 Army.	 The	 prime	objective	for	which	they	competed	was	the	support	of	the	Comintern,	which	would	be	extremely	helpful	in	the	inevitable	impending	intra-Party	power	struggles.	Once	the	 WRA	 became	 stranded	 on	 the	 west	 bank	 of	 the	 Yellow	 River,	 it	 was	 in	 a	position	 to	 approach	 the	 Gansu-Xinjiang	 border	 alone	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 military	assistance,	 and	 as	 a	 consequence,	 the	 two	 sides	 were	 no	 longer	 in	 competition.	Further,	 because	 of	 the	 geographical	 barriers,	 the	 WRA	 and	 the	 troops	 who	remained	on	the	eastern	bank	of	the	Yellow	River	now	faced	different	enemies,	and	thus,	they	were	much	less	likely	to	have	to	sacrifice	themselves	for	the	other	side.90	In	general,	conflicts	of	interest	no	longer	existed,	as	both	sides	would	benefit	only	if	 the	WRA	succeeded	 in	gaining	 the	Soviet	Union’s	assistance	and	preserving	 its	forces.	 Why,	 then,	 did	 the	 Party	 Center	 and	 the	 WRA	 continue	 to	 have	 such	 a	hostile	 relationship?	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 background	 of	 the	 already	 complicated	relationship	between	them,	another	explanation	is	that	both	sides	made	erroneous	evaluations	 of	 the	 situation	 in	 Gansu,	which	 resulted	 in	 the	 deterioration	 of	 the	WRA’s	situation	on	the	battlefield.	 	 		 	 The	Party	Center	had	limited	knowledge	of	western	Gansu,	so	its	orders	to	the	WRA	 depended	 heavily	 on	 information	 the	 latter	 sent	 back	 to	 Shaanxi.	 This	information	was	frequently	contradictory,	and	some	later	proved	to	be	completely	inaccurate.	 This	 was	 a	 result	 of	 the	WRA’s	 poor	 intelligence-gathering	 capacity,	and	because	its	leaders	often	reported	their	findings	selectively	as	well	in	order	to	influence	 the	 Party	 Center.	 The	 Party	 Center,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 continued	 to	convey	 strategic	 decisions	 to	 the	WRA	without	 explaining	 the	 reasons	 for	 those	decisions.	Not	surprisingly,	 the	WRA	found	the	Party	Center’s	directives	 far	 from	persuasive.	During	this	time,	the	Party	Center	kept	secret	from	the	WRA	the	details	of	 two	 important	 issues:	 the	 negotiations	 with	 the	 Nationalist	 Party	 and	 the	alliance	with	Zhang	Xueliang,	both	of	which	were	highly	relevant	to	the	WRA.	The	lack	 of	 communication	 about	 these	 issues	made	 the	WRA	 even	more	 disaffected	from	the	Party	Center.91	 	 																																																									90	 Proposals	about	the	WRA	cooperating	with	the	Red	Army	on	the	east	bank	of	the	Yellow	River	emerged	occasionally	in	communications	between	the	WRA	and	the	Party	Center,	but	actually	none	of	these	proposals	was	put	into	action.	 	91	 An	 example	 is	 the	 period	 from	 the	 launch	 of	 the	 Xi’an	 Incident	 on	 December	 12,	 1936	 to	December	25,	1936	when	Chiang	Kai-shek	was	released	and	departed	from	Xi’an.	In	this	period	the	Party	Center	constantly	changed	the	orders	that	they	gave	to	the	WRA.	The	orders	changed	because	negotiation	between	 the	Nanjing	 government,	 the	CCP	and	Zhang	Xueliang	were	 still	 in	progress	and	 Chiang’s	 Central	 Army	 threatened	 the	Red	Army	 and	 Zhang	 Xueliang’s	Northeast	 Army.	 The	
	 43		 	 Inaccuracy	 and	 the	 inefficient	 flow	 of	 information	 led	 to	 erroneous	 military	strategies	and	tactics	on	the	part	of	both	the	Party	Center	and	the	WRA.	As	their	situation	continued	to	deteriorate,	the	WRA	leaders	at	last	apprehended	the	reality	of	 their	 situation.	 Under	 normal	 conditions,	 new	 strategies	 should	 have	 been	adopted	according	to	the	changing	situations	on	the	ground.	However,	the	strained	relations	between	the	high	command	in	Shaanxi	and	the	field	command	in	Gansu	distorted	 the	 decision-making	 process	 greatly.	 As	 a	 result,	 rather	 than	 working	together	to	save	the	army,	the	WRA’s	leadership	distrusted	and	complained	about	the	Party	Center’s	direction	further,	such	that,	at	the	end	of	January	1937,	the	Party	Center	 simply	 ordered	 the	WRA	 to	 “decide	 its	 operation	 by	 itself.”92	 The	 fierce	rhetoric	 in	 the	 telegrams	 they	 exchanged	during	 this	 period	 set	 the	 tone	 for	 the	future	criticisms	of	the	WRA,	and	even	the	entire	Fourth	Front	Army.	 		 	 The	 Party	 Center	 and	 the	 WRA	 evaluated	 the	 situation	 incorrectly	 in	 four	respects:	underestimation	of	 the	Ma	brothers’	military	capability;	overestimation	of	 the	natural	 and	economic	 conditions	 in	western	Gansu,	 and	overestimation	of	the	so-called	“united	front	work,”	and	the	accessibility	of	military	assistance.	I	will	analyze	these	four	areas	individually	in	the	next	section.	 	
1.3	The	Failure	of	the	WRA	 	
1.3.1	Failures	in	Military	Operations	and	in	Establishing	Revolutionary	Bases		 	 The	first	and	most	critical	error	made	by	the	Party	Center	and	the	WRA	leaders	was	underestimating	 the	 local	warlords’	 determination	 to	 defeat	 the	Communist	troops.	 		 	 When	 the	WRA	was	 first	 established	 in	November	1936,	 the	Party	Center	 and	the	 WRA	 Military	 Committee	 were	 confident	 that	 they	 could	 not	 possibly	 be	defeated	 by	 the	 local	 troops	 in	 Gansu.93	 At	 first,	 when	 the	 WRA	 entered	 Ma																																																																																																																																																																			WRA	 leaders	 had	 no	 idea	 about	 what	 was	 happening	 on	 the	 east	 bank	 of	 the	 Yellow	 River	 and	became	furious	about	the	Party	Center’s	changeable	directives.	Another	issue	that	the	WRA	greatly	cared	about	was	the	Soviet	Union’s	arrangement	for	the	provision	of	military	assistance;	according	to	accessible	materials,	the	Party	Center	did	not	deliberately	conceal	anything	from	the	WRA.	The	problem	was	that	communication	between	the	Comintern	and	the	CCP	was	limited.	92	 Cable	64.	 	93	 For	instance,	Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao	reported	that	“two-thirds	of	Ma	brothers’	troops	had	already	been	attacked	by	the	WRA”	and	“the	enemy’s	fighting	capacity	was	just	so	so”.	Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao	 also	 believed	 that	 the	WRA	 could	 complete	 their	missions	without	 assistance.	See	 Cable	 48;	 Cable	 49.	 The	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 had	 once	 defeated	 the	Muslim	 Hui	 troops	 from	northwest	China,	 and	 regarded	 them	as	 ragtag	 and	 ill	 disciplined.	 For	 instance,	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	annihilated	a	regiment	of	Ma	Hongkui’s	35th	Division	in	the	fourth	“anti-encirclement”	 反圍
剿	 of	the	E-yu-wan	Soviet	Region.	
	44	Buqing’s	 馬步青	 (1901-1977)	 territory,	Ma	had	no	 time	 to	centralize	his	 troops,	which	were	 stationed	 in	 various	 areas,	 so	 the	WRA	 troops	met	 little	 resistance,	which	further	strengthened	their	confidence.	When	Ma’s	brother,	Ma	Bufang	 馬步
芳	 (1903-1975),	gathered	his	forces	to	pursue	and	besiege	the	WRA,	however,	the	battle	took	a	sudden	and	dramatic	turn.	The	WRA	was	defeated	on	the	battlefield	primarily	because	 it	 faced	two	overwhelming	disadvantages:	a	 low	percentage	of	combat	 forces,	 and	 insufficient	 munitions.94	 These	 disadvantages	 were	 obvious	when	compared	with	the	capabilities	of	the	Ma	brothers’	troops.	 	 	 	 		 	 The	total	number	of	troops	that	the	Ma	brothers	deployed	in	battles	against	the	Communists	 from	 late	 1936	 to	 April	 1937	 is	 unknown	 now,	 but	 information	 is	available	on	the	forces	they	had	at	the	time.	Ma	Bufang’s	Qinghai	Army	alone	had	more	 than	 35,000	 regular	 troops	 in	 1935. 95 	 The	 Ma	 brothers’	 advantages,	however,	lay	not	only	in	the	numbers	of	their	regular	troops.	Compared	to	the	Red	Army,	 their	 ability	 to	 supply	 labor	 and	 their	 powerful	 and	 experienced	 cavalry	were	 their	 real	 strengths.	 Ma	 Bufang	 began	 his	 “Military	 Training	 for	 Citizens”	project	in	1936.	Under	his	rule,	all	men	between	17	and	50	years	of	age	could	be	conscripted.	 These	 men	 were	 organized	 into	 large-scale	 “National	 Corps”	 that	complemented	 the	 regular	 troops.96 	 In	 battles	 near	 Nijiayingzi	 倪家營子 	 in	March	 1937,	 the	 “National	 Corps”	 from	 several	 regions,	 including	 those	 from	Menyuan	 門源	 and	Xunhua	in	Qinghai	province,	which	amounted	to	75,000	men,	were	 dispatched	 to	 fight	 the	 Communists.97	 According	 to	 some	 scholars,	 Ma	Bufang	sent	a	total	of	more	than	100,000	men	to	the	battlefields.98		 	 Ma	 Buqing’s	 Fifth	 Cavalry	Division	 had	 15,000	 troops.99	 In	 contrast,	 the	WRA	had	 only	 200	 cavalrymen	 and,	 because	 they	 did	 not	 have	 enough	 battle-horses,																																																									94	 Women,	 teenagers	 and	 sick	 people	made	 up	more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 troops.	 (The	 Fourth	 Front	Army	recruited	a	considerable	number	of	female	and	very	young	soldiers	in	Sichuan,	because	of	the	large	opium-addicted	population	there.)	The	other	forty	percent	were	combat	forces,	but	not	every	soldier	had	a	rifle.	For	 instance,	 in	 the	most	powerful	army,	 the	Thirtieth	Army,	7000	troops	had	only	 3200	 rifles,	 with	 an	 average	 25	 bullets	 for	 each	 rifle.	 This	 situation	was	worse	 in	 the	 Fifth	Army,	 as	 its	 2500	 troops	 had	 1000	 rifles,	with	 only	 4	 bullets	 for	 each	 rifle.	 See	 “Chen	 Changhao	guanyu	Xilujun	shibai	de	baogao”	(Chen	Changhao’s	report	on	the	WRA’s	failure),	in	SMHF,	p.	982.	95	 Chen	Bingyuan	 陳秉淵,	Ma	Bufang	jiazu	tongzhi	Qinghai	sishi	nian	 馬步芳家族統治青海四十年	(Ma	Bufang’s	family	controlled	Qinghai	for	four	decades).	Xining:	Qinghai	renmin	chubanshe	 青海
人民出版社,	1986,	p.	122.	96	 Chen	Bingyuan,	1986,	p.	122.	97	 Chen	Bingyuan,	1986,	p.	137.	98	 Zheng	Ziwen	 鄭子文,	“Xilujun	zai	hexi	zao	Ma	fei	zuji	de	kaocha	 西路軍在河西遭馬匪狙擊的考
察”	(Investigation	on	the	Western	Route	Army’s	failure	in	west	Gansu),	Gansu	shehui	kexue	 甘肅社
會科學,	1980(3),	pp.	68-73.	99	 Ibid.	
	 45	they	had	to	use	regular	horses	instead.	As	a	result,	they	simply	could	not	stop	Ma’s	cavalry	 attacks.100	 The	 WRA’s	 remaining	 20,000	 plus	 troops	 were	 infantry.	 The	advantage	of	cavalry	forces	over	infantry	forces	was	apparent	in	Gansu,	especially	after	 the	WRA	 arrived	 at	 Gaotai	 高台,	 Linze	 臨澤	 and	 the	 surrounding	 areas	 in	early	1937.	 In	 this	region,	 the	population	was	small	and	dispersed.	The	WRA	did	not	have	sufficient	accommodations,	and	therefore	had	to	stay	in	blockhouses	that	locals	had	built	 to	hide	from	bandits.	Once	the	enemy	besieged	a	blockhouse,	 the	troops	 inside	 had	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 fight	 until	 they	 had	 depleted	 their	ammunition.101	 Only	 after	 these	 serious	 failures	 on	 the	 battlefield	 did	 the	WRA	leaders	realize	that	“this	army	[the	WRA]	did	not	have	the	capability	to	defeat	the	Ma	brothers’	troops	by	itself.”102	 		 	 The	 WRA	 commanders	 made	 some	 clear	 mistakes	 that	 are	 historically	undisputed.	 Among	 these,	 the	most	 serious	 was	 that	 they	 often	 separated	 their	troops.	 From	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 conflict,	 the	 three	 armies	 always	 took	 different	routes	in	their	westward	advance.	They	did	this	in	part	because	of	the	shortage	of	accommodations,	 but	 conflicts	within	 the	WRA	were	also	an	 influential	 factor.103	The	Ma	forces	took	advantage	of	the	separation	of	the	Red	forces	and	defeated	the	smaller	one	by	one.	The	Ninth	Army	 lost	half	of	 its	 troops	 in	Gulang	 古浪	 when	the	main	 force	of	 the	WRA	was	marching	along	another	parallel	 route.	The	Fifth	Army	was	almost	annihilated	in	Gaotai	when	other	Red	troops	were	not	far	away,	but	were	unable	to	support	them.104		 	 Another	related	problem	was	the	WRA’s	failure	to	establish	bases.	According	to	the	original	plan	the	Party	Center	made	on	November	11,	1936,	 the	WRA	should	have	 first	 established	 revolutionary	 bases	 in	 the	Hexi	 Corridor,	 and	 then	 should	have	dispatched	 troops	 to	gain	assistance	on	 the	Gansu-Xinjiang	border.	 It	was	a	reasonable	 plan,	 given	 the	 large	 proportion	 of	 non-combat	 troops	 and	 the	 bad	transport	 conditions	 in	 western	 Gansu.	 The	 idea	 of	 establishing	 revolutionary																																																									100	 Cable	53;	Cable	55;	“Chen	Changhao	guanyu	Xilujun	shibai	de	baogao”	(Chen	Changhao’s	report	on	the	WRA’s	failure),	in	SMHF,	p.	982.	 	101	 A	number	of	 former	commanders	and	soldiers	described	situations	 in	 the	battlefields	 in	 their	recollections.	 See	Hao	 Chengming	 郝成銘	 and	 Zhu	 Yongguang	 朱永光,	 eds.,	Zhongguo	 gongnong	
hongjun	 Xilujun	 (huiyilu	 juan)	 中國工農紅軍西路軍（回憶錄卷）	 (The	WRA	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Red	Army	 of	Workers	 and	 Peasants:	 memoirs).	 Lanzhou:	 Gansu	 renmin	 chubanshe	 甘肅人民出版社,	2009.	 	102	 Cable	73.	103	 Some	telegrams	Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao	sent	to	the	Party	Center	suggested	that	for	a	period	 the	 Ninth	 Army	 had	 not	 complied	 with	 Xu	 and	 Chen’s	 directives.	 This	 might	 have	contributed	to	the	commanders’	decision	to	go	westward	separately.	See	Cable	52;	Cable	56.	104	 Qin	Sheng,	2011,	pp.	175-183.	
	46	bases,	however,	was	based	on	the	precondition	that	the	enemy	had	been	defeated,	or	 at	 least	 defeated	 for	 a	 time.	However,	 the	WRA	 could	 not	 accomplish	 this.	 In	addition,	 the	 population	 and	 economic	 conditions	 were	 not	 conducive	 to	establishing	 bases.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 the	 WRA’s	 efforts	 to	 establish	 bases	 in	Yongchang	 永昌,	 Shandan	 山丹	 and	 areas	 around	 Zhangye	 were	 unsuccessful.	The	 methods	 the	 Red	 Army	 had	 adopted	 previously	 in	 the	 southern	 provinces,	such	 as	 confiscating	 the	 property	 of	 local	 landlords	 and	 distributing	 land,	 were	inappropriate	in	western	Gansu.	As	they	could	not	obtain	provisions	by	the	usual	means,	the	WRA	had	to	plunder	from	the	local	population	as	a	last	resort,	but	even	this	 practice	 provided	 only	 limited	 materials.	 It	 also	 worsened	 the	 WRA’s	relationships	 with	 local	 people, 105 	 which	 prevented	 it	 from	 recruiting	 and	collecting	 useful	 information,	 and	 in	 turn,	worsened	 the	 army’s	 situation	 on	 the	battlefield.	 		 	 The	 WRA’s	 regular	 military	 failures	 and	 unfavorable	 economic	 and	 social	conditions	 beg	 the	 question:	 why	 did	 the	 WRA	 insist	 on	 marching	 westward?	There	were	two	reasons.	First,	the	Party	Center	and	the	WRA	believed	they	would	be	able	to	survive	in	western	Gansu	by	means	of	“united	front	works.”	Second,	they	were	attracted	 to	 the	prospect	of	 securing	 the	Soviet	Union’s	military	assistance.	The	 following	sections	will	argue	 that	both	of	 these	positive	outcomes	of	 “united	front	 works”	 and	 Soviet	 assistance	 were	 merely	 extravagant	 hopes	 that	 never	materialized.	
1.3.2	The	Unsuccessful	“United	Front	Works”		 	 The	essence	of	 the	“united	 front,”	a	concept	 invented	by	Lenin,	 is	 to	cooperate	with	minor	enemies	 in	order	to	confront	the	main	enemy.	During	the	Republican	period,	 numerous	 independent	 warlords	 controlled	 China,	 a	 situation	 that	provided	the	Communists	with	an	ideal	arena	in	which	to	implement	this	theory	in	practice.106	 In	its	decades	of	armed	struggles,	the	CCP	changed	the	definition	of	its	minor	enemies	and	the	main	enemy	repeatedly.	By	attacking	some	military	forces																																																									105	 “Chen	Changhao,	Li	Zhuoran	guanyu	Xilujun	zhengzhi	gongzuo	de	baogao	 陳昌浩、李卓然關於
西路軍政治工作的報告（1936年 12月 2日）”	(Chen	Changhao	and	Li	Zhuoran’s	report	on	the	WRA’s	political	 works,	 on	 December	 2,	 1936),	 in	 Hao	 Chengming	 and	 Zhu	 Yongguang,	 eds.,	 2004,	 pp.	459-460.	Cable	69.	106	 Mao	 Zedong	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 communist	 regime	 in	 China	 was	 made	possible	 by	 the	 constant	 struggles	 among	 a	 variety	 of	 warlords.	 See	 “Zhongguo	 de	 hongse	zhengquan	 weishenme	 nenggou	 cunzai?	 中國的紅色政權為什麼能夠存在?”	 (Why	 could	 China’s	red	 regime	 exist?),	Mao	 Zedong	 xuanji	 毛澤東選集	 (Selected	 works	 of	 Mao	 Zedong),	 Volume	 1.	Beijing:	Renmin	chubanshe	 人民出版社,	1991,	p.	49.	
	 47	while	 cooperating	 with	 others,	 the	 Chinese	 Communists	 survived	 and	 finally	secured	 national	 power.107	 This	 is	why	 the	 united	 front	was	 named	 one	 of	 “the	three	 great	 teachings”	 (san	 da	 fabao	 三大法寶)108	 of	 the	 Chinese	 revolution.	 In	1934	and	1935,	the	First	Front	Army	relied	on	united	front	work	to	solve	problems	during	 the	Long	March.	The	Fourth	Front	Army	also	 adopted	 this	method	 in	 the	Sichuan-Shaanxi	 Revolutionary	 Base.109	 When	 the	 Party	 considered	 occupying	Ningxia	and	Gansu,	it	believed	naturally	that	the	united	front	approach	would	help.	The	 local	warlords	 in	Gansu,	Qinghai,	 and	Ningxia	were	Muslim	Hui	 people,	 and	thus,	 the	 Party	 adopted	 the	 slogan,	 “Independent	Hui	 People”	 according	 to	 their	understanding	 of	 China’s	 ethnic	 problems.	 Together	with	 other	 slogans,	 such	 as	“Against	 the	 Japanese,”	 and	 “Down	 with	 Chiang	 Kai-shek,”	 the	 Party	 Center	believed	 that	Gansu	 local	warlords	might	 find	 cooperation	with	 the	Communists	attractive.110		 	 The	 Communists	 attempted	 to	 negotiate	 with	 Gansu	 local	 warlords	 by	 two	means.	An	 indirect	means	was	 to	ask	Zhang	Xueliang	and	Shaanxi	warlord,	Yang	Hucheng	 楊虎城	 (1893-1949),	who	had	already	built	an	alliance	with	the	CCP,	to	persuade	the	Ma	brothers	to	stop	fighting	with	the	WRA.	A	more	direct	means	was	to	negotiate	with	enemy	commanders	on	the	battlefield.	The	Party	Center	believed	that	 if	 the	 Red	 Army	 could	 destroy	 a	 certain	 number	 of	Ma	 Buqing’s	 troops,	 he	would	agree	to	make	peace	with	them.111	 After	the	Xi’an	Incident,	the	Party	Center	had	 greater	 hopes	 for	 Zhang	 and	 Yang’s	 influence	 on	 the	 Ma	 brothers. 112																																																									107	 For	more	about	the	Chinese	Communist	Party’s	“united	front”	policies	in	the	1930s,	see	Lyman	Van	Slyke,	Enemies	and	Friends:	The	United	Front	in	Chinese	Communist	History.	California:	Stanford	University	Press,	1967.	A	more	recent	study	about	the	“united	front	work”	is	Managing	Transitions:	
The	Chinese	Communist	Party,	United	Front	Work,	Corporatism,	and	Hegemony	by	Gerry	Groot	(New	York:	Routledge,	 2004).	Due	 to	 its	much	 longer	 time	 span	 (from	1930	 to	 the	mid-1990s)	 and	 its	focus	 on	 minor	 parties	 and	 groups,	 Groot’s	 book	 does	 not	 dedicate	 much	 to	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 CCP	 and	 the	 local	 warlords	 in	 the	 1930s.	 Yang	 Kuisong’s	 work	 (2010)	 provides	insights	into	changes	in	the	CCP’s	opinions	about	cooperation	with	local	warlords	after	the	Seventh	World	Congress	of	the	Comintern	in	1935.	108	 The	“three	great	teachings”	of	Chinese	revolution	are	united	front	 統一戰線,	armed	struggle	 武
裝鬥爭	 and	 construction	 of	 the	 Party	 黨的建設.	 This	 concept	 first	 appeared	 in	 the	 “Addressing	Words”	of	Communists	 共產黨人	 written	by	Mao	Zedong	in	1939.	 	109	 Sima	 Lu	 司馬璐,	 Hongjun	 Changzheng	 yu	 Zhonggong	 neizheng	 紅軍長征與中共內爭	 (Red	Army’s	Long	March	and	Chinese	Communist	internal	power	struggle).	Taipei:	Zilian	chubanshe	 自
聯出版社,	1985,	p.	149.	110	 “Zong	zhengzhibu	guanyu	wajie	yu	zhengqu	baijun	guanbing	gongzuo	jueyi	(cao	an)	 總政治部
關於瓦解與爭取白軍官兵工作決議	（草案）	（1936 年 6 月 27 日）”	(A	draft	decision	of	the	General	Political	 Department	 on	 disorganizing	 and	 gaining	 the	 whites,	 on	 June	 27,	 1936),	 in	 SMHF,	 pp.	546-548.	111	 Cable	16.	112	 Cable	58.	
	48	Simultaneously,	the	WRA	initiated	united	front	work	immediately	after	it	crossed	the	 Yellow	 River.	 In	 addition	 to	 regular	 methods,	 such	 as	 propaganda	 and	mobilization,	 a	 seemingly	 effective	 way	 was	 to	 send	 captured	 enemy	 soldiers	home.113		 	 Ironically,	when	the	Communists	attempted	to	“unify”	these	Hui	warlords	under	the	 slogan	 of	 “Down	 with	 Chiang	 Kai-shek,”	 the	 CCP	 leadership	 was	 actually	conducting	 secret	 talks	 with	 Chiang,	 in	 which	 the	 WRA	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	important	issues.	 		 	 All	of	these	attempts	to	negotiate	with	Gansu	local	warlords	proved	to	be	in	vain.	It	did	not	 take	 the	Party	Center	 long	 to	 realize	 that	Zhang	and	Yang	were	not	as	friendly	 with	 the	 Ma	 brothers	 as	 they	 had	 once	 imagined.114	 On	 the	 battlefield,	despite	 the	 Reds’	 friendly	 gestures,	Ma	 Buqing	 resumed	 his	 attacks	 after	 a	 brief	truce,	 and	 committed	 more	 troops	 to	 the	 conflict.	 The	 method	 of	 negotiating	directly	ended	with	no	effect.	 		 	 Talks	with	 the	Nanjing	government	were	also	 fruitless.	According	 to	 the	Party	Center’s	telegram	to	the	WRA	on	January	25,	1937,	Chiang	promised	to	allow	the	Red	Army	to	be	stationed	in	the	region	to	the	west	of	Liangzhou.115	 It	was	not	long	before	he	changed	his	mind	and	asked	the	WRA	to	stay	in	just	two	cities,	Liangzhou	and	 Suzhou.116	 This	 promise,	 however,	 proved	 to	 have	 little	 effect.	 On	March	 8,	when	 the	negotiation	between	 the	CCP	 representative,	 Zhou,	 and	 the	Nationalist	representative,	Gu	Zhutong	 顧祝同	 (1893-1987),	was	about	to	end,	Gu	personally	sent	 a	 telegram	 to	 Ma	 Bufang	 to	 ask	 him	 to	 stop	 pursuing	 and	 attacking	 the	WRA.117	 This	telegram	also	was	ineffective,	and	the	Ma	brothers	continued	to	fight	even	after	the	WRA	was	scattered.	Why	was	united	front	work	unsuccessful	on	this	occasion?	 		 	 The	Power	Structure	of	Gansu	in	the	1930s		 	 It	is	known	generally	that	although	Chiang	had	nominally	unified	China	after	the	Northern	 Expedition	 in	 1927,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 Nanjing	 government	and	 local	warlords	was	not	 that	of	 ruler	and	 ruled	 in	 the	ordinary	 sense.	Chiang	had	incorporated	warlord	troops	into	the	National	Revolutionary	Army	during	the																																																									113	 For	 instance,	some	of	Ma	Buqing’s	 troops	were	sent	back	after	being	captured	by	 the	WRA	in	the	middle	of	November	1936.	See	Cable	50.	114	 Cable	57.	115	 Cable	65.	116	 Cable	67.	117	 Cable	74.	
	 49	Northern	Expedition,	but	the	structure	of	their	forces	remained	the	same,	and	few	leaders	 were	 replaced.	 Indeed,	 they	 only	 changed	 their	 titles.	 Local	 officials	appointed	 by	 the	 Nanjing	 government	 often	 met	 difficulties	 when	 their	administrative	power	conflicted	with	 local	military	power.	A	speech	by	Chiang	in	1929	illustrates	the	relationship	between	the	central	and	local	governments:	“The	local	 governments	 control	 finance.	 They	 purchase	 munitions	 and	 increase	 their	troops	without	the	central	government’s	approval.	The	central	government	cannot	intervene	in	the	local	governments’	affairs.	In	contrast,	the	local	governments	who	have	 military	 power	 put	 pressure	 on	 the	 central	 government.”118	 The	 Nanjing	government’s	rule	over	Gansu	was	no	exception.		 	 To	some	extent,	it	was	the	Nanjing	government’s	intention	that	Gansu	remain	in	such	a	semi-independent	state.	Chiang	was	not	eager	to	put	this	region	under	his	direct	control,	because	of	the	 limited	capability	of	the	central	government.	At	the	time,	the	central	government’s	priority	was	to	control	politically,	economically,	and	culturally	 significant	 regions,	 in	 order	 to	 consolidate	 its	 rule.	 It	 had	 insufficient	resources	to	pay	attention	to	other	regions.	Gansu,	Qinghai,	and	Ningxia	were	far	from	the	center	of	authority.	More	importantly,	the	local	warlords	in	those	regions	were	much	less	powerful	than	were	those	of	other	provinces,	such	as	Yan	Xishan	
閻錫山	 (1883-1960)	 in	 Shanxi	 and	 Li	 Zongren	 李宗仁	 (1891-1969)	 in	 Guangxi,	so	 they	 did	 not	 threaten	 the	 central	 government.	 The	 policy	 Chiang	 adopted	 in	these	regions	was	that	as	long	as	the	local	warlords	acknowledged	the	authority	of	the	Nanjing	 government,	 they	 could	 enjoy	 considerable	 independence.	 From	 the	late	1920s	 to	 the	mid-1930s,	 several	warlords	competed	 for	power	 in	 the	Gansu	region.119	 During	 periods	 of	 power	 vacuums,	 the	 local	 gentry	 and	 strongmen	expressed	 a	 desire	 for	 the	 central	 government	 to	 exert	 its	 influence	 to	 end	 the	turbulence	in	Gansu.	Chiang,	however,	left	it	to	the	various	local	forces	to	sort	out	their	power	struggles,	rather	than	dispatch	large	numbers	of	troops	to	occupy	the	region.120																																																									118	 Chiang	Kai-shek 蔣介石,	“Zhongguo	guomindang	disanci	quanguo	daibiao	dahui	kaimu	ci	 中國
國民黨第三次全國代表大會開幕詞（1929 年 3 月 15 日）”	(Openning	speech	for	the	Third	National	Congress	 of	 the	Kuomintang,	 on	March	15,	 1929),	 in	Qin	Xiaoyi	 秦孝儀,	 ed.,	Xian	 zongtong	 Jiang	
gong	 sixiang	yanlun	 zong	 ji	 先總統蔣公思想言論總集	 (Collection	of	 the	 late	President’s	 thoughts	and	speeches),	Volume	10.	Taipei:	Zhongyang	wenwu	gongyingshe	 中央文物供應社,	1984,	p.	382.	119	 Both	Feng	Yuxiang	 馮玉祥	 (1882-1948)	and	Yang	Hucheng	controlled	Gansu	for	some	time,	and	Hui	warlord	Ma	Fuxiang	 馬福祥	 (1876-1932)	was	also	an	active	competitor.	120	 Liu	Jin	 劉進,	Zhongxin	yu	bianyuan:	Guomindang	zhengquan	yu	Gan	Ning	Qing	shehui	 中心與邊
緣：國民黨政權與甘寧青社會	 (The	 center	 and	 margin:	 the	 Kuomintang	 regime	 and	 society	 in	
	50		 	 This,	however,	did	not	mean	that	Gansu	and	other	provinces	in	Northwest	China	were	unimportant	 to	 the	Nanjing	 government.	As	 Japanese	 invaders	 approached	the	 Chinese	 heartland,	 it	 became	 increasingly	 important	 to	 exploit	 and	 control	Northwest	China.	 In	1931,	Shao	Lizi	 邵力子	 (1882-1967),	a	senior	official	 in	 the	Nationalist	Party,	was	appointed	as	the	provincial	governor	of	Gansu.	After	Shao’s	period	of	governance	ended	 in	 failure,	 the	military	 leader,	Zhu	Shaoliang	 朱紹良	(1891-1963)	 replaced	 him	 in	 1933.	 The	 appointments	 of	 both	 Shao	 and	 Zhu	underscore	the	central	government’s	endeavor	to	consolidate	 its	rule	over	Gansu	while	 still	 having	 no	 intention	 to	 control	 it	 with	 full	 force.	 Meanwhile,	 local	warlords	 continued	 to	 enjoy	 their	 independence	 under	 the	 Nationalists’	 unified	banner.	 		 	 This	was	the	power	structure	of	Gansu	when	the	WRA	entered	the	region	in	late	1936.	After	the	WRA	crossed	the	Yellow	River,	they	travelled	through	the	territory	controlled	 by	 Ma	 Buqing	 and	 then	 went	 into	 western	 Gansu,	 a	 vast	 region	controlled	 by	 Ma	 Bufang.	 The	 Ma	 brothers	 neither	 felt	 threatened	 by	 Japanese	invasion,	nor	were	they	capable	of	challenging	the	central	government’s	authority.	They	 had	 their	 own	 independent	 kingdom	 in	 Chiang’s	 regime,	 so	 none	 of	 the	Communists’	slogans,	such	as	“Against	the	Japanese,”	“Down	with	Chiang	Kai-shek,”	and	 “Independent	 Hui	 people,”	 were	 attractive	 to	 them.	 A	 truce	 between	 the	Communists	 and	 the	 Ma	 brothers	 would	 take	 place	 only	 if	 the	 following	 two	preconditions	were	met.	First,	 the	Ma	brothers	would	need	 to	be	 convinced	 that	the	 Red	 Army	 was	 determined	 to	 pass	 through	 their	 region,	 rather	 than	 stay	indefinitely,	 and	 second,	 the	Nationalists’	 Central	Army	would	not	 enter	 into	 the	regions	controlled	by	the	Ma	brothers	in	the	wake	of	the	Red	Army.	As	long	as	one	of	the	above	preconditions	was	not	met,	the	basic	interests	of	local	warlords	were	threatened.	For	these	reasons,	no	united	front	work	method	could	be	effective.		 	 As	 for	 the	 ineffectiveness	 of	 negotiations	 with	 the	 Nationalist	 central	government,	 a	 reasonable	 explanation	 is	 that	 annihilating	 the	 WRA	 in	 western	Gansu	was	 consistent	with	 the	 common	 interests	 of	 the	 central	 government	 and	local	warlords.	As	 a	powerful	 force	 that	made	up	one-fourth	of	 the	Communists’	military	 power,	 the	 WRA’s	 situation	 in	 western	 Gansu	 lent	 the	 CCP	 significant	leverage	 in	 negotiations	 with	 the	 Nanjing	 government.	 The	WRA’s	 defeat	 was	 a	
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	 51	blow	 for	 the	 CCP	 in	 its	 push	 for	 better	 terms	 in	 the	 negotiation.121	 From	 the	Nationalists’	perspective,	the	more	troops	the	Ma	brothers	killed,	the	stronger	the	Nationalists	became	in	their	negotiations	with	the	CCP.	As	such,	they	did	not	take	seriously	 the	 Communists’	 request	 to	 stop	 the	Ma	 brothers’	 attacks.	 Even	 if	 the	Nanjing	 government	 really	 wanted	 the	 Ma	 brothers	 to	 let	 the	 WRA	 have	 clear	passage,	the	brothers	would	not	have	obeyed	those	orders.122	
1.3.3	Unattainable	Assistance		 	 The	CCP	placed	great	hope	in	securing	military	assistance	from	the	Soviet	Union.	The	Party	Center’s	need	for	heavy	weapons	became	clear	after	it	paid	a	high	price	when	 fighting	 against	 the	 solid	 blockhouses	 Chiang	 built	 in	 the	 Jiangxi	 Soviet	Region	during	the	fifth	encirclement	campaign	in	1934.	This	is	reflected	in	cables	sent	 to	 the	 Comintern	 in	 June	 and	 August	 of	 1936.	Mao’s	 list	 of	 needs	 included	“planes,	heavy	artillery,	shells,	infantry	rifles,	anti-aircraft	machine-guns,	pontoons	and	 so	 on,”123	 and	 in	 August,	 he	 emphasized	 planes	 and	 heavy	 artillery	 again,	together	with	 Soviet	 personnel	 to	 fly	 the	 planes	 and	 operate	 the	 artillery.124	 As	mentioned	before,	Mao	was	determined	to	let	his	troops	secure	the	Soviet	Union’s	assistance.	However,	on	October	18,	he	heard	from	the	Comintern	that	“the	goods	are	 not	 as	 many	 as	 you	 requested…	 and	 there	 would	 be	 no	 planes	 or	 heavy	artillery…”125	 The	 difference	 between	 Mao’s	 expectation	 and	 the	 reality	 was	enormous,	 and	 it	 might	 explain	 why	 Mao	 agreed	 that	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	receive	 the	 assistance.	 Although	not	 as	 generous	 as	 expected,	 the	 Soviet	Union’s																																																									121	 The	close	relationship	of	situations	 in	battlefields	and	negotiations	was	obvious	 in	the	case	of	Shanchengbao	Battle.	The	articles	the	Nationalists	raised	after	the	battle	were	different	with	those	before	the	battle	and	were	favourable	for	the	Communists.	See	Yang	Kuisong	 楊奎松,	Shiqu	de	jihui?	
Kangzhan	 qianhou	 Guo	 Gong	 tanpan	 shilu	 失去的機會 ?	 抗戰前後國共談判實錄 	 (A	 lost	opportunity?	A	record	of	the	negotiations	between	the	Nationalists	and	the	Communists	before	and	after	the	Anti-Japanese	War).	Beijing:	Xinxing	chubanshe	 新星出版社,	2013,	pp.	39-40.	During	the	negotiations	 after	 the	 Xi’an	 Incident,	 the	 CCP’s	 leadership	worried	 that	 the	WRA’s	 failure	would	bring	negative	effects	to	the	Communists’	upper	hand	in	the	negotiation.	See	Cable	63;	Cable	66.	122	 There	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 deny	 the	 existence	 of	 ethnic	 animosity,	 but	 in	 the	 particular	 period	discussed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 ethnic	 animosity	 was	 not	 a	 major	 contributing	 factor	 to	 the	 tension	between	the	WRA	and	the	Ma	brothers.	123	 “Jimiteluofu	gei	Sidalin	de	xin	 季米特洛夫給斯大林的信（1936年 7月初於莫斯科）”	(Dimitrov’s	letter	 to	 Stalin,	 in	 early	 July	 1936,	Moscow),	Liangong	 (bu),	 Gongchan	 guoji	 yu	 Zhongguo	 suweiai	
yundong	(1931-1937)	 聯共（布）、共產國際與中國蘇維埃運動（1931-1937）(Communist	Party	of	the	 Soviet	Union	 (Bolshevik),	 the	Comintern	 and	China’s	 soviet	movements,	 1931-1937).	Beijing:	Zhonggong	zhongyang	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共中央黨史出版社,	2007,	pp.	223-229.	 	124	 Cable	17.	125	 “Gongchan	guoji	 zhiweihui	 shujichu	zhi	Zhonggong	zhongyang	 shujichu	dian	 共產國際執委會
書記處致中共中央書記處電（1936 年 10 月 18 日）”	 (A	 letter	 of	 the	 Comintern	 Secretariat’s	Executive	to	the	CCP	Secretariat,	on	October	18,	1936),	quoted	in	Yang	Kuisong,	2010,	p.	238.	
	52	assistance	 was	 still	 attractive	 to	 the	 WRA,	 who	 lacked	 winter	 clothes	 and	ammunition.	 The	 WRA’s	 Military	 Committee	 sent	 several	 telegrams	 to	 ask	 that	“bullets	 and	 fur	 clothes”	 be	 sent	 soon,	 and	 asked	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 to	 send	assistance	to	Gansu	rather	than	to	the	Xinjiang-Gansu	border.126	 However,	none	of	their	requests	were	met.	The	Soviet	Union	would	have	liked	to	assist	the	Chinese	Communists,	but	not	openly.	To	hide	their	actions	 from	international	society,	 the	Soviet	 Union	 bought	 weapons	 from	 other	 countries,	 rather	 than	 providing	Soviet-made	weapons.	Purchase	and	transportation	of	weapons	were	outsourced	to	 a	 foreign	 company,127	 which	 meant	 longer	 delivery	 times.	 The	 WRA	 once	attempted	 to	 go	westward	 directly	 and	 planned	 to	 arrive	 in	 Anxi,	 the	 last	 town	before	they	reached	the	Xinjiang-Gansu	border,	in	early	December	1936.	However,	they	were	informed	that	the	assistance	would	not	be	transported	to	Xinjiang	until	the	following	February,128	 so	they	had	to	remain	in	the	Hexi	Corridor	for	the	entire	winter.	 		 	 The	WRA	also	 had	 expected	 assistance	 from	 the	 other	 parts	 of	 the	Red	Army.	After	 rejecting	 the	WRA’s	 request	 for	 reinforcements	 repeatedly,	 in	March	1937,	the	 Party	 Center	 decided	 to	 establish	 a	 “Rescuing	 Army	 for	 the	 Western	 Route	Army”	 (Yuan	 xi	 jun	 援西軍,	 hereafter	 RAWRA),	 to	 help	 the	 remaining	 troops	 in	western	 Gansu.	 The	 RAWRA	 consisted	 of	 the	 Fourth	 and	 Thirty-first	 Armies.	Nonetheless,	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 doubt	 that	 the	 Party	 Center	 truly	 wanted	 these	troops	to	approach	western	Gansu.	At	 the	time,	 the	WRA	already	hovered	on	the	brink	of	collapse.	Their	ammunition	was	almost	depleted	and	they	were	besieged	by	 their	 enemy.129	 At	 the	 time,	 branches	 of	 the	 RAWRA	 had	 only	 just	 departed	from	Chunhua	 淳化 in	Shaanxi	Province,	which	was	at	least	1,200	kilometers	from	the	WRA.	Given	 their	 frequent	radio	communications,	 the	Party	Center	definitely	would	 have	 known	 that	 the	 reinforcements	 from	 Chunhua	 could	 not	make	 it	 in	time	to	help	the	WRA.	Complicating	matters	further	was	the	fact	that	the	CCP	was	in	 the	 middle	 of	 negotiations	 with	 the	 Nationalist	 Party,	 and	 thus,	 making	large-scale	 military	 arrangements,	 such	 as	 sending	 a	 large	 force	 to	 Gansu,	 was	obviously	 inappropriate.	 The	 Party	 Center	 understood	 this	 clearly.	 These	 two																																																									126	 Cable	51.	127	 Yang	Kuisong	 楊奎松,	“Sulian	da	guimo	yuanzhu	zhongguo	hongjun	de	yici	changshi	 蘇聯大規
模援助中國紅軍的一次嘗試”	 (An	 attempt	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 to	 provide	 the	 Chinese	 Red	 Army	large-scale	assistance),	Jindaishi	yanjiu	 近代史研究,	1995(1),	pp.	254-269.	128	 Cable	54.	129	 Cable	71.	
	 53	considerations	 might	 explain	 why	 the	 RAWRA	 stopped	 marching	 and	 stayed	 in	Zhenyuan	 鎮原,	 a	 town	 only	 250	 kilometers	 away	 from	 their	 departure	 point.	Thus,	 it	 is	 safe	 to	conclude	 that	 the	reason	 that	 the	RAWRA	was	established	was	not	to	rescue	the	WRA.	Instead,	it	was	designed	to	increase	the	pressure	on	Chiang,	and	force	him	order	the	Ma	brothers	to	stop	attacking	the	Red	Army,	and	also	to	prevent	commanders,	 comrades,	and	soldiers	 from	condemning	 the	Party	Center	for	not	sending	reinforcements	to	the	WRA.	Their	first	objective	was	impossible	to	achieve,	 as	 explained	 above.	 However,	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 RAWRA	 did	console	those	aligned	with	the	Communist	camp	at	the	time.	 		 	 Interestingly,	 at	 almost	 the	 same	 time	 that	 the	 RAWRA	 was	 established,	 the	Party	 Center	 sent	 telegrams	 to	 the	 WRA,	 blaming	 them	 again	 for	 not	 defeating	their	enemies.	In	a	telegram	sent	on	March	4,	1937,	the	Party	Center	said,	“Leaders	of	the	WRA	did	not	rely	on	their	own	power	to	conquer	all	difficulties,	to	destroy	enemies,	 and	 to	 accomplish	 their	 tasks.”	 The	 Party	 Center	 attributed	 the	WRA’s	mistakes	further	to	their	political	errors,	and	asserted	that	“the	WRA	leaders	had	committed	errors	of	right-deviationist	retreatist	opportunism,	the	same	errors	as	the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 had	 committed	 when	 they	 built	 the	 alternative	 Central	Committee”.130	 The	 WRA	 Headquarters	 defended	 itself	 by	 arguing	 that	 it	 “was	firmly	carrying	out	the	correct	line	of	the	Party	Central	Committee,”	while	claiming	that	it	had	never	conducted	“Guotao	Errors”	(Guotao	cuowu	 國燾錯誤,	i.e.,	splitting	the	Party).131	 When	Xu	recollected	the	WRA’s	operations	fifty	years	later,	he	said	that,	at	the	end	of	February	1937,	“failure	was	then	certain,	and	the	circumstances	[for	military	advantage]	had	gone.”132	 Although	fully	aware	of	the	WRA’s	difficult	situation,	 the	 Party	 Central	 Committee	 continued	 to	 criticize	 the	 WRA.	 In	 a	telegram	 sent	 on	 March	 17,	 the	 Central	 Committee	 insisted	 that	 “the	 leaders	always	opposed	the	Party	Central	Committee	and	the	Central	Military	Committee,	and	 that	 this	was	why	 the	WRA	had	 found	 itself	 in	 a	woeful	 predicament.”133	 It	was	obviously	inappropriate	for	the	Party	Center	to	criticize	the	WRA	in	this	way	when	the	troops	were	in	such	a	desperate	situation.	These	telegrams	also	can	be	comprehended	 better	 in	 light	 of	 the	 preparation	 to	 purge	 Zhang	 in	 Yan’an	 (see	Chapter	2),	rather	than	in	the	context	of	the	actual	situation	in	Gansu.	At	the	time,																																																									130	 Cable	70.	131	 	 Cable	73.	132	 Xu	Xiangqian,	1985,	p.	365.	133	 Cable	74.	
	54	although	the	top	commanders	in	Gansu	did	not	know	their	roles	in	purging	Zhang,	and	although	they	were	thousands	of	miles	from	Yan’an,	they	had	indeed	become	a	part	of	the	impending	political	movement.	
1.3.4	The	End	of	the	Western	Route	Army		 	 Since	 January	1937,	when	 the	WRA	moved	 to	Gaotai	and	Linze,	 they	had	been	stranded	in	the	area,	and	reduced	to	wandering	for	two	and	a	half	months.	In	the	middle	of	January,	the	Fifth	Army	was	nearly	annihilated	in	Gaotai,	after	which	the	main	 force	 of	 the	WRA	was	 besieged	 in	Nijiayingzi.	 After	more	 than	 a	month	 of	fierce	 fighting,	 fewer	 than	10,000	 troops	were	 left.134	 On	 February	 27,	 the	WRA	broke	 out	 of	 the	 siege,	 but	 was	 pursued	 closely	 by	 their	 enemy	 and	 forced	 to	engage	 in	 battle	 again.	 After	 another	 ten	 days’	 fighting,	 of	 the	 remaining	 five	regiments,	 seventy	percent	were	wounded	or	 sick.	The	 troops	hid	 in	 thick	 forest	and	 survived	 on	 the	meat	 of	 dead	 horses	 and	mules.135	 On	March	 12,	 the	WRA	fought	 in	 a	 gorge	 called	 Liyuankou	 梨園口 .	 Thereafter,	 Headquarters	 lost	connection	with	all	troops,	except	for	a	few	in	the	Thirtieth	Army.	In	fact,	the	WRA	had	been	disbanded	already.		 	 Two	days	 later,	on	March	14,	1937,	 the	WRA	Military	Committee	convened	 its	last	 conference	 in	 a	mountain	where	 they	were	 hiding,	 and	 decided	 to	 dispatch	Chen	and	Xu	 to	Yan’an,	 accompanied	by	a	 team	of	 guards.	The	 remaining	 troops	were	 divided	 into	 three	 guerrilla	 teams,	 among	 which	 only	 the	 team	 led	 by	 Li	Xiannian	 arrived	 at	 the	 Xinjiang-Gansu	 border	 and	 met	 Chen	 Yun	 陳 雲	(1905-1995),	one	of	the	CCP	representatives	from	the	Comintern	who	took	charge	of	delivering	munitions	to	the	Red	Army.	Thereafter,	this	team	of	420	troops	went	to	 Dihua	 迪化 	 (now	 Urumqi).	 The	 Xinjiang	 government	 claimed	 they	 were	recruited	 from	 China	 proper	 to	 build	 roads	 in	 Xinjiang,	 but	 actually	 they	 took	classes	on	Marxist	theory	and	military	techniques	in	Dihua.136	 Over	the	following	two	years,	these	survivors	were	transported	to	Yan’an	in	several	groups.	 		 	 According	 to	 the	CCP’s	official	 statistics,	 of	 the	22,000	 troops	who	crossed	 the																																																									134	 Qin	Sheng,	2011,	pp.	352-359.	135	 Cable	72.	136	 Teng	Daiyuan	 滕代遠,	 “Huiyi	 fu	Xinjiang	yingjie	Hong	Xilujun	he	chengli	Balujun	zhu	Xinjiang	banshichu	 qingkuang	 回憶赴新疆迎接紅西路軍和成立八路軍駐新疆辦事處情況”	 (Recollection	 of	welcoming	 the	 WRA	 and	 establishing	 the	 Eighth	 Route	 Army	 Agency	 in	 Xinjiang),	 in	 Zhongguo	
gongnong	 hongjun	 zuo	 zhidui	 zai	 Xinjiang	 中國工農紅軍左支隊在新疆	 (The	 Left	 Branch	 of	 the	Chinese	Red	Army	of	Workers	and	Peasants	in	Xinjiang).	Urumchi:	Xinjiang	renmin	chubanshe	 新
疆人民出版社,	1991,	p.	40.	
	 55	Yellow	River	in	October	1936,	more	than	7,000	were	killed	on	the	battlefields,	and	approximately	11,000	were	captured	or	drifted	around	in	western	Gansu.	Some	of	the	 captives	 escaped	 from	 the	 Ma	 brothers’	 control	 after	 the	 Communists	 and	Nationalists	began	 their	 second	official	 round	of	 cooperation.137	 In	 the	 following	years,	 approximately	 4,000	 members	 of	 the	 former	 WRA	 entered	 Yan’an	 by	various	means.138	 Although	more	than	half	of	its	troops	survived,	the	three	armies	that	 consisted	 of	 the	 WRA—the	 Fifth,	 Ninth,	 and	 Thirtieth	 Armies,	 no	 longer	existed.	This	marked	the	end	of	the	WRA.	 		 	 Since	 they	 first	met	 in	Maogong	 in	 June	 1935,	 competition	 between	Mao	 and	Zhang	had	been	a	major	issue	for	the	Party.	The	competition	was	not	determined	solely	 by	 Mao’s	 and	 Zhang’s	 respective	 military	 power,	 but	 was	 definitely	 a	significant	 factor.	 When	 they	 met	 in	 Maogong,	 the	 First	 Front	 Army	 had	 only	10,000	troops,	while	the	Fourth	Front	Army	had	80,000.	Over	the	next	12	months,	however,	 they	had	 very	different	 experiences.	 The	Party	Center	 led	by	Mao,	 and	the	 First	 Front	 Army,	 which	 settled	 in	 north	 Shaanxi,	 developed	 quickly.	 After	failed	attempts	to	take	over	Chengdu	and	the	surrounding	towns,	the	other	Party	Center	led	by	Zhang	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army	were	stationed	in	Tibetan	regions	in	 western	 Sichuan,	 where	 conscripting	 soldiers	 was	 extremely	 difficult	 due	 to	sparse	settlement,	as	well	as	geographic,	logistical,	and	cultural	factors.	Combined	with	harsh	natural	conditions,	by	October	1936,	when	the	main	forces	of	the	Red	Army—the	First,	Second	and	Fourth	Front	Armies—joined	in	Huining,	fewer	than	40,000	 troops	 remained	under	Zhang’s	 control.	Meanwhile,	 the	First	Front	Army	had	grown.139	 Five	months	later,	when	the	22,000	troops	of	the	WRA	had	largely	been	decimated,	the	impasse	in	the	balance	of	power	between	Mao	and	Zhang	was	resolved	 completely.	 Even	 more	 importantly,	 however,	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 WRA																																																									137	 See	Dong	Hanhe	 董漢河,	“Guanyu	Xilujun	shi	yanjiu	zhong	de	jige	wenti	 關於西路軍史研究中
的幾個問題”	(On	some	issues	of	the	WRA’s	history),	Gansu	shehui	kexue	 甘肅社會科學,	1980(1),	pp.	67-73.	138	 Zhang	Wentian	 張聞天,	“Guanyu	Xilujun	shibai	de	jiaoxun	yu	fan	Guotao	luxian	 關於西路軍失
敗的教訓與反國燾路線（1937 年 11 月 24 日）”	(Lessons	drawn	of	the	WRA’s	failure,	oppose	to	the	Guotao	 Line,	 on	November	 24,	 1937).	 Hao	 Chengming	 郝成銘	 and	 Zhu	 Yongguang	 朱永光,	 eds.,	
Zhongguo	 gongnong	 hongjun	 Xilujun	 (diaocha	 yanjiu	 juan)	 中國工農紅軍西路軍（調查研究卷）	(The	WRA	of	 the	Chinese	Red	Army	of	Workers	and	Peasants:	 research).	Lanzhou:	Gansu	renmin	chubanshe,	2009,	p.	649.	139	 There	 is	no	exact	number	of	 the	Red	Army	 in	Shaanxi	 in	October	1936.	 Some	scholars	belive	there	 are	 about	 20,000	 troops.	 See	 姜任耕	 Jiang	 Rengeng,	 “Guanyu	 Changzheng	 jieshu	 hou	 de	Hongjun	 renshu	 wenti	 關於長征結束後的紅軍人數問題”	 (The	 number	 of	 the	 Red	 Army	 troops	after	 the	 Long	 March),	 Jiangxi	 daxue	 xuebao	 (shehui	 kexue	 ban)	 江西大學學報（社會科學版）,	1983(3),	pp.	86-88.	
	56	provided	 Mao	 and	 his	 supporters	 with	 a	 perfect	 excuse	 to	 launch	 a	 purging	campaign	against	Zhang.	 In	 fact,	 in	 late	March,	when	the	remaining	 troops	of	 the	WRA	were	still	 conducting	guerilla	warfare	 in	 the	Qilian	Mountains,	Mao	and	his	supporters	had	already	prepared	themselves	to	deal	with	the	problem	of	Zhang.	
Conclusion		 	 This	chapter	dealt	with	the	divergences	and	conflicts	between	the	Fourth	Front	Army	and	 the	Party	Center	during	 the	period	 from	June	1935	 to	April	1937,	and	focused	on	the	establishment	and	defeat	of	the	WRA.		 	 Cooperating	 to	 secure	 the	 Soviet	 Union’s	 military	 assistance	 was	 a	 plan	 that	would	have	benefitted	both	sides,	but	due	to	movements	of	the	Nationalist	Central	Army	and	other	changing	situations,	this	plan	was	not	conducted	as	conceived	in	August	1936.	Since	September	1936,	both	 the	Party	Center	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army	 had	 rearranged	 troops	 according	 to	 their	 own	 interests.	 As	 the	 Party	 had	already	nominally	reunified,	theoretically	speaking,	both	the	Party	Center	and	the	Red	Army	Headquarters	headed	by	Zhu	and	Zhang	were	able	to	direct	the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	operations,	which	complicated	further	the	contradiction	in	directives	that	the	operational	commanders	received.		 	 It	was	under	 these	 circumstances	 that	 the	WRA	was	 established	 and	began	 to	march	westward	 to	 Xinjiang.	 Due	 to	 the	 complicated	 relationship	 that	 has	 been	analyzed	previously,	the	Party	Center	and	the	WRA	commanders	made	a	number	of	 inaccurate	evaluations	of	 the	situation	on	 the	ground,	and	 furthermore,	 to	 the	detriment	 of	 the	WRA,	 these	 evaluations	 failed	 to	 be	 corrected	 through	 normal	decision-making	processes.	As	 a	 result,	 the	WRA	was	defeated	utterly	by	 the	Ma	brothers’	 troops	 in	 Gansu.	 This	 failure	 also	 meant	 that	 Mao’s	 military	 strength	finally	overwhelmed	 that	of	Zhang,	 and	provided	 the	pretext	Mao	had	 long	been	looking	for	to	purge	Zhang.		 	 There	 is	one	aspect	of	 the	 friction	between	 the	Shaanxi	 and	 the	Sichuan	Party	Centers,	or	between	the	Party	Center	and	the	WRA,	that	historians	cannot	afford	to	ignore.	That	 is	 the	attempts	on	the	part	of	both	sides	to	evaluate	the	other	side’s	work.	Each	 side	had	 its	 own	discourse	 to	 interpret	what	had	happened	and	was	happening,	and	competition	between	the	two	incompatible	discourses	featured	in	their	 battle	 for	 intra-Party	 power.	 Specifically,	 during	 the	 period	 of	 separation,	both	sides	spared	no	efforts	to	define	the	other	side	as	illegal,	in	order	to	legitimize	its	 own	 status	 as	 the	 real	 “Party	 Center.”	 When	 they	 did	 negotiate,	 both	 sides	
	 57	worked	 to	 prove	 that	 their	 plans	were	 correct.	When	 the	WRA	 fought	 in	 Gansu,	both	 sides	 argued	 that	 the	 other	 should	 take	 responsibility	 for	 the	 WRA’s	disadvantageous	 situation	 on	 the	 battlefields.	 As	 will	 be	 shown	 in	 the	 next	 two	chapters,	the	Shaanxi	Party	Center	won	this	competition,	and	during	the	Mao	era,	Zhang	was	depicted	as	a	traitor	who	led	the	WRA	to	their	deaths,	while	the	WRA	was	portrayed	as	a	practitioner	of	the	so-called	“Zhang	Guotao	Line.”	 		 	
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Table	1-1	The	Right	Route	Army	and	the	Left	Route	Army	(August	3,	
1935-September	10,	1935)140			 The	Central	Red	Army	 	
(The	First	Front	Army)	 The	Fourth	Front	Army	
Leadership	 Chief	Commander:	Zhu	De	Chief	Political	Commissar:	Zhou	Enlai	 	Chief	of	Staff:	Liu	Bocheng	 	 Chief	Commander:	Xu	Xiangqian	Deputy	Commander:	Wang	Shusheng	Political	Commissar:	Chen	Changhao	
The	Right	
Route	Army		Commanders:	Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao	
The	First	and	Third	Armies	 The	Fourth	and	Thirtieth	Armies*	Note:	 1.	 The	 First	 and	 Third	 Armies	used	 to	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 First	Army	 Corps	 and	 the	 Third	 Army	Corps.	 The	 titles	 were	 changed	 in	July	1935.	2.	 The	 Party	 Center	 was	 with	 the	Right	Route	Army.	3.	 After	 the	 split	 between	 Mao	 and	Zhang,	 the	First	Army	and	 the	Third	Army	marched	to	the	Shaanxi-Gansu	Soviet	 Region	with	 the	 Party	 Center	led	by	Mao.	
Note:	After	the	split	between	Mao	and	Zhang,	Chen	Changhao	and	Xu	Xiangqian	 led	 the	 Fourth	 and	Thirtieth	 Armies	 back	 to	 Zhang’s	camp.	
The	 Left	
Route	Army	 		Commanders:	Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao	
The	Fifth	and	Thirty-second	Armies	 The	 Ninth*,	 Thirty-first,	 and	Thirty-third	Armies	Note:	1.	 In	 July	1935,	the	Fifth	Army	Corps	 and	 the	 Ninth	 Army	 Corps	 of	the	 First	 Front	 Army	 were	reorganized	 into	 the	 Fifth	 and	Thirty-second	Armies.	2.	After	 July	1936,	 the	Thirty-second	Army	 accompanied	 the	new-established	 Second	 Front	 Army	to	the	Shaanxi-Gansu	borders.	3.	 In	 January	 1936,	 the	 Fifth	 Army	combined	with	the	Thirty-third	Army	of	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 and	became	a	new	Fifth	Army.	
Note:	 In	 January	 1936,	 the	Thirty-third	Army	combined	with	the	 Fifth	 Army	 of	 the	 First	 Front	Army	 and	 became	 a	 new	 Fifth	Army*.	
*	The	armies	that	later	formed	the	Western	Route	Army			
																																																									140	 Military	History	Institute	of	PLA	Military	Science	Academy,	ed.,	1987,	pp.	263-283;	Appendix,	Table	48.	 	
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Table	1-2	The	First	Front	Army,	the	Second	Front	Army	and	the	Fourth	Front	
Army	(October	1936)141		
The	First	Front	Army	 	Commander/Political	Commissar:	 	Peng	Dehuai	
The	First	Army	Corps	The	Fifteenth	Army	Corps	The	Twenty-eighth	Army	 	
The	Second	Front	Army	
	Chief	Commander:	He	Long	 	Political	Commissar:	Ren	Bishi	 	
The	Second	Army	Corps	 	The	Sixth	Army	Corps	The	Thirty-second	Army	
The	Fourth	Front	Army	
	 	Chief	Commander:	Xu	Xiangqian	 	Political	Commissar:	Chen	Changhao	 	
The	Fourth	Army	The	Fifth	Army	The	Ninth	Army	 	The	Thirtieth	Army	 	The	Thirty-first	Army	
																		
																																																									141	 Military	History	Institute	of	PLA	Military	Science	Academy,	ed.,	1987,	Appendix,	Table	63.	
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Table	1-3	The	Western	Route	Army	(November	1936-April	1937)142		Chief	Commander:	Xu	Xiangqian	 	Political	Commissar:	Chen	Changhao	Deputy	Commander:	Wang	Shusheng	 	Chief	of	Staff:	Li	Te	 	Director	of	Political	Department:	Li	Zhuoran	
The	Fifth	Army	 	
	Commander:	Dong	Zhentang	 	Political	Commissar:	Huang	Chao	 	
The	Thirteenth	Division	 	The	Fifteenth	Division	
The	Ninth	Army	
	Commander:	 Sun	 Yuqing;	 Wang	Shusheng	(after	Sun	died)	Political	Commissar:	Chen	Haisong	
The	Twenty-fifth	Division	 	The	Twenty-seventh	Division	 	
The	Thirtieth	Army	
	 	Commander:	Cheng	Shicai	 	Political	Commissar:	Li	Xiannian	 	
The	Eighty-eighth	Division	 	The	Eighty-ninth	Division	
Others	 The	Calvary	Division	The	Women’s	Independent	Regiment	The	 Special	 Service	 Regiment	 (Tewu	
tuan	 特務團)	The	 Instructor	 Regiment	 (Jiaodao	
tuan	 教導團) 	
																																																								142	 Military	History	Institute	of	PLA	Military	Science	Academy,	ed.,	1987,	Appendix,	Table	67.	
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Chapter	2:	Constructing	a	Consensus	on	the	Western	
Route	Army’s	History	in	the	Yan’an	Period	
Introduction	The	last	chapter	indicated	that,	as	early	as	the	time	during	which	the	WRA	was	still	fighting	 in	 Gansu,	 there	 emerged	 two	 distinct	 interpretations	 about	 the	 WRA’s	failure.	The	WRA	Headquarters	 insisted	 that	 the	Party	Center	had	overestimated	their	capability	and	offered	confusing	directives.	The	Party	Center	argued	that	the	WRA	 had	 committed	 so-called	 “errors	 of	 line”	 (luxian	 cuowu	 路線錯誤).	 This	chapter	 investigates	 the	process	during	which,	 in	 the	several	years	 following	 the	WRA’s	defeat,	the	Party	Center’s	interpretation	of	the	WRA	emerged	victorious	and	gained	consensus	within	the	Party.	Through	this	case,	this	chapter	will	reveal	the	methods	 by	 which	 Mao’s	 camp	 succeeded	 in	 suppressing	 other	 historical	narratives,	and	maintaining	a	firm	hold	in	interpreting	Party	history.	 		 	 For	Mao,	 the	 power	 of	 interpreting	 Party	 history	 had	 twofold	 significance.	 On	the	one	hand,	highlighting	his	opponents’	mistakes	was	one	of	the	crucial	ways	in	which	Mao	secured	more	administrative	and	military	power	within	the	Party.	Only	after	 his	 opponents	 were	 forced	 to	 bear	 certain	 historical	 blame	 could	 Mao	eliminate	 their	 influence	 and	 take	 over	 their	 forces.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	formation	of	Mao’s	image	as	a	(or	the	only)	practitioner	of	the	correct	political	line,	or	 in	 other	words,	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 “Maoist	myth,”	 as	 Dorrill	 defined	 it,1	 was	critical	 to	Mao’s	 rule	over	 the	Party.	 It	was	by	promoting	a	 series	of	 such	myths	that	 Mao	 and	 his	 Party	 theorists	 created	 so-called	 “Mao	 Zedong	 Thought,”	 and	made	it	the	accepted	“sinicization	of	Marxism.”	Based	on	the	two	points	above,	it	is	fair	 to	 say	 that	 Party	 history	 played	 an	 important	 role	 for	 Mao	 in	 realizing	 the	union	of	organizational	power	and	political	ideology.		 	 Mao’s	criticism	of	his	opponents	and	his	supporters’	praise	co-occurred;	 in	the	case	 of	 the	WRA,	when	Zhang	was	 condemned	 for	 having	 sacrificed	 the	WRA	 to	endorse	his	 incorrect	 political	 line,	 the	myth	 that	Mao	had	 correctly	 pointed	out																																																									1	 According	 to	 William	 F.	 Dorrill,	 the	 major	 elements	 of	 the	 “Maoist	 myth”	 included:	 (1)	 Mao’s	successful	 leadership	 of	 the	 practical	 movement	 since	 the	 Zunyi	 conference;	 (2)	 his	 gradual	displacement	 of	 all	 opposition	 groups	 in	 the	 Party;	 (3)	 his	 increasing	 independence	 from	 the	influence	of	Moscow;	(4)	his	growing	stature	as	the	party’s	leading	military	strategist;	and	(5)	his	emergence	 as	 a	 Marxist-Leninist	 theorist	 in	 his	 own	 right.	 William	 F.	 Dorrill,	 “Transfer	 of	Legitimacy	in	the	Chinese	Communist	Party:	Origins	of	the	Maoist	Myth”,	in	John	Wilson	Lewis,	ed.,	
Party	Leadership	and	Revolutionary	Power	in	China.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1970,	pp.	69-113.	
	62	Zhang’s	 errors	 formed	 simultaneously.	 The	 case	 of	 the	WRA	 indicates	 that,	 as	 a	means	 to	 write	 Party	 history,	 this	 dual	 process	 of	 criticizing	 opponents	 while	praising	Mao	was	designed	elaborately,	and	carried	out	from	the	top	down	during	the	Yan’an	period.	The	first	section	of	this	chapter	deals	with	the	process	the	CCP	top	leadership	underwent	in	defining	Zhang’s	errors.	The	second	section	analyzes	how	 the	 top	 leadership’s	 critical	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Zhang	 issue	 became	 a	consensus	among	Party	cadres.	Throughout	the	whole	top-down	process,	the	issue	of	the	WRA	was	the	main	focus	of	debate,	and	its	failure	was	a	significant	factor	in	the	purges	of	Zhang	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army.	
2.1	Verdicts	on	 the	Western	Route	Army:	“The	Final	Breakdown	of	 the	
‘Zhang	Guotao	Line’”		 	 In	late	November	or	early	December	1936,	Zhang	and	Zhu,	who	held	the	titles	of	Chief	 Political	 Commissar	 and	 Chief	 Commander	 of	 the	 Red	 Army,	 respectively,	arrived	at	Bao’an,	 the	small	 town	in	North	Shaanxi	where	the	CCP’s	Party	Center	was	 located.	This	was	 the	 first	 time	since	 the	CCP’s	split	 in	September	1935	that	Zhang	and	Zhu	met	with	the	Party	Center	controlled	by	Mao,	and	it	was	then	that	the	purge	of	Zhang	began	to	be	prepared	in	secret.	 		 	 At	 the	time,	 the	WRA	was	trapped	in	western	Gansu,	and	the	remainder	of	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	troops	had	been	organized	as	the	RAWRA	with	Liu	Bocheng	 劉
伯承	 (1892-1986),	a	senior	commander	whom	Mao	trusted,	as	 the	head.	By	 that	time,	Zhang	had	lost	his	control	over	military	power.	Therefore,	the	preparation	on	an	organizational	level	to	purge	Zhang	was	comparatively	easy.	Consequently,	the	friction	between	Zhang’s	and	Mao’s	camps	during	this	period,	as	 this	section	will	show,	 occurred	 primarily	 as	 a	 result	 of	 theoretical	 issues.	 Although	 Zhang	 was	certain	to	lose	his	power	within	the	Party	leadership,	there	was	still	space	for	him	to	struggle,	because	whether	he	would	come	back	to	power	in	the	future	depended	on	how	the	Party	Center	defined	the	errors	he	had	committed.	 	
2.1.1	Debates	in	Defining	Zhang	Guotao’s	Errors		 	 During	 this	 period,	 Mao	 published	 no	 words	 condemning	 Zhang,	 but	 let	 then	Chief	 Director	 of	 the	 CCP’s	 Propaganda	 Department,	 He	 Kequan	 何克全	 (or	Kaifeng	 凱豐)	(1906-1955),	be	his	spokesman.	There	were	significant	differences	between	 the	 two	sides	 in	defining	Zhang’s	 alleged	 “errors.”	These	were	 reflected	
	 63	primarily	 in	 two	 materials—the	 self-critical	 material	 Zhang	 submitted	 to	 the	Central	 Committee	 in	 February	 1937	 and	 He’s	 lengthy	 article,	 “What	 are	 the	Divisions	between	the	Party	Central	Committee	and	the	Guotao	Line?”2	 		 	 In	 his	 article,	 He	 analyzed	 and	 criticized	 Zhang	 and	 his	 “wrong	 line”	 from	thirteen	 perspectives.	 Indeed,	 He	 provided	 such	 a	 comprehensive	 criticism	 that	almost	 all	 of	 Zhang’s	 “revolutionary	 activities”	 were	 included.3	 However,	 by	careful	 comparison	of	Zhang’s	 self-criticism	and	He’s	 criticism,	one	can	 find	 that	the	 heart	 of	 their	 debate	 was	 twofold,	 and	 that	 the	major	 effort	 on	 the	 part	 of	Mao’s	 side	 was	 to	 emphasize	 the	 seriousness	 and	 naegative	 impacts	 of	 Zhang’s	errors.		 	 The	 first	 and	most	 significant	disagreement	was	whether	Zhang’s	errors	were	“errors	of	 line.”	Since	 the	6th	National	Congress	of	 the	CCP	 in	1928,4	 committing	“errors	of	line”	had	been	one	of	the	most	serious	mistakes	one	could	make	within	the	Party.	In	Zhang’s	opinion,	he	did	commit	some	mistakes,	but	they	were	merely	tactical	errors,	rather	than	“errors	of	line.”5	 According	to	He,	the	nature	of	Zhang’s	errors	 needed	 no	 discussion.	 He	 entitled	 his	 article,	 “the	 Guotao	 Line”	 (Guotao	
luxian	 國燾路線),	 and	 defined	 it	 as	 “a	 particular	 type	 of	 right-deviationism	(youqing	zhuyi	 右傾主義),	warlordism	(junfa	zhuyi	 軍閥主義)	and	banditry	(tufei	
zhuyi	 土匪主義).”6	
																																																								2	 According	to	He	Kequan’s	biographer,	He’s	writing	was	 inspired	by	his	discontent	with	Zhang’s	self-criticism.	See	Zhang	Xuelong	 張學龍,	Kaifeng	zhuan	 凱豐傳	 (Biography	of	Kaifeng),	Nanchang:	Baihuazhou	wenyi	chubanshe	 百花洲文藝出版社,	2010,	p.	148.	 In	 fact,	publishing	such	an	article	criticizing	a	high-rank	leader	could	not	be	He’s	personal	decision.	He’s	article	made	a	preliminary	verdict	on	Zhang	Guotao	on	behalf	of	Mao.	3	 He	 Kequan	 criticized	 Zhang	 Guotao	 on	 the	 following	 points:	 assessment	 of	 the	 recent	 political	situation,	military	strategies,	 issues	of	marching	north	or	south,	 the	unity	of	 the	First	Front	Army	and	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army,	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 Red	 Army	 and	 Soviet	 Governments,	revolutionary	bases,	 the	policies	 of	 eliminating	 counterrevolutionaries,	 construction	of	 the	Party,	ethnic	problems,	 the	national	united	 front,	 the	relationship	between	national	 revolution	and	 land	revolution,	and	the	relationship	between	the	Party	and	Soviet	Union	and	the	unity	of	the	Party.	See	Kaifeng	(He	Kequan),	“Dang	zhongyang	yu	Guotao	luxian	fenqi	zai	nali	 黨中央與國燾路線分歧在哪
裡”	(What	are	the	divisions	between	the	Party	Central	Committee	and	the	Guotao	Line?),	in	Sheng	Xueren	 盛學仁,	 ed.,	Zhang	Guotao	wenti	 yanjiu	 ziliao	 張國燾問題研究資料	 (Materials	 for	 studies	on	Zhang	Guotao	issue).	Chengdu:	Sichuan	renmin	chubanshe	 四川人民出版社,	1982,	pp.	23-72.	4	 The	6th	National	Congress	of	CCP	was	held	in	Moscow	from	July	to	August	1928.	5	 Zhang	Guotao,	 “Cong	xianzai	kan	guoqu	 從現在看過去”	 (Think	about	 the	past	 from	the	present	perspective),	in	Sheng	Xueren,	ed.,	1982,	p.	608.	Zhang	argued	this	point	in	a	remarkably	subtle	way.	He	admitted	that	he	had	misunderstood	the	Central	Red	Army’s	retreat	from	the	Jiangxi	Soviet	Base	in	1934	and	the	military	failure	during	the	Long	March,	wrongly	deeming	them	to	be	errors	of	line.	He	 said,	 “Tactical	 and	 partial	 errors	 should	 not	 be	misinterpreted	 as	 errors	 of	 line”.	 In	 this	way,	although	he	did	not	make	the	nature	of	his	own	errors	clear,	he	succeeded	in	suggesting	that	they	were	not	errors	of	line.	6	 Kaifeng,	in	Sheng	Xueren,	ed.,	1982,	p.	23.	
	64		 	 The	 other	 significant	 difference	 between	 Zhang’s	 and	 Kai’s	 assessments	 was	whether	Zhang’s	errors	had	been	rectified.	Zhang	insisted	in	his	self-criticism	that	there	 was	 no	 division	 between	 him	 and	 the	 Party	 Center	 after	 the	 December	Conference	was	held	and	the	December	Solution	 issued.7	 Thus,	regardless	of	how	serious	his	mistakes	were,	they	lasted	for	less	than	four	months,	from	September	1935	to	December	1935.8	 In	contrast,	in	He’s	opinion,	Zhang’s	erroneous	line	was	persistent	 and	 still	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 after	 it	rejoined	the	Central	Red	Army	in	October	1936.	 		 	 These	disparate	accounts	of	Zhang’s	errors	explain	why	the	WRA	and	its	defeat	were	important	in	Mao’s	rebuttal	of	Zhang.	The	WRA	moved	to	western	Gansu,	a	barren	 region	 far	 from	 the	 battlefields	 of	 the	 Chinese	 troops	 and	 the	 Japanese	invaders.	Therefore,	the	WRA’s	actions	were	ostensibly	in	accord	with	Mao	and	his	supporters’	 condemnation	 of	 Zhang’s	 errors	 as	 being	 retreatism,	 or,	 more	specifically,	 avoiding	 fighting	 with	 powerful	 enemies	 and	 instead	 retreating	 to	relatively	 safe	 areas.	 The	WRA	 became	 a	 convenient	 source	 of	 evidence	 for	 the	existence	 of	 Zhang’s	 retreatist	 policies,	 and,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 provided	 an	excellent	excuse	to	purge	him.	As	long	as	the	WRA	could	be	proven	to	have	been	carrying	 out	 the	 so-called	 “Zhang	 Guotao	 Line,”	 its	 defeat	 could	 prove	 that	 the	“wrong	 line”	 was	 still	 causing	 the	 Red	 Army	 harm,	 and	 therefore,	 a	 large-scale	purge	was	warranted.		 	 In	 the	 article,	 which	 was	 published	 in	 March	 1937,	 He	 wrote	 explicitly	 that	Zhang	held	political	views	different	from	those	of	the	Party	Center,	and	it	was	on	the	basis	of	 these	views	that	Zhang	ordered	WRA	troops	 to	go	 farther	west	after	they	 arrived	 in	 Gansu.	 According	 to	 He,	 the	WRA	was	 to	 retreat	 to	 the	western	region	to	preserve	military	power.9	 This	was	the	first	attempt	by	Mao’s	supporters	to	connect	the	WRA	with	the	“Zhang	Guotao	Line”	officially.	 		 	 To	describe	the	WRA	and	its	defeat	as	a	“product	of	the	Zhang	Guotao	Line”	was	not	easy.	As	has	been	argued	in	Chapter	1,	the	establishment	of	the	WRA	was	due	to	 the	CCP’s	need	 for	military	assistance	 from	the	Soviet	Union,	Zhang	Xueliang’s	fickle	cooperation	with	the	CCP	in	its	efforts	to	secure	the	Soviet	Union’s	assistance,	as	well	 as	 to	 the	 splits	within	 the	 Party	 and	 the	 Red	 Army.	 To	 interpret	 such	 a	complex	 situation	 as	 Zhang’s	 errors	 of	 line	 was	 not	 convincing.	 Actually,	 as	 the																																																									7	 The	December	Conference	referred	to	the	Wayaobao	Conference,	which	held	in	December	1935.	8	 Zhang	Guotao,	in	Sheng	Xueren,	ed.,	1982,	pp.	605-610.	9	 Kaifeng,	in	Sheng	Xueren,	ed.,	1982,	pp.	23-72.	
	 65	second	 part	 of	 this	 chapter	 will	 show,	 it	 took	 the	 CCP	 leadership	 months	 to	persuade	Party	members	and	Red	Army	commanders,	especially	the	Fourth	Front	Army	commanders,	that	the	WRA’s	defeat	represented	the	failure	of	the	so-called	“Zhang	Guotao	Line.”		 	 To	compensate	 for	 the	weakness	of	 some	of	 the	claims	made	 in	his	article,	He	adopted	other	means	to	bolster	his	judgment	of	Zhang.	At	approximately	the	time	that	the	article	was	published,	He	convened	a	series	of	secret	meetings	to	arrange	the	 impending	 purge,	 and	 all	 attendees	were	 expected	 to	 participate	 actively	 in	criticizing	Zhang.10	 It	is	likely	that,	as	a	part	of	the	arrangement,	He	disseminated	the	views	written	in	his	article	to	these	leaders	of	opinion	in	the	Party	and	the	Red	Army,	and	let	them	exert	influence	on	other	people.		 	 When	the	Party	Center,	led	by	Mao,	was	ready,	it	held	a	conference	to	launch	its	large-scale	purge.	
2.1.2	The	Yan’an	Conference	and	its	Resolution		 	 The	Yan’an	Conference	was	an	enlarged	conference	of	the	Politburo	of	the	CCP.11	In	the	last	five	days	of	the	conference,	participants	focused	on	discussing	the	errors	that	Zhang	had	committed.	Convening	an	enlarged	conference	to	criticize	a	Party	leader’s	mistakes	showed	how	determined	Mao	and	his	allies	were	to	elevate	this	issue	to	a	new	height.	 		 	 Accessible	 materials	 on	 the	 Yan’an	 Conference	 include	 official	 chronological	biographies	 of	 Mao,	 Zhang	 Wentian,	 and	 other	 CCP	 leaders,	 as	 well	 as	 Zhang’s	memoirs.	In	addition	to	these,	more	noteworthy	are	excerpts	of	conference	records	released	 in	a	book	printed	privately	by	a	group	of	retired	researchers	at	 the	CCP	Central	 Archives. 12 	 There	 is	 a	 vast	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 CCP’s	 official	publications,	 and	 Zhang’s	 recollection	 of	 the	 Yan’an	 Conference,	 even	 on	 certain	basic	 issues,	 such	 as	 the	 procedure	 and	 participants.13	 Considering	 that	 Zhang																																																									10	 Zhang	Guotao,	2004,	volume	2,	pp.	495-496.	11	 This	conference	convened	from	March	23	to	March	31,	1937	(March	25	was	an	adjournment	day).	12	 These	excerpts	of	conference	recordings	were	compiled	in	Lantai	gaocun	 蘭臺稿存	 (edited	by	Tian	 Fenglu	 田逢祿,	 printed	 in	May	 2005).	 Tian	 Fenglu	 is	 the	 former	 office	 administrator	 of	 the	Central	 Archives,	 and	 once	 took	 part	 in	 the	 compilation	 of	 Selected	 Works	 of	 Mao	 Zedong	 and	
Chronological	 Biography	 of	 Mao	 Zedong.	 All	 articles	 in	 Lantai	 gaocun	 were	 written	 by	 retired	researchers	of	the	Central	Archives,	including	Geng	Zhonglin,	Qi	Deping,	and	others.	 	13	 For	 example,	 according	 to	 the	 official	 chronological	 biography	 of	 Zhang	 Wentian,	 a	 total	 of	fifty-six	 Party	 leaders	 attended	 this	 conference.	 See	 Zhang	 Peisen,	 ed.,	 Volume	 1,	 2000,	 p.	 441.	Zhang	Guotao	said	there	were	only	twenty	some	attendees,	most	of	whom	were	students	at	Kangda	and	many	Politburo	members,	 including	Zhou	Enlai,	Bo	Gu,	Wang	 Jiaxiang	 and	Ren	Bishi	did	not	
	66	recalled	this	event	decades	later,	and	the	CCP	Party	historians	made	a	considerable	number	of	changes	when	compiling	the	conference	speeches	into	publications,	the	conference	records	that	were	released	without	any	official	supervision	provide	an	independent	perspective.14		 	 As	 this	 privately	 released	 material	 shows,	 a	 total	 of	 sixty	 senior	 cadres	 and	commanders	attended	the	Yan’an	Conference,	and	thirty-one	of	them	spoke.	Most	speeches	 denigrated	 Zhang	 and	 his	 main	 supporters	 in	 Yan’an.15	 Each	 of	 the	attendees	recalled	their	work	experience	and	personal	contact	with	the	criticized,	and	made	arguments	based	on	their	recollections.16	 Some	speakers’	made	barbed	and	sarcastic	remarks.	He	Long,	for	example,	said:	“Once	I	was	a	warlord.	Now	I	am	a	 Communist	 Party	member.	 I	 became	 a	 Communist	 after	 being	 a	 warlord.	 You	have	retrogressed	 from	being	a	Communist	 to	become	a	warlord.	 I	 am	definitely	more	 progressive	 than	 you!	 Your	 trick	 is	 no	 more	 than	 what	 the	 most	unenlightened	warlord	of	Sichuan	would	have	done.”17	 Arguments	such	as	 these	bolstered	the	Party	Center’s	reasons	to	purge	Zhang.		 	 Indeed,	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 the	 cadres’	 speeches	 at	 the	 Yan’an	 Conference	were	 influenced	 to	 varying	 degrees	 by	 the	 careful	 preparations	 of	 Mao	 and	 his	colleagues.	 On	 March	 25,	 mid-way	 through	 the	 conference,	 Zhang	 Wentian	 and	Mao	 sent	 a	 telegram	 to	 Zhou	 Kun	 and	 Yuan	 Guoping,	 who	 then	 headed	 the	Qingyang	Infantry	School.18	 The	telegram	directed	them	to	“commence	discussion																																																																																																																																																																			attend.	See	Zhang	Guotao,	2004,	p.	504.	 	14	 There	 are	 two	 reasons	 that	 lead	me	 to	 believe	 that	 the	 excerpts	 of	 conference	 recordings	 in	
Lantai	 gaocun	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 the	 original	 recordings.	 First,	 due	 to	 their	 positions,	 the	compilers	of	Lantai	gaocun	 had	access	 to	 the	CCP’s	original	 conference	 recordings.	 Second,	 these	compilers	 had	 deep	 affection	 for	 Mao.	 In	 fact,	 their	 purpose	 in	 compiling	 such	 a	 book	 was	 to	criticize	 other	 writers	 who	 held	 less	 favorable	 opinions	 about	 Mao.	 Therefore,	 they	 have	 no	motivation	to	fabricate	a	version	of	reference	recordings	in	which	Mao	spoke	less	logically	and	less	reasonably	than	in	the	official	version.	15	 Besides	Zhang,	the	main	targets	for	critism	included	Zhou	Chunquan	 周純全	 (1905-1985),	the	Director	of	the	Political	Department	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	and	He	Wei	 何畏	 (1900-1960),	who	once	held	the	position	of	the	Ninth	Army	commander.	16	 For	 example,	 He	 Long	 criticized	 Zhang	 Guotao	 for	 not	 allowing	 him	 to	 join	 the	 Party	 several	years	earlier,	and	Ren	Bishi	complained	that	one	year	earlier	Zhang	let	the	Second	Front	Army	be	the	vanguard	for	the	Fourth	Front	Army.	17	 Tian	 Zhongqun	 田仲群,	 “Qingsuan	 Zhang	Guotao	 cuowu	de	 yici	 zhongyao	 huiyi—1937	 nian	 3	yue	zhongyang	zhengzhiju	kuoda	huiyi	taolun	Zhang	Guotao	cuowu	wenti	de	qingkuang	jieshao 清
算張國燾錯誤的一次重要會議——1937 年 3 月中央政治局擴大會議討論張國燾錯誤問題的情況介
紹”	 (An	 important	 conference	 on	 reckoning	 Zhang	 Guotao’s	 errors—an	 introduction	 to	 the	discussions	of	Zhang	Guotao’s	errors	in	the	Politburo’s	enlarged	conference	in	March	1937),	in	Tian	Fenglu,	 ed.,	 Lantai	 gaocun	 蘭臺稿存	 (A	 Collection	 of	 Lantai),	 Privately	 published,	 2005,	 pp.	298-299.	Tian	Zhongqun	is	the	collective	penname	of	Tian	Fenglu,	Geng	Zhonglin 耿仲琳	 and	Tang	Qun	 唐群.	 	18	 The	 Qingyang	 Infantry	 School	 (Qingyang	 bubing	 xuexiao	 慶陽步兵學校)	 was	 a	 branch	 of	 the	
	 67	on	 opportunistic	 errors	 of	 the	 Guotao	 line	 immediately	 and	 fully	 expose	 those	errors,	in	order	to	achieve	the	unity	of	the	Party.”19	 The	telegram	shows	that	when	the	 attendees	 were	 discussing	 the	 first	 item	 on	 the	 agenda	 of	 the	 Yan’an	Conference,	 Zhou	 and	 Yuan	 were	 not	 at	 Yan’an.	 Later,	 however,	 when	 Zhang’s	errors	 were	 criticized,	 Zhou	 appeared	 in	 the	 meeting	 room	 and	 clamored	 for	 a	public	 trial	 of	 Zhang.20	 The	 careful	 preparation	 Mao	 and	 his	 allies	 made	 at	 the	Yan’an	Conference	to	purge	Zhang	is	evident.		 	 Mao’s	Speech		 	 Mao	 did	 not	 make	 his	 speech	 to	 discuss	 the	 Zhang	 Guotao	 issue	 until	 the	penultimate	day	of	the	conference.	In	the	conference	records,	Mao’s	speech	is	quite	long,	and	his	style	is	just	like	that	which	Zhang	recalled	decades	later—“Mao	made	an	impromptu	speech	with	giggles	and	a	relaxed	presence.”21	 However,	after	Party	writers	 had	 polished	 the	 recordings,	 compiled	 them	 into	 the	 chronological	biographies	 of	 Party	 leaders,	 and	 issued	 them	 to	 the	whole	 Party,	Mao’s	 speech	was	edited	 into	a	piece	of	 logical	and	convincing	analysis	of	 the	Zhang	 issue,	and	was	 only	 one-tenth	 of	 its	 original	 length.	 This	 revised	 version	 of	 his	 speech	subsequently	became	the	authoritative	assessment	of	Zhang.		 	 At	the	outset	of	the	official	version	of	Mao’s	speech,	he	repudiated	the	so-called	“Zhang	 Guotao	 line”	 totally.	 He	 then	 criticized	 Zhang	 from	 both	 military	 and	political	perspectives.	In	the	CCP’s	discourse,	although	many	military	errors	were	motivated	 by	 political	 errors,	 purely	 military	 mistakes	 were	 always	 considered	forgivable.	 Whether	 an	 error	 was	 politically	 innocent	 or	 not	 depended	 on	 the	intra-Party	political	 situation	at	 the	 time	 the	error	was	 criticized,	 rather	 than	on	social,	 military,	 or	 political	 grounds. 22 	 Obviously,	 in	 Mao’s	 opinion,	 Zhang’s	problem	 was	 not	 limited	 to	 military	 matters.	 Zhang’s	 main	 error	 was	 to	 have	adopted	 an	 “opportunistic	 line.”	 According	 to	 Mao,	 Zhang	 had	 committed	opportunist	errors	for	several	years.23	 This	indictment	of	Zhang’s	political	errors	provided	legitimacy	for	a	large-scale	criticism	of	him.		 	 This	official	version	of	Mao’s	speech	 is	clearly	a	result	of	deliberate	editing.	By																																																																																																																																																																			China	Anti-Japanese	Red	Army	College.	Zhou	Kun	 周昆	 (1902-?)	disappeared	in	1938,	but	there	is	no	evidence	that	Zhou	defected	to	the	KMT.	 	19	 Zhang	Peisen,	ed.,	2000,	p.	441.	20	 Zhang	Guotao,	2004,	p.	506.	21	 Zhang	Guotao,	2004,	p.	505.	22	 The	 defeat	 at	 the	 Jiangxi	 base	 which	 was	 judged	 to	 be	 a	 pure	 military	 error	 at	 the	 Zunyi	Conference	 遵義會議	 during	the	Long	March	is	an	example.	 	23	 Zhonggong	zhongyang	wenxian	yanjiushi,	1993,	p.	666.	
	68	comparing	 it	 with	 the	 conference	 records,	 one	 can	 find	 that	 three	 main	components	were	 deleted,	 including	Mao’s	 accounts	 of	 the	WRA’s	 history.	 In	 his	speech,	Mao	took	the	WRA	as	an	example	 to	argue	that	Zhang	once	deceived	the	Party	 Center	 and	 tried	 to	 control	 the	 Red	 Army	 through	 conspiracy.	 Mao	 said,	“Zhang	intended	to	let	all	troops	cross	the	Yellow	River;	we	did	not	know	this	until	the	three	armies	had	finished	crossing;	we	had	no	choice	but	to	approve.”	A	huge	proportion	of	the	telegrams	that	were	cited	in	Chapter	1	of	this	thesis	indicate	that	this	final	argument	of	Mao’s	is	greatly	at	odds	with	the	facts.	The	Party	historians	would	 have	 been	 unwilling	 to	 leave	 these	 incorrect	 narratives	 to	 be	 challenged.	This	 helps	 explain	 why	 the	 official	 version	 of	 Mao’s	 speech	 at	 the	 Yan’an	Conference	consists	almost	solely	of	conclusions,	and	is	devoid	of	factual	evidence.	A	 further	deletion	was	made	of	Mao’s	 judgment	on	Zhang’s	 errors,	 as	well	 as	on	Zhang’s	 self-criticism.	 Mao	 argued	 that	 Zhang	 had	 committed	 “evil	 errors,”	 and	consequently	 called	on	comrades	 to	 “ruthlessly	expose”	Zhang	and	his	 followers.	The	third	component	that	was	deleted	is	his	sarcastic	remarks	about	Zhang.24	 It	is	likely	that	the	two	sections	above	were	deleted	in	order	to	conceal	the	ferocity	of	intra-Party	power	struggles.	 	
	 	 A	Resolution		 	 On	March	31,	1937,	the	last	day	of	the	Yan’an	Conference,	the	Central	Committee	passed	 the	 “Resolution	 about	 Comrade	 Zhang	 Guotao’s	 Errors”	 (hereafter	“Resolution”).	Based	largely	on	the	definition	of	Zhang’s	mistakes	Mao	gave	in	his	speech,	the	“Resolution”	also	specified	the	origin,	content,	and	harmful	influence	of	those	mistakes.		 	 This	resolution	defined	Zhang’s	errors	officially	as	“Right-opportunist	retreatism	and	 warlordism.”	 In	 the	 words	 of	 the	 “Resolution,”	 the	 essence	 of	 Zhang’s	Right-opportunism	was	 that	 “he	 lost	 the	confidence	 to	defeat	enemies,	 to	build	a	new	 Soviet	 base	 in	 northwestern	 China,	 and	 to	 make	 the	 Soviet	 Red	 Army	 the	leading	 center	 of	 the	 anti-Japanese	 revolutionary	 war;	 instead,	 he	 proposed	retreating	to	the	barren	area	of	western	China.”	Zhang’s	warlordism	was	stated	to	be	his	attempt	to	“build	his	private	network	in	the	Red	Army.”	He	“sought	military																																																									24	 When	 criticizing	 Zhang’s	 empiricism—“not	 believe	 what	 one	 cannot	 see	 with	 one’s	 own	eyes”—Mao	 said,	 “Zhang	 needs	 not	 only	 glasses,	 but	 also	 telescopes	 and	microscopes”.	 If	 cadres	were	 all	 like	 Zhang	 Guotao,	 then	 “nameless	 sores	 would	 emerge	 endlessly”	 (wuming	 zhongdu	
cengchu	 buqiong	 無名腫毒層出不窮).	 When	 dealing	 with	 the	 destructive	 effects	 of	 Zhang’s	thoughts	and	works,	Mao	compared	Zhang	to	the	bandits	in	the	Chinese	novel	Outlaws	of	the	March	(Shuihu	zhuan	 水滸傳)—“Is	Zhang	Guotao	a	Chao	Gai	or	is	he	a	Wang	Lun?”	(Guotao	jiujing	shi	Chao	
Gai	haishi	Wang	Lun?	 國燾究竟是晁蓋還是王倫?)	See	Tian	Fenglu,	ed.,	2005,	pp.	299-301.	
	 69	power	over	the	Party’s	power	[as	by	having	control	of	the	military	power	he	could	go	 on	 to	 gain	 political	 power].”	 Although	 the	 “Resolution”	 stated	 that	 Zhang’s	opportunism	and	warlordism	were	reflected	in	all	of	his	work,	such	as	mass	work	(qunzhong	gongzuo	 群眾工作),	 and	 land	and	economic	policies,	 the	Party	Center	emphasized	the	military	affairs	clearly.	 		 	 As	 for	 Zhang’s	 most	 significant	 error—that	 of	 splitting	 from	 the	 Party—the	“Resolution”	claimed	that	this	error	had	a	much	deeper	and	wider	influence	than	any	 inner-Party	 issue,	 as	 it	 influenced	 not	 only	 the	 Red	 Army,	 but	 also	counteracted	 the	efforts	of	 the	Anti-Japanese	National	United	Front.	 In	 the	Party	Center’s	 opinion,	 although	 Zhang	 had	 changed	 his	 mind	 and	 marched	 north	following	the	Party	Center’s	directive,	he	was	always	unaware	of	the	correctness	of	the	Party	Center’s	line,	and	thus,	his	wrong	line	had	not	diminished.	On	this	point,	the	 actions	 of	 the	WRA	were	 clear	 evidence.	 Therefore,	 the	 “Resolution”	 stated,	“The	main	reason	for	the	WRA’s	march	to	northern	Gansu	and	its	serious	failure	is	that	they	did	not	get	over	the	Zhang	Guotao	Line.”25		 	 As	was	discussed	 in	Chapter	1,	during	 the	period	of	 the	split	 (from	September	1935	to	November	1936),	both	Zhang’s	and	Mao’s	sides	issued	official	documents	to	 declare	 the	 other	 side’s	 identity	 illegal.	 Although	 issued	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	“Party	Center,”	theses	documents	actually	did	not	represent	authoritative	opinions	of	 the	Party.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 resolution	 of	 the	Yan’an	Conference	was	 a	 decision	made	by	 the	united	Party	Center.	After	 reference	 to	 the	 so-called	 “Zhang	Guotao	Line”	 was	 included	 in	 the	 official	 document,	 Zhang	 wrote	 a	 short	 statement	 to	criticize	 the	 lack	 of	 thoroughness	 and	 depth	 of	 his	 earlier	 self-criticism,	emphasizing	that	his	errors	were	“errors	of	line.”	He	said,	“I	declare	the	complete	failure	of	my	wrong	[political]	line	and	that	every	comrade	relentlessly	struggling	with	my	errors	is	an	essential	guarantee	of	the	Bolshevization	of	the	Party.”26	 By	making	 this	 statement	 after	 the	 conflicts	 at	 the	 Yan’an	 Conference,	 Zhang	effectively	admitted	his	defeat	in	the	power	struggles	for	top	leadership,	as	well	as	his	failure	in	the	competition	to	interpret	the	history	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	and																																																									25	 “Guanyu	Zhang	Guotao	 tongzhi	 cuowu	de	 jueyi	 關於張國燾同志錯誤的決議”	 (Resolution	about	Comrade	 Zhang	 Guotao’s	 errors),	 in	 Zhongguo	 renmin	 jiefangjun	 lishi	 ziliao	 congshu	 shenbian	weiyuanhui	 中國人民解放軍歷史資料叢書審編委員會 	 (Committee	 for	 compiling	 historical	materials	of	the	PLA),	in	Gonggu	he	fazhan	Shaan-Gan	suqu	de	junshi	douzheng	 鞏固和發展陝甘蘇
區的軍事鬥爭	 (Consolidate	and	develop	the	military	struggles	in	the	Shaanxi-Gansu	Soviet	Region).	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	2000,	pp.	952-954.	26	 Zhang	Guotao,	 “Guanyu	wo	de	cuowu	 關於我的錯誤”	 (About	my	errors),	 in	Sheng	Xueren,	ed.,	1982,	pp.	611-612;	originally	published	in	Dang	de	gongzuo	 黨的工作,	No.	31	(April	12,	1937).	
	70	the	WRA.	At	that	point,	intra-Party	conflict	then	shifted	to	the	level	of	middle-rank	cadres.	
2.1.3	Mao’s	article,	“Strategic	Issues	of	the	Chinese	Revolutionary	War”		 	 Amongst	official	documents	released	by	 the	CCP,	 the	 first	 interpretation	of	 the	WRA	 appeared	 neither	 in	 He’s	 article	 published	 in	 mid-March	 1937,	 nor	 in	 the	Yan’an	 Conference	 resolution	 issued	 at	 the	 end	 of	 March	 1937.	 Instead,	 it	 was	presented	 in	 an	 article	Mao	 had	written	 some	 four	months	 earlier.	 The	 relevant	content	 in	 this	 article	 may	 have	 been	 revised	 after	 the	 Yan’an	 Conference,	 and	similar	 to	 the	conference’s	resolution,	 this	article	also	played	a	significant	role	 in	disseminating	the	official	interpretation	of	the	WRA	to	ordinary	Party	members.	 		 	 “Strategic	 Issues	 of	 The	 Chinese	 Revolutionary	 War”	 (hereafter	 “Strategic	Issues”)	is	one	of	Mao’s	most	famous	articles,	and	is	regarded	as	“a	work	that	made	a	contribution	to	Marxist	military	theory.”27	 Although	there	is	only	one	sentence	in	this	 article	 that	 assesses	 the	WRA,	 it	was	 taken	 to	be	 the	most	 reliable	basis	 for	Party	historians	to	write	about	the	WRA’s	history.		 	 The	original	version	of	“Strategic	Issues”	was	based	on	Mao’s	lecture	notes	in	the	China	Anti-Japanese	Red	Army	College	(Zhongguo	kangri	hongjun	daxue	 中國抗日
紅軍大學,	or	Kangda	 抗大)28	 from	October	1936	to	December	1936.29	 When	the	lectures	concluded,	mimeographed	single-article	pamphlets	were	made,	and	Mao’s	views	 about	 Chinese	 revolutionary	 war	 were	 circulated	 among	 the	 Red	 Army	commanders.30	 In	February	1941,	the	Military	Politics	Magazine	Press	republished	“Strategic	Issues”	and	subsequently,	that	version	was	reprinted	repeatedly.	
																																																								27	 Zhonggong	 zhongyang	 dangshi	 yanjiushi 中共中央黨史研究室 	 (The	 Central	 Party	 History	Research	Office),	Zhongguo	gongchandang	lishi	 中國共產黨歷史	 (The	CCP’s	history	)(1921-1949),	Volume	1.	Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	2002,	p.	454.	 	28	 The	China	Anti-Japanese	Red	Army	College	was	established	in	Bao’an.	After	the	college	moved	to	Yan’an	in	1937,	its	name	was	changed	to	The	Chinese	People’s	Anti-Japanese	Military	and	Politics	College	 (Zhongguo	 renmin	 kangri	 junzheng	 daxue	 中國人民抗日軍政大學)	 but	 it	 was	 still	 called	Kangda	for	short.	 	29	 In	order	to	lift	the	morale	and	teach	military	and	political	knowledge,	several	CCP	leaders	gave	lectures	there.	See	Cao	Muyao	 曹慕堯,	“Hongse	ronglu:	Yan’an	Kangda	er	qi	de	xuexi	yu	shenghuo	
紅色熔爐：延安抗大二期的學習與生活”	(The	red	furnace:	learning	and	living	in	the	Yan’an	Kangda),	
Dangyuan	zongheng	 黨員縱橫,	1996(6),	pp.	6-7.	30	 He	 Jinnian	 賀晉年,	 “Yongbu	 yunluo	 de	 xing	 永不隕落的星”	 (The	 star	 that	 will	 never	 fall),	 in	zhongyang	 wenxian	 yanjiushi	 中央文獻研究室 	 (CCP	 Central	 Literature	 Research	 Office),	 ed.,	
Mianhuai	 Mao	 Zedong	 緬懷毛澤東	 (Cherish	 the	 memory	 of	 Mao	 Zedong).	 Beijing:	 Zhonggong	zhongyang	wenxian	chubanshe	 中共中央文獻出版社,	1993.	www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/8198/30446/30450/2209759.html	 (last	 visited	 on	 November	24,	2015).	
	 71		 	 At	the	beginning	of	the	1941	version,	there	was	a	note	explaining	the	purpose	of	the	article.	Summarizing	the	experience	 in	the	civil	war,	“it	was	the	outcome	of	a	huge	debate,	and	represented	one	[political]	 line’s	opposing	the	views	of	another	[political]	 line.”31	 Thus,	 this	article	 focused	on	the	different	policies	and	views	of	the	 correct	 vs.	 the	 incorrect	political	 line.	As	 a	 result,	Mao	provided	examples	 in	each	chapter	of	both	the	correct	and	erroneous	political	lines.	In	the	fifth	chapter,	“Tactical	Defense,”	Mao	stated,	“In	the	ten-year	war32	 there	were	two	tendencies:”	one	was	to	underestimate	the	enemy,	while	the	other	was	to	be	frightened	by	him.	The	former	were	identified	as	“leftist”	errors,	and	the	latter	as	rightist	errors.	Mao	used	 the	Hai-Lu-Feng33	 and	 the	 Er-Yu-Wan	 Soviet	 Areas	 as	 examples	 of	 “leftist”	errors.	 The	 WRA	 was	 an	 example	 of	 a	 rightist	 error.	 Mao	 wrote,	 “An	 extreme	example	of	being	frightened	by	the	enemy	is	the	retreatist	Zhang	Guotao	Line;	the	failure	of	the	WRA	on	the	west	bank	of	the	Yellow	River	was	the	final	breakdown	(zuizhong	 pochan	 最終破產)	 of	 this	 political	 line.”34	 This	 argument	 seems	 clear	and	 reasonable,	 and	 serves	 the	 theme	 of	 Mao’s	 article	 well.	 A	 closer	 look	 at	 its	content	and	publication	date,	however,	reveals	a	controversy.	 		 	 Mao’s	 lectures	 on	 tactics	 began	 in	 late	 October	 1936.	 He	 taught	 three	 hours	weekly	 until	 the	 Xi’an	 Incident	 occurred	 in	 December	 1936.	 Consequently,	December	 1936	 has	 always	 been	 taken	 as	 the	 date	 when	 they	 were	 written.	Because	Mao’s	lectures	were	long,	however,	they	must	have	taken	him	some	days	to	prepare.	Considering	the	start	date	of	Mao’s	lectures,	and	the	fact	that	the	WRA	was	mentioned	in	the	middle	lectures,	 it	 is	safe	to	say	that	 if	Mao	did	discuss	the	WRA’s	 failure	 in	 class,	 this	 would	 have	 taken	 place	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 November	1936	 at	 the	 latest.	 By	 that	 time,	 the	 WRA	 had	 lost	 some	 troops	 in	 Gansu,	 but	neither	the	WRA	nor	the	Party	Central	Committee	thought	they	had	lost	the	battle	with	 the	 Ma	 brothers.	 This	 point	 is	 supported	 by	 telegrams	 between	 the	 WRA	Headquarters	and	 the	Party	Center.	Therefore,	 the	 sentences	about	 the	WRA	did	not	appear	in	Mao’s	original	speech,	but	must	have	been	added	to	the	article	later.	Cong	Jin,	a	mainland	scholar,	discussed	this	point	in	a	paper	in	the	early	1980s.	He																																																									31 	 	 Mao	 Zedong,	 Zhongguo	 geming	 zhanzheng	 de	 zhanlue	 wenti	 中國革命戰爭的戰略問題	(Strategic	issues	of	the	Chinese	revolutionary	war).	Huabei	xinhua	shudian	 華北新華書店,	1947,	p.	1.	 	32	 Here	“the	ten-year	war”	refers	to	the	war	between	the	Republic	Government	and	the	CCP	from	1927	to	1937.	33	 The	 Hailufeng	 Revolutionary	 Base	 (海陸豐蘇區)	 was	 established	 in	 1927	 and	 covered	 two	counties,	Haifeng	 海豐	 and	Lufeng	 陸豐,	in	Guangdong	Province.	34	 	 Mao	Zedong,	1947,	pp.	33-34.	
	72	believed	 that	 the	 article	was	 revised	 during	 the	 anti-Zhang	 campaign,	which	 did	not	 begin	 until	 late	March	 1937.35	 Although	 the	 original	mimeographed	 version	has	not	been	found,	Cong’s	view	is	the	most	reasonable	deduction.		 	 Thus	far,	this	section	has	presented	a	process	during	which	the	narratives	about	issues	 that	 related	 to	Zhang,	 including	 the	WRA	 issue,	were	gradually	 simplified.	According	to	accessible	materials,	both	before	and	during	the	Yan’an	Conference,	debates	on	the	Zhang	issue	were	fierce.	Zhang’s	opinion	on	this	issue	was	criticized	vehemently,	 but	 Zhang	 at	 least	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 defend	 himself.	 When	compiled	 into	 official	 conference	 records	 and	 issued	 as	 an	 official	 resolution,	different	 opinions	 about	 how	 to	 define	 Zhang’s	 errors	 were	 erased,	 and	 Mao’s	words,	 much	 revised,	 stand	 alone	 as	 the	 final	 assessment.	 Furthermore,	 when	Mao’s	verdicts	on	the	WRA	were	added	to	his	“Strategic	Issues,”	both	background	and	evidence	were	concealed,	and	readers	were	provided	only	with	a	one-sentence	conclusion.	When	 Chinese	 people	 study	 this	 history,	 the	 first	 thing	 they	 learn	 is	this	extremely	simplified	conclusion.		 	 The	next	 chapter	will	 show	 that	 in	 the	1950s,	Mao	and	his	 secretaries	made	a	number	of	changes	to	“Strategic	Issues,”	as	well	as	Mao’s	other	works,	in	order	to	make	the	dissemination	of	official	historical	narratives	more	effective,	as	well	as	to	maintain	Mao’s	 “great,	 glorious,	 and	 correct”	 image.	 Similar	 to	Mao’s	works,	 the	records	 of	 the	 Yan’an	 Conference	 were	 revised	 as	 well,	 and	 even	 the	 revised	version	was	not	released	until	the	1980s.	Materials	about	debates	between	Zhang	and	 He,	 as	 well	 as	 primary	 records	 of	 the	 Yan’an	 Conference,	 still	 remain	unavailable	 to	most	 readers.	 As	 a	 result,	 Chinese	 readers	 have	 neither	 access	 to	earlier	versions	of	historical	narratives,	nor	to	all	of	the	historical	facts	required	to	draw	any	objective	conclusions.	 In	summary,	 the	Party	concealed	 the	debates	on	historical	interpretations	within	the	top	leadership,	and	in	doing	so,	concealed	the	possibility	that	the	official	interpretation	is	incorrect.		 	 After	 the	 top	 leadership	achieved	a	 consensus	on	 the	Zhang	 issue,	 confronting	the	 Party	 Center	 was	 another,	 and	 even	 more	 serious,	 task.	 This	 task	 involved	making	 the	 verdicts	 on	 Zhang	 common	 knowledge	 to	 all	 senior	 cadres,	 veteran	commanders,	and	ordinary	Party	members	and	soldiers.																																																									35	 Cong	 Jin	 叢進,	 “Dui	 ‘Maoxuan’	zhong	guanyu	Xilujun	de	yige	duanyu	he	yitiao	zhushi	de	bianyi	
對‘毛選’中關於西路軍的一個斷語和一條註釋的辨疑”	(Analysis	of	a	judgment	and	a	note	about	the	WRA	in	Selected	Works	of	Mao	Zedong),	Dangshi	yanjiu	cankao	ziliao	 黨史研究參考資料,	1983(9),	pp.	 27-30.	 The	 journal	 in	 which	 this	 article	 was	 published	 was	 withdrawn	 in	 1983	 because	 of	hign-rank	officials’	intervene	(see	Chapter	4).	 	
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2.2	Constructing	a	Consensus		 	 The	 following	 three	 sections	will	 deal	with	 the	 three	 essential	 steps	 the	 Party	Center	 employed	 to	 force	 cadres	 to	 accept	 its	 verdicts	 on	 the	WRA:	 conducting	purges,	dealing	with	the	after-effects	of	the	purges,	and	requiring	cadres	to	study	Party	history	systematically.	 	
2.2.1	Purges	and	Discontents		 	 Despite	the	Party	Center’s	fierce	criticism	of	Zhang	and	of	the	close	relationship	between	him	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	official	documents	 issued	at	the	Yan’an	Conference	 emphasized	 protecting	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 cadres,	 arguing	 that	they	were	victims	of	Zhang’s	lies.	Then	CCP	Chief	Secretary,	Zhang	Wentian,	said	at	the	 conference	 that,	 “the	 reason	 these	 cadres	 chose	 to	 follow	Zhang	Guotao	was	because	Zhang	applied	his	deceptive	policies,	and	consequently	these	cadres	were	deceived	and	thought	Zhang	was	 the	equivalent	of	 the	Party	Center.”36	 Logically,	Zhang’s	 speech	 and	 other	 documents	 pointed	 out	 firmly	 that	 the	 Fourth	 Front	Army	 and	 the	 Zhang	Guotao	 Line	 should	 be	 treated	 separately.	 In	 their	 opinion,	“Comrade	 Zhang	 Guotao	 should	 take	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 responsibility	 for	 the	mistakes	that	the	Fourth	Front	Army	committed,”37	 and	they	promised	to	“oppose	the	kind	of	view	that	linked	criticism	of	Zhang	Guotao	with	criticism	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army.”	 38	 		 	 If	the	Party	Center	actually	applied	the	principles	above	in	addressing	the	issue	of	Zhang,	 it	would	have	criticized	and	punished	him,	and	no	one	else	would	have	been	involved.	At	the	time,	however,	to	isolate	Zhang	completely	was	impractical,	as	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 still	 included	 a	 considerable	 number	 of	 Zhang’s	supporters	and	followers.	In	this	case,	if	the	Party	Center	could	not	first	eliminate	Zhang’s	 influence	on	 the	Army,	his	purge	might	meet	 resistance.	What	happened	subsequently	 actually	 confirms	 that	 the	 vow	 to	 protect	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	commanders	and	soldiers	was	just	an	empty	promise.	In	fact,	the	Party	Center	took	the	opportunity	to	criticize	Zhang	to	launch	a	movement	against	the	whole	Fourth	Front	Army.	 																																																									36	 Zhang	Wentian,	 “Chuli	Zhang	Guotao	cuowu	ying	zhuyi	de	 jige	wenti	 處理張國燾錯誤應注意的
幾個問題”	(Several	issues	on	dealing	with	Zhang	Guotao’s	errors	that	require	attention)	(on	March	31,	 1937)”,	 in	Zhang	Wentian	 xuanji	 張聞天選集	 (Selected	works	 of	 Zhang	Wentian),	 Volume	 2.	Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	1993,	pp.	229-231.	37	 “Guanyu	 Zhang	 Guotao	 tongzhi	 cuowu	 de	 jueyi”	 (Resolution	 about	 Comrade	 Zhang	 Guotao’s	errors).	38	 Zhang	Wentian,	“Several	issues	on	dealing	with	Zhang	Guotao’s	errors	that	require	attention”.	
	74		 	 The	 Party	 Center	 purged	 the	 senior	 commanders	 and	 lower-range	 cadres	 for	different	 purposes.	 For	 the	 senior	 commanders	 and	 cadres	 who	 had	 personal	connections	with	Zhang,	the	Party	Center	planned	to	force	them	to	reconsider	their	relationship	 with	 him.	 After	 everyone	 stated	 unequivocally	 his	 or	 her	 view	 on	Zhang,	 the	 Party	 Center	 used	 intra-Party	 power	 struggles	 to	 control	 them.	 For	middle-range	and	junior	cadres	and	soldiers,	the	Party	Center	“re-educated”	them,	and	made	 them	accept	 the	Party	 Center’s	 account	 of	 Zhang’s	 errors.	Overall,	 the	Party	Center’s	ultimate	goal	was	to	make	the	majority	of	Zhang’s	supporters	turn	to	 Mao’s	 camp,	 and	 eliminate	 those	 who	 insisted	 on	 supporting	 Zhang.	Consequently,	 although	 the	Party	Center	 claimed	 it	would	not	 hold	other	people	accountable	for	Zhang’s	actions,	nearly	all	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	commanders	and	 soldiers	were	 subjected	 to	 “cruel	 attack	 and	merciless	 struggle”	 (canku	daji,	
wuqing	douzheng	 殘酷打擊，無情鬥爭).39	 		 	 Yan’an	 had	 been	 the	 CCP’s	 political	 center	 since	 the	 Party	 Center	 had	moved	there	 from	Bao’an	 in	 January	1937.	Mao	and	his	 supporters	 launched	 the	official	purge	 against	 Zhang	Guotao	 two	months	 later,	 and	 Yan’an	 naturally	 became	 the	main	stage.	In	Yan’an,	Party	leaders	paid	most	attention	to	Kangda,	because	at	the	time,	a	large	number	of	Red	Army	commanders,	as	well	as	senior	and	middle-range	cadres	were	studying	there.	The	Party	Center	summoned	a	number	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	commanders	 to	Yan’an	to	study	 in	Kangda,	putting	 them	under	 their	direct	 control.	 This	made	 Kangda	 a	 perfect	 place	 to	 promote	 the	 Party	 Center’s	verdict	on	Zhang.	 		 	 According	 to	 Zhang	 Guotao’s	 recollection,	 extensive	 preparation	 was	 made	before	 the	 purge	 began,	 including	 separating	 Red	 Army	 commanders	 and	 other	cadres,	and	arranging	activists	to	be	placed	in	every	study	unit.40	 The	goal	was	to	prevent	cadres	outside	of	the	Red	Army	from	obtaining	knowledge	of	what	really	happened	 within	 the	 Army.	 In	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 the	 purge,	 the	 Political	Department	of	Kangda	held	meetings	for	the	activists	of	each	unit,	explaining	how	to	conduct	the	purge,	and	conveyed	the	Party	Center’s	interpretations	on	Zhang’s	and	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army’s	 errors	 to	 other	 cadres.	 Hong	 Xuezhi	 洪學智	(1912-2006),	 then	Chief	of	 the	Political	Department	 in	 the	Fourth	Army,	recalled	that	 Kangda	 students	were	 told	 that	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	was	 guilty	 of	 three																																																									39	 Originally	 this	 phrase	 was	 used	 to	 criticize	 the	 brutality	 of	 struggles	 within	 the	 Party	 under	Wang	Ming’s	leadership.	 	40	 Zhang	Guotao,	2005,	p.	496.	
	 75	crimes:	 “First,	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 soldiers	 are	 bandits.	 Second,	 the	 Fourth	Front	Army	commanders	are	warlords.	Third,	all	Fourth	Front	Army	commanders	are	 bought	 by	 Zhang	Guotao.”41	 These	 convictions	 indicate	 that,	 at	 the	 time,	 the	policy	 of	 protecting	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 commanders	 and	 soldiers,	 and	separating	 them	 from	 Zhang’s	 errors	 was	 utterly	 contradictory.42	 Fourth	 Front	Army	troops	stationed	at	other	places	experienced	similar	treatment.43	 The	Party	Center	 held	 a	 “struggle	 session”	 for	 Zhang	 in	 May	 1937,	 and	 forced	 all	 senior	commanders	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	including	those	in	Zhenyuan,	to	gather	in	Yan’an	to	attend	the	meeting.	Rather	than	being	protected—as	official	documents	had	 ordered—these	 senior	 commanders	 became	 objects	 of	 the	 struggle	 session.	Labeled	 as	 “Zhang	 Guotao’s	men,”	 their	 comrades	 in	 other	 armies	 ridiculed	 and	humiliated	them.44		 	 The	Fourth	Front	Army	commanders	responded	aggressively	to	the	accusations	above.	 Some	who	were	 studying	 in	Kangda	questioned,	 “If	 Zhang	Guotao	bought	the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	loyalty	after	he	went	to	the	Er-Yu-wan	Revolutionary	base	in	1931,	 then	who	paid	 for	 our	 loyalty	when	we	 joined	 the	Red	Army	 in	1927?”	These	 commanders	 asked	 the	 Politics	 Department	 of	 Kangda	 to	 answer	 these	questions,	but,	not	 surprisingly,	 received	no	answer.	Certain	others	 chose	 to	 flee	from	the	Red	Army.45	 		 	 The	 antagonism	 between	 the	 Party	 Center	 and	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	commanders	 reached	 its	 zenith	when	Xu	 Shiyou	 許世友	 (1905-1985)	 organized																																																									41	 Hong	 Xuezhi	 洪學智,	 Hong	 Xuezhi	 huiyilu	 洪學智回憶錄	 (Memoirs	 of	 Hong	 Xuezhi).	 Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	2002,	p.	128.	42	 When	 it	 came	 to	 the	 last	 stage	 of	 this	 purge,	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 commanders	 were	interrogated	severely.	Heads	of	Kangda,	Luo	Ruiqing	 羅瑞卿	 (1906-1978)	and	Mo	Wenhua	 莫文
驊	 (1910-2000),	personally	led	“struggle	teams”	(douzheng	xiaozu	 鬥爭小組)	to	interrogate	these	commanders	 one	 by	 one,	 to	 force	 them	 to	 answer	 questions	 such	 as	 “Did	 you	 ever	 kill	 people	without	 proper	 reasons?”,	 “Did	 you	 ever	 struggle	with	 landlords	without	 permission?”,	 “Did	 you	ever	 rape	women?”,	 “Did	 you	 ever	 say	 anything	 critical	 of	 the	 Party	 Center?”	 See	 Zhang	 Guotao,	2005,	p.	499.	43	 For	example,	in	the	RAWRA,	which	at	the	time	was	stationed	at	Zhenyuan,	380	kilometers	away	from	Yan’an,	the	commander	Liu	Bocheng	also	mobilized	their	troops	to	criticize	Zhang.	Qin	Jiwei,	a	middle-rank	 officer	 in	 the	 WRA	 who	 was	 captured	 by	 the	 Ma	 brothers	 and	 then	 escaped	 to	Zhenyuan,	 recollected	 in	 his	memoirs	 that	 Liu	 Bocheng	 claimed	 Zhang	Guotao	was	 a	 “poisonous	pill”.	Liu	said:	“This	pill	was	thrown	into	a	well	and	all	comrades	in	the	Fourth	Front	Army	drank	water	from	this	well.	This	is	why	all	these	comrades	need	to	take	a	shower.”	By	“take	a	shower”,	Liu	meant	Zhang	Guotao’s	influence	needed	to	be	eliminated	by	means	of	education	and	“struggle”.	Qin	Jiwei	 秦基偉,	Qin	 Jiwei	huiyilu	 秦基偉回憶錄	 (Memoirs	of	Qin	 Jiwei)	(E-book).	Beijing:	 Jiefangjun	
chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	2002,	p.	57.	44 	 Li	 Jianli	 李建力 	 and	 Lu	 Yanhua	 鹿彥華 ,	 Chuanqi	 jiangjun	 Hu	 Qicai	 傳奇將軍胡奇才	(Legendary	General	Hu	Qicai).	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	wenyi	chubanshe	 解放軍文藝出版社,	2004,	p.	95.	45	 For	 instance,	 on	 the	 same	 day	 as	 Liu	 Bocheng’s	 speech	 mentioned	 above,	 two	 regimental	commanders	and	a	battalion	commander	deserted	at	night.	Qin	Jiwei,	2002	(E-book),	p.	57.	
	76	the	flight	of	a	number	of	commanders	in	April	1937.	Xu	was	the	head	of	the	Fourth	Army,	and	an	influential	figure	among	its	commanders.	While	studying	in	Kangda,	Xu	started	to	make	a	plan	to	go	to	southern	Shaanxi	to	conduct	guerilla	warfare.	Xu	was	successful	in	persuading	thirty-odd	commanders	to	desert	with	him,	including	five	 army	 commanders,	 six	 division	 commanders,	 and	 more	 than	 twenty	regimental	commanders.46	 As	for	Xu’s	motivation,	according	to	the	verdict	issued	by	 the	 Shaan-Gan-Ning	 High	 Court,	 and	 the	materials	 provided	 by	 then	 Chief	 of	Staff	in	Xu’s	army,	Jin	Ye,	Xu	planned	to	flee	primarily	because	he	was	dissatisfied	with	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 resolution	 of	 the	 Zhang	 Guotao	 issue,	 believing	 that	 the	Party	 Center	 took	 this	 opportunity	 to	 disband	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 by	destroying	 army	 units	 and	 commanders	 one	 by	 one. 47 	 According	 to	 Jin’s	recollections,	Xu	insisted	that	Zhang	had	not	committed	retreatist	errors,	and	used	the	 First	 Front	Army	as	 an	 analogy,	 claiming	 that	 if	 Zhang	 and	 the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	departure	from	its	base	in	1934	was	an	“escape,”	then	the	Party	Center	and	the	 First	 Front	 Army	 also	 “escaped”	 the	 Central	 Soviet	 Base	 in	 Jiangxi.	 This	statement	made	Xu	a	“struggle”	target.	Some	commanders	said	that	Xu	was	Zhang’s	spokesman	in	Kangda,	and	therefore,	if	Xu	could	not	be	brought	under	control,	the	struggle	against	Zhang	could	not	be	undertaken	successfully.	Almost	at	 the	same	time,	 the	 deputy	 head	 of	 Xu’s	 army	 committed	 suicide	 because	 of	 the	 constant	purges.	This	incident	forced	Xu	to	decide	to	leave.	 		 	 As	introduced	above,	these	events	reflect	the	political	atmosphere	in	Yan’an	and	the	considerable	pressure	placed	upon	the	Fourth	Front	Army	cadres.	At	the	same	time,	these	events	also	reflect	the	fact	that	the	Party	leaders	faced	an	internal	crisis.	Mao	and	his	 supporters,	however,	were	already	skilled	 in	 conducting	 intra-Party	struggles	and	averting	crises	related	to	power	struggles.	Thus,	this	latest	crisis	was	soon	resolved.	
2.2.2	Carrots	and	Sticks		 	 The	first	measure	the	Party	Center	applied	was	to	separate	the	opponents	who	held	differing	opinions	from	the	Party	Center	concerning	Zhang	Guotao,	the	Fourth																																																									46	 In	the	end,	however,	Xu’s	plan	was	foiled	since	one	of	the	supposed	escapers	revealed	the	escape	plan	to	the	top	official	of	Kangda	and	all	the	participants	were	immediately	arrested.	Li	Yigen	 李意
根,	“Hong	si	fangmian	jun	ganbu	‘gaozhuang	shijian’	shimo	 紅四方面軍幹部「告狀事件」始末”	(The	complaint	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	cadres),	Wenshi	jinghua	 文史精華,	2009(4),	pp.	42-50.	47	 	 Hu	Yongheng	 胡永恆,	“Xu	Shiyou	deng	‘tuoqiang	taopao	an’	shenpan	shimo	 許世友等「拖槍逃
跑案」審判始末”	(The	trial	on	the	defection	of	Xu	Shiyou	and	other	people),	Bolan	qunshu	 博覽群書,	2010(11),	pp.	109-113.	
	 77	Front	Army,	and	the	WRA.	With	the	constant	struggle	sessions	and	criticism,	a	few	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	cadres	took	the	first	steps	in	accepting	the	Party	Center’s	verdicts	on	the	issue	of	Zhang,	and	began	to	join	the	bandwagon	and	criticize	the	Fourth	 Front	 Army	 leaders.48	 Consequently,	 the	 original	 situation	 of	 the	 Party	Center	 vs.	 the	 whole	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 changed,	 as	 a	 number	 of	 Fourth	 Front	Army	commanders	 joined	the	Party	Center	 in	opposing	their	colleagues.	This	not	only	 strengthened	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 position	 in	 this	 confrontation,	 but	 also	informed	 other	 commanders	 that	 they	 actually	 had	 an	 alternative	 other	 than	insisting	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	was	 blameless.	 After	 the	 first	 few	 commanders	turn	 to	 its	 side,	 the	 power	 of	 this	 example	motivated	more	 and	more	 cadres	 to	express	agreement	with	the	Party	Center’s	verdicts.	 		 	 The	 second	measure	was	 the	decision	by	 top	Party	 leaders	 to	 review	 struggle	policies	 and	practices.	After	 the	 ruthless	 struggle	 against	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	commanders,	top	leaders	headed	by	Mao,	criticized	the	radical	way	of	conducting	struggle	 sessions,	 and	 insisted	 on	 the	 “correct	 way”	 to	 purge	 Zhang,	 while	protecting	 other	 commanders	 personally.	 This	 action	 had	 the	 effect	 of	 making	those	who	had	been	purged	believe	 firmly	 that	all	 the	unfair	 treatment	 they	had	suffered	 was	 due	 to	 the	 misconduct	 of	 middle-level	 officers	 rather	 than	 the	intentions	of	the	top	leadership.	Because	of	this	psychological	compensation,	these	commanders	accepted	the	Party	Center’s	verdicts	on	Zhang	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	which	were	in	fact	also	verdicts	on	themselves.	How	the	Party	Center	dealt	with	Xu’s	case	is	an	example.	 		 	 In	 the	CCP’s	system,	 inciting	military	commanders	to	desert	 is	a	serious	crime.	However,	 Xu	was	 sentenced	merely	 to	 one	 year	 in	 jail	 and,	 in	 fact,	was	 released	after	 a	 short-term	 detention.	 There	 is	 a	 popular	 theory	 about	 why	 Xu	 was	 not	punished:	Chairman	Mao	forgave	him.	Xu	wrote	in	an	article	in	1970	that	Mao	had	told	him	face	 to	 face	 that	because	 it	was	 the	Party	Center	who	sent	Zhang	to	 the	Fourth	Front	Army,	Zhang’s	errors	should	be	blamed	on	Zhang	himself	and	on	the	Party	Center,	not	on	cadres	in	the	Fourth	Front	Army.	It	was	not	rare	in	the	CCP’s	history	that	the	 leadership	 let	middle-rank	officials	conduct	 intra-Party	purges	 in	radical	 ways,	 and	 then	 criticized	 and	 corrected	 such	 inappropriate	 behavior	subsequently.	The	effect	of	this	method	was	obvious,	as	almost	all	cadres	who	had	been	 purged	 ruthlessly	 praised	 and	 expressed	 gratitude	 to	 the	 leadership	 after																																																									48	 Zhang	Guotao,	2005,	p.	503.	
	78	they	 were	 “rescued,”	 “liberated,”	 or	 “forgiven,”	 which	 only	 enhanced	 Mao’s	charisma.	 This	 method	 worked	 on	 Xu,	 who	 served	 Mao	 loyally	 in	 the	 following	decades,	 and	 performed	 outstanding	military	 service,	 as	 did	many	 other	 Fourth	Front	Army	cadres.		 	 As	 for	 those	cadres	who	had	a	close	relationship	with	Zhang	Guotao,	 the	Party	Center	applied	the	third	method	to	continue	to	purge	them	until	they	lost	all	power	within	the	Party.	Zhang	deserted	to	the	Nationalist	Party	after	a	yearlong	purge	in	April	 1938.	 He	Wei,	 a	 senior	 commander,	who	was	 also	 a	major	 target	 of	 these	purges,	secretly	left	Yan’an	almost	one	year	earlier.49	 Because	the	CCP	had	already	identified	the	two	as	traitors,	the	Party	Center	no	longer	needed	to	attempt	to	keep	them	under	control	or	woo	their	return.	For	the	other	senior	commanders	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	the	Party	Center	divided	them	into	two	categories,	and	settled	them	in	new	positions	in	two	different	ways.	 		 	 Commanders	 in	 the	 first	 category	 were	 forced	 to	 leave	 the	 politically	 central	institutions,	 and	were	never	again	allowed	 to	 lead	military	operations.	The	Chief	Commissar	of	the	WRA,	Chen	Changhao,	who	was	also	Zhang’s	closest	colleague,	is	one	example.	Chen	wrote	two	confessions	in	1937,	but	still	could	not	win	the	trust	of	 the	 Party	 Center.	 In	 1939,	 Chen	 was	 sent	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 for	 medical	treatment.	After	his	recovery,	he	continued	to	write	to	the	Party	Center	to	ask	to	return	to	China	to	devote	himself	to	the	Party,	but	the	Party	Center	refused	every	time	until	the	PRC	was	established.	Chen	returned	to	China	finally	in	1952,	only	to	be	appointed	as	deputy	director	of	the	Central	Compilation	and	Translation	Bureau	for	Marx’,	 Engels’,	 Lenin’s,	 and	 Stalin’s	Works,	 a	 position	 that	 did	 not	match	 his	former	ranks	within	the	Party	and	the	Red	Army.50	 Another	example	is	Li	Zhuoran	
李卓然	 (1899-1989),	the	WRA’s	commissar	from	March	1937	until	their	defeat.	Li	began	his	 revolutionary	 career	 in	France	as	 early	 as	1921	and	 joined	 the	CCP	 in	1923.	One	of	 the	 few	senior	Party	members	who	had	undergone	regular	military	training,	 Li	 graduated	 from	 the	 famous	 Frunze	 Military	 Academy	 in	 the	 Soviet	Union.	As	the	commissar	of	the	Fifth	Army	Corps,	Li	led	his	troops	in	the	rearguard																																																									49	 About	He	Wei’s	experience	after	his	defect,	there	still	are	different	opinions	in	Mainland	China.	For	instance,	scholars	are	still	uncertain	about	to	what	extent	He	served	the	Nationalist	Party	after	he	left	Yan’an.	See	He	Libo	 何立波	 and	Liu	Yuhai	 柳玉海,	“Bei	lishi	yanmo	de	Hong	Jiujun	junzhang	He	 Wei	 被歷史湮沒的紅九軍軍長何畏”	 (Commander	 of	 the	 Ninth	 Army	 He	 Wei	 who	 has	 been	forgotten	by	history),	Dangshi	bocai	 黨史博采,	2010(12),	pp.	19-22.	50	 Fan	 Qing 范青 ,	 Chen	 Changhao	 zhuan	 陳昌浩傳 	 (Biography	 of	 Chen	 Changhao).	 Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	1993,	p.	308.	
	 79	during	the	Long	March,	protecting	the	Party	Center,	and	more	significantly,	as	one	of	 thirteen	 attendees	 of	 the	 Zunyi	 Conference,	 Li	 supported	 Mao	 firmly	 at	 the	conference.	Despite	this	background,	Li	was	removed	from	military	positions	after	the	WRA’s	 defeat,	 and	worked	 as	 a	 propaganda	 officer	 for	 the	 remainder	 of	 his	life.51		 	 Commanders	in	the	second	category	were	permitted	to	resume	their	careers	in	the	army,	but	in	much	lower	positions.	For	example,	Li	Xiannian,	the	Commissar	of	the	Thirtieth	Army,	was	appointed	as	a	battalion	commander,	a	position	six	ranks	lower	than	his	former	position.52		 	 Relying	on	a	combination	of	carrots	and	sticks,	opposition	to,	or	dissatisfaction	with,	the	way	in	which	the	Party	Center	dealt	with	the	issue	of	Zhang	Guotao	and	the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 was	 suppressed	 successfully. 53 	 The	 Party’s	 efforts	following	the	Yan’an	Conference	legitimized	the	verdicts	issued	at	the	conference	further,	and	by	the	end	of	the	1930s,	the	verdicts	had	already	become	a	consensus	among	the	Fourth	Front	Army	cadres.	
																																																								51	 From	1937,	 Li	 Zhuoran	 served	 as	 director	 of	 Propaganda	Department	 of	 the	 General	 Political	Department,	director	of	Propaganda	Department	of	the	Border	Region’s	Central	Bureau,	director	of	Propaganda	 Department	 of	 the	 Northwest	 Bureau,	 etc.	 See	 Qin	 Chuan	 秦川,	 “Wo	 yanzhong	 de	‘yanwang	dian’	 我眼中的「閻王殿」”	(The	“Palace	of	Hell”	that	I	have	experienced),	in	Ji	Xianlin	 季
羨林,	 ed.,	Women	dou	 jingli	 guo	 de	 rizi	 我們都經歷過的日子	 (The	days	 that	we	 all	 experienced).	Beijing:	Beijing	shiyue	wenyi	chubanshe	 北京十月文藝出版社,	2001,	pp.	181-203.	52	 “Mao	 Zedong	 zanyu	 Li	 Xiannian	 ‘jiangjun	 bu	 xiama’	 毛澤東讚譽李先念「將軍不下馬」	 (Mao	Zedong	praised	Li	Xiannian	as	‘a	general	who	never	got	off	his	horse’)”	on	Zhongguo	gongchandang	xinwen	 中國共產黨新聞	 (News	of	the	Communist	Party	of	China)	http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64172/85038/6198311.html	 (last	 visited	 on	 November	 24,	 2015).	According	to	this	article,	it	was	Mao	Zedong’s	decision	to	change	the	instruction	that	assigned	Li	to	a	battalion	position	and	send	him	to	Central	China	to	be	a	brigade	level	officer.	Also	see	Li	Xiannian	
zhuan	 李先念傳	 (Biography	of	 Li	 Xiannian).	Beijing:	 Zhongyang	wenxian	 chubanshe	 中央文獻出
版社,	2009.	53	 	 If	Chen	Fusheng’s	recollection	in	his	memoirs	are	correct,	what	is	even	more	brutal	is	that	some	of	 former	 WRA	 cadres	 were	 killed	 in	 Yan’an	 by	 Kang	 Sheng	 康生	 and	 the	 Party’s	 security	institution	 under	 his	 control.	 Chen	 Fusheng	 陳復生,	 Sanci	 bei	 kaichu	 dangji	 de	 ren—yige	 lao	
hongjun	 de	 zishu	 三次被開除黨籍的人——一個老紅軍的自述	 (A	 man	 who	 was	 thrice	 expelled	from	the	Party:	memoirs	of	an	old	Red	Army	soldier).	Beijing:	Wenhua	yishu	chubanshe	 文化藝術
出版社,	1992,	pp.	21-28.	However,	as	Gao	Hua	points	out	in	his	book,	there	is	no	further	evidence	to	support	Chen’s	argument.	Interestingly,	no	official	institution	ever	tried	to	clarify	this	argument.	So	whether	WRA	cadres	were	really	killed	by	the	Party	is	still	a	pending	case.	See	Gao	Hua	 高華,	Hong	
taiyang	 shi	 zenyang	 shengqi	 de—Yan’an	 zhengfeng	 yundong	 de	 lailong	 qumai	 紅太陽是怎樣升起
的——延安整風運動的來龍去脈	 (How	 the	 red	 sun	 rises:	 the	 Yan’an	 Rectification	 Movement).	Hong	 Kong:	 Chinese	 University	 of	 Hong	 Kong	 Press	 香港中文大學出版社,	 2000,	 p.	 444.	 Two	high-ranking	 officers	 of	 the	 WRA,	 Huang	 Chao	 黃超	 (1906-1938)	 and	 Li	 Te	 李特	 (1902-1938)	were	killed	in	Xinjiang	in	1938	as	Trotskyites,	but	whether	this	was	related	to	the	purging	of	Zhang	Guotao	is	not	clear.	 	
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2.2.3	Forming	a	Common	Understanding	about	the	Party’s	History		 	 Despite	 the	 sophisticated	 skills	 in	 ideological	 control	 that	 the	 Party	 had	developed	 in	 the	1930s,	 the	 leadership’s	goal	of	 constructing	a	consensus	on	 the	history	 of	 the	 Party	 could	 not	 be	 achieved	 by	 one	 or	 two	 purges	 or	 educational	movements.	In	the	late	1930s,	Mao	was	inspired	by	Stalin’s	official	History	of	the	CPSU,	 which	 was	 published	 in	 1938,	 and	 thereafter	 became	 the	 only	 orthodox	version	 of	 the	 CPSU’s	 turbulent	 past.	 Following	 Stalin’s	 model,	 Mao	 began	 to	expand	the	writing	and	learning	of	Party	history	on	a	larger	scale.		 	 In	 the	early	1940s,	 the	Party	Center	had	good	 reasons	 to	make	 innovations	 in	history	 education.	 In	 addition	 to	 a	 relatively	 stable	 environment,	 the	 Party	members’	 and	 commanders’	 ignorance	 of	 the	 Party’s	 past	 was	 an	 advantage	 in	indoctrinating	certain	ideas.	In	the	preceding	decade,	because	of	the	geographical	separation	of	CCP	revolutionary	bases,	most	cadres	had	limited	knowledge	of	Party	affairs.	When	they	had	the	opportunity	to	 learn	systematically	what	happened	to	the	Party	and	the	Red	Army	for	the	first	time,	they	accepted	the	assessment	of	each	event	 together	with	 the	 relevant	 facts	 selected	 deliberately	 by	 the	 Party	 Center.	The	 methods	 of	 history	 education	 applied	 in	 the	 Yan’an	 Rectification	 Campaign	then	became	the	Party’s	classic	strategy	 for	 ideological	 transformation,	and	were	used	widely	in	political	movements	and	in	everyday	life.	 		 	 From	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 1940s,	 all	 cadres	 and	 Party	members	 were	 forced	often	to	take	part	in	political	movements	during	which	the	official	interpretations	of	 their	experience	were	reinforced	repeatedly.	Every	cadre	also	needed	to	 learn	other	parts	of	Party	history	that	s/he	had	not	witnessed	in	person.	In	this	way,	a	common	understanding	of	Party	history	from	1921	was	built	within	the	CCP,	and	Mao	was	presented	as	the	only	true	successor	to	the	Marxist	revolutionary	legacy	in	China.	
	 	 Party	History	Education	during	the	Yan’an	Rectification	Campaign		 	 The	 WRA	 participants	 and	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 commanders	 found	themselves	having	to	prepare	for	another	large-scale	political	movement	almost	as	soon	as	 they	survived	the	anti-Zhang	movement	 in	Yan’an.	 In	 the	 first	half	of	 the	1940s,	during	the	Yan’an	Rectification	Campaign,	these	cadres,	together	with	other	Party	members	and	military	commanders,	attended	collective	study	sessions	about	Party	history,	recalled	their	personal	experiences,	and	provided	primary	materials	used	to	write	the	official	version	of	Party	History.	How	to	interpret	the	WRA	was	
	 81	no	longer	a	problem	relevant	merely	to	the	Fourth	Front	Army	cadres.	Similarly,	as	a	 system	 of	 knowledge	 about	 Party	 history	 had	 been	 established,	 for	 these	participants,	the	WRA	was	not	merely	a	personal	experience,	but	an	integral	part	of	the	system	for	interpreting	the	Party’s	past.	 		 	 The	Yan’an	Rectification	Campaign	is	famous	for	the	Party	members’	ideological	transformation,	which	 led	directly	 to	 the	 establishment	of	Mao’s	 absolute	power	within	 the	Party.	Allowing	cadres	 to	study	and	 take	part	 in	writing	Party	history	was	an	essential	factor	that	contributed	to	the	movement’s	success.	Some	scholars	have	 argued	 this	 point	 already,	 and	 Party	 historians	 have	 emphasized	 the	extensive	participation	in	writing	history	during	this	period	as	well,	describing	the	Yan’an	period	as	“the	first	flourishing	period	of	the	CCP’s	historiography.”54 		 	 The	Party’s	history	education	system	during	the	Yan’an	Rectification	Campaign	was	 highly	 effective,	 and	 consisted	 of	 three	 levels:	 theories,	 assessments	 of	different	 political	 lines,	 and	 interpretations	 of	 specific	 historical	 events,	 all	 of	which	interacted	with	each	other.	If	a	person	acknowledged	the	authority	of	Mao’s	thought,	 s/he	would	 have	 to	 accept	 the	 verdicts	 on	 different	 “wrong	 lines”	 that	were	made	in	accordance	with	Mao’s	political	theories.	Similarly,	if	one	supported	the	way	in	which	the	Party	Center	assessed	the	“wrong	lines”	in	Party	history,	it	is	self-evident	that	one	also	had	to	agree	with	the	official	assessments	of	events	and	figures	 related	 to	 these	 political	 lines.	 Looking	 at	 the	 procedure	 of	 Party	 history	education	in	Yan’an,	one	can	learn	how	the	three	levels	of	education	worked.	 		 	 When	Mao	and	his	men	began	 to	prepare	 for	 the	Rectification	Campaign,	 they	did	 not	 call	 upon	 the	 whole	 Party	 to	 study	 its	 past	 at	 that	 time.	 Instead,	 they	introduced	their	plan	by	promoting	“Mao	Zedong	Thought,”	through	which	Mao’s	verdicts	 on	 former	 Party	 leadership	were	 presented	 as	 supporting	material.	 For	example,	 when	 Mao	 taught	 dialectical	 materialism	 in	 Kangda,	 he	 related	philosophical	 terminologies	 to	 examples	 in	 Party	 history	 in	 order	 to	 emphasize	“the	danger	of	subjectivism,	dogmatism,	and	empiricism	to	the	revolution.”55	  	 	 When	this	theoretical	preparation	was	completed,	an	enlarged	conference	of	the	CCP	Politburo	(the	“September	Conference”	 九月會議)	was	held	from	September	to	October	1941.	This	conference	was	considered	to	be	the	official	start	to	senior																																																									54	 Zhang	Jingru	and	Tang	Manzhen,	1990,	p.	53.	55	 Jiang	 Jiannong	 蔣建農	 and	Zheng	Guangjin	 鄭廣瑾,	Changzheng	 tuzhong	de	Mao	Zedong	 長征
途中的毛澤東	 (Mao	Zedong	during	the	Long	March).	Beijing:	Hongqi	chubanshe	 紅旗出版社,	1993,	p.	312.	
	82	cadres’	 study	 of	 Party	 History.56	 At	 the	 conference,	 the	 Party	 Center	 decided	 to	build	 “senior	 learning	 groups.”	 All	 cadres	 of	 the	 Party	 Central	 Bureau,	 branched	bureaus,	 and	 provincial	 committees,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Eighth	 Route	 Army,	 and	 the	New	Fourth	Army	commanders	were	required	to	attend	these	learning	groups	to	study	 theories	 and	 Party	 history.57	 Ways	 in	which	 to	 assess	 historical	 problems	was	 the	 focus	 of	 study	 for	 senior	 cadres	 over	 the	 following	 months.	 In	 these	learning	 groups,	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 attention	was	 paid	 to	 the	 Second	 Revolutionary	Civil	War	(1927-1937),	the	most	controversial	period	in	the	CCP’s	history.	Cadres	were	 asked	 to	 recall	 what	 they,	 and	 the	 units	 they	 belonged	 to,	 did	 during	 the	period,	and	“combine	‘studies	on	macroscopic	issues’	[such	as	the	Party’s	political	lines]	with	 ‘studies	 on	microscopic	 issues’	 [such	 as	 comrades’	 specific	works].”58	This	 requirement	 made	 history	 studies	 specific	 and	 targeted.	 For	 instance,	 “the	cadres	who	took	part	 in	the	Long	March	were	required	to	draw	lessons	from	the	dogmatism	and	sectarianism	(zongpai	zhuyi	 宗派主義)	of	the	‘left’	line	that	had	led	to	the	failure	in	the	Central	Soviet	Base,	while	the	cadres	who	worked	in	the	white	regions	 (baiqu	 白區 ,	 the	 regions	 controlled	 by	 the	 Nationalist	 Party)	 were	required	 to	 draw	on	 lessons	 from	 the	 putschism	 (mangdong	 zhuyi	 盲動主義)	 of	the	 ‘left’	 line	 that	 caused	 the	 loss	 of	 Party	 organizations	 in	 cities.” 59 	 Two	committees—the	Committee	for	Resolving	Historical	Problems,	and	the	Committee	for	 Reinvestigating	 Cadres	 Purged	 by	Wrong	 Lines—led	 by	 Mao	 and	 Chen	 Yun,	respectively,	 also	 were	 established	 at	 the	 September	 Conference.	 Their	 purpose	was	 to	 hand	 down	 new	 verdicts	 on	 specific	 historical	 issues	 and	 rearrange	positions	for	the	cadres	related	to	these	issues.60	 In	this	context,	cadres	were	not	studying	 Party	 history	 in	 a	 vacuum.	 Indeed,	 the	 works	 of	 the	 two	 committees	above	during	 this	period	 inevitably	 influenced	 these	cadres’	assessments	of	 their	own	pasts.	 																																																									56	 Zhang	Jingru	and	Tang	Manzhen,	1990,	p.	66.	57	 Sun	Guolin	 孫國林,	 “Zhonggong	dangshi	shang	 liangci	zhongyao	de	 jiuyue	huiyi	 中共黨史上兩
次重要的九月會議”	(The	two	“September	Conferences”	in	the	CCP’s	history),	Dangshi	bolan	 黨史博
覽,	2011(1),	pp.	28-33.	58	 Zhang	Jingru	and	Tang	Manzhen,	1990,	pp.	62-63.	59	 Xu	 Yunbei	 徐運北,	 “Shi	 wo	 zhongsheng	 nanwang	 de	 luxian	 jiaoyu	 使我終生難忘的路線教育”	(The	 line	 education	 that	 is	 unforgettable	 in	 my	 life),	 in	 Yan’an	 Zhongyang	 dangxiao	 zhengfeng	yundong	bianxiezu	 延安中央黨校整風運動編寫組	 (Compiling	team	on	the	rectification	studies	 in	the	Yan’an	Central	Party	School),	ed.,	Yan’an	zhongyang	dangxiao	de	zhengfeng	xuexi	 延安中央黨校
的整風學習	 (The	 rectification	 studies	 in	 the	 Yan’an	 Central	 Party	 School),	 Volume	 1.	 Beijing:	Zhonggong	zhongyang	dangxiao	chubanshe	 中共中央黨校出版社,	1988,	pp.	51.	60	 Sun	Guolin,	2011,	pp.	28-33.	 	
	 83		 	 Beginning	in	the	winter	of	1943,	the	third	phase	in	the	study	of	Party	History	in	Yan’an	began.	In	this	phase,	cadres	were	asked	to	focus	on	studying	Since	the	Sixth	
Congress—selected	documents	compiled	by	Mao’s	aides.	In	contrast	to	the	second	phase,	 cadres	 no	 longer	 focused	 on	 their	 own	 experiences,	 but	 studied	 Party	History	 systematically.	 This	 is	 why	 this	 phase	 was	 also	 called	 “the	 phase	 of	studying	the	lines.”	 		 	 When	the	Yan’an	Rectification	Campaign	ended	in	1945,	“Mao	Zedong	Thought,”	Mao’s	 verdicts	 on	 different	 “wrong	 lines,”	 and	 his	 assessments	 of	 specific	 issues	had	 become	 intertwined	 already.	 Consequently,	 the	 Party	 History	 education	system	was	like	a	large	system	of	gears—once	set	in	motion,	it	would	be	extremely	difficult	to	stop	any	part	of	it.	This	explains	in	part	why	during	the	Deng	Xiaoping	era	in	the	early	1980s,	the	reassessments	of	historical	events	and	persons	met	with	such	great	resistance,	as	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	 		 	 It	is	also	noteworthy	that	exposing	one’s	own	historical	problems	has	become	an	inseparable	part	of	political	life	ever	since	the	Yan’an	Rectification	Campaign.	From	that	 time	 forward,	 there	was	not	 a	 single	person—except	Mao	himself,	who	was	entirely	innocent,	of	course—who	was	without	any	“historical	problem.”	Everyone	in	 the	 CCP’s	 system	 needed	 to	 examine	 other	 people’s	 history,	 just	 as	 others	examined	and	assessed	one’s	own.	In	this	context,	rewriting	one’s	past	experiences	according	 to	 the	 Party’s	 official	 version	 was	 no	 longer	 an	 individual	 act,	 but	 a	collective	activity.	 	
	 	 The	Dynamic	Role	of	Party	Cadres		 	 Another	point	this	thesis	emphasizes	is	that	the	extent	to	which	the	Party	cadres	played	dynamic	roles	in	learning	and	writing	history	deserves	reexamination	and	balanced	 adjudication.	 The	 CCP	 cadres	 produced	 a	 large	 number	 of	 historical	narratives	during	the	Yan’an	period	that	provided	the	foundation	for	history	books,	propaganda	materials,	and	even	literary	works	after	1949.	However,	Mao	and	his	aides	 supervised	 the	writing	of	 these	 recollections	and	 self-assessments	directly,	which	indicates	that	the	originality	of	the	cadres’	writings	is	questionable.	This	is	evident	in	how	cadres	wrote	their	autographical	materials	in	Yan’an.	Liu	Baiyu	 劉
白羽	 (1916-2005),	 a	 famous	writer	who	 then	was	 studying	 in	 the	 Central	 Party	School,	wrote	 and	 rewrote	 autographical	materials	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 the	school	leadership,	“strictly	investigating	the	past	years	since	the	day	of	birth,	inch	by	inch,”	but	he	still	could	not	achieve	recognition	from	his	supervisor.	Liu	recalled	
	84	how	he	analyzed	his	own	experience.	In	those	suffering	days	and	nights,	I	wrote	hundreds	of	thousands	of	words.	 Every	 time	 I	 found	 myself	 not	 making	 any	 progress,	 I	 felt	extremely	distressed;	every	time	I	made	a	little	bit	of	progress,	I	was	hysterical.	 It	 was	 when	 I	 made	 these	 step-by-step	 changes	 that	 I	understood	 dialectical	materialism	 and	 historical	materialism.	Only	by	 improving	 my	 theoretical	 level	 in	 Marxism	 could	 my	 writings	increasingly	 get	 closer	 to	 reality	 and	 truth.	This	 is	 how	 theory	was	linked	with	practice.61	 		 	 Liu’s	experience	 is	what	every	cadre	had	to	undergo	during	the	Yan’an	period.	When	 each	 cadre	 managed	 to	 interpret	 his	 or	 her	 “microscopic	 history”	 in	accordance	with	the	Party’s	official	assessments	of	 its	“macroscopic	history,”	and	receive	approval	from	his	or	her	superiors,	the	Party	Center	had	achieved	its	goal	of	unifying	the	Party’s	thinking	with	respect	to	historical	issues.	  	 	 It	 would,	 however,	 be	 imprudent	 to	 underestimate	 the	 role	 cadres	 played	 in	writing	 Party	 History.	 Their	 forced	 involvement	 in	 the	 writing	 indicates	 how	crucial	their	attitude	was	to	Mao’s	Party	Center.	Specifically,	it	was	inevitable	that	building	a	common	understanding	of	Party	history	among	all	cadres	was	based	on	a	 series	 of	 consensuses	 about	 single	 events	 or	 figures.	 These	 consensuses	 were	reached	through	the	methods	described	in	the	last	subsection.	If	the	Fourth	Front	Army	 cadres	 did	 not	 accept	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 verdicts	 after	 the	 anti-Zhang	movement	in	1937	and	1938,	it	was	unimaginable	that	the	official	accounts	of	the	WRA	could	be	disseminated	without	any	resistance	during	the	Yan’an	Rectification	Campaign.	 Accordingly,	 if	 Mao	 and	 his	 main	 supporters—Zhang	 Wentian	 and	Wang	Jiaxiang	 王稼祥	 (1906-1974)—had	not	resolved	a	number	of	internal	Party	problems	 concerning	 the	 assessments	 of	 former	 leaderships,	 the	 official	 Party	historical	narratives	that	they	had	striven	to	build	in	the	early	1940s	would	have	encountered	much	resistance.	In	this	sense,	within	the	CCP’s	system,	learning	and	understanding	 the	Party’s	 entire	history	were	 related	 closely	 to	narrating	 (or,	 in	the	Party’s	terms,	confessing),	and	assessing	each	cadre’s	own	history.		 	 Only	after	 the	Party	Center	completed	 the	construction	of	 its	official	 system	of																																																									61	 	 Liu	Baiyu	 劉白羽,	“Wo	de	rensheng	zhuanzhe	dian	 我的人生轉折點”	(The	turning	points	in	my	life),	 in	 Yan’an	 Zhongyang	 dangxiao	 zhengfeng	 yundong	 bianxiezu	 (Compiling	 team	 on	 the	rectification	studies	in	the	Yan’an	Central	Party	School),	ed.,	1988,	pp.	135-136.	
	 85	Party	 history—which	 included	 both	 words	 written	 in	 official	 documents	 and	authoritative	 articles,	 and	 invisible	 consensuses	 among	 the	 Party	members—did	the	Party	Center	convene	the	7th	Plenum	of	the	6th	Central	Committee	in	1945.	This	passed	 the	 first	 authoritative	 document	 that	 summarized	 the	 Party’s	 historical	experience,	 “Resolution	 on	 Several	 Historical	 Issues”	 (hereafter	 “Resolution	 of	1945”).62	 By	 then,	 the	 construction	 of	 official	 historical	 narratives	 of	 the	 Party’s	first	 twenty-odd	years	had	been	 completed,	 as	had	 the	method	 to	 construct	 that	History.	 	
Conclusion		 	 According	to	official	records,	after	the	CCP	Party	Center	passed	its	resolution	on	Zhang	 Guotao	 in	 late	 March	 1937,	 which	 included	 an	 official	 assessment	 of	 the	WRA,	and	especially	after	Zhang	defected	to	the	Nationalist	side	in	April	1938,	the	whole	 Party	 supported	 this	 resolution	 fully,	 and	 agreed	 with	 the	 Party	 Center’s	verdicts	 on	 Zhang	 and	 the	 WRA.	 Consequently,	 “the	 struggles	 against	 Zhang	Guotao’s	 splittism	 solidified	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 Party	 and	 the	 Red	 Army.”63	 As	 has	been	 revealed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 however,	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 Mao	 and	 his	supporters	neither	had	a	simple	way	to	 interpret	such	an	 important	event	 in	 the	way	 that	 they	 preferred,	 nor	 did	 they	 readily	 have	 a	 way	 to	 make	 their	interpretation	 a	 consensus	 amongst	 all	 Party	 members	 and	 Red	 Army	commanders.		 	 The	 Party	 Center’s	 verdicts	 triggered	 not	 only	 disagreement,	 but	 also	 a	comprehensive	 crisis,	 one	 that	was	 as	 serious	 as	 that	which	 had	 threatened	 the	Party	 Center’s	 control	 over	 its	 army.	 Subsequently,	 Mao	 deployed	 a	 variety	 of	measures—including	 persuasion,	 education,	 as	 well	 as	 demotion	 and	 removal	from	positions	in	the	Red	Army—to	exert	his	influence.	Ultimately,	the	majority	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	accepted	the	Party	Center’s	verdicts	and	became	obedient	to	Mao.	 		 	 Apter	 and	 Saich’s	 claim	 that	 the	 struggle	 with	 Zhang	 was	 one	 of	 Mao’s	 four	struggles	 during	 the	 Yan’an	 period	 that	 helped	 to	 redefine	 his	 mandate	 is	 no	exaggeration,64	 because	 this	 victory	 helped	 consolidate	 not	 only	 Mao’s	 military																																																									62	 	 The	7th	Plenum	of	the	6th	Central	Committee	was	held	from	May	21,	1944	to	April	20,	1945.	In	total	 eight	meetings	were	 held	 during	 these	 eleven	months.	 The	 Resolution	 on	 Several	 Historical	
Issues	was	passed	at	the	last	meeting	on	April	20,	1945.	63	 Zhonggong	zhongyang	dangshi	yanjiushi,	2002,	Volume	1,	pp.	403-404.	64	 David	 Apter	 and	 Tony	 Saich,	 Revolutionary	 Discourse	 in	 Mao’s	 Republic.	 Cambridge:	 Harvard	
	86	and	administrative	positions,	but	also	his	intellectual	and	ideological	positions.	In	the	power	struggle	between	Mao	and	Zhang	as	well	as	the	Returned	Students,	one	of	 the	 key	 issues	 was	 how	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	 “correct”	 and	 “incorrect”	integration	 of	 Marxist	 theory	 and	 Chinese	 practice.	 By	 condemning	 Zhang’s	military	 command	 and	 theories,	 Mao’s	 camp	 in	 fact	 challenged	 Zhang	 and	 the	Returned	 Students’	 grasp	 of	Marxism-Leninism.	 After	 he	managed	 to	win	 in	 the	struggle	against	Zhang,	in	“Strategic	Issues,”	the	same	article	in	which	Mao	gave	his	verdict	 of	 the	WRA,	Mao	 finally	 could	 claim,	 “[What	 the	 Returned	 Students	 did]	were	mechanistic…[their	actions]	represented	the	theories	and	practices	of	stupid	and	ignorant	people.	They	did	not	have	the	slightest	flavor	of	Marxism	about	them;	indeed,	they	were	anti-Marxist.”65		 	 In	 his	 research	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	 Maoism,	 Wylie	 said	 that	 it	 was	 in	 the	autumn	of	1943,	when	the	Maoists	were	in	firm	control	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party,	 that	 they	 turned	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 history	 of	 the	 CCP.	 Wylie	 pointed	 out	correctly	that,	at	the	time,	Maoists	felt	a	need	for	an	intellectual	rationale	to	justify	the	cult	of	Mao	as	the	correct	leader	of	the	Chinese	Communist	movement,	and	the	cult	of	Mao’s	thought	as	the	ideological	manifestation	of	this	correct	leadership.66	Wylie’s	argument,	however,	is	based	on	a	narrow	definition	of	“the	writing	of	Party	history.”	He	believed	that	Party	history	was	concerned	only	with	the	compilation	of	 historical	 materials	 and	 writing	 of	 history	 books.	 If	 we	 look	 at	 the	 issue	 of	writing	 Party	 history	 from	 a	 broader	 perspective,	 the	 struggle	 over	 how	 to	interpret	Party	history	 in	 fact	 took	place	 throughout	 the	whole	process	of	Mao’s	efforts	 to	 gain	 supreme	 leadership.	 From	 the	 late	 1930s	 to	 1945,	 Mao	 and	 his	supporters	dealt	with	several	issues	similar	to	those	that	they	confronted	with	the	WRA.	In	doing	so,	Mao	achieved	the	top	position	systematically	and	with	absolute	power.	 		 	 Looking	 at	 the	 writing	 of	 Party	 history	 from	 the	 same	 narrow	 definition,	scholars	of	the	CCP’s	historiography,	both	within	and	outside	the	PRC,	considered	the	“Resolution	of	1945”	as	the	point	at	which	the	CCP	began	to	chronicle	official	party	 history	 systematically.67	 What	 this	 chapter	 has	 emphasized	 is	 that	 the	publication	of	the	“Resolution	of	1945”	should	also	be	seen	as	an	outcome	of	a	long																																																																																																																																																																			University	Press,	1994,	pp.	35-36.	65	 Mao	Zedong,	1947,	p.	43.	66	 Raymond	 F.	 Wylie,	 The	 Emergence	 of	 Maoism:	 Mao	 Tse-tung,	 Ch’en	 Po-ta	 and	 the	 Search	 for	
Chinese	Theory	1935-1945.	Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	1980,	pp.	226.	67	 Susanne	Weigelin-Schwiedrzik,	1993.	
	 87	process	of	power	struggles	and	thought	transformation	that	marked	Mao’s	success	in	writing	Party	history	as	he	preferred,	and	at	the	expense	of	historical	accuracy.	
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Chapter	3:	Finalizing	the	Western	Route	Army’s	Historical	
Narratives	in	the	1950s	
Introduction	Superficial	observation	shows	that	the	official	 interpretation	of	the	WRA	given	in	Mao’s	1937	article,	“Strategic	Issues,”	did	not	change	greatly	until	the	early	1980s.	The	only	apparent	change	was	that	an	endnote	was	added	to	interpret	the	WRA’s	history	when	 this	 article	was	 compiled	 into	Selected	Works	 of	Mao	 Zedong	 (Mao	
Zedong	 xuanji	 毛澤東選集 )	 in	 1951.	 Subsequently,	 several	 paragraphs	 of	narratives	about	the	WRA’s	history,	which	at	most	seemed	to	expand	the	endnote,	emerged	in	the	Party	History	textbooks.	As	there	also	was	no	distinct	change	in	the	narratives	 of	 other	 events	 in	 Party	 History,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 1950s’	 historical	narratives	 simply	 repeated	 the	 Party’s	 verdicts	made	 in	 the	 Yan’an	 period.	 This	chapter	will	argue	 that,	behind	 this	stability,	 several	 improvements	 took	place	 in	the	 1950s.	 First,	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 official	 historical	 framework	 as	 a	 whole	strengthened	and	supported	the	historical	narratives	of	individual	events	and	the	converse,	 making	 changes	 to	 existing	 historical	 interpretations	 even	 more	impossible.	Second,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	history	education	in	the	Yan’an	period	showed	its	effects	 in	the	1950s,	as	participants	in	historical	events	disseminated	 the	 official	 interpretations	 to	 a	 broader	 readership.	 Third,	 the	participation	 of	 professional	 historians	 improved	 the	 effectiveness	 of	indoctrinating	 ordinary	 people	 all	 around	 the	 country	 with	 the	 Party’s	 official	narratives.	This	chapter	illustrates	the	above	three	points	through	the	case	of	the	WRA.	 	
3.1	The	Western	Route	Army	in	the	Party	History	Framework	Created	by	
the	Top	Leadership		 	 Before	the	30th	anniversary	of	the	Party’s	establishment,	the	Party	Center	issued	the	first	nationwide	call	to	study	the	Party’s	history.	The	People’s	Daily	said,	“Party	history	 is	 like	 a	 textbook	 about	 how	 to	 apply	 Marxism-Leninism	 to	 China’s	revolutionary	practice,	as	well	as	a	gateway	to	understanding	Mao	Zedong	Thought.	Consequently,	every	Party	member	and	every	person	who	 intends	to	understand	
	90	Communism	 will	 have	 to	 learn	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party’s	 history.”1	 The	teaching	materials	for	this	national	movement	was	a	series	of	articles	published	in	the	People’s	 Daily	and	 the	 four	 volumes	 of	Selected	Works	 of	Mao	 Zedong,	which	were	 published	 successively	 beginning	 in	 October	 1951.	 Compared	 to	 the	“Resolution”	 issued	 in	 1945,	 these	 new	 materials	 did	 not	 differ	 remarkably	 in	terms	 of	 the	 methods	 used	 to	 interpret	 historical	 problems	 and	 make	 specific	assessments.	What	 is	 noteworthy	 is	 that	Mao’s	works	 and	Party	writers’	 articles	integrated	the	hitherto	scattered	assessments	and	interpretations	of	Party	history	successfully	 into	a	 logical	 and	coherent	 framework.	As	 the	new	materials	 spread	rapidly	 and	 widely,	 official	 Party	 History	 in	 the	 1950s	 was	 no	 longer	 merely	 a	powerful	weapon	in	the	CCP’s	intra-Party	struggles,	but	had	become	an	ideological	instrument	for	social	education.	 		 	 This	official	framework	consisted	of	two	parts:	an	outline	that	defined	whether	a	specific	 event	 should	be	 included	 in	 the	official	History,	 and	one	 that	provided	a	series	of	authoritative	 interpretations	of	certain	historical	events.	 In	the	first	half	of	 the	 1950s,	 the	 Party	 created	 the	 outline	 through	 articles	 written	 by	 Party	writers	 and	 perfected	 related	 narratives	 by	 revising	Mao’s	works.	 The	 following	two	subsections	will	deal	with	these	two	parts	of	the	Party’s	official	framework	for	its	history.	 	
3.1.1	“The	CCP’s	Thirty	Years”	and	the	Two	Grand	Themes	of	Party	History		 	 Among	the	articles	published	by	Party	writers’	in	the	early	1950s,	Hu	Qiaomu’s	
胡喬木	 (1912-1992)2	 “The	Chinese	Communist	Party’s	Thirty	Years”	(中國共產黨																																																								1	 “Jinian	dang	de	sanshi	zhounian	yinggai	xuexi	Dang	de	lishi	 紀念黨的三十周年應當學習黨的歷史”	(To	Celebrate	 the	30th	anniversary	of	 the	Party	we	should	 learn	the	history	of	 the	Party),	Renmin	
ribao	 人民日報,	 on	 June	 29,	 1951.	 Cited	 in	Wu	 Zhijun	 吳志軍,	 “Yijiu	wuyi	 nian:	 jiandang	 sanshi	zhounian	‘wenben	jinian’	huodong	de	lishi	huigu	yu	fansi–yi	dui	zhonggong	dangshi	de	xuanchuan	wei	xushu	zhongxin	 一九五一年：建黨三十週年「文本紀念」活動的歷史回顧與反思——以對中共
黨史的宣傳為敘述中心”	 (The	 year	 of	 1951:	 review	 and	 reflection	 on	 ‘text	 commemoration’	activities	in	memory	of	the	30th	anniversary	of	the	establishment	of	the	Party—take	propaganda	on	the	CCP’s	history	as	the	narrative	center),	Dangshi	yanjiu	yu	jiaoxue	 黨史研究與教學,	2008(3),	pp.	49-57.	2	 Hu	 Qiaomu	 enrolled	 in	 the	 History	 Department	 at	 the	 Tsinhua	 University	 in	 1930	 but	 left	 the	university	 and	 became	 a	 professional	 revolutionary	 a	 year	 later.	 He	 joined	 the	 CCP	 in	 1932	 and	went	to	Yan’an	in	late	1936.	From	1941	to	1948,	Hu	worked	as	Mao	Zedong’s	secretary.	During	this	period,	Hu	was	in	charge	of	compiling	and	writing	of	a	number	of	documents	that	were	important	in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Party	 and	 its	 historiography.	 Ye	 Yonglie	 葉永烈 ,	 Hu	 Qiaomu	 胡喬木	(Biography	of	Hu	Qiaomu).	Beijing:	Zhonggong	zhongyang	dangxiao	chubanshe	 中共中央黨校出版
社,	1994.	Cao	Junjie	 曹俊傑,	Zhongguo	er	Qiao:	Hu	Qiaomu,	Qiao	Guanhua	zhuanlue	 中國二喬——
胡喬木、喬冠華傳略	 (Biography	 of	 Hu	 Qiaomu	 and	 Qiao	 Guanhua).	 Nanjing:	 Jiangsu	 renmin	chubanshe	 江蘇人民出版社,	1996.	
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的三十年,	 hereafter,	 “Thirty	 Years”)3	 made	 the	most	 remarkable	 contribution	 in	creating	the	framework	for	official	Party	History.4	 To	write	this	article,	Hu	placed	Mao	Zedong	Thought	 at	 the	 center	 of	 Party	History,	 borrowing	Mao’s	 narratives	directly	 to	 interpret	 historical	 issues. 5 	 Most	 importantly,	 Hu	 succeeded	 in	arranging	 Mao’s	 assessments	 of	 Party	 history,	 which	 Mao	 had	 addressed	 on	separate	occasions,	 into	a	simple	and	clear	outline.6	 This	was	one	of	 the	reasons	that	Mao	praised	it	highly.	 	 		 	 Generally,	 this	 outline	 for	 official	 Party	 History	 as	 created	 in	 “Thirty	 Years”	determined	the	structure	and	themes	of	historical	narratives,	and	provided	history	writers	with	an	official	criterion.	By	assessing	an	historical	event	according	to	this	criterion,	writers	could	recognize	whether	an	event	should	be	included	in	History	books,	and	how	they	should	present	it.		 	 Specifically,	 the	official	Party	History	outline	divided	 the	history	 from	1921	 to	1949	 into	 four	 phrases—the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Party	 and	 the	 First	Revolutionary	 Civil	 War	 (1921-1927),	 the	 Second	 Revolutionary	 Civil	 War	(1927-1937),	 the	 Anti-Japanese	 War	 (1937-1945)	 and	 the	 Third	 Revolutionary	Civil	War	(1945-1949)7—and	events	in	Party	history	were	selected	deliberately	to																																																									3	 This	article	originally	was	a	draft	 for	Liu	Shaoqi’s	 劉少奇	 (1898-1969)	speech	at	the	memorial	meeting	 before	 Mao	 Zedong	 decided	 to	 publish	 it	 in	 the	 People’s	 Daily.	 Hu	 Qiaomu,	 “Zhongguo	gongchandang	de	sanshi	nian	 中國共產黨的三十年”	(The	Chinese	Communist	Party’s	thirty	years).	
Renmin	ribao	 人民日報,	June	22,	1951.	4	 Two	articles	by	Chen	Boda	 陳伯達	 also	exerted	 influence	 to	 the	writing	of	Party	history	 in	 the	1950s.	 Chen	 was	 one	 of	 leading	 Party	 historians	 in	 the	 Yan’an	 period	 and	 also	 worked	 as	 Mao	Zedong’s	secretary.	He	wrote	two	articles	“Du	‘Hunan	nongmin	yundong	kaocha	baogao’”	(讀《湖南
農民運動考察報告》,	Report	on	an	investigation	of	the	peasant	movement	in	Hunan)	and	“Neizhan	shiqi	 de	 fan	 geming	 he	 geming”	 ( 內 戰 時 期 的 反 革 命 和 革 命 ,	 Revolutionaries	 and	counter-revolutionaries	 in	 the	 Civil	War)	 in	 1944.	 Compared	 to	 these	 two	 articles,	 Hu	 Qiaomu’s	“Thirty	 years”	 was	 more	 influential	 in	 the	 1950s,	 so	 this	 section	 uses	 Hu’s	 article	 as	 the	 main	example.	5	 In	this	30,000	word	article	Hu	cited	Mao’s	18	works	24	times	in	total.	This	writing	method	later	became	a	standard	way	to	write	Party	History.	For	more	about	the	influence	of	this	writing	method,	see	Xu	Chong	 許衝,	“Lun	liangongbu	dangshi	dui	Zhonggong	dangshi	bianzhuan	de	yingxiang	 論聯
共布黨史對中共黨史編撰的影響”	(On	the	influence	of	A	Concise	History	of	the	Communist	Party	of	
the	Soviet	Union	 [Bolsheviks]	on	 the	CCP’s	historiography),	Xiandai	zhexue	 現代哲學,	2013(2),	pp.	47-56.	6	 Chinese	 specialists	 of	CCP	historiography	have	already	noticed	 this	point.	 Zhang	 Jingru	 張靜如	said,	“this	article	did	not	contain	a	large	amount	of	material,	but	mainly	drew	an	outline	and	built	a	framework	of	 the	Party’s	history	of	 the	previous	 thirty	years,	while	also	bringing	out	 some	basic	views.	 All	 these	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 studying	 the	 CCP’s	 history	 at	 the	 time	 and	 in	 the	following	years.”	See	“Bianxie	 ‘Zhongguo	gongchandang	lishi	 jiaocai’	shiling	 編寫‘中國共產黨歷史
教材’拾零”	(Some	issues	about	the	compilation	of	Textbook	of	the	History	of	the	CCP),	Bainian	chao	
百年潮,	2013(2),	pp.	76-78.	 	7	 Dividing	 the	 Party’s	 history	 in	 such	 a	way	 has	 exerted	 considerable	 influence	 on	 Party	 history	studies	ever	since.	 In	August	1951	 the	official	 journal	of	 the	CCP’s	Propaganda	Department	Xuexi	
學習	 called	on	history	researchers	to	follow	this	way	to	divide	and	name	stages	of	the	Party’s	past.	
	92	demonstrate	 two	 grand	 themes.	 The	 first	 of	 these	 was	 that,	 when	 narrating	intra-Party	 power	 struggles,	 the	 narratives	 addressed	 conflicts	 between	 the	correct	and	incorrect	lines,	in	which	Mao	was	the	representative	of	the	correct	line.	In	order	to	propagandize	the	CCP’s	legitimacy	to	the	outside	world,	the	second	of	these	themes	made	the	CCP’s	contribution	the	focus	of	issues	external	to	the	Party.		 	 During	the	Yan’an	period,	the	Party	used	this	same	technique	of	parsing	out	its	history	 according	 to	 internal	 line	 struggles.8	 In	 the	 1950s,	 official	 materials	presented	five	incorrect	lines	that	“brought	great	loss	to	the	Party,”	each	of	which	had	 corresponding	 standard	and	 inflexible	narratives.	They	are	 the	 right-leaning	error	 of	 Chen	 Duxiu	 (Chen	 Duxiu	 youqing	 cuowu	 陳獨秀右傾錯誤 ), 9 	 the	“left”-leaning	putschism	(zuoqing	mangdong	zhuyi	「左」傾盲動主義)	represented	by	 Qu	 Qiubai 瞿秋白 (1899-1935),10	 the	 “left”-leaning	 adventurism	 (zuoqing	
maoxian	zhuyi	「左」傾冒險主義)	represented	by	Li	Lisan,	 李立三	 (1899-1967),11	the	“left”-leaning	adventurism	represented	by	Wang	Ming,12	 and	the	right-leaning	separatism	of	Zhang	Guotao.	These	five	incorrect	lines	exemplified	the	core	of	the	Party’s	 first	 twenty	years	of	history,	 throughout	which	Mao	proved	repeatedly	to	have	made	and	conducted	the	correct	line.		 	 The	contribution	that	the	CCP	made	to	China	and	to	the	Chinese	people	is	also	an	essential	 theme	 in	 the	 CCP’s	 official	History	 framework.	 The	 framework	 showed																																																																																																																																																																			See	Wu	Zhijun,	2008.	8	 In	his	speech	in	the	Party	Center	Study	Group	(中共中央學習組)	in	1942,	Mao	Zedong	considered	lines	 and	 policies	 as	 the	 main	 object	 of	 Party	 history	 study.	 See	 Mao	 Zedong,	 “Ruhe	 yanjiu	Zhonggong	 dangshi	 如何研究中共黨史”	 (How	 to	 do	 research	 on	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party’s	history),	in	Mao	Zedong	wenji	 毛澤東文集	 (Collection	of	Mao	Zedong’s	works),	Volume	2.	Beijing:	Renmin	chubanshe	 人民出版社,	 1993,	p.	406.	One	year	 later,	Liu	Shaoqi	divided	 lines	within	 the	Party	into	“the	Bolshevik	line	represented	by	Mao	Zedong”	and	“the	Menshevic	lines	represented	by	opportunists	within	the	Party”.	See	Liu	Shaoqi,	“Qingsuan	dangnei	de	mengshiweike	zhuyi	sixiang	
清算黨內的孟什維克主義思想”	 (Eliminate	 Menshevik	 thought	 within	 the	 Party),	 in	 Laoyidai	
gemingjia	 lun	dangshi	 yu	dangshi	 yanjiu	 老一代革命家論黨史與黨史研究	 (The	 revolutionaries	 of	senior	 generation’s	 talks	 about	 the	history	 of	 the	Party	 and	 research	on	Party	History).	 Taiyuan:	Shanxi	renmin	chubanshe	 山西人民出版社,	1993,	pp.	15-16.	9	 According	to	the	CCP’s	official	interpretation,	the	right	deviation	error	of	Chen	Duxiu	(1879-1942)	manifested	 as	 pinning	 all	 of	 their	 hope	 on	 left-wing	 Nationalists,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 the	Great	Revolution.	 	10 	 According	 to	 the	 CCP’s	 official	 interpretation,	 the	 “left”-leaning	 putschism	 manifested	 as	proposing	 not	 only	 to	 struggle	 against	 imperialism	 and	 feudalism,	 but	 also	 to	 struggle	 against	national	bourgeoisie	and	upper	class	petty	bourgeoisie.	11	 Around	 1930,	 Li	 Lisan	 and	 other	 leaders	 of	 the	 CCP	 believed	 it	 was	 time	 to	 build	 a	 national	revolutionary	 regime	 by	 armed	 uprisings.	 The	 CCP’s	 official	 historiography	 criticized	 that	 their	activities	had	brought	serious	loss	to	the	Party	and	to	the	Communists’	revolutionary	career.	 	12	 According	 to	 the	 CCP’s	 official	 interpretation,	 Wang	 Ming’s	 “left”-deviation	 error	 was	 more	serious	 than	 that	of	Li	Lisan,	 as	Wang’s	mistakes	directly	 caused	 the	 failure	of	 the	Central	 Soviet	Region’s	fifth	encirclement	campaign	and	forced	the	Central	Red	Army	to	start	the	Long	March.	
	 93	consistently	that	the	CCP	as	a	whole	engaged	in	causes	that	benefited	the	Chinese	people.	 Specifically,	 when	 the	 revolution	 led	 by	 the	 bourgeoisie,	 whose	 purpose	was	to	establish	a	bourgeois	republic,	failed,	the	Chinese	Communist	Party,	as	the	vanguard	 of	 the	 most	 advanced	 class—the	 working	 class—emerged,	 as	 was	necessitated	 by	 the	 times	 (yingyun	 ersheng	 應運而生).	When	 imperialist	 powers	and	 the	 Northern	Warlords	 persecuted	 the	 Chinese	 people,	 the	 CCP	 cooperated	with	 the	 Nationalist	 Party,	 paving	 the	 way	 for	 a	 new	 historical	 phase:	anti-imperialism,	 anti-feudalism,	 and	 anti-warlordism.	 When	 Chiang	 Kai-shek	became	a	new	warlord,	the	CCP	began	to	fight	him	and	his	army.	Finally,	when	the	Japanese	 invaded	China	 in	1937,	 the	CCP	opposed	their	aggression	resolutely.	To	summarize,	Party	History	was	trying	its	best	to	promote	the	following	claim:	only	the	CCP	can	save	China.	 		 	 Before	 the	 Communists	 assumed	 national	 power,	 their	 internal	 and	 external	propaganda	 systems	 focused	 on	 different	 content,	 with	 the	 two	 grand	 themes	above	as	their	main	concerns.	The	content	concerning	“line	struggles”	existed	only	in	 Party	 resolutions	 and	 internal	 documents.	 Senior	 cadres	 received	 these	materials,	 while	 they	 carefully	 kept	 them	 secret	 from	 the	 outside	 world.	 At	 the	same	 time,	 the	 CCP’s	 propaganda	 system	 spared	 no	 effort	 to	 demonstrate	 its	merits	 to	 the	Chinese	people.	 In	some	cases,	 careful	planning	began	 immediately	after	particular	events	occurred.13	 In	other	cases,	it	was	other	media,	rather	than	the	 Party’s	 propaganda	 system,	 that	 played	 a	major	 role	 in	 promoting	 the	 CCP’s	contributions,	 and	 in	 turn,	 the	 Party’s	 sophisticated	 theorists	 and	 writers	 made	
																																																								13	 Propaganda	on	the	Long	March	is	a	typical	example.	As	has	been	mentioned	in	the	Introduction	section,	 right	 after	 the	Long	March,	 the	Chairman	of	 the	Central	Military	Committee	Mao	Zedong	and	 the	 Chief	 of	 Political	Department	 Yang	 Shangkun	 楊尚昆	 (1907-1998)	 issued	 a	 notice	 to	 all	commanders	and	soldiers	who	took	part	in	the	Long	March,	asking	them	to	recall	their	experience	and	to	write	down	their	feelings	for	the	purpose	of	“propaganda”.	The	notice	said,	“Writing	articles	amounts	 to	making	a	donation	 to	 the	Red	Army	and	 improving	 the	 international	 influence	of	 the	Red	Army.”	 See	 Shen	 Jin 沈津,	 “Preface”,	 in	Hongjun	Changzheng	 ji	 紅軍長征記	 (The	Red	Army’s	Long	 March).	 Guilin:	 Guangxi	 shifan	 daxue	 chubanshe	 廣西師範大學出版社,	 2006,	 p.	 2.	 Tong	Xiaopeng	 童小鵬	 wrote	in	his	diary	on	August	6,	1936:	“[We	were	told	that	the	compilation	of	our	articles]	would	be	brought	 out	 of	 the	Red	 region	by	 that	 foreigner	 and	be	published,	 in	 order	 to	solicit	donations	for	purchasing	aircraft.	This	news	makes	us	extremely	happy.”	Cited	in	Liu	Tong	
劉統,	Qinli	Changzheng:	 laizi	Hongjun	Changzheng	zhe	de	yuanshi	 jilu	 親歷長征——來自紅軍長征
者的原始記錄 	 (Personal	 experience	 during	 the	 Long	 March:	 primary	 recordings	 by	 the	participants	of	the	Long	March).	Beijing:	Zhongyang	wenxian	chubanshe	 中央文獻出版社,	2006,	p.	1.	The	“foreigner”	referred	to	was	the	American	journalist	Edgar	Snow	who	entered	the	Northern	Shaanxi	region	in	July	1936	through	arrangements	made	by	the	CCP’s	underground	organizations.	The	elaborate	arrangement	of	propaganda	work	is	evident.	
	94	good	use	of	their	lavish	praise.14	 		 	 Both	 the	 CCP’s	 intra-Party	 and	 external-Party	 propaganda	 systems	 were	unquestionably	 efficient.	 Before	 1949,	 Mao’s	 portrayal	 within	 the	 Party	 as	 the	designer	 and	 consistent	 practitioner	 of	 the	 correct	 line	 had	 been	 achieved	successfully,	 while	 a	 positive	 image	 of	 the	 CCP	 as	 a	 patriotic	 and	 efficient	organization	had	been	disseminated	widely	 in	China	and	even	around	the	world.	The	 official	 Party	 History	 framework	 built	 in	 the	 1950s	 incorporated	 the	 above	two	aspects	of	Party	propaganda.		 	 Thus,	the	question	is	how	the	WRA	was	presented	in	this	Party	History	outline,	and	how	this	position	influenced	the	writing	of	the	WRA’s	history.	First,	due	to	its	relationship	with	the	so-called	“Zhang	Guotao	Line,”	the	WRA	was	included	in	the	outline.	This	is	important,	because	it	meant	the	WRA	would	continue	to	be	part	of	the	 Party	 history	 narrative.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 outline	 excluded	 many	 events	 and	figures	 completely,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 they	were	 never	mentioned	 in	 the	Mao	 Era.	Second,	as	an	historical	event,	 the	WRA	fell	 in	 the	category	of	 “line	struggles,”	as	evidence	 of	 Zhang	 Guotao’s	 errors,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 was	 deemed	 unworthy	 of	research,	 and	 instead,	 deserved	 only	 criticism.	 When	 E.	 H.	 Carr	 explained	 the	difference	between	a	“fact”	and	an	“historical	fact,”	he	emphasized	the	function	of	interpretation:	“Whether	a	fact	can	be	a	well-established	historical	fact	depends	on	whether	 the	 interpretation	 in	 support	 of	 which	 historians	 cite	 this	 incident	 is	accepted	by	other	historians	as	valid	and	significant.	 Its	status	as	a	historical	 fact	will	 turn	 on	 a	 question	 of	 interpretation.”15 	 It	 is	 thus	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 the	relationship	with	Zhang	made	the	history	of	the	WRA	an	“historical	fact”	in	Party	History.		 	 This	 outline,	 however,	 only	 included	 the	 WRA	 in	 the	 official	 Party	 history	framework,	 but	 did	 not	 provide	 Party	 writers	 with	 any	 content	 with	 which	 to	narrate	this	issue.	Mao’s	works	would	fulfill	this	task.	 	
																																																								14	 For	 instance,	 the	 so-called	 “Great	 Victory	 at	 the	 Pingxing	 Pass”	 (Pingxingguan	 dajie	 平型關大
捷)—in	which	the	Eighth	Route	Army	secured	a	minor	victory	over	Japanese	forces	in	1937—was	greatly	 exaggerated	 by	 the	 media	 in	 Nationalist-controlled	 regions	 and	 subsequently	 was	 taken	advantage	of	by	the	CCP	to	raise	its	reputation.	For	more	details	about	the	Victory	at	the	Pingxing	Pass	and	 its	propaganda,	see	Zhai	Zhicheng	 翟志成,	 “Jiti	 jiyi	yu	 lishi	zhenshi:	 ‘Pingxingguan	dajie’	de	 jiangou	yu	 jiegou	 集體記憶與歷史真實：「平型關大捷」的建構與解構”	 (Collective	memory	vs.	historical	 truth:	 the	construction	of	 the	so-called	 ‘Great	Victory	at	 the	Pingxing	Pass’	and	 its	 later	deconstruction),	Zhongyang	yanjiuyuan	jindaishi	yanjiusuo	jikan	 中央研究院近代史研究所集刊,	No.	51,	2006(3),	pp.	131-186.	15	 E.	H.	Carr,	What	is	History.	London	:	Macmillan,	1985,	pp.	12-13.	
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3.1.2	The	WRA	in	Selected	Works	of	Mao	Zedong		 	 Before	the	Reform	Era,	the	only	authoritative	interpretation	of	the	WRA	was	an	endnote	in	one	of	Mao’s	most	famous	articles.	As	will	be	described	in	Part	Two	of	this	thesis,	even	after	the	1980s,	opponents	of	the	“new	interpretation”	of	the	WRA	still	cited	this	endnote	frequently	in	their	arguments.	It	is	ridiculous	to	rely	merely	on	an	endnote	of	some	hundred	words	to	explain	a	historical	issue	as	complicated	as	 the	 WRA.	 This	 absurd	 phenomenon,	 however,	 was	 common	 in	 Party	historiography.	As	Yang	Kuisong,	a	Chinese	specialist	in	Party	history,	has	pointed	out,	the	four	volumes	of	Selected	Works	of	Mao	Zedong	(hereafter,	Selected	Works)	included	 standard	 interpretations	of	 almost	 all	 important	 issues	 in	Party	history	before	 1949,	 and	 consequently,	 for	 quite	 a	 long	 time,	 not	 only	 Party	 history	teachers,	 but	 also	 researchers	 in	 relevant	 fields,	 considered	 reading	 and	memorizing	 the	 contents	 of	 Selected	 Works	 to	 be	 their	 basic	 and	 most	 reliable	training.16	 In	 this	regard,	a	brief	discussion	of	how	Selected	Works	was	compiled	will	advance	our	understanding	of	Party	historiography	in	the	Mao	Era	greatly.  	 	 From	 the	 beginning,	 both	 the	 Party	 Center	 and	 Mao	 himself	 emphasized	 the	value	of	Mao’s	works	as	materials	 for	studying	Party	history.17	 In	order	 to	make	Mao’s	works	the	most	authoritative	materials,	and	to	indoctrinate	the	masses	with	the	leader’s	most	recent	understanding	of	the	Party’s	past,	Mao	and	his	secretaries,	together	with	Party	 theorists	and	historians,	made	a	number	of	changes	 to	 these	works.18	 Mao	 himself	 invested	 considerable	 efforts	 in	 this	 task,	 and	 he	 checked	and	approved	all	writings	before	their	publication.19	 																																																									16	 Yang	Kuisong	 楊奎松,	“Wushi	nian	lai	de	zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	 五十年來的中共黨史研究”	(Party	historiography	in	the	past	fifty	years),	Jindaishi	yanjiu	 近代史研究,	1999(5),	pp.	178-202.	17	 On	 July	 1,	 1951,	 the	 People’s	 Daily	 announced	 the	 publication	 of	 Selected	 Works	 in	 advance,	stressing	 the	 importance	 of	 learning	 Party	 history	 and	 pointing	 out	 that	 “the	 basic	materials	 for	learning	should	be	Comrade	Mao	Zedong’s	major	works	 that	he	wrote	 in	 the	different	phrases	of	Chinese	revolution.”	“Mao	Zedong	xuanji	chuban	weiyuanhui	tongzhi	 毛澤東選集出版委員會通知”	(A	notice	 issued	by	 the	Committee	 for	 the	Publication	of	Selected	Works	 of	Mao	Zedong),	Renmin	
ribao	 人民日報,	on	July	1,	1951.	Cited	in	Wu	Zhijun,	2008.	18	 One	 of	 mao’s	 secretary,	 Tian	 Jiaying	 田家英	 (1922-1966),	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 compiling	 Mao’s	works.	 Tian	 went	 to	 Yan’an	 in	 1937	 when	 he	 was	 only	 15	 years	 old.	 After	 taking	 courses	 in	Shaanbei	Public	School	(Shaanbei	gongxue	 陝北公學),	he	joined	the	CCP	and	became	a	teacher	in	that	school.	From	1948	Tian	was	Mao’s	secretary	until	he	committed	suicide	in	1966.	The	historians	and	theorists	who	took	part	in	the	compiling	work	included	senior	Marxists	such	as	Ai	Siqi	 艾思奇	(1910-1966),	who	had	become	a	 famous	 theorist	as	early	as	 in	 the	early	Yan’an	period.	See	Pang	Xianzhi	 逄先知,	“Mao	Zedong	he	ta	de	mishu	Tian	Jiaying	 毛澤東和他的秘書田家英”	(Mao	Zedong	and	 his	 secretary	 Tian	 Jiaying),	 in	 Dong	 Bian	 董邊,	 Tan	 Deshan	 鐔德山	 and	 Zeng	 Zi	 曾自,	 eds.,	
Mao	Zedong	he	 tade	mishu	Tian	 Jiaying	 毛澤東和他的秘書田家英	 (Mao	Zedong	and	his	secretary	Tian	Jiaying).	Beijing:	Zhongyang	wenxian	chubanshe	 中央文獻出版社,	1996,	p.	39.	19	 For	 more	 about	 the	 publication	 of	 Mao	 Zedong’s	 works,	 see	 Zhang	 Shenqu	 張慎趨 ,	 “Xin	
	96		 	 The	revisers	made	 two	 types	of	 changes	 to	Mao’s	works.	One	was	 to	delete	or	rewrite	 inappropriate	 content	 in	 the	main	 body	 of	 the	writings.20	 In	 addition	 to	the	technical	changes	made,	such	as	those	in	grammar	and	structure,	Mao	and	his	aides	revised	 these	materials	 for	 two	other	reasons.	First,	Mao	often	used	vulgar	language	 to	 condemn	 his	 colleagues	 within	 the	 leadership.21	 As	 these	 kinds	 of	expressions	would	spoil	the	great	leader’s	image,	all	were	deleted.	In	other	cases,	particular	situations	had	changed	since	the	articles	were	written,	and	as	a	result,	certain	narratives	needed	 to	be	 rewritten,	 as	 these	arguments	or	 interpretations	otherwise	would	contradict	the	larger	picture	of	Mao	Zedong	Thought.22		 	 The	 other	 change	 was	 the	 addition	 of	 explanatory	 notes.	 The	 revisers	 were	cautious	about	changing	words	in	the	main	body	of	Mao’s	works.	Unless	absolutely	necessary,	they	preferred	to	use	notes	to	modify	or	complement	specific	meanings,	rather	than	changing	content	that	had	already	been	published,	and	which,	in	some	cases,	 had	 already	 become	 familiar	 to	 Party	 members	 and	 even	 to	 the	 broader	readership.	Indeed,	to	some	extent,	the	use	of	notes	played	a	more	important	role	than	 the	 changes	made	 in	 the	main	 body	 of	 the	 texts,	 because	 it	was	 by	writing																																																																																																																																																																			Zhongguo	chengli	hou	Mao	Zedong	xuanji	chuban	gaikuang	 新中國成立後《毛澤東選集》出版概況”	(Publishing	 Selected	 Works	 of	 Mao	 Zedong	 in	 the	 PRC),	Dangshi	 gailan	 黨史概覽,	 2008(11),	 pp.	16-17,	42.	20 	 The	 Collected	 Writings	 of	 Mao	 Tse-tung	 compiled	 by	 Japanese	 scholar	 Minoru	 Takeuchi	compared	 various	 versions	 of	Mao	 Zedong’s	works	 and	marked	 the	 places	where	 they	 had	 been	changed	in	the	body	of	the	text.	Minoru	Takeuchi,	ed.,	Mao	Zedong	ji	 毛澤東集	 (Collected	writings	of	Mao	Zedong).	Hong	Kong:	Yishan	tushu	gongying	 一山圖書供應,	1976.	 	 	21	 For	 instance,	when	he	mentioned	Li	Lisan,	 the	Party	 leader	between	1929	to	1930,	Mao	wrote	“Li	Lisan	 is	 sneaky”	 (李立三也不老實)	and	when	he	condemned	dogmatism,	Mao	wrote	 “dog	shit	can	 help	 to	 fertilize	 the	 soil	 and	 human	 shit	 can	 feed	 dogs,	 but	 what	 about	 dogmatism?	 It	 can	neither	fertilize	the	soil	nor	feed	dogs.”	See	Zhang	Shenqu,	2008.	22	 For	instance,	when	Mao’s	speech	On	The	Coalition	Government	was	published	in	1945,	it	argued	that	 “on	 the	 premise	 of	 voluntary	 democracy,	 all	 ethnic	 groups	 living	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 China	should	be	organized	into	the	Federation	of	the	Chinese	Democratic	Republic	(中華民主共和國聯邦),	and	a	central	government	should	be	established	based	on	this	federation”.	But	when	the	CCP	held	national	power,	Mao’s	ethnic	policy	changed	to	one	of	 “ethnic	autonomy”	(民族自治).	As	a	result,	the	relevant	paragraphs	about	the	federation	of	ethnic	groups	were	deleted	from	On	the	Coalition	
Government	manuscript	and	a	new	statement	was	added,	which	argued	that	“ethnic	groups	in	this	country	should	be	nicely	treated,	and	their	request	 for	autonomy	should	be	allowed”.	“Lun	lianhe	zhengfu	 論聯合政府”	(On	The	Coalition	Government)	was	firstly	published	on	May	2,	1945	on	the	
Jiefang	 ribao	 (解放日報),	 with	 a	 subheading	 of	 “Yijiu	 siwu	 nian	 si	 yue	 ershisi	 ri	 zai	 Zhongguo	gongchandang	diqici	quanguo	daibiao	dahui	shang	zhi	zhengzhi	baogao	 一九四五年四月二十四日
在中國共產黨第七次全國代表大會上之政治報告”	(The	political	report	on	the	7th	National	Congress	of	 the	CCP	on	April	 24,	 1945).	 This	 version	was	 included	 in	 the	Mao	Zedong	 ji	 edited	by	Minoru	Takeuchi	 (Volume	9,	 pp.	 183-276).	 The	 revised	 version	 of	 “On	The	 Coalition	Government”	 can	 be	found	 in	 Volume	 3	 of	 Selected	 Works	 of	 Mao	 Zedong	 (pp.	 930-1000).	 For	 more	 details	 about	revisions	on	this	article,	see	Zhong	Tian’e	 鐘天娥,	“Zhengque	lijie	jianguo	hou	Mao	Zedong	dui	‘Lun	lianhe	zhengfu’	de	xiugai	 正確理解建國後毛澤東對《論聯合政府》的修改”	(To	correctly	understand	the	 revisions	 Mao	 Zedong	 made	 after	 1949	 on	 his	 article	 “On	 The	 Coalition	 Government”),	Mao	
Zedong	sixiang	yanjiu	 毛澤東思想研究,	2014(1),	pp.	107-111.	
	 97	notes	 and	 using	 them	 to	 make	 authoritative	 historical	 interpretations	 that	 the	revisers	 achieved	 their	 goal	 of	 recreating	 Mao’s	 writings	 as	 the	 official	 and	comprehensive	accounts	of	Party	history.23	 	
	 	 Explanatory	Notes	on	Titles		 	 Explanatory	notes	on	titles	explained	the	writings’	backgrounds,	such	as	dates	of	composition	and	original	publication	information.	Some	notes	on	titles	succeeded	in	integrating	a	single	writing	into	the	“line	struggle”	category	in	the	Party	History	framework.	One	 such	 example	 is	 the	 explanatory	note	made	 for	 “Analysis	 of	 the	Classes	in	Chinese	Society”	(“Zhongguo	shehui	ge	jieceng	fenxi”	 中國社會各階層分
析).	 This	 note	 portrayed	 Mao	 in	 1926—when	 he	 wrote	 this	 article—as	 an	opponent	 to	 then	 Party	 leader,	 Chen	 Duxiu,	 and	 high-ranking	 comrade	 Zhang	Guotao.	This	 article	 was	 written	 by	 Comrade	 Mao	 Zedong	 to	 oppose	 two	deviations	then	in	the	Party.	The	first	deviation,	represented	by	Chen	Duxiu,	was	concerned	only	about	co-operation	with	the	Kuomintang	and	forgetting	about	the	peasants.	This	was	Right-wing	opportunism.	The	second	deviation,	represented	by	Zhang	Guotao,	was	concerned	only	 with	 the	 labor	 movement,	 and	 likewise	 forgot	 about	 the	peasants.	 This	 was	 “Left-wing”	 opportunism.	 Both	 of	 these	opportunistic	 deviators	 were	 aware	 that	 their	 strength	 was	inadequate,	but	neither	of	them	knew	where	to	seek	reinforcements	or	 where	 to	 obtain	 allies	 on	 a	 mass	 scale.	 Comrade	 Mao	 Zedong	pointed	out	 that	 the	peasantry	was	 the	 staunchest	 and	numerically	the	 largest	 ally	 of	 the	 Chinese	 proletariat,	 and	 thus	 solved	 the	problem	of	who	was	the	chief	ally	in	the	Chinese	revolution.24	 		 	 In	total,	there	were	eighty-one	explanatory	notes	in	the	four	volumes	of	Selected	
Works,	 fifteen	 of	 which	 highlighted	 the	 correctness	 of	 Mao’s	 political	 line	 by	summarizing	other	mistaken	lines.25	 These	notes	mentioned	all	the	“line	struggles”																																																									23	 Minoru	 Takeuchi’s	 work	 indicated	 the	 significance	 of	 distinguishing	 the	 different	 versions	 of	Mao’s	articles,	but	he	did	not	pay	any	attention	to	the	notes	that	were	written	after	1949.	24	 Mao	 Zedong	 xuanji	 毛澤東選集	 (Selected	 works	 of	 Mao	 Zedong),	 Volume	 1.	 Beijing:	 Renmin	chubanshe	 人民出版社,	 1966,	p.	 3.	When	 translating	 this	note,	 the	author	 referred	 to	 the	official	English	version	of	Mao	Zedong’s	works.	Selected	Works	of	Mao	Tse-tung	Volume	1.	Beijing:	Foreign	Languages	Press	 外文出版社,	1975,	p.	14.	25	 Similar	 examples	 include:	 “Hunan	 nongmin	 yundong	 kaocha	 baogao	 湖南農民運動考察報告”	(Report	 on	 an	 investigation	 of	 the	 peasant	 movement	 in	 Hunan),	 “Guanyu	 jiuzheng	 dangnei	 de	
	98	in	the	official	Party	History	outline	analyzed	in	the	previous	subsection.	 	
	 	 Endnotes		 	 The	eight	hundred	and	seventy-two	endnotes	 in	Selected	Works	can	be	divided	into	three	categories.	The	first	was	designed	to	make	Mao’s	writings	more	readable	by	 explaining	 classical	 allusions,	 idioms,	 and	 historical	 figures	 and	 events	 in	ancient	China,	etc.,	or	by	paraphrasing	Mao’s	words	in	simpler	language.26	 		 	 The	goal	of	the	second	category	was	to	introduce	events	and	figures	in	modern	Chinese	 history,	 both	 within	 and	 outside	 the	 Party.	 Notes	 concerning	 the	Nationalists,	 warlords,	 and	 other	 important	 persons	 provided	 a	 background	 for	Mao’s	analysis	of	political,	economic,	and	social	issues,	while	notes	on	intra-Party	issues	enlarged	the	scope	of	Mao’s	writings,	making	the	 information	conveyed	to	readers	much	more	abundant	(some	of	the	endnotes	in	Volume	1	of	Selected	Works	that	interpreted	the	Party’s	historical	issues	are	listed	in	Table	3-1).		 	 In	addition	to	the	issues	presented	in	Table	3-1,	a	number	of	important	events	in	Chinese	 modern	 history,	 such	 as	 the	 Taiping	 Rebellion	 (1851-1864),	 the	 Boxer	Uprising	 (1900),	 and	 the	 Xinhai	 Revolution,	 also	 emerged	 in	 the	 endnotes.	 The	interpretations	 of	 these	 events	 provided	 necessary	 background,	 as	 well	 as	legitimacy,	for	establishing	the	Party.		 	 In	compiling	Mao’s	works,	one	of	the	criteria	established	for	a	good	note	was	to	maintain	 the	 authority	 of	 his	 works.27	 The	 third	 category	 of	 endnotes	 helped	achieve	this	goal.	One	factor	that	could	have	damaged	Mao’s	authority	was	that	the	accounts	 in	 one	 article	 contradicted	 those	 in	 other	 articles.	 Rather	 than	deleting	some	words	 to	eliminate	 the	 contradictions,	 the	 revisers	preferred	 to	 rationalize	the	 conflicting	 accounts	 by	 attributing	 them	 to	 changed	 circumstances.	 For	example,	 in	 the	 1927	 article,	 “The	 Struggle	 in	 the	 Jinggang	 Mountains”	(“Jinggangshan	 de	 douzheng”	 井岡山的鬥爭),	 Mao	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	
																																																																																																																																																																		cuowu	sixiang	 關於糾正黨內的錯誤思想”	(On	correcting	mistaken	ideas	in	the	Party),	“Lun	fandui	riben	diguo	zhuyi	de	celue	 論反對日本帝國主義的策略”	(On	tactics	against	Japanese	imperialism),	“Zhongguo	geming	zhanzheng	de	zhanlue	wenti	 中國革命戰爭的戰略問題”	(Strategic	issues	of	the	Chinese	 revolutionary	 war),	 “Shijian	 lun	 實踐論”	 (On	 practice),	 and	 “Maodun	 lun	 矛盾論”	 (On	contradiction),	etc.	Most	of	the	other	notes	on	the	titles	are	very	short,	introducing	the	occasion	in	which	Mao	made	the	speech	or	wrote	the	article.	26	 This	 work	 was	 important	 because	 Mao	 liked	 referring	 to	 ancient	 works	 of	 prose	 and	 taking	advantage	of	historical	 stories	 to	criticize	 the	reality	of	 contemporary	situations,	as	well	as	using	metaphors	and	revising	Chinese	old	sayings	to	express	his	own	ideas.	 	 	27	 Wang	Jingye	 王敬業,	“Tian	Jiaying	yu	Mao	xuan	sijuan	de	bianji	chuban	 田家英與《毛選》四卷
的編輯出版”	 (Tian	 Jiaying	and	 the	publication	of	 four	volumes	of	Selected	Works	of	Mao	Zedong),	
Chuban	faxing	yanjiu	 出版發行研究,	1999(10),	pp.	8-10.	
	 99	equal	 living	 standards	 and	democracy	within	 the	Red	Army,	both	of	which	were	matters	of	fact	at	the	time,	but	which	changed	in	the	following	years.	The	endnotes	removed	the	contradiction	by	highlighting	the	uniqueness	of	the	Red	Army’s	early	period,	 arguing	 that	 in	 the	 early	 years,	 providing	 officers	 and	 ordinary	 soldiers	with	the	same	standard	of	living	and	maintaining	democracy	within	the	army	was	“necessary”	 for	 the	 army’s	 development,	 while	 later	 on,	 it	 was	 also	 correct	 for	officers	to	receive	higher	wages	and	for	Mao	to	criticize	the	demand	for	so-called	“ultra-democracy.”28		 	 Another	 situation	 was	 that,	 when	 making	 arguments,	 Mao	 exaggerated	 or	distorted	 the	 facts	 deliberately	 or	 interpreted	 them	 in	 an	 illogical	 way	 to	 win	power	or	 for	propaganda	purposes.	 In	 these	cases,	 the	revisers	used	endnotes	to	patch	the	loopholes.	Take	Mao’s	assessment	of	the	WRA	as	an	example.	“Strategic	Issues”	was	included	in	the	first	volume	of	Selected	Works	in	1951.29	 Compared	to	the	book	published	in	1941,	the	most	important	change	occurred	in	the	endnotes	section,	where	 a	 160-Chinese-character	 note	was	 added	 to	 introduce	 the	WRA’s	history.	In	the	autumn	of	1936,	after	rejoining	with	the	Second	Front	Army,	the	Fourth	Front	Army	started	to	move	north	from	the	northeast	of	Xikang	
西康.	 Then	 Zhang	 Guotao	was	 still	 persisting	 in	 his	 anti-Party	 stand	and	in	his	policy	of	retreatism	and	cancelism	(quxiao	zhuyi	 取消主義).	In	October	of	 this	 year,	 after	 the	 Second	Front	Army	and	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	arrived	at	Gansu,	Zhang	Guotao	ordered	the	vanguards	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	numbering	more	than	twenty	thousand	troops,	to	build	the	WRA	and	march	to	the	west	of	the	Yellow	River	towards	Qinghai.	 The	 WRA	 suffered	 a	 blow	 and	 was	 practically	 defeated	 in																																																									28	 See	notes	13	and	14	in	“The	Struggle	in	the	Jinggang	Mountains”	in	Selected	Works	of	Mao	Zedong,	Volume	1,	pp.	81-82.	 	29	 Before	 1949,	 at	 least	 three	 versions	 of	 Selected	Works	 of	 Mao	 Zedong	 published	 by	 different	institutions	had	“Strategic	Issues”	included.	In	1947	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Jin-Cha-Ji	Region	printed	Continuation	of	Selected	Works	of	Mao	Zedong	 毛澤東選集續編,	which	 included	“Strategic	Issues”,	 as	well	 as	 a	 letter	written	 in	1930	by	Mao	 to	Lin	Biao.	Lin	Biao	 suggested	 to	 the	Central	Department	of	the	CCP	that	this	letter	should	not	be	released	to	the	public.	As	a	result	this	book	was	only	 disseminated	 as	 internal	material.	 The	 two	 other	 versions	 of	 Selected	Works	 of	Mao	 Zedong	that	 included	 “Strategic	 Issues”	 were	 the	 Northeastern	 Bookshop	 version	 and	 the	 Central	Committee	 of	 the	 Jin-Cha-Lu-Yu	 Region	 versions,	 both	 published	 in	 1948.	 All	 these	 pre-1949	versions	 focused	 on	 collecting	 Mao’s	 writings	 that	 were	 scattered	 in	 a	 number	 of	 journals	 and	newspapers,	 rather	 than	making	 any	 changes	 or	 comments	 on	 these	works.	 “Strategic	 Issues”	 in	these	versions	were	the	same	as	when	it	was	first	published	by	Military	Politics	Magazine	Press	in	1941.	
	100	 December	1936.	In	March	1937,	they	were	completely	defeated.30	   	 	 In	 this	 endnote,	 “be	 practically	 defeated”	 (jiben	 shibai	 基本失敗)	 and	 “be	completely	 defeated”	 (wanquan	 shibai	 完全失敗)	were	 two	 innovative	 concepts.	As	analyzed	in	the	previous	chapter,	when	written,	“Strategic	Issues”	contradicted	Mao’s	 argument	 on	 the	 WRA	 in	 this	 essay.	 When	 compiling	 Mao’s	 works,	 the	compilers’	freedom	was	limited,	as	they	could	not	change	the	dates	of	the	writings	nor	Mao’s	 verdicts	 in	 the	main	body.	With	 these	 two	unalterable	premises—this	essay	 was	 written	 in	 December	 1936,	 at	 which	 point	 Mao	 already	 knew	 of	 the	WRA’s	failure—the	compilers	had	no	choice	but	to	invent	a	new	type	of	failure—“be	practically	defeated.”	This	is	because	Mao’s	assertion	would	have	been	logical	only	 if	 the	 WRA	 had	 already	 failed,	 even	 only	 “practically,”	 when	 he	 made	 his	speech	 in	 Kangda.	 In	 this	 way,	 they	 rationalized	 the	 contradictions	 in	 former	versions.		 	 Several	versions	of	Selected	Works	of	Mao	Zedong	were	published	before	1949.31	Compared	 to	 these	 previous	 versions,	 the	 new	 Selected	 Works	 was	 valuable	because	 of	 the	 unprecedented	 readership,	 and	more	 importantly,	 because	 of	 the	cautious	 revisions	 made	 to	 Mao’s	 writings,	 which	 demonstrated	 the	 Party	leadership’s	attempts	to	make	Mao’s	works	the	most	authoritative	interpretations	of	the	Party’s	past.	 		 	 In	 summary,	 the	 revised	 version	 of	 Mao’s	 works	 contributed	 to	 the	 Party’s	official	 History	 framework	 in	 three	 ways:	 first,	 some	 that	 were	 fitted	 into	 the	contexts	of	“line	struggles”	strengthened	the	outline,	which	took	the	so-called	“line	struggles”	as	one	of	 its	two	grand	themes,	further.	Second,	Mao’s	works	provided	Party	 historians	 and	 ordinary	 readers	 with	 interpretations	 of	 specific	 historical	events.	 Third,	 after	 revision,	 contradictions	 were	 removed	 and	 the	 official	narratives	became	more	consistent	and	reasonable.	It	was	because	of	the	existence	of	this	seemingly	logical	and	comprehensive	framework	that	official	narratives	of																																																									30	 Note	19,	Mao	Zedong,	 “Strategic	 issues	 of	 the	Chinese	 revolutionary	war”,	 in	Selected	works	 of	
Mao	 Zedong	 Volume	 1,	 pp.	 223-224.	When	 translating	 this	 note,	 the	 author	 referred	 to	 Selected	
Works	of	Mao	Tse-Tung	(Volume	1),	p.	252.	31	 The	earliest	version	of	Selected	Works	of	Mao	Zedong	was	published	by	the	Jinchaji	Daily	 晉察冀
日報	 in	1944.	Then	Suzhong	Publishing	House	 蘇中出版社,	Haerbin	Northeast	Book	Store	 哈爾濱
東北書店	 and	the	Central	Committee	of	Jin	Cha	Lu	Yu晉察魯豫中央局	 published	different	versions	of	 Selected	 Works	 of	 Mao	 Zedong	 in	 1945	 and	 1948	 respectively.	 For	 more	 details	 about	 the	publication	of	Mao	Zedong’s	works,	see	Liu	Jintian	 劉金田	 and	Wu	Xiaomei	 吳曉梅,	“Mao	Zedong	
Xuanji”	 chuban	 de	 qianqian	 houhou	 《毛澤東選集》出版的前前後後	 (About	 the	 publication	 of	
Selected	works	of	Mao	Zedong).	Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	1993.	
	 101	Party	 history,	 including	 the	 WRA’s	 history,	 became	 more	 convincing	 and	impregnable.		 	 Looking	at	the	process	of	the	formation	of	the	official	Party	history	framework	overall,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 in	 the	 early	 period	 of	 the	 PRC,	 Mao	 supervised	 the	recording	of	Party	history	directly.	His	trusted	aides,	Hu	Qiaomu,	and	Tian	Jiaying,	who	 were	 party	 theorists	 as	 well,	 became	 the	 first	 leading	 authorities	 on	 Party	history.	 	
3.2	A	Chorus	of	Revolutionary	Recollections	of	the	WRA	 		 	 If	the	formation	of	the	official	Party	history	framework	was	the	most	important	process	in	Party	historiography	in	the	1950s,	the	second	most	important	was	that	the	 participants—senior	 Party	 cadres	who	were	 involved	 intensively	 in	 learning	campaigns,	 and	 were	 forced	 or	 induced	 to	 accept	 standard	 versions	 of	 Party	History—became	 its	 narrators.	 These	 cadres	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	 CCP’s	official	 system	 of	 historiography	 by	 writing	 “revolutionary	 memoirs”	 (geming	
huiyilu	 革命回憶錄).32	 After	 presenting	 the	 pattern	 of	 revolutionary	 memoir	writing	and	compilation,	and	analyzing	the	position	of	these	memoirs	in	the	Party’s	historiography	 in	 general,	 the	 second	 half	 of	 this	 section	will	 focus	 on	memoirs	written	 by	 the	 WRA	 survivors.	 This	 discussion	 highlights	 the	 characteristics	 of	revolutionary	memoirs	written	in	the	1950s	by	comparing	them	to	accounts	of	the	same	topic	written	in	the	Yan’an	period.	 	
3.2.1	Revolutionary	Memoirs	and	Their	Position	in	Party	Historiography		 	 In	1951,	a	series	of	articles	written	by	top	leaders,	such	as	Liu	Shaoqi	and	Zhu	De,	appeared	 in	 the	People’s	Daily	 to	celebrate	 the	Party’s	30th	anniversary.	This	was	the	starting	point	of	 the	production	of	 revolutionary	memoirs	 in	 the	PRC	period.	Since	 the	 mid-1950s,	 more	 and	 more	 cadres	 had	 taken	 part	 in	 writing	revolutionary	memoirs.	The	Chief	Political	Department	of	 the	People’s	Liberation	Army	(PLA)	 launched	an	essays	collection	campaign	 in	August	1956	 to	celebrate	the	 30th	 anniversary	 of	 the	 army’s	 establishment.	 This	 large-scale	 campaign	showed	 that	 memoir	 writing	 by	 senior	 cadres’	 had	 become	 a	 collective	 activity	with	 official	 support.33	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 late	 1950s	 witnessed	 a	 peak	 in	 the																																																									32	 Revolutionary	 memoirs	 sometimes	 were	 also	 called	 “memoirs	 on	 revolutionary	 struggles”	(geming	douzheng	huiyilu	 革命鬥爭回憶錄).	The	contents	of	these	kinds	of	memoirs	must	focus	on	struggles	that	were	led	by	the	CCP.	33	 Partly	as	outcomes	of	this	campaign,	two	revolutionary	memoir	series	“Xinghuo	liaoyuan	 星火燎
	102	production	of	narratives	on	Party	history.		 	 Propaganda	at	 the	 time	considered	writing	revolutionary	memoirs	as	a	way	to	“make	 History	 by	 letting	 people	 write	 their	 own	 history.”34	 Strictly	 speaking,	revolutionary	memoirs	 are	neither	 serious	historical	works	nor	 reliable	 primary	historical	 materials,	 because	 they	 contain	 considerable	 elements	 of	 fiction.35	Despite	 these	 elements,	 however,	 revolutionary	memoirs	 are	 still	 worth	 serious	study	from	a	historiographical	perspective	for	two	reasons.	First,	in	most	cases,	in	revolutionary	memoirs	written	in	the	1950s,	senior	cadres	narrated	the	accounts,	and	 secretaries	 or	 writers	 recorded	 and	 polished	 them	 into	 essays.	 Therefore,	these	memoirs	 contain	 considerable	elements	of	oral	history,	which	makes	 them	valuable	 for	 historical	 studies.	 Meanwhile,	 a	 more	 important	 reason	 that	 the	revolutionary	memoirs	are	worth	studying	 is	 that	 they	were	essential	vehicles	of	ideological	 propaganda	 in	 the	 first	 few	 years	 of	 the	 PRC,	 and	 also	 helped	authorities	 connect	 internal	 Party	 history	 education	 before	 1949	 successfully	 to	the	Party	history	propaganda	disseminated	to	ordinary	Chinese	people	thereafter.	 		 	 By	the	second	half	of	the	1950s,	many	of	the	Communists	who	joined	the	Party	during	 or	 before	 the	 1930s	 already	 held	 high	 positions	 in	 the	 government,	 the	Party,	 or	 in	 military	 institutions.	 It	 was	 the	 works	 of	 these	 high-ranking	cadres—who	had	taken	part	in	a	series	of	political	movements	and	who	had	been	forced	 to	 write	 self-examination	 materials	 several	 times—that	 constituted	 the	main	body	of	revolutionary	memoirs.	Despite	 the	authorship	being	the	same,	 the	revolutionary	 memoirs	 written	 in	 the	 1950s	 differed	 considerably	 from	 the	narratives	 written	 in	 self-examination	 materials	 before	 1949.	 There	 were	 three	new	 characteristics	 to	 these	 narratives,	 which	 indicated	 that	 revolutionary	memoirs,	 while	 seemingly	 reflective	 of	 individual	 experience,	 indeed	 contained																																																																																																																																																																			
原”	(A	single	spark	can	start	a	prairie	fire)	and	“Hongqi	piaopiao	 紅旗飄飄”	(Red	flags	are	waving)	were	 published	 successively.	 Included	 in	 these	 two	 series	 were	 some	 of	 the	 most	 popular	revolutionary	 recollections.	Apart	 from	organizing	 cadres	 to	write	memoirs,	 editing	 teams	of	 the	above	memoir	series	and	other	related	agencies	also	held	“discussion	conferences”	and	published	comments	 on	 journals	 and	 newspapers,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 propagandizing	 senior	 cadres’	revolutionary	 memoirs.	 There	 were	 a	 number	 of	 “reading	 reports”	 (duhou	 gan	 讀後感)	 for	revolutionary	 memoirs	 published	 in	 newspapers	 in	 the	 late	 1950s.	 These	 reports	 helped	 to	promote	revolutionary	memoirs.	 	34	 Xiao	Yu	 笑雨,	 “Yong	ziji	de	shou	xie	ziji	de	 lishi	 用自己的手寫自己的歷史”	 (To	write	our	own	history	by	our	Own	hands),	Wenyi	bao	 文藝報,	1958(13).	35	 Some	Chinese	scholars,	who	have	studied	revolutionary	memoirs	from	a	literature	perspective,	concluded	that	memoirs	have	played	a	similar	role	in	the	achievements	of	authoritative	historical	narratives	 to	 that	of	 revolutionary	historical	novels	written	by	Party	novelists.	 See	Hong	Zicheng	
洪子誠,	 Zhongguo	 dangdai	 wenxueshi	 中國當代文學史	 (History	 of	 Chinese	 modern	 literature).	Beijing:	Beijing	daxue	chubanshe	 北京大學出版社,	1999,	p.	159.	
	 103	elements	 of	 collective	 memories,	 and	 to	 a	 great	 degree,	 resembled	 official	historical	narratives.	 		 	 The	 first	 characteristic	 of	 these	 memoirs	 is	 political	 correctness.	 The	 writers	tended	 to	 use	 the	 differences	 between	 political	 lines	within	 the	 Party	 to	 explain	their	 experiences.	 The	 second	 feature	 is	 an	 omniscient	 perspective.	 Thus,	 the	memoirs	 included	 not	 only	 the	 experiences	 of	 the	 writers,	 but	 also	 facts	 or	assessments	about	which	the	writers	could	not	have	been	aware	when	they	took	part	 in	 the	 revolutionary	 events.36	 The	 last	 characteristic	 is	 the	 similarity	 in	 the	content	 of	 these	 memoirs.	 Given	 that	 individual	 narrators	 of	 revolutionary	memoirs	 have	 unique	 experiences,	 theoretically,	 their	 recollections	 should	 have	been	different,	but	in	fact,	many	contain	similar	ideas	and	some	even	incorporate	the	same	sentences.	 		 	 Why	did	revolutionary	memoirs	contain	 these	 three	new	characteristics?	First,	senior	 cadres	 were	 encouraged	 to	 recall	 their	 past	 in	 this	 way.	 Education	 and	propaganda	 repeatedly	 instilled	 in	 cadres	 that	 once	 they	 had	 been	 blooded	 in	revolution,	 they	 should	 not	 be	 satisfied	with	 recollecting	 experiences	 from	 their	individual	perspective	alone.	Just	as	an	article	published	in	the	Journal	of	Literature	
and	Art	 (Wenyi	bao	 文藝報)	wrote,	 “to	write	 revolutionary	history	 is	not	only	 to	write	 what	 the	 history	 was,	 but	 also	 to	 write	 why	 the	 history	 was	 as	 such.”	Specifically,	 “Writing	 revolutionary	 memoirs	 requires	 Marxist-Leninist	 historical	views.	We	 have	 to	 judge	 everything	 by	Mao	 Zedong’s	military	 thought	when	we	write	 about	 military	 struggles	 in	 Chinese	 revolutionary	 history.	 We	 must	distinguish	between	essence	and	mainstream,	and	what	 is	mere	phenomena,	and	consequently	 what	 should	 be	 excessively	 praised	 and	 what	 should	 not	 be	propagandized,	and	even	what	should	be	criticized.”37	 		 	 Second,	because	these	senior	cadres	had	been	steeped	in	the	CCP’s	revolutionary	discourse	 for	 decades,	 they	were	 apt	 to	 take	 a	 collective	 standpoint.	When	 they	collected	memoirs	in	the	1950s,	the	editors	already	noticed	that	cadres	tended	to																																																									36	 Chinese	researcher	Pan	Sheng	has	noticed	this	point,	noting	that	there	was	a	pair	of	“God’s	eyes”	that	hid	behind	the	narratives	in	revolutionary	memoirs.	This	pair	of	eyes	could	observe	an	event	from	an	overall	 perspective,	 breaking	 the	 limitation	of	 the	 author’s	personal	 experience.	 See	Pan	Sheng	 潘盛,	“	‘Shiqi	nian’	geming	huiyilu	shuxie	zhong	de	lishi	xushi	yu	gonggong	jiyi	“十七年”革命
回憶錄書寫中的歷史敘事和公共記憶 	 (Historical	 narratives	 and	 public	 memories	 in	 the	revolutionary	memoirs	 of	 the	 first	 seventeen	 years	 of	 the	 PRC).	M.	 A.	 Thesis	 of	 Nanjing	 Normal	University	 南京師範大學,	2006,	p.	15.	 	37	 Li	Wei	 李偉,	 “Gaoju	Mao	Zedong	sixiang	hongqi	xiechu	gengduo	genghao	de	geming	douzheng	huiyilu	 高舉毛澤東思想紅旗，寫出更多更好的革命鬥爭回憶錄”	(Hold	the	red	flag	of	Mao	Zedong	Thought	and	write	more	and	better	revolutionary	memoirs),	Wenyi	bao 文藝報,	1960(15).	 	
	104	avoid	talking	about	personal	experiences,	preferring	instead	to	attribute	victories	to	 the	 leadership	 and	 the	 Chinese	 people	 as	 a	 whole.38	 The	 Party	 Center	 had	conveyed	 its	 interpretations	 of	 historical	 events	 systematically	 to	 every	 Party	member	 since	 the	 late	 1930s.	 Consequently,	 when	 the	 Party	 asked	 these	 senior	cadres	 to	 take	up	 their	pens	again	 in	 the	1950s	 to	 recall	 their	past,	 these	 cadres	naturally	 adopted	 the	 orthodox	 dogma	 that	 they	 had	 learnt	 through	 repeated	sessions	 in	 the	preceding	decades,	 and	 integrated	 specific	 conclusions	with	 their	personal	 memories.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 not	 difficult	 to	 comprehend	 why	 the	revolutionary	memoirs	were,	 to	a	great	degree,	a	mixture	of	 the	conclusions	that	the	Party	had	taught	the	authors	and	the	facts	that	they	had	personally	witnessed.	 		 	 Further,	the	strategies	and	methods	adopted	by	the	institutions	that	edited	the	memoirs	also	contributed	to	the	narrative	style	of	the	memoirs.	Memoirs	about	a	single	 event	 or	 several	 events	 that	 happened	 in	 a	 specific	 period	were	 compiled	into	one	category.	In	some	cases,	editors	would	submit	a	detailed	outline	to	senior	cadres	during	the	early	stage	of	preparation,	listing	some	main	questions	to	guide	the	 recollections	 of	 the	 senior	 cadres.39	 In	 the	 revision	 and	proofreading	 stages,	editors	deleted	some	narratives	they	considered	unrelated	to	the	books’	themes.	In	this	way,	 they	 could	 guarantee	 that	 the	 selected	memoirs	would	 best	 reflect	 the	revolutionary	themes	desired	in	the	1950s.		 	 Based	on	the	above	analysis,	we	can	now	make	the	following	observation	about	the	memoirs	produced	 in	 the	1950s	and	early	1960s:	memoirs	written	by	senior	cadres	were	outcomes	of	the	Party’s	successful	intra-Party	education	system.	This	was	 the	 first	 time	 that	 the	consensuses	on	historical	 issues	 reached	by	 the	Party	cadres—consensuses	achieved	through	power	struggles,	criticism	movements,	and	Party	history	education,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter—were	disseminated	to	 ordinary	 Chinese	 people.	 Because	 of	 the	 authors’	 official	 backgrounds	 and	editing	 institutions,	 ordinary	 readers	 and	 academic	 researchers	 at	 the	 time	accepted	 revolutionary	 memoirs	 as	 authoritative	 descriptions	 of	 the	 CCP’s	revolutionary	history.																																																									38	 Revolutionary	 memoir	 writer	 Xie	 Nanzheng	 recorded	 in	 1958	 that	 senior	 cadres	 often	 told	writers	there	was	nothing	about	them	worth	writing	down	because	all	the	victories	were	due	to	the	Party’s	leadership	and	the	Chinese	masses.	Xie	Nanzheng	 解南征,	Women	shi	zenyang	bangzhu	lao	ganbu	xie	huiyilu	de	 我們是怎樣幫助老幹部寫回憶錄的	 (How	we	helped	senior	Cadres	in	writing	memoirs),	Wenyi	bao	 文藝報,	1958(12).	39	 Zhongguo	 renmin	 jiefangjun	 moubu	 buduishi	 bianxiezu	 中國人民解放軍某部部隊史編寫組,	“Women	 shi	 zenyang	 bianxie	 buduishi	 de	 我們是怎樣編寫部隊史的”	 (How	we	wrote	 the	 Army’s	history),	Wenyi	bao 文藝報,	1959(3).	
	 105		 	 The	 following	 subsection	will	 use	 the	WRA	as	 a	 case	 study	 to	 compare	 senior	cadres’	 writings	 before	 and	 after	 1949,	 and	 investigate	 the	 similarities	 and	differences	between	them.	 	
3.2.2	The	Western	Route	Army	in	Revolutionary	Memoirs	 		 	 The	WRA	in	pre-1949	Recollections	and	Self-examination	Materials		 	 From	 1937,	 when	 the	 WRA	 failed,	 to	 the	 late	 1940s,	 some	 WRA	 survivors	recorded	 their	 experiences	 to	 report	 their	 actions	 to	 Party	 organizations	 or	 to	conduct	 self-examinations.	 The	 Party	 kept	 these	materials	 secret	 in	 the	 archives	for	 decades.	 Four	 such	 writings	 have	 been	 released	 to	 date:	 two	 reports	 to	 the	Party	Center	written	by	the	WRA’s	leader,	Chen	Changhao	and	two	essays	written	by	the	Ninth	Army’s	Chief	of	Staff	Li	Jukui	 李聚奎	 (1904-1995)	and	the	Thirtieth	Army	Commander,	Cheng	Shicai	 程世才	 (1912-1990),	respectively.	Both	 focused	on	the	reasons	 for	 the	WRA’s	 failure.	Although	they	share	similar	subject	matter,	these	materials	illustrate	the	diversity	of	the	WRA	survivors’	narratives	and	ideas,	which	reflect	their	different	positions	and	perspectives	at	the	time.	 	
  Chen’s	 first	 report	 recalled	 the	 WRA’s	 operations	 in	 detail	 and	 provide	 a	multi-angled	 analysis	 of	 the	 WRA’s	 failure,	 arguing	 that	 the	 low	 proportion	 of	combat	troops	in	the	WRA,	lack	of	weapons,	geographical	conditions	in	Gansu,	and	the	enemies’	capability	were	all	relevant	factors.	In	this	report,	Chen	examines	the	mistakes	he	had	made	 in	 leading	the	WRA	cautiously,	admitting	that	he	had	held	some	“right-deviationist	points	of	view”	that	coincided	to	some	degree	with	Zhang	Guotao’s	 opinions.40	 Chen’s	 second	 report	was	 terse	 and	 designed	 to	 emphasize	that	he	advocated	the	Party	Center’s	conclusion	on	the	Zhang	issue,	revealing	the	stress	he	was	under	at	the	time.	This	report	did	not	provide	any	new	information	about	 the	WRA.41	 Li	 Jukui’s	 article	 analyzes	 the	WRA’s	 operation	 systematically	and	 listed	strategic	and	tactical	mistakes	 that	 the	WRA	had	committed.	Li	argues	that	 the	WRA	had	 advantages	 on	 the	 battlefield	 yet	 had	 failed	because	 the	WRA	leaders	were	biased	against	the	Party	Center	and	refused	to	follow	its	directions.	Li	even	criticizes	commanders	of	the	same	or	higher	rank	than	himself,	such	as	Wang	
																																																								40	 Only	a	part	of	 this	report	has	been	released.	 “Chen	Changhao	guanyu	Xilujun	shibai	de	baogao	
陳昌浩關於西路軍失敗的報告”	 (Chen	 Changhao’s	 report	 on	 the	 WRA’s	 failure),	 in	 SMHF,	 pp.	976-991.	41	 “Chen	Changhao	di’erci	baogao	shu	 陳昌浩第二次報告書”	 (Chen	Changhao’s	 second	report),	 in	SMHF,	pp.	992-995.	
	106	Shusheng 王樹聲 	 (1905-1974), 42  Cheng	 Shicai,	 and	 Sun	 Yuqing	 孫玉清	(1909-1937)	explicitly,43	 which	was	an	unusual	practice	within	the	Party.44	 Cheng	Shicai’s	 recollection	 focuses	 primarily	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	WRA,	 and	 its	battles	and	experiences	in	Xinjiang	after	its	defeat.45  	 	 Chen,	 Li,	 and	 Cheng’s	 recollections	 or	 self-examination	 materials	 apparently	reflect	 the	 different	 circumstances	 of	 three	 types	 of	 WRA	 survivors	 and	 their	respective	 views	 about	 the	 army’s	 failure.	 Chen	 and	 the	other	 top	 leaders	 of	 the	WRA,	 who	 were	 under	 pressure	 because	 they	 suffered	 serious	 military	 defeat,	attempted	 to	 extract	 original	 ideas	 about	 the	 army’s	 defeat	 from	 their	 own	experiences.	These	leaders’	conclusions,	however,	clashed	with	the	Party	Center’s	convictions.	As	a	result,	Chen	accepted	the	Party	Center’s	conclusions	reluctantly	and	 in	 part,	 while	 sparing	 no	 efforts	 to	 emphasize	 the	 difficulties	 the	WRA	 had	faced	in	Gansu.	For	the	same	reason,	Chen	criticized	his	own	mistakes,	but	argued	that	he	was	different	from	Zhang	Guotao.	 		 	 Given	the	fact	that	both	Li	and	Cheng	were	lower-ranking	commanders	and	had	no	access	to	the	primary	materials	that	determined	the	WRA’s	actions	at	the	time,	such	as	the	directives	sent	by	the	Party	Center	and	the	Central	Military	Committee,	Cheng’s	 cautious	 decision	 to	 focus	 on	 battle	 experience	 rather	 than	 talk	 about	strategies	or	the	way	in	which	the	WRA	leadership	carried	out	the	Party	Center’s	orders	 seems	 reasonable.	 In	 striking	 contrast,	 Li’s	 bald	 criticism	 of	 the	 WRA	leadership	 is	 difficult	 to	 understand.	 In	 fact,	 Li	 originally	 was	 a	 divisional	commander	in	the	First	Front	Army,46	 allowing	him	to	take	an	opposing	position	to	that	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	and	to	make	negative	comments	about	the	WRA.	  	 	 As	analyzed	 in	 the	previous	 chapter,	during	 the	Yan’an	period,	WRA	survivors																																																									42	 Wang	Shusheng	was	the	Commander	of	the	Thirty-first	Army.	43	 Sun	Yuqing	successively	served	as	 the	Commander	of	 the	Ninth	Army	and	the	Fifth	Army.	Sun	was	arrested	and	killed	by	Ma	Bufang	in	1937.	44	 	 Li	Jukui	 李聚奎,	“Xilujun	xue	de	jiaoxun	 西路軍血的教訓”	(The	bloody	historical	lessons	of	the	WRA),	in	Qinghai	minzu	xueyuan	zhengzhi	xi	Zhonggong	dangshi	jiaoyanzu	 青海民族學院政治系中
共黨史教研組	 (The	CCP	Party	History	Teaching	and	Research	Group	in	the	Politics	Department	of	Qinghai	Nationalities	University),	ed.,	Hong	Xilujun	zai	Qinghai	youguan	qingkuang	diaocha	cailiao	
huibian	 紅西路軍在青海有關情況調查材料彙編	 (The	 collection	 of	 investigation	materials	 on	 the	WRA	in	Qinghai)	(Internal	materials),	Volume	4,	1980,	pp.	580-589.	45	 	 Cheng	Shicai	 程世才,	“Guanyu	Xilujun	de	cailiao	 關於西路軍的材料”	(Materials	on	the	WRA),	in	Hao	Chengming	and	Zhu	Yongguang,	eds.,	2007,	pp.	15-37.	46	 When	the	First	Front	Army	met	with	the	Fourth	Front	Army	during	the	Long	March,	some	First	Front	Army	commanders	were	 transferred	to	work	 in	 the	Fourth	Front	Army.	 It	was	 then	that	Li	Jukui	 was	 appointed	 to	 be	 Chief	 of	 Staff	 of	 the	 Thirty-first	 Army.	When	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	troops	 crossed	 the	Yellow	River,	 Li	was	 in	 a	 coma	and	was	 carried	by	 soldiers	 to	 the	west	bank,	while	 the	 Thirty-first	 Army	 was	 left	 on	 the	 east	 bank.	 After	 Li	 recovered,	 he	 replaced	 a	 dead	commander	to	be	the	Chief	of	Staff	of	the	Ninth	Army.	
	 107	and	others	were	forced	to	accept	the	verdicts	issued	by	the	Party	Center.	Although	they	 fought	 against	 their	 unfair	 treatment,	 these	 people	 reached	 a	 consensus	 on	the	 issue	 of	 the	WRA	by	 the	 end	of	 the	Yan’an	Rectification	Campaign.	After	 the	PRC	was	established	in	1949,	allowing	cadres	and	veterans	to	write	revolutionary	memoirs	 became	 a	 popular	 way	 to	 produce	 revolutionary	 narratives,	 through	which	this	consensus	was	conveyed	to	a	much	broader	audience. 
	 	 The	WRA	in	the	Post-1949	Revolutionary	Memoirs		 	 From	 1949	 to	 1966,	 when	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution	 began,	 a	 large	 number	 of	revolutionary	 memoirs	 emerged.	 Presumably	 because	 of	 the	 WRA’s	 close	relationship	with	the	so-called	Zhang	Guotao	Line,	memoirs	about	the	WRA	were	not	 as	 numerous	 as	were	 those	 about	 other	military	 events.	 There	were	 only	 Li	Tianhuan’s	 李天煥	 (1912-1986)47	 Full	of	Power	and	Grandeur,	published	in	1958,	and	Cheng	Shicai’s	Tragic	Experience,	published	 in	1959,	as	well	as	six	essays	by	Cheng,	Qin	 Jiwei,	 Zhou	Chunlin	 周純麟	 (1913-1986),	 Li	Tianhuan,	 and	Dai	Kelin	
戴克林	 (1913-1990),	which	were	compiled	into	Selected	Works	of	“A	Single	Spark	
Can	 Start	 a	 Prairie	 Fire.”48	 Although	 the	 number	 of	 authors	 and	 essays	 written	after	1949	exceeded	 the	number	of	 similar	materials	before	 that,	 these	memoirs	written	in	the	first	few	years	of	the	PRC	did	not	exhibit	much	diversity.	In	addition	to	 descriptions	 about	 battles,	 the	memoirs	 above	 focused	on	 the	 following	 three	subjects.	  	 	 The	first	was	that	Zhang	ordered	the	WRA	to	cross	the	Yellow	River	without	the	Party	Center’s	approval.	Cheng	wrote	that,	immediately	after	the	Red	Army	joined	together	in	Huining,	“Chen	Changhao	went	to	the	Thirtieth	Army’s	headquarters	to	convey	 Zhang	Guotao’s	 orders	 about	 establishing	 the	WRA	 and	 about	 building	 a	base	in	Ningxia,	as	well	as	to	make	use	of	the	Party	Center’s	name	to	put	forward	a	slogan	about	 connecting	with	 the	Soviet	Union.”49	 Li	Tianhuan	also	 recalled	 that	Zhang	conveyed	a	fake	order	to	the	Fourth	Front	Army	in	order	to	“avoid	fighting	against	 the	Nationalists	and	 Japanese	 imperialists,	 and	 to	 instead	build	a	base	 in	the	northwest	and	to	separate	the	Party.”	Li	analyzed	further	why	Zhang	and	Chen	borrowed	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 name	 to	 cheat	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 cadres	 and																																																									47	 Li	Tianhuan	was	the	Chief	of	Political	Department	of	the	Thirtieth	Army.	48	 Xinghuo	 Liaoyuan	 xuanbian	 zhi	 san	 星火燎原選編之三	 (A	 single	 spark	 can	 start	 a	 prairie	 fire,	selected	works	No.3).	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	1980.	Three	of	these	six	essays	were	excerpts	of	the	above-mentioned	singles	by	Cheng	Shicai	and	Li	Tianhuan.	49 	 	 Cheng	 Shicai 程世才 ,	 Beizhuang	 de	 licheng	 悲壯的歷程 	 (Tragic	 experience).	 Shenyang:	Chunfeng	wenyi	chubanshe	 春风文艺出版社,	1959,	p.	4.	
	108	soldiers,	 arguing	 that	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 troops	 only	 followed	 the	 Party	Center’s	orders.	As	a	result,	“the	troops	had	high	morale	as	they	believed	that	what	Chen	 conveyed	 was	 really	 from	 the	 Party	 Center.” 50	 Interestingly,	 this	 piece	 of	information	was	absent	in	all	official	documents	that	had	been	issued	by	the	Party	Center,	 and	did	not	exist	 in	Party	 leaders’	previous	authoritative	 interpretations.	How	 then,	 did	 these	 authors	 obtain	 this	 information	or	draw	 such	 a	 conclusion?	Indeed,	 according	 to	 Dai	 Kelin’s	 recollection,	 “Zhang	 Guotao’s	 evil	 behavior	 of	ordering	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	to	go	 to	 the	west	bank	of	 the	Yellow	River”	had	been	“revealed	with	abundant	truth,”	conveyed	to	veterans,	and	criticized	as	early	as	1937	in	“anti-Zhang	Guotao	Line	meetings.”51	 Cheng’s	memoirs	also	mentioned	that	he	obtained	this	information	from	Mao	in	the	1930s.	Cheng	recalled	that	while	talking	with	 the	WRA	survivors,	Mao	said,	 “Zhang	Guotao	 feared	 the	Nationalists	while	 also	 fearing	 the	 Japanese	 imperialists.	 So	 he	 secretly	 dispatched	 troops	 to	cross	 the	 Yellow	 River	 without	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 approval	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	attaining	an	independent	region	and	an	independent	position.” 52	 For	Party	cadres	like	 Dai	 and	 Cheng,	 Chairman	Mao’s	 words	 and	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 directives	 or	opinions	 conveyed	 at	 conferences	 or	 learning	 sessions	 were	 as	 authoritative	 as	statements	printed	in	official	documents.	As	Chapter	2	showed,	some	assessments	and	details	always	were	conveyed	orally,	but	in	the	end,	they	were	not	included	in	official	reports	or	resolutions.	Some	of	this	information,	which	official	documents	avoided	 deliberately,	 circuitously	 became	 a	 part	 of	 the	 newly	 emerged	 and	semi-official	materials,	including	revolutionary	memoirs,	as	the	previous	audience	had	now	become	writers	and	disseminators	of	Party	history.	 		 	 The	second	focus	of	these	materials	was	to	condemn	the	so-called	Zhang	Guotao	Line	and	attribute	the	failure	of	the	WRA	to	this	 incorrect	 line.	In	the	opinions	of	WRA	 veterans,	 as	 Mao’s	 correct	 line	 was	 always	 opposed	 to	 the	 incorrect	 lines	within	 the	 Party,	 the	 WRA’s	 failure	 “undoubtedly	 proved	 a	 truth:	 nobody,	 no	matter	 how	great	 a	 hero	 he	 is,	 could	 avoid	 failing,	 if	 he	 deviates	 from	Chairman	Mao’s	correct	line.”53 As	a	result,	narrating	the	WRA’s	story	was	about	more	than	just	recollecting	the	revolutionary	past—it	demonstrated	the	correctness	of	Mao’s																																																									50 	 	 Li	 Tianhuan 李天煥 ,	 Qizhuang	 shanhe	 氣壯山河 	 (Full	 of	 power	 and	 grandeur).	 Beijing:	Zhongguo	qingnian	chubanshe	 中國青年出版社,	1959,	p.	1.	51	 	 Dai	Kelin	 戴克林,	“Huidao	dang	de	huaibao	 回到黨的懷抱”	(Return	to	the	Party’s	embrace),	in	
Xinghuo	liaoyuan	xuanbian	zhi	san	(A	single	spark	can	start	a	prairie	fire,	selected	works	No.3),	p.	452.	 	52	 Cheng	Shicai,	1959,	pp.	67-70.	53	 Li	Tianhuan,	1959,	p.	85.	
	 109	political	line.	The	following	is	an	example	of	how	Li	Tianhuan	connected	the	WRA’s	failure	with	the	significance	of	recognizing	the	correctness	of	Mao’s	line:	 	Using	 their	 own	 blood,	 those	 martyrs	 (of	 the	 WRA)	 who	 sacrificed	themselves	wrote	down	a	basic	experience	and	 lesson	 in	our	Party’s	and	Army’s	history:	Chairman	Mao’s	line	is	the	sole	correct	line	in	this	country’s	 revolutionary	 history.	 We	 marched	 from	 one	 victory	 to	another	victory	when	we	followed	Chairman	Mao’s	correct	line.	When	we	deviated	from	this	correct	line,	we	suffered	failures.	The	following	generations	will	draw	this	lesson	from	the	WRA’s	failure.54	 	In	 this	 way,	 a	 military	 failure	 was	 endowed	 unexpectedly	 with	 some	 positive	meanings.		 	 The	 third	 focus	 was	 on	 Chairman	 Mao’s	 concern	 over	 the	 WRA	 issue.	 All	memoirs	 written	 after	 1949	 have	 paid	 considerable	 attention	 to	 the	 spiritual	consolation	and	practical	assistance	that	the	authors	received	from	Chairman	Mao.	It	 seems	 that	 Mao	 helped	 authors	 divest	 themselves	 of	 the	 physical	 and	psychological	 burden	 of	 being	 defeated,	 and	 all	 of	 the	 WRA	 survivors	 and	 the	Fourth	 Front	 Army	 veterans	 were	 grateful	 to	 their	 leader	 for	 forgiving	 their	mistakes.	Dai	recalled	that	in	1937,	he	and	other	Fourth	Front	Army	commanders	all	believed	that	both	they	and	Zhang	would	be	executed,	or	at	best,	dismissed	and	dispatched	 to	perform	heavy	 labor.55 This	 is	why	 these	authors	expressed	 their	gratitude	to	Mao	for	not	apportioning	blame	to	the	commanders	and	soldiers	 for	the	WRA’s	mistakes. As	analyzed	in	the	previous	chapter,	Mao	was	accustomed	to	allowing	 his	 followers	 to	 purge	 specific	 comrades	 before	 coming	 forward	 to	criticize	their	actions	in	defense	of	the	comrades	treated	unfairly,	in	order	to	draw	his	foe’s	men	to	his	side.	In	the	logic	of	such	a	narrative,	receiving	Chairman	Mao’s	forgiveness	should	have	occurred	subsequent	 to	having	been	wronged	greatly	 in	purges.	 However,	 all	 materials	 about	 purges	 of	 the	 WRA	 survivors	 cited	 in	 the	previous	 chapter	 emerged	 after	 the	 1980s,	 at	 a	 time	 when	 neither	 official	documents	 nor	 cadres’	 memoirs	 contained	 such	 accounts.	 The	 authors	 of	 the	1950s’	 revolutionary	 memoirs	 quoted	 Mao’s	 words	 to	 emphasize	 the	disconnection	between	the	WRA	commanders	and	Zhang,56	 but	at	the	same	time																																																									54	 Ibid.,	1959,	p.	121.	55	 	 Dai	Kelin,	1980,	pp.	452-453.	56	 The	authors	all	respected	Chairman	Mao’s	assessment	of	the	WRA	soldiers	as	innocent	victims	of	
	110	also	 acknowledged	 that	 they	 themselves	 were	 guilty	 and	 deserved	 punishment.	This	 psychological	 mood	 disposed	 them	 to	 express	 their	 feelings	 for	 Mao	 in	flattering	 terms.	 Cheng	 Shicai’s	 recollection	 of	 Mao	 interviewing	 the	 WRA	commanders	is	an	example	to	show	the	strong	leadership	worship	that	existed	in	this	period.	Cheng	wrote:	  Chairman	 Mao’s	 words	 were	 as	 quiet	 as	 lake	 water,	 as	 gentle	 as	 if	talking	 about	 everyday	 life.	 Contained	 in	 these	 peaceful	 and	 plain	words,	however,	there	were	truths	that	were	solid	as	steel	and	firm	as	iron.	Every	word	imprinted	deeply	in	my	heart.	I	 looked	at	Chairman	Mao’s	broad	forehead	and	clear	eyes	without	blinking.	I	concentrated	on	Chairman	Mao’s	teachings,	in	case	I	missed	a	single	word.57		 	 In	 addition	 to	 those	 who	 took	 part	 in	 the	 WRA,	 other	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	commanders	 who	 stayed	 on	 the	 east	 bank	 of	 the	 Yellow	 River	 also	 wrote	 their	recollections	 about	 the	 WRA	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s.	 Despite	 the	 absence	 of	battlefield	 scenes,	 these	 memoirs	 also	 contained	 similar	 accounts	 of	 the	 WRA’s	establishment	and	failure,	all	of	which	came	from	learning	sessions.58	 Overall,	the	WRA’s	 history	 portrayed	 in	 revolutionary	 memoirs	 was	 a	 combination	 of	 being	cheated	 by	 Zhang,	 fighting	 bitterly	 on	 the	 battlefields,	 and	 at	 last	 returning	 to	Chairman	 Mao’s	 “embrace,”	 a	 memory	 that	 contained	 similar	 expressions	 of	grievance	and	gratitude.		 	 The	recollections	of	WRA	participants,	however,	experienced	another	round	of	rewriting	in	the	1980s.	This	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	chapter.	 	
3.3	The	Western	Route	Army’s	Narratives	by	Professional	Historians		 	 The	 publication	 of	 the	 first	 systematic	 Party	 History	 textbooks	 written	 for	compulsory	 tertiary	 courses	 in	 the	 1950s	marked	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 official	system	of	Party	history	narratives.	The	first	half	of	this	section	uses	the	WRA	as	an	
																																																																																																																																																																		the	 so-called	 “Zhang	 Guotao	 Line”.	 For	 example,	 Cheng	 Shicai	 said	 Mao’s	 assessment	 “was	 a	conclusion	made	by	history,	and	also	indicated	that	the	times	were	moving	ahead”	(是歷史的結論，
是時代在前進的腳步聲).	Cheng	Shicai,	1959,	pp.	67-70.	57	 	 Cheng	Shicai,	1959,	p.	67.	58	 In	his	memoirs	written	in	1962,	former	commander	of	the	Thirty-third	Army	in	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	Wang	Weizhou,	 said	 it	was	Chen	Changhao	who	 refused	 to	 join	with	 the	Party	Center	and	insisted	on	letting	the	WRA	stay	in	north	Gansu.	He	also	argued	that	the	WRA’s	failure	was	because	of	Zhang	Guotao’s	incorrect	line.	Wang	Weizhou	 王維舟,	“Wode	huiyi	 我的回憶”	(My	recollections),	
Zhonggong	 dangshi	 ziliao	 中共黨史資料	 (The	 CCP	 Party	 history	 materials)	 Volume	 1.	 Beijing:	Zhonggong	zhongyang	dangxiao	chubanshe	 中共中央黨校出版社,	1982,	pp.	105-106.	
	 111	example	 to	 investigate	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 1950s’	 Party	 History	 textbooks	complemented	 and	 revised	 Mao	 and	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 conclusions	 about	historical	issues.	The	second	half	discusses	the	role	of	Party	historiography	in	the	transformation	of	Chinese	historiography	that	happened	in	the	early	years	of	 the	PRC.	 	
3.3.1	The	WRA	in	1950s’	Party	History	Textbooks		 	 As	 early	 as	 the	 1940s,	 “the	 History	 of	 the	 New	 Democratic	 Revolution”	 (Xin	
minzhu	zhuyi	geming	shi	 新民主主義革命史)	had	become	a	political	subject	in	the	CCP’s	 education	 system.	 Although	 this	 subject	 focused	 on	 the	 Party’s	 activities,	Party	theorists	avoided	entitling	it	“The	CCP’s	history.”	In	1948,	The	University	of	Northern	 China	 (Huabei	 daxue	 華北大學)	 set	 up	 courses	 on	 Party	 history,	 the	building	 of	 the	 Party	 (Dang	 de	 jianshe 黨的建設) and	 the	 Party’s	 policies,	 all	lectures	 for	 which	 were	 given	 by	 Hu	 Hua	 胡華 (1921-1987). 59 After	 the	Communists	 took	 over	 Beijing,	 the	 faculty	 of	 Party	 history	 in	 The	 University	 of	Northern	 China,	 including	 Hu,	 became	 a	 part	 of	 the	 Renmin	 University	 of	 China	(Zhongguo	 renmin	 daxue	 中國人民大學,	 hereinafter,	 RUC),	 a	 newly	 established	university	that	since	then	has	played	the	core	role	in	the	teaching	and	research	of	party	history.	In	1953,	the	Ministry	of	High	Education	included	the	course	“Chinese	Revolutionary	 History”	 (Zhongguo	 geming	 shi	 中國革命史)	 in	 the	 compulsory	courses	for	tertiary	education.	This	course	was	firstly	set	up	in	the	RUC,	and	then	was	 introduced	 nationally	 a	 short	 while	 after.	 This	 actually	 marked	 “the	integration	of	the	history	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party’s	leading	revolutionary	struggles	into	the	civil	education	system	as	an	independent	subject	and	the	course	became	 a	 significant	 means	 to	 deploy	 ideological	 education	 to	 university	students.”60	 The	 course	 in	 “Chinese	Revolutionary	History”	nominally	 taught	 the	history	of	a	series	of	revolutions	in	modern	times,	but	in	fact,	the	history	before	the	CCP’s	establishment	and	the	history	of	other	revolutionary	group’s	activities	were,																																																									59	 Hu	 Hua	 胡華,	Hua	 Hua	 wenji	 胡華文集	 (The	 collected	 works	 of	 Hu	 Hua).	 Beijing:	 Zhongguo	renmin	daxue	chubanshe	 中國人民大學出版社,	1988,	p.	229.	Hu	Hua	went	to	Yan’an	in	1938	when	he	was	eighteen	years	old.	After	he	graduated	from	the	Shaanbei	Public	School,	he	became	a	teacher	of	Chinese	Revolutionary	History	in	1940.	60	 Geng	 Huamin	 耿化敏,	 “Zhongguo	 renmin	 daxue	 yu	 gaoxiao	 Zhongguo	 gemingshi	 kecheng	 de	chuangjian	 yu	 tingkai 中国人民大学與高校中國革命史課程的創建與停開（1950-1957）”	 (The	establishment	 and	 concealment	 of	 Chinese	 revolutionary	 history	 classes	 in	 the	 Chinese	 Renmin	University	and	other	universities,	1950-1957),	Dangshi	yanjiu	yu	jiaoxue	 黨史研究與教學,	2012(6),	pp.	69-81.	
	112	to	 varying	 degrees,	 ignored.	 In	 the	 late	 1950s,	 the	 Central	 Party	 School	 and	 the	RUC	 set	 up	 CCP	 History	 Departments,	 and	 the	 latter	 began	 to	 recruit	 four-year	undergraduate	and	three-year	graduate	students	majoring	in	the	Party’s	history.61	Subsequently,	 local	 universities	 also	 renamed	 their	 courses	 in	 “Chinese	Revolutionary	History,”	“The	CCP’s	History.”62	 		 	 In	accordance	with	the	evolution	in	Party	history	education	above,	Party	History	textbooks	 began	 to	 emerge	 in	 the	 early	 1950s.	 Hu	 and	 He	 Ganzhi	 何幹之	(1906-1969),	both	of	whom	were	professors	at	the	RUC,	were	the	main	compilers	of	Party	History	textbooks	in	the	1950s	and	1960s.	Modern	Chinese	Revolutionary	
History63	 by	He,	and	Chinese	Revolutionary	History	Lectures64	 by	Hu,	were	the	two	most	influential	textbooks	before	the	Cultural	Revolution.65		 	 Hu	 and	 He’s	 books	 resembled	 to	 a	 considerable	 degree	 Hu	 Qiaomu’s	 “Thirty	Years,”	 in	 that	 all	 of	 them	were	 strictly	 in	 accord	with	 authoritative	 documents,	followed	 the	style	of	 the	Soviet	Union’s	history	 textbook,	A	Concise	History	of	 the	
Communist	Party	of	 the	Soviet	Union	 [Bolsheviks]66	 deliberately,	and	cited	a	 large	number	of	Mao’s	works	to	support	their	arguments.	By	comparison	to	Hu	Qiaomu’s	article,	when	compiling	textbooks,	historians	had	more	scope	to	imitate	the	Soviet	Union’s	method,	as	well	as	to	highlight	Mao’s	role	in	both	making	and	writing	Party	History,	 because	 the	 textbooks	 were	 much	 longer	 than	 regular	 articles	 and																																																									61	 Gao	 Jun	 高峻,	 “Yanjin	 zhixue	 yongyu	 chuangxin—shenqie	 huainian	 Zhonggong	 dangshi	 xue	zhuanjia	 Hu	 Hua	 jiaoshou 嚴謹治學勇於創新——深切懷念中共黨史學專家胡華教授”	 (Rigorous	and	 innovative	 academic	 attitude:	 in	 the	memory	of	CCP	Party	history	 specialist	Hu	Hua),	Fujian	
dangshi	yuekan	 福建黨史月刊,	1988(4),	pp.	58-62.	62	 Hu	Hua,	1988,	p.	230.	63	 He	 Ganzhi’s	 Zhongguo	 xiandai	 geming	 shi	 中國現代革命史	 (Modern	 Chinese	 revolutionary	history)	was	firstly	published	in	Beijing	in	1954.	64	 Hu	 Hua’s	 Zhongguo	 gemingshi	 jiangyi	 中國革命史講義	 was	 written	 in	 1953	 and	 1954	 and	printed	 as	 teaching	 materials	 in	 universities.	 In	 1959,	 the	 Renmin	 University	 of	 China	 Press	published	it.	65	 Besides	 these	 two	books,	Hu	and	He	had	other	 achievements	 that	 established	and	maintained	their	status	in	the	field	of	Party	history.	Hu’s	History	of	the	China’s	New	Democratic	Revolution	(中國
新民主主義革命史),	 completed	 in	 1950,	 was	 the	 first	 Party	 history	 textbook	 that	 was	 published	after	the	Communists	took	over	national	power	and	also	was	popular	reading	material	 for	cadres	and	university	 students	 in	 the	 first	 few	years	of	 the	PRC.	He	Ganzhi	was	 the	 first	historian	 to	be	appointed	 by	 the	 High	 Education	 Department	 Ministry	 to	 coordinate	 teachers	 from	 various	universities	to	compile	revolutionary	history	textbooks.	This	work	started	in	1953	and	the	outcome	of	 this	project,	Lectures	on	Chinese	Modern	Revolutionary	History	 (Draft)	(中國現代革命史講稿[初
稿]),	was	published	the	following	year.	66	 On	the	influence	that	this	history	textbook	exerted	on	Party	history	writing,	see	Wang	Zhongqing	
王仲清,	ed.,	Zhonggong	dangshi	xue	gailun	 中共黨史学概论	 (An	outline	of	the	CCP	historiography).	Hangzhou:	 Zhejiang	 renmin	 chubanshe	 浙江人民出版社.	 Lou	 Shenghua	 婁勝華,	 “Lun	 Liangong	
dangshi	jianming	jiaocheng	zai	Zhongguo	de	yingxiang	 論《聯共（布）黨史簡明教程》在中國的影
響	 (On	the	influence	of	A	Concise	History	of	the	Communist	Party	of	the	Soviet	Union	[Bolsheviks]	in	China),	Nanjing	shehuikexue	 南京社會科學,	1997(6),	pp.	38-53.	Xu	Chong,	2013.	
	 113	required	 more	 details.	 Take	 He’s	 Modern	 Chinese	 Revolutionary	 History	 as	 an	example.	 Similar	 to	 “Thirty	 Years,”	 this	 book	 also	 used	 conflicts	 between	 the	correct	 line	 represented	 by	 Mao	 and	 the	 incorrect	 “leftist”	 and	 “rightist”	 lines	within	the	Party	as	an	outline,	and	ultimately	proved	Mao’s	 infallibility.	 In	 five	of	the	 total	 fifteen	 chapters,	 He	 used	 independent	 sections	 to	 discuss	 intra-Party	struggles	and	emphasized	the	correctness	of	Mao’s	line.67		 	 Despite	 such	 similarities,	 it	 would	 be	 a	 mistake	 to	 regard	 Party	 History	textbooks	 of	 the	 1950s	 as	 simply	 expanded	 versions	 of	 “Thirty	 Years”	 or	 of	 the	“Resolution	 of	 1945”.	 These	 Party	 History	 textbooks	 targeted	 ordinary	 readers	rather	 than	 Party	 comrades.	 This	 meant	 they	 used	 much	 simpler	 language	 and	more	explanations.	Moreover,	although	they	had	an	equally	deep	sense	of	fidelity	to	 the	 leadership’s	 authority,	 university	 history	 professors	 were	 more	 likely	 to	pursue	 logic	 and	 consistency,	 and	 also	were	more	 likely	 to	 ensure	 that	 evidence	and	conclusions	were	consistent	than	were	those	writers	who	held	high	positions	in	 the	 Party	 or	 in	 administrative	 institutions.	 This	 subsection	 takes	 the	 WRA’s	history	 in	 Hu’s	 Chinese	 Revolutionary	 History	 Lectures68	 as	 an	 example	 to	 show	how	 historians	 transferred	 Party	 documents	 and	 official	 interpretations	 into	historical	narratives	that	were	suitable	for	dissemination	to	ordinary	readers.	
	 	 The	Western	Route	Army	in	the	Textbook	Written	by	Hu	Hua		 	 In	general,	Hu’s	introduction	to,	and	analysis	of,	the	WRA	were	consistent	with	Mao’s	relevant	accounts	as	laid	out	in	“Strategic	Issues,”	while	they	also	contained	more	 details	 and	 explanations.	 Hu	 expressed	 complete	 agreement	 with	 Mao’s	verdict	on	the	WRA:	“The	failure	of	the	WRA	was	a	great	crime	that	‘Zhang	Guotao	separatists’	 committed	 against	 the	 Chinese	 revolution,”69	 and	 “the	 failure	 also	marked	the	final	bankruptcy	of	Zhang’s	right-deviationist	separatist	line.”70	 Then,	to	argue	this	point	of	view,	Hu	included	more	illustrative	accounts	in	his	book.	 																																																									67 	 He	 Ganzhi 何幹之 ,	 Zhongguo	 Xiandai	 gemingshi	 中國現代革命史 	 (Modern	 Chinese	revolutionary	history).	Beijing:	Gaodeng	jiaoyu	chubanshe	 高等教育出版社,	1954.	For	more	details	and	analysis	about	this	textbook,	see	Geng	Huamin	 耿化敏,	“Wushi	niandai	geming	lishi	shuxie	de	dianfan:	Ping	He	Ganzhi	zhubian	Zhongguo	xiandai	geming	shi	 五十年代革命歷史書寫的典範——
評何幹之主編《中國現代革命史》”	(A	good	model	of	writing	revolutionary	history	in	the	1950s:	a	review	of	Chinese	Modern	Revolutionary	History	by	He	Ganzhi),	Shehui	kexue	luntan 社會科學論壇,	2010(8),	pp.	205-208.	 	68	 Hu	Hua’s	book	was	republished	and	reprinted	several	times.	This	thesis	references	two	versions:	
Zhongguo	 geming	 shi	 jiangyi	 中國革命史講義 	 (Lectures	 on	 Chinese	 revolutionary	 history)	 ,	Volume	 2.	 Beijing:	 Zhongguo	 renmin	 daxue	 chubanshe 中國人民大學出版社,	 1959;	 Zhongguo	
geming	shi	jiangyi.	Beijing:	Zhongguo	renmin	daxue	chubanshe,	1979.	69	 Hu	Hua,	1959,	p.	285.	70	 Hu	Hua,	1979,	p.	370.	
	114		 	 First,	he	complemented	an	argument	 in	 the	endnotes	of	Mao’s	essay	“Strategic	Issues”—“Zhang	Guotao	was	still	 firmly	against	the	Party	after	the	reunion	of	the	Red	Army”71—	with	more	supporting	materials.72		 	 Second,	when	discussing	the	establishment	of	the	WRA,	Mao	used	an	ambiguous	expression	 to	 say,	 “Zhang	Guotao	 ordered”	 the	 troops	 to	 cross	 the	 Yellow	River,	leaving	 it	 open	 as	 to	 whether	 Zhang	 gave	 this	 order	 with	 the	 Party	 Center’s	approval	or	not.	Hu’s	book	made	a	much	clearer	case	 that	 these	 incorrect	orders	came	from	Zhang:	When	 the	 army	 crossed	 the	 grassland,	 and	 entered	 into	 the	 Gannan	(甘南)	area	 in	August	1936,	and	 the	day	of	 reunion	with	 the	Central	Red	Army	was	coming,	Zhang	Guotao	arbitrarily	ordered	the	vanguard	of	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	to	cross	 the	Yellow	River	and	march	west.	Zhang	attempted	to	occupy	a	territory	in	Xinjiang.	When	these	troops	were	crossing	the	Yellow	River,	two	armies	were	blocked	on	the	east	bank	(including	Zhang	Guotao	himself;	 they	rejoined	the	Central	Red	Army	 and	 became	 the	 129th	 division	 led	 by	 Liu	 Bocheng	 in	 the	Anti-Japanese	 War).	 The	 three	 armies	 that	 had	 crossed	 the	 Yellow	River	became	 the	WRA	and	marched	west	 along	 the	Gansu	Corridor	according	to	Zhang	Guotao’s	wrong	orders.73		 	 As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 last	 subsection,	 almost	 simultaneously,	 senior	 cadres’	memoirs	also	emphasized	Zhang’s	selfish	purpose	and	arbitrary	orders	that	came	without	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 approval.	 As	 a	 significant	 element	 of	 the	 historical	narratives	of	the	WRA,	this	statement	did	not	exist	in	any	official	documents	before	1949	 and	 no	 primary	 materials	 (meeting	 records,	 documents	 or	 diaries,	 etc.)	supported	 it.	 The	 emergence	 of	 this	 piece	 of	 information	 in	 both	 revolutionary	memoirs	and	Party	History	textbooks	in	the	1950s	demonstrates	how	the	Party’s	education	and	propaganda	became	official	historical	narratives.																																																									71	 Note	19,	Mao	Zedong,	 “Strategic	 issues	of	 the	Chinese	 revolutionary	war”,	 in	Selected	works	of	
Mao	Zedong,	Volume	1,	pp.	223-224.	72	 Hu	argued	that	Zhu	De	and	Liu	Bocheng	went	with	the	Fourth	Front	Army	when	Zhang	Guotao	separated	the	army	 from	the	Central	Red	Army	because	 they	were	 forced	by	Zhang	Guotao	 to	do	this.	 Although	under	difficult	 circumstances,	 Zhu	 and	Liu	 still	 firmly	 supported	 the	Party	Central	Committee	and	Mao	Zedong.	This	was	why,	according	to	Hu,	Zhang	Guotao	was	compelled	to	cancel	the	 alternative	 Party	 Center	 and	 agreed	 to	 march	 north	 to	 join	 Mao	 Zedong.	 According	 to	 Hu’s	argument,	however,	Zhang	still	held	his	ambition,	so	he	commanded	his	troops	to	cross	the	Yellow	River	to	build	a	new	base.	These	accounts	supported	Mao’s	argument	that	Zhang	persisted	in	“his	policy	of	retreatism	and	cancelism”.	See	Hu	Hua,	1959,	p.	285;	Hu	Hua,	1979,	p.	370.	73	 Hu	Hua,	1979,	p.	370.	
	 115		 	 Third,	Hu	clarified	the	ambiguity	of	two	newly	invented	phrases	in	the	endnote	of	Mao’s	 essay,	 “Strategic	 Issues”—“be	 practically	 defeated,”	 and	 “be	 completely	defeated.”	 As	 the	 following	 paragraph	 shows,	 according	 to	 Hu,	 the	 defeat	 in	Yongchang	was	a	practical	failure	and	the	defeats	in	Gaotai	and	Jiuquan	(Suzhou)	were	complete	failures.	Being	attacked	by	both	the	northwestern	warlord	Ma	Bufang’s	troops	and	the	Nationalist	Hu	Zongnan’s	troops,	the	WRA	fought	bravely,	but	due	 to	 the	 completely	 wrong	 line,	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 number	 of	troops	 and	 difficulty	 in	 providing	 supplies,	 they	 suffered	 serious	setbacks	 in	 Yongchang	 in	 December	 1936.	 In	 March	 1937,	 they	completely	failed	in	Gaotai	and	Jiuquan.	Most	of	the	twenty	thousand	troops	 died.	 Only	 one	 thousand	 troops,	 led	 by	 Li	 Xiannian	 and	 Li	Zhuoran,	 succeeded	 in	 breaking	 the	 siege	 and	 arriving	 at	 Xinjiang	through	 the	 Qilian	 Mountains.	 In	 the	 end,	 only	 four	 hundred	 red	soldiers	were	left.74		 	 It	is	thus	clear	that	accounts	in	Mao’s	writings	and	the	Party	Center’s	documents	were	not	absolutely	unalterable.	As	 long	as	 they	preserved	the	basic	evaluations,	revisions,	 including	 adding	 details,	 rephrasing	 expressions,	 and	 providing	 more	powerful	evidence,	were	allowed.		 	 The	 influence	 of	 the	 1950s’	 Party	 History	 textbooks	 has	 been	 extraordinarily	long	 lasting	 and	 strong.	 In	 the	 subsequent	 two	 decades,	 although	 there	 were	numerous	 textbooks	 entitled	 “Party	 History”	 or	 “Chinese	 Revolutionary	 History,”	their	contents,	and	even	specific	words	that	they	used	to	assess	historical	 figures	and	events	were	similar	to	those	used	in	the	1950s	textbooks.	Just	as	some	Chinese	scholars	 have	 pointed	 out,	 these	 textbooks	 constructed	 the	 basic	 knowledge	 of,	theories	about	and	views	on	modern	Chinese	history	of	an	entire	generation—the	generation	that	grew	up	in	the	1950s	and	1960s.75	 Furthermore,	despite	relatively	ample	 materials	 that	 scholars	 could	 use	 after	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 and	 the	greatly	 changed	 views	 of	 textbook	 compilers,	 the	 new	 textbooks	 published	 after	the	 1980s	 still	 followed	 the	 same	 framework	 and	 structure	 of	 their	 1950s	
																																																								74	 Hu	Hua,	1979,	p.	370.	The	1959	version	was	more	concise	to	make	this	point.	The	main	points	of	the	two	versions	are	almost	the	same.	 	75	 Geng	Huamin,	2010.	
	116	counterparts.76	 This	 fact	 increases	 the	 importance	of	discussing	 the	1950s	Party	History	textbooks.	 		 	 Concerning	 sensitive	 historical	 issues	 like	 the	 WRA,	 textbooks	 were	 the	 only	channel	 through	which	ordinary	people	 could	 obtain	 relevant	 knowledge.	At	 the	time,	historians’	research	and	teaching	were	under	the	supervision	of	universities’	Party	committees,	which	always	played	a	significant	role	in	preventing	researchers	from	crossing	 the	 line	 to	 address	 sensitive	 topics.	A	more	 important	 reason	was	that,	 although	 there	was	no	 explicit	 instruction	 that	directed	Party	historians	on	which	 topics	 they	should	study,	or	on	which	conclusions	 they	should	draw,	most	trained	 historians	 could	 read	 such	 information	 from	 materials	 that	 the	 Party	provided.	Understanding	 the	Party’s	 implications	was	one	of	 the	skills	 that	 these	historians	 acquired	 through	 constant	 intra-Party	 education	 and	 political	movements.	 	
3.3.2	Party	History	and	the	Transformation	of	Historiography	in	the	1950s		 	 Because	 of	 the	 establishment	 of	 Party	 history	 departments	 and	 faculty	 in	universities	 and	 the	 publication	 of	 textbooks	 in	 the	 1950s,	 Party	 history	 as	 a	discipline	is	always	considered	to	have	been	established	in	this	period,77	 just	like	other	sub-fields	of	Chinese	history.	A	comparison	of	studies	of	Party	history	with	those	 of	 other	 history	 fields,	 however,	 indicates	 that	 Party	 history	 actually	occupied	a	relatively	special	position	in	the	early	years	of	the	PRC.	 		 	 Immediately	after	1949,	when	Chinese	scholars	tried	to	rebuild	professional	and	disciplined	Chinese	historiography	in	the	new	regime,	they	found	that	the	tension	between	 Marxist	 and	 non-Marxist	 historiography	 (in	 other	 words,	 the	 tension	between	 the	 Historical	 Materialism	 School	 and	 the	 Textual	 Criticism	 School)	became	 increasingly	high.	While	Marxists	 stipulated	 that	history	 is	driven	by	 the	development	of	the	forces	of	production,	emphasizing	classes	and	class	struggles,	as	well	as	the	link	between	historical	study	and	social	reality,	the	advocates	of	the	Textual	Criticism	School	upheld	the	academic	principle	of	“seeking	the	truth	for	the	sake	of	the	truth”	and emphasized	“proof.”78	 The	process	of	making	all	historians	
																																																								76	 Zhang	Jingru	 張靜如,	“He	Ganzhi	dui	Zhonggong	lishi	xueke	jianshe	de	gongxian	 何幹之對中共
歷史學科建設的貢獻”	 (He	 Ganzhi’s	 contributions	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 discipline	 of	 Party	history),	Beijing	dangshi	 北京黨史,	2006(5),	pp.	50-52.	77	 Zhang	Jingru	and	Tang	Manzhen,	1990,	p.	117.	78	 For	 more	 about	 the	 long-standing	 split	 between	 the	 Historical	 Materialism	 School	 (Weiwu	
shiguan	 pai	 唯物史觀派)	 and	 the	 Textual	 Criticism	 School	 (Shiliao	 kaozheng	 史料考證派),	 see	
	 117	accept	 Marxist	 historiography,	 or	 the	 process	 of	 the	 transformation	 of	historiography	(shixue	gaizao	 史學改造),	lasted	throughout	the	1950s.	In	order	to	realize	this	transformation,	a	number	of	movements	formed,	from	the	criticism	of	Wu	 Xun	 and	 the	 film	Wu	 Xun	 Zhuan	 (武訓傳)	 in	 1951	 and	 that	 of	 Hu	 Shi	 胡適	(1891-1962)	in	1953-1954,79	 to	the	criticism	of	Wu	Han	and	Jian	Bozan	on	the	eve	of	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution.	 At	 last,	 Marxim-Leninism,	 as	 well	 as	 Mao	 Zedong	Thought,	became	established	as	the	unquestionable	sources	of	guidance	for	history	studies.	During	this	 long	period,	most	historians’	views	ultimately	were	criticized	severely,	and	some	were	purged.	Their	views	about	the	Party’s	history,	however,	were	never	subjects	for	criticism	or	discussion.	In	contrast,	Party	history	served	as	an	ideological	tool	to	remodel	historians’	thought.		 	 The	official	version	of	Party	History	was	an	essential	aspect	of	 the	educational	program	 the	CCP	developed	 for	 scholars	 from	 the	 former	 regime	who	had	 to	 be	integrated	 into	 the	 CCP-led	 academic	 system.	 Party	 history	 and	 that	 of	 the	revolution	were	the	central	topics	that	all	intellectuals	had	to	learn.80	 The	training	of	 the	 teachers	 of	 these	 topics	 came	 from	 the	 newly	 established	 Remin	University.81	 The	 technique	 of	 using	 official	 Party	 History	 as	 learning	 material	soon	 showed	 results,	 and	 the	methodology	 and	 content	 of	 official	 Party	 History	began	 to	 exert	 an	 influence	 on	 Chinese	 scholars.	 When	 the	 first	 round	 of	mandatory	 political	 learning	 sessions	 for	 historians	 ended	 in	 1951,	 many	historians	 claimed	 that	 they	 would	 conduct	 more	 research	 on	 modern	 Chinese	history	that	had	to	do	with	the	political	reality.82	 Historians	also	stated	that	they	would	 consider	Mao	 Zedong	 Thought	 to	 be	 the	 “Chinese	 philosophy	 of	 history,”	arguing,	“Mao	Zedong’s	instructions	on	the	writing	of	history	is	the	most	important	foundation	 to	make	History	 scientific.”83	 In	 practice,	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 official																																																																																																																																																																			Wang	Xuedian,	“Fifty	Years	of	Chinese	Historiography”,	Chinese	Studies	 in	History,	Vol.	45,	No.	2-3 (2011),	pp.	7-69.	79	 For	 the	public	 campaign	 against	Hu	 Shi,	 see	Chan	Lien,	 “Communism	versus	Pragmatism:	The	Criticism	of	Hu	Shi’s	Philosophy”,	Journal	of	Asian	Studies,	Vol.	27,	No.	3	(May	1968),	pp.	551-570.	80	 In	 universities,	 “the	 history	 of	 revolution”	was	 a	 compulsory	 course	 not	 only	 for	 students	 but	also	for	teachers.	See	Du	Xuexia	 杜學霞,	Shi	shang:	ershi	shiji	wu	liushi	niandai	de	shixue	yanjiu	 史
殤：二十世紀五六十年代的史學研究	 (History	elegy:	Chinese	historiography	in	the	1950s	and	the	1960s).	Beijing:	Guojia	xingzheng	xueyuan	chubanshe	 國家行政學院出版社,	2014,	p.	29.	81	 Geng	Huamin,	“Zhongguo	renmin	daxue	yu	gaoxiao	zhongguo	gemingshi	kecheng	de	chuangjian	yu	 tingkai”	 (The	 establishment	 and	 concealment	 of	 Chinese	 revolutionary	 history	 classes	 in	 the	Chinese	Renmin	University	and	other	universities,	1950-1957),	2012.	82	 Chen	Yuan	 陳垣,	“Ziwo	jiantao	 自我檢討”	(Self-criticism),	Guangming	ribao	 光明日報,	March	6,	1952,	p.	3.	83	 Wu	 Tingqiu	 吳廷璆,	 “Zunxun	 zhe	 Mao	 Zedong	 sixiang	 qianjin—jinian	 Zhongguo	 shixuehui	
	118	Party	history	 framework	began	 to	 step	out	 of	 the	 field	 of	 Party	history,	 as	 some	historians	who	wrote	modern	Chinese	history	began	to	pay	increasing	attention	to	the	 role	 that	 the	 CCP	 had	 played,	 and	 established	 their	 points	 of	 views	accordingly.84	 In	 summary,	 by	 studying	 Party	 history,	 historians	 learnt	 step	 by	step	to	comply	with	the	official	history	framework.	  	 	 Like	 most	 Chinese	 intellectuals	 who	 had	 received	 a	 modern	 education,	professional	historians	who	specialized	in	Party	history	also	claimed	that	historical	research	 required	 reliable	 materials	 and	 scientific	 methods.	 Nevertheless,	 these	historians,	such	as	He	and	Hu,	accepted	the	official	history	 framework	and	grand	narratives	 consciously,	 allowing	 them	 to	 dominate	 their	 research.	 As	 for	 those	“black	 holes”	 that	 the	 CCP	 labeled	 taboo,	 historians	 showed	 no	 interest.	 In	 this	sense,	during	this	period,	what	professional	historians	conducted	were	the	Party’s	assignments	rather	than	academic	research.		 	 Among	 Party	 history	 teachers	 in	 universities,	 those	 who	 had	 a	 “red”	background—i.e.,	 had	 once	 worked	 in	 revolutionary	 bases	 and	 applied	 Marxist	theories	 to	 study	modern	 history,	 including	 Party	 history—received	 the	 highest	status	 and	 privilege.	 He	 and	 Hu	 belonged	 to	 this	 category.	 If	 we	 compare	 their	backgrounds	 to	 those	 of	 scholar-officials	 (or	 “academic	 politicians,”	 as	 Timothy	Cheek	referred	to	Deng	Tuo)	who	were	also	specialists	in	Party	history,	such	as	Hu	Qiaomu	 and	 Tian	 Jiaying,	 we	 find	 that	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 educational	background	and	experience	of	these	two	categories	of	people	was	not	as	significant	as	 was	 imagined.85	 Whether	 they	 worked	 inside	 the	 Party	 leadership	 or	 held	positions	 in	 academic	 institutions	 did	 not	 depend	 on	 how	 they	 understood	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																		chengli	 yi	 zhounian	 遵循著毛澤東思想前進——紀念中國史學會成立一週年”	 (Making	 progress	under	 the	 guidance	 of	 Mao	 Zedong	 Thought—to	 commemorate	 the	 first	 anniversary	 of	 the	establishment	of	 the	Chinese	Association	of	History	Studies),	Lishi	 jiaoxue	 歷史教學,	1952(8),	pp.	1-3.	 	84	 An	example	is	Hu	Sheng’s	research	on	modern	Chinese	history.	As	Luo	Zhitian	pointed	out,	Hu’s	opinion	about	the	“three	upsurges”	in	modern	history—the	Taiping	Rebellion,	the	Boxer	Movement	and	 the	 Xinhai	 Revolution—indicated	 that	 Hu	 was	 influenced	 by	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 CCP	explained	its	history.	See	Luo	Zhitian	 羅志田,	 Jingdian	danchu	zhihou:	20	shiji	Zhongguo	shixue	de	
zhuanbian	yu	yanxu	 經典淡出之後：20 世紀中國史學的轉變與延續	 (When	the	glory	of	the	classics	faded:	 transformation	 and	 continuation	 of	 Chinese	 historiography	 in	 the	 20th	 century).	 Beijing:	Shenghuo	dushu	xinzhi	sanlian	shudian	 生活讀書新知三聯書店,	2013,	p.	77.	85	 The	four	main	contributors	of	the	first	complete	official	version	of	Party	History	—Hu	Qiaomu,	Tian	Jiaying,	He	Ganzhi	and	Hu	Hua—shared	a	similar	experience	in	the	late	1930s.	They	all	went	to	Yan’an	 during	 the	 first	 three	 years	 of	 the	 Sino-Japanese	War	 and	 subsequently	 experienced	 the	Yan’an	 rectification	 campaign.	He	Ganzhi	was	 older	 than	 the	 other	 three	 and	 had	 already	 gotten	reputation	as	a	historian	during	 the	Social	History	Controversial.	Before	Hu	Hua	and	Tian	 Jiaying	themselves	became	teachers	in	Yan’an,	He	once	was	their	teachers.	
	 119	relationship	between	politics	and	academic	studies.86	 In	fact,	 in	the	field	of	Party	history,	professional	historians	were	doing	the	same	job	as	those	scholar-officials,	creating	historical	narratives	according	to	the	CCP’s	standard	explanations.	Thus,	there	actually	were	no	“academic	historians.”	 	 	 	 	
	 	 Dissident	Opinions	about	the	Writing	of	Party	History		 	 In	 the	 transformation	 of	 Chinese	 intellectuals,	 the	 period	 from	 mid-1956	 to	mid-1957	 is	 one	 that	 is	 worth	 particular	 attention,	 because	 it	 was	 during	 this	so-called	 “freedom	 of	 speech	 period”	 (mingfang	 shiqi	 鳴放時期)	 that	 Chinese	intellectuals	declared	 their	dissatisfaction	with	 the	Party’s	control	over	academic	research	most	boldly.	During	this	time,	numerous	suggestions	about,	and	criticism	of,	the	status	quo	of	Party	history	research	emerged.	This	criticism	on	the	part	of	both	 professional	 historians	 and	 intellectuals	 who	 specialized	 in	 other	 fields,	focused	on	three	points.	 		 	 First,	 scholars	 questioned	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	 terms	 “Chinese	revolutionary	history”	and	“the	CCP’s	history,”	trying	to	emphasize	that	there	were	other	 revolutionary	 forces	 besides	 the	 CCP.87	 As	 the	 Party’s	 contribution	 to	 the	country	and	to	the	Chinese	nation	was	one	of	the	two	grand	themes	of	official	Party	history	 narratives,	 the	 above	 argument	 weakened	 the	 rationality	 of	 the	 Party’s	official	writings	to	a	considerable	extent.	 		 	 Second,	 scholars	 challenged	 the	 authenticity	 of	 the	 popular	 Party	 historical	narratives.	 They	 said	 that	 the	 conclusions	 in	 Party	 documents	 and	 authoritative	works	 had	 simplified	 the	 complexity	 of	 historical	 events,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 when	researchers	adopted	these	conclusions	to	study	Party	history,	they	were	unable	to	analyze	 and	 assess	 historical	 issues	 objectively. 88 	 In	 addition	 to	 the																																																									86	 In	1939	Mao	Zedong	offered	He	Ganzhi	a	position	as	his	secretary	for	theories	(lilun	mishu	 理論
秘書),	but	He	preferred	teaching	and	refused	this	offer.	See	Geng	Huamin	 耿化敏,	He	Ganzhi	zhuan	
何幹之傳	 (Biography	of	He	Ganzhi).	Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	2012,	pp.	90-91.	 	87	 “Zhongyang	 tongzhanbu	 jixu	yao	minzhu	renshi	zuotan	 中央統戰部繼續邀民主人士座談”	 (The	United	 Front	 Department	 of	 the	 CCP	 continues	 inviting	 democratic	 personages	 to	 symposiums),	
Renmin	 ribao	 人民日報,	 on	 May	 31,	 1957;	 “Tongzhanbu	 zhaokai	 de	 minzhu	 renshi	 zuotanhui	zuotian	 jixu	 juxing	 統戰部召開的民主人士座談會昨天繼續舉行”	 (Yesterday	 the	 Symposium	 for	Democratic	Personages	held	by	the	United	Front	Department	continued),	Renmin	ribao,	on	June	2,	1957.	 In	 Song	 Yongyi	 宋永毅 ,	 ed.,	 Zhongguo	 fanyou	 yundong	 shujuku	 中國反右運動數據庫	(Chinese	Anti-rightist	movement	database)	(Disc).	Hong	Kong:	Universities	Service	Centre	for	China	Studies	 in	 the	 Chinese	 University	 of	 Hong	 Kong	 香港中文大學中國研究服務中心,	 2009.	 Cited	 in	Geng	Huamin,	“Zhongguo	renmin	daxue	yu	gaoxiao	zhongguo	gemingshi	kecheng	de	chuangjian	yu	tingkai”	 (The	 establishment	 and	 concealment	 of	 Chinese	 revolutionary	 history	 classes	 in	 the	Chinese	Renmin	University	and	other	universities,	1950-1957),	2012.	88	 Rong	Lang	 荣琅,	“Kefu	jiaotiao	zhuyi	jiaqiang	Zhongguo	xiandaishi	de	kexue	yanjiu	 克服教條主
	120	methodological	criticism	above,	they	raised	specific	questions	as	well.	For	example,	some	scholars	questioned	whether	Northeastern	China	was	liberated	the	day	after	the	 Soviet	 Union	 dispatched	 troops	 to	 this	 region,	 as	 Party	 History	 textbooks	claimed.89	 As	 these	 historical	 events	 had	 occurred	 not	 long	 before—if	 too	many	questions	 about	 the	 facts	 in	 the	 Party’s	 official	 narratives	 emerged,	 the	authoritative	position	of	the	official	Party	History	would	be	questionable.	 		 	 Third,	 historians	 and	 teachers	 complained	 that	 they	 had	no	 access	 to	 primary	materials	about	Party	history	because	of	the	restrictions	on	the	use	of	archives.90	This	point	might	have	been	the	most	troubling	to	researchers	in	the	field	of	Party	History.	 Some	 teachers	 said	 the	 lack	 of	 primary	 materials	 forced	 them	 to	 rely	entirely	on	Selected	Works	of	Mao	Zedong	and	the	textbooks	written	by	He	and	Hu,	and	as	a	result,	students	had	lost	interest	in	Party	history	courses.91		 	 These	 expressions	 of	 these	 fierce	 criticisms	 and	 sharp	 opinions	 during	 the	“freedom	 of	 speech	 period”	 indicated	 that	 historians	 who	 specialized	 in	 Party	history	 did	 not	 concur	 wholeheartedly	 with	 the	 Party	 and	 Mao’s	 ready-made	historical	conclusions.	They	were	indeed	quite	clear	about	the	problems	that	had	prevented	Party	history	studies	 from	becoming	more	academic	and	objective.	As	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	after	Mao	died,	Chinese	historians	began	to	express	their	 discontent	with	historical	 research	 conducted	during	 the	PRC	period.	After	waiting	 for	 twenty	 years,	 Chinese	 historians	 grasped	 another	 opportunity	 to	continue	to	do	what	they	would	have	liked	to	do	in	1957.	 	
Conclusion		 	 The	first	decade	of	the	PRC	(1949-1959)	was	the	final	phase	in	the	formation	of	the	official	 historical	 interpretations	of	 the	CCP’s	 history.	During	 this	 period,	 the	CCP	 leadership	 and	 professional	 historians	 were	 the	 two	 primary	 contributors																																																																																																																																																																			
義，加強中國現代史的科學研究”	 (Overcoming	dogmatism	 and	 improving	 the	 studies	 on	modern	Chinese	history),	Guangming	ribao	 光明日報,	on	June	20,	1957.	Cited	in	Zhang	Jiqian	 張寄謙,	“Yige	dangshi	 jiaoyuan	 zai	 baijia	 zhengming	 hou	 de	 zaoyu	 一個黨史教員在百家爭鳴後的遭遇”	 (The	experience	of	a	Party	history	teacher	after	the	“Hundreds	of	Schools	Contend”	period),	Yan-Huang	
chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	2011(6),	pp.	44-47.	89	 Song	Yongyi,	 ed.,	 2009.	 Cited	 in	Geng	Huamin,	 “Zhongguo	 renmin	daxue	 yu	 gaoxiao	 zhongguo	gemingshi	 kecheng	 de	 chuangjian	 yu	 tingkai”	 (The	 establishment	 and	 concealment	 of	 Chinese	revolutionary	history	classes	in	the	Chinese	Renmin	University	and	other	universities,	1950-1957),	2012.	90	 Rong	Lang,	1957.	Cited	in	Zhang	Jiqian,	2011.	91	 Song	 Yongyi,	 ed.,	 2009,	 cited	 in	 Geng	Huamin,	 “Zhongguo	 renmin	 daxue	 yu	 gaoxiao	 zhongguo	gemingshi	 kecheng	 de	 chuangjian	 yu	 tingkai”	 (The	 establishment	 and	 concealment	 of	 Chinese	revolutionary	history	classes	in	the	Chinese	Renmin	University	and	other	universities,	1950-1957),	2012.	
	 121	who	developed	the	Party	historical	narratives	composed	in	the	Yan’an	period.	 		 	 After	 assuming	 national	 power,	 the	 CCP	 employed	 official	 Party	 history	 for	propaganda	 and	 education.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 their	 goals,	Mao	 and	 his	writers	adopted	certain	new	measures.	First,	 they	established	a	Party	history	 framework	that	 synthesized	 former	 intra-Party	 education	 materials	 and	 external-Party	propaganda.	 Second,	 the	 Party	 created	 official	 versions	 of	 Mao’s	 works	 and	presented	 them	 as	 the	 most	 authoritative	 historical	 narratives.	 Third,	 they	permitted	senior	cadres	to	become	narrators	of	Party	history	by	allowing	them	to	write	revolutionary	memoirs.		 	 Because	 the	 CCP	 Center	 did	 not	 issue	 any	 official	 Party	 history	 textbooks,	university	historians	had	to	assume	the	task	of	transforming	the	internal	materials	used	 in	 the	 intra-Party	 power	 struggles	 into	 a	 more	 systematic	 literature	 and	disseminating	 it	 to	a	broader	 readership.	As	discussed	 in	 this	 chapter,	historians	added	certain	elements	to	the	official	narratives	about	the	WRA,	but	this	was	not	an	indicator	of	their	creativity.	In	fact,	certain	seemingly	new	accounts	had	already	appeared	in	the	Yan’an	period.		 	 After	some	twenty	years	of	development,	the	joint	efforts	of	the	CCP	leadership	and	 Party	 historians	 enabled	 the	 official	Maoist	 narratives	 of	 the	 Party’s	 past	 to	achieve	their	final	form	by	the	end	of	the	1950s.	The	completion	of	this	final	form	was	marked	by	the	regularization	of	Party	History	education	in	universities	across	the	country	and	the	popularization	of	a	number	of	textbooks	written	by	specialists.	By	then,	the	alternative	narratives	of	historical	events,	as	described	in	Chapter	1,	had	disappeared	entirely.		 	 The	1950s	was	a	watershed	not	only	in	Party	historiography,	but	also	in	Chinese	historiography	 as	 a	whole.	 During	 this	 period,	Marxist	 historiography	 secured	 a	dominant	position	in	China	through	a	number	of	learning	movements	and	purging	campaigns.	 Meanwhile,	 to	 explain	 Chinese	 history,	 especially	 modern	 Chinese	history,	the	Party	also	created	a	grand	narrative	that	was	consistent	with	Marxist	historical	 materialism.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 Party	 developed	 a	 system	 of	 historical	knowledge	 in	 which	 facts	 served	 to	 prove	 the	 theory,	 and	 theory	 served	 as	 the	criterion	 for	 presenting	 facts.	 Therefore,	 as	 scholars	 have	 commented,	 “The	historian	no	 longer	had	 to	 study	history	 in	order	 to	know	 the	past:	he	knew	 the	past	before	studying	history.”92	 In	this	process,	official	Party	History	in	fact	served																																																									92	 Susanne	Weigelin-Schwiedrzik,	 “Chinese	Historical	Writing	Since	1949”,	 in	Axel	 Schneider	and	
	122	as	an	excellent	prototype	 for	what	historians	needed	to	build.	 In	the	competition	between	 Maoist	 and	 non-Marxist	 historiography,	 Party	 history	 was	 neither	 a	battlefield,	 nor	 a	 source	 of	 conflict.	 Instead,	 Party	 history	 became	 a	 tool	 for	 the	transformation	of	Chinese	historiography.	 		 	 To	 some	 extent,	 the	 reeducation	 of	 Chinese	 intellectuals	 during	 the	 first	seventeen	 years	 of	 the	 PRC	 period	 was	 a	 prelude	 to	 the	 purges	 of	 intellectuals	during	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 when	 many	 scholars	 suffered	 a	 great	 deal	 of	physical	 and	 mental	 abuse.	 Similarly,	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 official	 history	framework	 in	 the	 1950s	was	 also	 a	 prelude	 to	 the	 radical	 historiography	 of	 the	Cultural	Revolution.	The	way	in	which	Party	history	was	written	into	the	history	of	two-line-struggles,	with	Mao	 as	 the	 omniscient	 and	 ever-victorious	 Party	 leader,	which	emerged	in	the	Yan’an	period	and	was	finalized	in	the	1950s,	was	adopted	extensively	from	1966	to	1976.	Some	former	leaders	received	new	radical	verdicts	and	were	portrayed	as	practitioners	of	certain	“wrong	lines.”93	 Many	events	from	the	past	became	taboo	and	many	facts	were	“distorted”	in	historical	writings.	The	dishonesty	 of	 this	 ridiculous	 historiography	 led	 inevitably	 to	 an	 anti-“innuendo	historiography”	 campaign	 immediately	 after	 the	 dramatic	 change	 in	 the	 CCP																																																																																																																																																																			Daniel	Woolf,	eds.,	The	Oxford	History	of	Historical	Writing,	vol.	5:	Historical	Writing	Since	1945.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	pp.	615-636.	93	 First,	on	the	premise	that	Mao	Zedong	always	represents	the	correct	line,	the	number	of	wrong	lines	 increased.	 By	 1971,	 according	 to	Mao	 Zedong’s	 definition,	 there	were	 in	 total	 ten	 struggles	between	different	lines	(十大路線鬥爭)	in	the	Party’s	first	fifty	years	of	history.	Besides	the	five	line	struggles	 listed	 previously	 in	 this	 chapter,	 there	 were	 five	 more	 struggles.	 They	 were:	 the	“left”-deviation	adventurism	 led	by	Luo	Zhanglong	 羅章龍,	Gao	Gang	and	Rao	Shushi’s	anti-party	clique,	 Peng	 Dehuai’s	 right-deviation	 opportunism,	 Liu	 Shaoqi’s	 anti-party	 clique	 and	 Lin	 Biao’s	anti-party	clique.	Two	years	later,	these	line	struggles	were	included	in	Zhou	Enlai’s	report	at	the	Tenth	National	Congress	of	the	CCP.	See	“Zhou	Enlai	zai	zhongguo	gongchandang	dishici	quanguo	daibiao	 dahui	 shang	 de	 baogao	 周恩來在中國共產黨第十次代表大會上的報告”	 (Zhou	 Enlai’s	report	on	the	Tenth	National	Congress	of	the	CCP,	on	August	24,	1973).	 	http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64562/65450/4429430.html	 (last	 visited	 on	November	 26,	 2015)	 Second,	whether	 a	 specific	 figure	 belonged	 to	 the	 right	 line	 or	wrong	 lines	changed	according	 to	 this	 figure’s	ups	and	downs.	Those	who	held	power	were	considered	 to	be	representatives	 of	 the	 right	 line.	When	 they	 lost	 power,	 however,	 they	 immediately	 fell	 into	 the	wrong	line	category.	The	different	assessments	on	the	One-hundred	Regiments	Campaign	(百團大
戰)	 directed	 by	 Peng	 Dehuai	 made	 before	 and	 after	 Mao’s	 criticism	 to	 Peng	 at	 the	 Lushan	Conference	(廬山會議)	and	the	different	narratives	on	the	relationship	between	Lin	Biao	 林彪	 and	Zhang	Guotao	written	before	 and	after	Lin’s	death	 in	1972	are	 two	examples.	Before	 the	Lushan	Conference	 in	 1959,	 the	 One-hundred	 Regiments	 Campaign	 enjoyed	 high	 praise	 in	 official	 Party	History.	 After	 the	 Lushan	 Conference,	 this	 campaign	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 reflection	 of	right-deviationist	 opportunism,	military	 adventurism	 and	Wang	Ming’s	 capitulationism.	 Lin	 Biao	was	called	“the	intimate	comrade-in-arms	of	Chairman	Mao”	when	he	was	alive.	However,	after	Lin	died,	a	number	of	accusations	were	made	about	him.	For	instance,	some	cadres	recalled	that	when	Mao	 struggled	 with	 Zhang	 Guotao’s	 wrong	 line,	 Lin	 was	 on	 Zhang’s	 side.	 See	 Sima	 Lu	 司馬璐	
Hongjun	Changzheng	 yu	 Zhonggong	neizheng	 紅軍長征與中共內爭	 (The	Red	Army’s	 Long	March	and	the	CCP’s	inner	struggles).	Hong	Kong:	Zilian	chubanshe	 自聯出版社,	1985,	p.	183.	
	 123	leadership	in	1976.	It	was	through	this	campaign	that	historians	began	to	resume	their	 academic	 work.	 Nevertheless,	 neither	 the	 new	 Party	 leadership	 nor	professional	 historians	 questioned	 the	 master	 narrative	 and	 the	 official	 history	framework.	This	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	two	chapters.		 	
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Table	3-1	Endnotes	about	the	Party’s	history	in	Selected	Works	of	Mao	Zedong,	
Volume	1		 Endnote	Subjects94	 Year	 Articles	The	Kuomintang’s	alliance	with	Communists	 1924	 Analysis	of	the	Classes	in	Chinese	Society	The	right	opportunism	of	Chen	Duxiu	 1924-1929	 Problems	 of	 Strategy	 in	 China’s	Revolutionary	War	 	The	 Guomintang’s	 general	 headquarters	 in	Nanchang	 1926	 Report	on	an	Investigation	of	the	Peasant	Movement	in	Hunan	The	 organizational	 form	 of	 China’s	 Red	political	power	 Since	1927	 How	Can	the	Red	Political	Power	Exist	 in	China?	Independent	regimes	of	peasants	 1927	 How	Can	the	Red	Political	Power	Exist	 in	China?	Putschism	 1927	 On	Correcting	Mistaken	Ideas	in	the	Party	The	Nanchang	Uprising	 	 1927	 Problems	 of	 Strategy	 in	 China’s	Revolutionary	War	The	Trotskyite	group	 Since	1927	 On	Tactics	against	Japanese	Imperialism	The	 Sixth	 National	 Congress	 of	 the	Communist	Party	of	China	 	 1928	 A	Single	Spark	Can	Start	A	Prairie	Fire	The	Ten-Point	Program	adopted	in	the	Sixth	National	Congress	of	the	CCP	 1928	 On	Tactics	against	Japanese	Imperialism	The	 Central	 Committee’s	 letter	 dated	February	(「二月來信」)	 1929	 A	Single	Spark	Can	Start	A	Prairie	Fire	The	“left”	opportunism	of	Li	Lisan	 1930	 Problems	 of	 Strategy	 in	 China’s	Revolutionary	War	The	AB	(Anti-Bolshevik)	Group	 1930-1931	 Problems	 of	 Strategy	 in	 China’s	Revolutionary	War	The	“left”	opportunist	line	of	Wang	Ming	and	Bo	Gu	 1931-1935	 Problems	 of	 Strategy	 in	 China’s	Revolutionary	War	The	 Fifth	 Encirclement	 and	 Suppression	Campaign	 1933	 Pay	Attention	to	Economic	Work	The	Second	Front	Army	 1934	 On	Tactics	against	Japanese	Imperialism	The	December	9th	Movement	 1935	 On	Tactics	against	Japanese	Imperialism	The	Long	March	 1934-1935	 On	Tactics	against	Japanese	Imperialism	The	Fourth	Front	Army	 1935	 On	Tactics	against	Japanese	Imperialism	The	 third	 encirclement	 and	 suppression	campaign	 against	 the	 Shaanxi-Gansu	revolutionary	base	 1935	 On	Tactics	against	Japanese	Imperialism	Guerrilla	war	in	southern	China	 1934-1935	 On	Tactics	against	Japanese	Imperialism																																																									94	 In	many	cases,	the	endnotes	are	not	limited	to	explaining	the	subjects,	but	introduce	background	or	 other	 relevant	 issues.	 For	 example,	 the	 note	 for	 “the	 Guomintang’s	 general	 headquarters	 in	Nanchang”	 indeed	 analyses	 Chang	 Kai-shek’s	 preparation	 for	 the	 anti-communists	 massacre	 in	April	1927.	 	
	 125	The	 Northeastern	 People’s	 Revolutionary	Army	 1935	 On	Tactics	against	Japanese	Imperialism	The	 declaration	 by	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	Party	on	August	1,	1935	 1935	 The	 Tasks	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	Party	in	the	Period	of	Resistance	to	Japan	The	Wayaobao	Conference	 	 1935	 The	 Tasks	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	Party	in	the	Period	of	Resistance	to	Japan	The	Red	Army’s	 telegram	demanding	to	end	the	civil	war	 1936	 The	 Tasks	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	Party	in	the	Period	of	Resistance	to	Japan	The	 slogans	 of	 “A	 people’s	 republic”	 and	 “A	democratic	republic”	 	 1935-1936	 The	 Tasks	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	Party	in	the	Period	of	Resistance	to	Japan	The	WRA	 1936-1937	 Problems	 of	 Strategy	 in	 China’s	Revolutionary	War	The	Xi’an	Incident	 	 1936	 A	 Statement	 on	 Chiang	 Kai-shek’s	Statement		
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Part	Two:	Rewriting	the	Western	Route	Army’s	History	in	the	
Reform	Era	
Chapter	4:	The	“New	Interpretation”	of	the	Western	Route	
Army	
Introduction	The	late	1970s	to	the	middle	of	the	1980s	was	a	period	of	transformation	in	Party	historiography,	 because	 during	 this	 period	 an	 unprecedented	 number	 of	 people	took	 part	 in	 writing	 Party	 history,	 and	 a	 variety	 of	 comparably	 new	 historical	assessments	of	important	personages	and	incidents	emerged.	The	official	historical	conclusions	 made	 by	 the	 Party	 during	 the	 Mao	 Era	 were	 revised,	 changed,	 or	challenged.	 A	 convenient	 explanation	 for	 this	 phenomenon	 is	 that	 due	 to	 the	changing	 social	 circumstances	 after	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 and	 due	 to	 the	adoption	 of	 reform	 policies,	 Party	 leaders	 needed	 to	 make	 a	 corresponding	ideological	 transformation.	 As	 a	 part	 of	 this	 transformation,	 Party	 history	 was	inevitably	rewritten.	This	explanation,	however,	is	far	from	comprehensive.	As	this	chapter	will	 show,	 the	 new	 leadership	 did	 not	 intend	 originally	 to	 challenge	 the	official	 historical	 narratives	 created	 by	 Mao	 and	 his	 writers;	 instead,	 they	preferred	 to	 some	 extent	 to	 maintain	 Mao’s	 verdicts	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 conflicts	among	factions	within	the	Party.	Who	produced	the	new	narratives,	and	what	was	the	impetus	to	do	so?	This	chapter	will	answer	these	questions	through	the	case	of	the	WRA.		 	 In	the	first	several	years	of	the	Reform	era,	the	alternative	interpretation	of	the	WRA	that	was	replaced	by	Mao’s	in	the	1930s	reemerged	in	a	new	form.	Because	this	 new	 interpretation,	 which	 contained	 a	 number	 of	 arguments	 that	 diverged	from	 official	 narratives,	 gained	 the	 support	 of	 high-ranking	 leaders	 and	 senior	veterans,	 and	 also	 because	 the	 advocates	 of	 this	 new	 interpretation	 presented	 a	huge	amount	of	primary	material	as	evidence,	the	CPHRO	felt	threatened	and	as	a	result,	 responded	 to	 the	 new	 interpretation	 actively.	 The	 top	 leadership	 soon	stopped	 the	 debates	 between	 the	 two	 sides,	 because	 the	 issue	 was	 not	 only	historical,	but	political	as	well.	 		 	 This	 chapter	 includes	 three	 sections.	 The	 first	 examines	 the	 Party	 Center’s	
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practices	concerning	the	reassessment	of	Party	history,	arguing	that	although	the	leadership	 did	 not	 mean	 to	 rewrite	 official	 History	 comprehensively,	 its	 related	practices,	such	as	rehabilitating	historical	cases	and	publishing	new	resolutions	on	historical	 issues,	 actually	 encouraged	 senior	 cadres	 and	 relevant	 people	 to	reconsider	historical	problems.	It	was	in	this	context	that	the	issue	of	the	WRA	was	raised	 again.	 The	 second	 section	 examines	 debates	 among	 relevant	 people	 who	held	 different	 opinions	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 WRA,	 and	 the	 leadership’s	 attitudes	towards	this	issue.	Because	of	the	involvement	of	top	Party	leaders,	the	case	of	the	WRA	 allows	 us	 to	 discuss	 the	 new	 leadership’s	 approach	 to	 sensitive	 historical	problems.	The	last	section	compares	the	different	interpretations	of	the	WRA,	and	examines	their	respective	positions	in	Party	historiography.	 	
4.1	The	New	Party	Center’s	Concerns	about	“Historical	Problems”		 	 In	late	1977,	one	year	after	Mao’s	death	and	the	end	of	the	Cultural	Revolution,	the	new	CCP	Party	Center	began	to	“rehabilitate	unjust,	false	and	erroneous	cases”	(pingfan	 yuanjia	 cuo’an	 平反冤假錯案,	 hereafter	 “rehabilitate	 erroneous	 cases”).	The	original	meaning	of	“rehabilitate	erroneous	cases”	was	the	reinvestigation	of	cases	 in	 which	 people	 were	 convicted	 during	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 and	rehabilitation	 of	 those	 who	 had	 been	 sentenced	 incorrectly.	 Despite	 the	 Party	Center’s	original	intention	to	focus	on	those	cases	that	were	“made	by	the	Gang	of	Four”,	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 reinvestigation	 and	 rehabilitation	 soon	 extended	 to	 the	entire	 PRC	 period,	 and	 even	 to	 the	 1930s	 and	 1940s.	 Within	 a	 short	 time,	 the	whole	of	Chinese	society	was	swept	up	in	the	mood	of	rehabilitation.1	 Because	“to	rehabilitate”	meant	 to	 reevaluate	a	person	or	an	event,	 “rehabilitating	erroneous	cases”	should	be	considered	a	practice	of	the	new	leadership	that	actually	revised	historical	conclusions	made	during	the	Mao	Era.	 		 	 At	the	end	of	the	1970s,	the	new	leadership	began	to	formulate	a	new	resolution	on	 historical	 issues.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 Party	 Center	 organized	 senior	 cadres	 to																																																									1	 According	to	the	Party’s	official	statistics,	approximately	three	million	cadres	were	rehabilitated	and	470,000	cadres	were	readmitted	to	Party	membership	by	1985	when	the	rehabilitation	work	basically	ended.	Renmin	wang	 人民網	 (People	Online),	“Zhongguo	gongchandang	xinwen:	pingfan	yuanjia	cuo’an	gongzuo	 中國共產黨新聞:	 平反冤假錯案工作”	(CCP	news:	rehabilitation	of	unjust,	false	and	erroneous	cases)	 	http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64156/64157/4512071.html.	 (last	 visited	 on	 May	 9,	 2015)	 Data	provided	 by	 the	 daughter	 of	 Hu	 Yaobang	 shows	 that	 1.58	million	 cases	 concerning	 intellectuals	were	resolved.	See	Man	Mei	 滿妹,	Sinian	yiran	wujin:	huiyi	fuqin	Hu	Yaobang	 思念依然無盡：回憶
父親胡耀邦 	 (Remembrance	 is	 endless:	 reminiscing	 my	 father	 Hu	 Yaobang).	 Beijing:	 Beijing	chubanshe	 北京出版社,	2005,	p.	288.	
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discuss	 certain	 essential	 issues	 in	 Party	 history,	 such	 as	 Mao’s	 positive	contributions	 and	 mistakes,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 definition	 of	 “Mao	 Zedong	 Thought.”	However,	 these	 discussions	 revealed	 the	 contradiction	 in	 the	 Party	 leadership’s	idealistic	perspective	of	attempting	to	maintain	Mao’s	authority,	while	also	trying	to	 promote	 their	 new	 policies	 of	 reform	 and	 opening	 up.	 Ironically,	 during	 the	discussions,	 some	 previously	 little-known	 facts	 were	 raised	 and	 subsequently	disseminated	 widely,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 led	 to	 fervent	 discussions	 of	 Party	 history.	This	was	something	that	the	Party	Center	neither	anticipated	nor	wanted.	 		 	 In	 addition	 to	 discussing	 historical	 issues	 from	 the	 Party’s	 perspective,	 senior	cadres	were	 also	 organized	 to	 recollect	 their	 own	histories	 in	 a	 variety	 of	ways.	Although	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 intention	 was	 to	 use	 revolutionary	 history	 to	propagandize	 the	 Party’s	 glorious	 image,	 and	 also	 to	 minimize	 the	 effect	 of	historical	problems	within	 the	Party,	 it	 transpired	 that	 allowing	 senior	 cadres	 to	investigate	 and	 write	 their	 own	 histories	 led	 to	 more	 challenges	 to	 official	historical	narratives.	 	
4.1.1	Rehabilitating	Unjust,	False,	and	Erroneous	Cases		 	 After	Mao’s	death	and	the	downfall	of	the	Gang	of	Four,	the	Party	Center	realized	that	 rehabilitating	 erroneous	 cases	 had	 become	 an	 urgent	 task	 for	 two	 main	reasons.	First,	after	two	decades	of	turbulent	mass	movements,	the	Chinese	people	were	experiencing	a	“crisis	of	faith.”	In	particular,	the	injustice	that	had	marked	the	Cultural	Revolution	had	led	people	to	question	Marxism,	socialism,	and	the	Party	leadership.2	 Therefore,	 if	 the	 Party	 could	 not	 restore	 social	 justice,	 it	 might	 be	unable	to	maintain	its	authority.	Another,	and	more	realistic,	reason	was	that	the	revival	of	the	Party	and	the	nation	required	cadres	and	intellectuals.	Unfortunately,	most	of	these	people	were,	to	varying	degrees,	purged	during	the	Mao	Era,	and	at	the	time,	remained	troubled	by	their	historical	problems.	Without	reinvestigation	and	rehabilitation,	they	would	be	unable	to	work	for	the	Party’s	new	cause,	that	of	improving	 the	 economy.3	 Therefore,	 because	 rehabilitating	 erroneous	 cases	was																																																									2	 Liu	 Jisheng 刘濟生,	 “Lun	 Hu	 Yaobang	 pingfan	 yuanjia	 cuo’an	 論胡耀邦平反冤假錯案”	 (Hu	Yaobang	 and	 rehabilitation),	 Yan-Huang	 chunqiu	 wangzhan	 《炎黃春秋》網站	 (Website	 of	 the	journal	Yan-Huang	Chunqiu),	 	http://www.yhcqw.com/html/kwg/2010/88/108818124D61CC77824GA78AFF9060I65.html	(last	visited	on	May	9,	2015).	3	 This	is	why	local	governments	were	instructed	not	only	to	resolve	intellectuals’	 living	problems	but	also	 to	 “take	advantage	of	 their	wisdom	and	 talent	 to	promote	our	socialist	 construction	and	realize	the	four	modernizations”.	See	Wu	Linquan	 吳林泉	 and	Peng	Fei	 彭飛,	“Boluan	fanzheng	li	
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considered	to	be	a	threshold	that	must	be	crossed	if	political,	social,	and	economic	reforms	were	to	remain	on	schedule,4	 the	new	leadership	preferred	to	resolve	the	problem	as	soon	as	possible.		 	 Initially,	 the	 Party	 Center	 directed	 most	 of	 its	 attention	 to	 those	 cases	 that	occurred	 during	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 but	 soon,	 a	 large	 number	 of	 appeals	emerged	to	reinvestigate	cases	prior	to	that.	In	the	words	of	Song	Renqiong	 宋任
窮	 (1909-2005),	Minister	of	Organization	Department	at	the	time:	“it	seemed	that	people	 wanted	 us	 to	 reinvestigate	 all	 the	 cases	 related	 to	 all	 the	 political	movements	 during	 the	 PRC	 period.”5	 Further,	 the	 Party	 Center	 also	 received	appeals	 from	 senior	 cadres	 to	 reassess	 intra-Party	 cases	 that	 took	 place	 before	1949.	This	unexpected	situation	forced	the	Party	Center	to	revise	its	work	plan.		 	 The	revised	plan	of	 rehabilitation	enlarged	 its	 scale,	but	continued	 to	 focus	on	the	 period	 of	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution.	 As	 for	 the	 period	 prior	 to	 the	 Cultural	Revolution,	most	effort	was	invested	in	four	political	movements,	because	of	their	large	 scales—the	 Campaign	 to	 Suppress	 Counterrevolutionaries	 (zhenya	
fangeming	 鎮壓反革命,	 in	 short,	zhenfan	 鎮反,	1950-1953);	 the	Purge	of	Hidden	Counterrevolutionaries	 (suqing	 fangeming	 肅清反革命 ,	 in	 short,	 sufan	 肅反 ,	1955-1957);	 the	 Anti-rightist	 Movement	 (fanyou	 反右 ,	 1957),	 and	 the	 Four	Clearances	Campaign	 (siqing	 四清,	 1962).	With	 respect	 to	 other	 cases,	 the	Party	Center	 decided	 to	 address	 only	 those	 cases	 in	which	 victims	 or	 victims’	 families	requested	reinvestigation	explicitly.6	 		 	 Although	the	Party	Center	rehabilitated	the	cadres	who	were	purged	during	the	Cultural	 Revolution	without	 hesitation,	 it	 adopted	 a	 different	method	 to	 address	other	cases.	First,	it	used	different	words	to	convey	its	attitudes	towards	different	types	of	cases.	Making	reassessments	of	cases	during	the	Cultural	Revolution	and	removing	 the	 sentences	 and	 labels	 that	were	 applied	 to	 people	 during	 that	 time																																																																																																																																																																			fengbei	 撥亂反正立豐碑”	 (Monument	 for	 setting	wrong	 things	 to	 right),	Renmin	 ribao 人民日報,	June	1,	1989,	p.	6.	4	 Li	Rui	 李銳,	“Qianyan	 前言”	(Preface),	in	Dai	Huang	 戴煌,	Hu	Yaobang	yu	pingfan	yuanjia	cuo’an
胡耀邦與平反冤假錯案	 (Hu	 Yaobang	 and	 rehabilitation	 of	 unjust,	 false	 and	 erroneous	 cases).	Beijing:	Zhongguo	gongren	chubanshe	 中國工人出版社,	2004,	p.	1.	5	 Song	 Renqiong	 宋任窮,	 Song	 Renqiong	 huiyilu	 宋任窮回憶錄	 (Memoirs	 of	 Song	 Renqiong).	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	2007,	p.439.	6	 The	 Central	 Organization	 Department	 of	 CCP	 made	 such	 rules	 in	 a	 document	 issued	 in	 1979,	titled	“Guanyu	‘Wenhua	dageming’	qian	yixie	anjian	chuli	yijian	 關於“文化大革命”前一些案件處理
意見”	 (Instructions	on	how	to	deal	with	 the	cases	 that	happened	before	 the	Cultural	Revolution).	See	Song	Renqiong,	2007,	pp.	439-440.	
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was	 called	 “rehabilitation”	 (pingfan	 平反).	 This	 meant	 that	 the	 purges	 of	 these	people	and	assessments	of	 these	events	were	definitely	erroneous	decisions.	For	certain	other	cases,	such	as	the	Anti-rightist	Movements,	the	reassessments	were	referred	to	as	“correction”	(gaizheng	 改正).	This	meant	that	the	Party	Center	had	made	the	right	decision	to	launch	the	movement,	but	the	purge	was	too	extreme.7	Similarly,	it	was	declared	that	the	the	infamous	campaigns	of	the	1930s	and	1940s	that	targeted	the	so-called	“counterrevolutionaries”	suffered	from	the	problem	of	magnification	 (kuodahua	 擴大化),	 indicating	 that	 the	 Party	 had	 launched	 these	campaigns	 for	 a	 good	 reason	 as	 well,	 but	 had	 failed	 to	 control	 the	 scale	 of	 the	purges.8	 More	subtly,	in	some	cases,	the	information	that	a	certain	event	or	cadre	had	 been	 reassessed	was	 conveyed	 to	 the	 public	 by	 publishing	 commemorative	articles	 in	 official	 newspapers,	 rather	 than	 by	 issuing	 official	 documents	 with	explicit	accounts.9		 	 These	methods	 indicated	 that	 the	 new	 Party	 Center	 in	 the	 late	 1970s	 always	“attempted	to	define	the	areas	of	permissible	rehabilitation	and	debate	rather	than	letting	 the	momentum	 of	 public,	 intellectual	 and	 academic	 pressure	 lead	 where	they	might.”10	 In	fact,	at	the	time,	the	Organization	Department	of	the	CCP	adopted	the	following	internal	principle.	For	those	cases	that	had	already	been	interpreted	officially	 before	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 the	 Party	 Center	 removed	 the	 revisions	that	were	made	during	the	Cultural	Revolution	and	reemphasized	the	authority	of	the	original	interpretations.11	 		 	 From	 1977	 to	 1979,	 the	 three	 years	 during	 which	 historical	 cases	 were	rehabilitated	 actively,	 the	WRA	 issue	was	 never	 discussed	 officially	 amongst	 the	Party	leadership.	From	the	leadership’s	standpoint,	because	it	was	related	closely	to	intra-Party	power	struggles,	the	WRA	issue	was	still	too	sensitive	to	be	studied,	or	even	mentioned,	much	 less	reassessed.	When	addressing	actual	problems	that	related	 to	 the	WRA,	 the	Party	Center	acted	on	 the	principle	discussed	above—to	rehabilitate	and	compensate	the	cadres	because	they	were	purged	wrongly	during	
																																																								7	 Xiao	Donglian	 蕭冬連,	Lishi	de	zhuangui:	cong	boluan	fanzheng	dao	gaige	kaifang	(1979-1981)	 歷
史的轉軌：從撥亂反正到改革開放（1979-1981）(A	transformation	of	history:	from	setting	wrong	things	 to	 right,	 to	 reforms	and	opening	up,	 1979-1981).	Hong	Kong:	Xianggang	Zhongwen	daxue	dangdai	Zhongguo	wenhua	yanjiu	zhongxin	 香港中文大學當代中國文化研究中心,	2008,	p.115.	8	 People	Online,	“CCP	news:	rehabilitation	of	unjust,	false	and	erroneous	cases”.	 	9	 Song	Renqiong,	2007,	p.	447.	10	 Geremie	Barmé,	1991.	11	 Song	Renqiong,	2007,	p.	435.	
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the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 while	 avoiding	 dealing	 with	 purges	 pre-1966.12	 The	outside	world,	however,	was	immersed	in	the	excitement	of	rehabilitation,	paying	little	 attention	 to	 the	 specific	 methods	 that	 the	 Party	 Center	 used	 to	 deal	 with	historical	cases.	People	at	the	time	collected	information	relevant	to	themselves	or	their	 families	 discreetly,	 and	 believed	 the	 release	 of	 some	 information	 was	 a	deliberate	indicator	of	ongoing	changes.	 		 	 In	 1980,	 then	 Chief	 Secretary	 of	 the	 CCP,	 Hu	 Yaobang	 胡耀邦	 (1915-1989),	wrote	 a	 comment	 about	 a	 senior	 cadre’s	 memoirs.	 When	 this	 cadre	 mentioned	Chen	Changhao	in	his	memoirs,	he	called	Chen	“a	 loyal	running	dog	of	 the	Zhang	Guotao	Line.”	Hu	commented:	“Comrade	Chen	Changhao	did	make	mistakes	but	he	has	already	died,	and	his	death	was	a	result	of	the	Gang	of	Four’s	persecution.	It	is	inappropriate	to	call	him	a	 loyal	running	dog.”13	 This	comment	was	published	in	
Party	 History	 Material	 Reports,14	 in	 which	 messages	 could	 be	 delivered	 to	 all	researchers	and	officers	in	the	field	of	Party	history.	Although	Hu	also	emphasized	the	Gang	of	Four’s	persecution,	his	directive	 to	stop	referring	 to	Chen	as	a	 “loyal	running	 dog”	 was	 impressive.	 There	 was	 a	 variety	 of	 special	 phrases	 in	 the	revolutionary	 language	developed	during	 the	Mao	Era	 that	 served	 to	 exhibit	 the	spirit	of	Maoism	and	to	reinforce	the	Chinese	people’s	collective	memories.	When	certain	 specific	 labels	were	 removed,	 this	 took	 the	audience	off	guard,	 for	 it	was	not	only	a	change	in	language,	but	also	an	apparent	signal	of	change.	By	then,	the	
																																																								12	 For	instance,	the	Party	Center	re-buried	the	former	chief	political	commissar	of	the	WRA,	Chen	Changhao,	 at	 public	 expense	 and	 held	 a	 memorial	 ceremony	 for	 him	 at	 the	 Babaoshan	Revolutionary	 Cemetery	 in	 1980.	 This	 arrangement	 had	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 Chen	 having	 been	treated	 unfairly	 since	 1937	 due	 to	 his	 connection	 with	 Zhang	 Guotao,	 but	 was	 because	 he	 had	committed	suicide	in	1967,	during	the	Cultural	Revolution.	Another	example	was	Zhang	Qinqiu	 張
琴秋,	 the	commander	of	the	Women’s	Independent	Regiment	in	the	WRA,	who	committed	suicide	in	1968.	The	memorial	ceremony	was	held	in	1979	and	Xu	Xiangqian	presided	over	the	ceremony.	In	 contrast,	 there	 was	 no	 memorial	 service	 for	 other	 senior	 cadres	 who	 were	 purged	 and	 died	before	the	Culture	Revolution.	As	Chinese	scholar	Xiao	Donglian	observed,	although	many	rightists	died	before	rehabilitation,	only	those	who	died	during	the	Culture	Revolution	were	commemorated	in	ceremonies.	Xiao	Donglian,	2008,	p.	115.	13	 “Hu	Yaobang	tongzhi	guanyu	dui	Chen	Changhao	tongzhi	de	tifa	de	piyu	 胡耀邦同志關於對陳昌
浩同志的提法的批語 ”	 (Comrade	 Hu	 Yaobang’s	 comment	 about	 Comrade	 Chen	 Changhao).	Zhonggong	Gansu	sheng	Zhangye	diwei	dangshi	ziliao	zhengji	bangongshi	 中共甘肅省張掖地委黨
史資料徵集辦公室	 (Party	Historical	Materials	Collection	Office	of	Zhangye	Committee	of	the	CCP),	ed.,	Hong	 Xilujun	 shiliao	 紅西路軍史料	 (Historical	materials	 on	 the	WRA)	 (Internal	 publication),	Vol.	1	and	Vol.	2,	1984,	p.	1.	14	 Party	History	Material	Reports	(Dangshi	ziliao	tongxun	 黨史資料通訊)	was	edited	by	the	Central	Party	History	Research	Office,	starting	from	1981.	 It	was	renamed	Party	History	Reports	 (Dangshi	
tongxun	 黨史通訊)	in	1983	and	combined	with	the	Party	History	Research	(Dangshi	yanjiu	 黨史研
究)	by	the	Central	Party	School	in	1988	into	CCP	Party	History	Research	(Zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	
中共黨史研究).	
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surviving	WRA	commanders	and	their	families	felt	the	official	interpretation	of	the	WRA	was	ready	to	be	challenged.		 	 In	 theory,	 because	 the	 “rehabilitation	 of	 erroneous	 cases”	movement	 targeted	actual	cases,	rather	than	historical	writings,	 it	should	not	be	included	in	research	on	 Party	 historiography.	 However,	 the	 fact	 is	 that,	 as	 events	 and	 figures	 were	rehabilitated,	 relevant	 official	 narratives	 had	 to	 be	 changed	 accordingly,	 which	meant	 that	 Party	History	 had	 already	 been	 revised.	Moreover,	 discussion	 in	 this	section	has	already	shown	that	the	“rehabilitation	of	erroneous	cases”	movement	had	changed	Chinese	people’s	estimation	of	the	political	environment.	As	more	and	more	appeals	were	made,	the	Party	Center	tried	to	limit	the	scale	of	rehabilitation,	but	under	pressure,	 they	could	not	help	but	address	some	historical	assessments	that	they	otherwise	would	have	preferred	to	set	aside.	In	short,	the	“rehabilitation	of	erroneous	cases”	movement	 inevitably	 led	to	the	rewriting	of	Party	history.	 In	this	 sense,	 although	 rewriting	 the	 narratives	 of	 certain	 historical	 issues	 was	exclusive	to	the	Party’s	original	aims,	it	was	truly	an	outcome	of	changed	political	realities.	 	
4.1.2	Discussions	of	Several	Historical	Issues		 	 At	approximately	the	same	time	that	the	Party	began	to	rehabilitate	erroneous	cases,	 the	 top	 leaders	 also	 expressed	 their	 concerns	 about	writing	 official	 Party	History.15	 At	the	beginning	of	1980,	the	Central	Committee	decided	to	establish	a	series	of	new	institutions—two	committees	and	two	research	offices16—to	“satisfy																																																									15	 The	 political	 report	 to	 the	 Eleventh	National	 Party	 Congress	 in	 1977	 indicated	 that	 the	 Party	leadership	had	decided	 to	organize	people	 to	 research	Party	history,	 learn	and	sum	up	historical	experience.	See	Zhongguo	gongchandang	 lici	daibiao	dahui	shujuku	 中國共產黨歷次代表大會數據
庫	 (Database	of	CCP	Congresses),	http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html	(last	visited	on	May	9,	2015).	Ye	Jianying,	then	 chancellor	 of	 the	 Central	 Party	 School	 said	 in	 an	 opening	 speech	 that,	 “Chairman	Mao	 had	prepared	to	do	a	great	thing,	which	was	to	sum	up	the	struggle	experience	 in	our	Party’s	history,	which	has	been	his	unfulfilled	wish”.	See	Wu	Zhijun	 吳志軍,	 “Yijiu	qiqi	nian	zhi	yijiu	baqi	nian	de	Zhonggong	 dangshi	 yanjiu	 shuping	 一九七七年至一九七八年的中共黨史研究述評”	 (Review	research	 on	 CCP	 Party	 history	 in	 1977	 and	 1978),	 Zhonggong	 dangshi	 yanjiu	 中共黨史研究,	2011(9),	pp.	38-46.	16	 The	two	committees	were	the	Central	Party	History	Committee	(Zhongyang	dangshi	weiyuan	hui	
中央黨史委員會)	and	the	Party	History	Editorial	Committee	(Dangshi	bianshen	weiyuanhui	 黨史編
審委員會).	The	former	was	the	top	unit	in	the	organizational	structure.	There	were	eight	members	in	 this	 committee,	 including	 Hua	 Guofeng	 華國鋒	 (1921-2008),	 Ye	 Jianying,	 Deng	 Xiaoping,	 Li	Xiannian,	Chen	Yun,	Nie	Rongzhen	 聶榮臻	 (1899-1992),	Deng	Yingchao	 鄧穎超	 (1904-1992)	and	Hu	Yaobang,	 the	most	 senior	 and	powerful	 figures	 in	 the	Party.	The	 final	decisions	 about	official	opinions	 on	 important	 historical	 events	 rested	 with	 this	 committee.	 The	 Party	 History	 Editorial	Committee	was	inferior	to	the	previous	one,	responsible	for	regular	issues	concerning	Party	history	writing.	 One	 of	 its	 missions	 was	 to	 examine	 drafts	 before	 submitting	 them	 to	 the	 Central	 Party	
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the	urgent	need	of	 all	Party	members	 for	 compiling	and	publishing	official	Party	History	as	soon	as	possible.”17	 In	establishing	these	institutions,	the	Party	planned	to	publish	a	new	official	version	of	Party	History	before	1985.18	 		 	 Why	 did	 the	 Party	 invest	 so	 much	 effort	 in	 compiling	 Party	 History	 at	 the	beginning	 of	 a	 new	 era,	 when	 developing	 the	 economy	 and	 enhancing	 people’s	standard	of	 living	were	considered	the	 first	priorities?	Some	scholars	explain	the	enthusiasm	 amongst	 the	 CCP	 leadership	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four’s	“innuendo	 historiography”	 (yingshe	 shixue	 影射史學 ;	 this	 concept	 will	 be	explained	 in	 detail	 in	 the	 next	 chapter),	 or	 in	 other	words,	 as	Wu	 Zhijun	 of	 the	Central	Party	School	put	it,	“out	of	outrage	towards	fabrication	of	Party	History	by	extreme-left	 forces	 and	 anxiety	 about	 the	 weakness	 of	 this	 field	 caused	 by	extreme-left	thought.”19	 While	correct,	the	analyses	of	Wu	and	other	scholars	are	far	 from	 comprehensive.	 Rather	 than	 simply	 attributing	 the	 new	 leadership’s	choices	 to	 their	opposition	 to	 the	Gang	of	Four,	 it	 is	more	reasonable	 to	 look	 for	answers	by	studying	the	problems	that	the	leaders	faced.		 	 One	 of	 the	most	 urgent	 of	 these	was	 that,	 because	most	 of	 their	 new	 policies	contradicted	 the	 principles	 that	 the	 Party	 had	 been	 advertising	 for	 decades,	 the	leadership	 would	 be	 unable	 to	 promote	 these	 new	 policies	 before	 eliminating	contradictions	to	them.	At	the	time,	“one	option	[for	the	Party]	was	to	acknowledge	that	some	of	its	former	principles	were	wrong,	while	another	option	was	to	judge	what	it	was	working	on	was	wrong.”20	 Between	the	above	two	options,	the	Party	Center	 chose	 to	 reinterpret	 Party	 history—to	 emphasize	 the	historical	 events	 or																																																																																																																																																																			History	 Committee.	 The	 two	 research	 offices	 were	 the	 Central	 Party	 History	 Research	 Office	(Zhongyang	dangshi	yanjiushi	 中央黨史研究室)	and	 the	Committee	 for	Collecting	Party	Historical	Materials	 (Dangshi	 ziliao	 zhengji	 weiyuanhui	 黨史資料徵集委員會).	 The	 former	 was	 an	 institute	that	 directly	 took	 charge	 of	 researching	 and	writing	Party	History.	Hu	Yaobang,	 Peng	Zhen	 彭真	(1902-1997),	Su	Yu	 粟裕	 (1907-1984),	Hu	Qiaomu,	Lu	Dingyi	 陸定一	 (1906-1996),	Li	Weihan	 李
維漢	 (1896-1984),	 Cheng	 Zihua	 程子華	 (1905-1991),	 Yang	 Shangkun,	 Wang	 Heshou	 王鶴壽	(1909-1999),	An	Ziwen	 安子文	 (1909-1980),	Yao	Yilin	 姚依林	 (1917-1994)	and	Feng	Wenbin	 馮
文彬	 (1911-1997)	were	members	of	this	committee.	Mao’s	former	secretary	Hu	Qiaomu,	one	of	the	most	 famous	 theorists	 and	writers	 within	 the	 Party	 was	 appointed	 director.	 The	 Committee	 for	Collecting	 Party	 Historical	Materials	was	 established	 a	 couple	 of	months	 later,	 in	 order	 to	 “save	Party	History	data	and	compile	official	Party	History”.	It	ran	for	eight	years	before	it	was	combined	with	the	Central	Party	History	Research	Office	in	1988.	17	 Niu	Yunxiao 牛雲霄,	“Canyu	choujian	dangshi	yanjiushi	 參與籌建黨史研究室”	(I	participated	in	establishing	the	Party	History	Research	Office),	Zhongguo	gongchandang	lishi	wang	 中國共產黨歷
史網	 (CCP	History	Online),	http://www.zgdsw.org.cn/GB/222127/14738703.html	(last	visited	on	May	9,	2015).	18	 Xie	Xiaonai謝筱迺,	“Xie	Xiaonai	tongzhi	de	jianghua	 谢筱迺同志的講話”	(Speech	of	Comrade	Xie	Xiaonai),	Sichuan	dangshi	yanjiu	ziliao	 四川黨史研究資料,	1982(5),	p.	14.	 	19	 Wu	Zhijun,	2011.	 	20	 Xiao	Donglian,	2008,	p.	257.	
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aspects	of	an	event	that	it	had	deliberately	avoided	mentioning	previously—or	to	reconsider	history	from	a	different	perspective	in	order	to	support	its	new	policies.	The	 necessity	 and	 specific	 approach	 of	 doing	 this	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 following	speech	 given	 in	 1984	 by	 Wang	 Shoudao	 王首道	 (1906-1996),	 then	 Standing	Committee	Member	of	the	CCP	Consultative	Committee:	Some	comrades	do	not	understand	why	we	need	to	deploy	the	policy	of	 opening	 up.	 In	 their	 opinion,	 this	 policy	 is	 against	 the	 Party’s	splendid	 history	 as	 we	 great	 Communists	 cooperate	 with	 foreign	capitalists.	Let	us	look	for	answers	from	our	Party’s	history.	Our	Party	once	 cooperated	 with	 the	 Nationalist	 Party	 who	 slaughtered	Communists,	 because	 our	 goal	 was	 to	 defeat	 the	 Japanese	 who	invaded	our	country.	What	was	the	outcome	of	 the	cooperation	with	the	 Nationalists?	 The	 outcome	was	 our	 victory	 in	 the	 Anti-Japanese	War.	 It	 is	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 there	 is	 plenty	 of	 spiritual	 treasure	 in	 the	Party’s	history,	which	is	waiting	for	us	to	exploit.21		 	 In	addition	to	the	need	to	construct	legitimacy,	there	was	another	concern	that	forced	Deng	Xiaoping	and	his	colleagues	to	rewrite	Party	history	at	the	beginning	of	 the	 Reform	 Era.	 As	members	 of	 “the	 first	 generation	 of	 revolutionaries”	 who	won	 national	 power	 under	Mao’s	 leadership,	 senior	 leaders	 such	 as	 Deng,	 Chen	Yun	and	Ye	Jianying,	believed	it	was	necessary	for	them	to	make	a	judgment	about	Mao	during	their	lifetimes,	in	case	someone	discredited	the	leadership	headed	by	Mao	 completely,	 just	 as	 Khrushchev	 had	 done	 to	 Stalin.	 Chen	 once	 said,	 “We	definitely	 need	 to	 finalize	 the	 assessment	 of	 Chairman	 Mao’s	 contributions	 and	errors.	 If	we	 fail	 to	do	 this,	 there	might	be	a	Khrushchev	 [in	China]	 in	 the	 future	who	could	overthrow	[the	image	of]	Chairman	Mao,	as	well	as	us,	who	now	[are]	making	 [only]	 an	 ambiguous	 historical	 judgment.”22	 These	 senior	 leaders	 also	believed	 that	 if	Mao	were	discredited	 completely	 in	China,	 the	 foundation	of	 the	Party’s	 rule	 would	 be	 undermined	 seriously.	 This	 is	 why	 Deng	 maintained																																																									21	 Wang	Shoudao	 王首道,	“Dangshi	gongzuo	zhong	de	jidian	jiben	yaoqiu:	zai	Hunan	sheng	dangshi	ziliao	zhengji	gongzuo	huiyi	shang	de	jianghua	 黨史工作中的幾點基本要求——在湖南省黨史資料
徵集工作會議上的講話”	 (Several	 suggestions	on	works	 concerning	Party	history:	 a	 speech	 at	 the	Conference	on	the	Collection	of	Party	History	Materials	of	Hunan),	Hunan	dangshi	tongxun	 湖南黨
史通訊,	1984(4),	pp.	16-20.	22	 Hu	Qiaomu	zhuan	bianxie	zu	《胡喬木傳》編寫組	 (The	writing	team	of	Biography	for	Hu	Qiaomu),	ed.,	Hu	Qiaomu	 tan	 zhonggong	dangshi	 胡喬木談中共黨史	 (Hu	Qiaomu’s	works	 and	 speeches	on	Party	history).	Beijing:	Renmin	chubanshe	 人民出版社,	1999,	p.	75.	
		
136	
136	
resolutely,	“The	Party	and	Chinese	people	will	never	do	what	Khrushchev	did!”23		 	 In	 summary,	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 decision	 to	 reassess	 selected	 historical	 issues	was	 based	 on	 two	major	 goals—to	 explain	 all	 historical	 elements	 in	 a	 way	 that	would	benefit	the	political	and	social	reality	of	the	day,	and	maintain	the	image	of	the	Party,	and	Mao,	 in	particular.	One	problem	is	that	these	two	goals	sometimes	were	 incompatible,	 and	 even	 conflicting.	 This	 incompatibility	 and	 conflict	 were	most	 obvious	 in	 1980	 and	 1981,	 when	 thousands	 of	 cadres	 were	 organized	 to	discuss	historical	issues.	
	 	 Senior	Cadres’	Comments	on	the	Draft	of	the	“Resolution	of	1981”		 	 The	first	job	of	the	newly	established	institutions	mentioned	above	was	to	draft	a	 resolution	 about	 several	 historical	 issues	 in	 the	 Party’s	 history.	 This	 project	began	 in	March	1980	and	was	completed	 in	 June	1981,	when	 the	 “Resolution	on	Certain	Questions	 in	 the	History	of	Our	Party	Since	 the	Founding	of	 the	People's	Republic	of	China”	(hereafter	the	“Resolution	of	1981”)24	 was	passed	at	the	Sixth	Plenary	Session	of	the	Eleventh	Central	Committee.	The	scale	of	participation	and	the	depth	of	discussion	throughout	the	drafting	process	were	impressive.	At	least	four	 thousand	 senior	 Party	 members	 from	 central	 state	 organs	 and	 local	governments	 attended	 a	 series	 of	 meetings.25	 More	 important	 was	 the	 way	 in	which	these	discussions	were	conducted.	Participants	were	divided	into	groups	of	approximately	 thirty	people.	Everyone	was	 required	 to	voice	his	or	her	opinions	while	 secretaries	 recorded	 and	 compiled	 them	 into	 newsletters	 that	 were	 then	distributed	to	other	groups.	According	to	attendees’	recollections,	three	significant	problems	 were	 discussed	 intensively:	 how	 to	 assess	 the	 history	 of	 the	 first	seventeen	 years	 of	 the	 PRC,	 from	 1949	 to	 1966,	 how	 to	 define	 so-called	 “Mao																																																									23	 Leng	Rong	 冷溶	 and	Wang	Zuoling	 汪作玲,	eds.,	Deng	Xiaoping	nianpu	(1975-1997)	 鄧小平年
譜（1975-1997）(Chronological	biography	of	Deng	Xiaoping),	Volume	1.	Beijing:	Zhongyang	wenxian	chubashe	 中央文獻出版社,	2004,	pp.	435,	441.	24	 “Guanyu	jianguo	yilai	dang	de	ruogan	lishi	wenti	de	jueyi	 關於建國以來黨的若干歷史問題的決
議”	(Resolution	on	certain	questions	in	the	history	of	our	Party	since	the	founding	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China).	Beijing:	Zhongyang	dangshi	chubanshe	 中央黨史出版社,	2010.	25	 Guo	Daohui	 郭道暉,	 “Siqian	 lao	ganbu	dui	dangshi	de	yici	minzhu	pingyi	 四千老幹部對黨史的
一次民主評議”	 (A	 democratic	 evaluation	 of	 Party	 history	 by	 four	 thousand	 senior	 cadres),	
Yan-Huang	 chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	 2010(4).	 pp.	 1-7.	 If	 the	 fifteen	 hundred	 cadres	 studying	 in	 the	Central	 Party	 School	who	were	 involved	 in	 the	 discussion	were	 counted,	 there	would	 have	 been	more	than	five	and	half	thousand	people	who	participated	in	writing	a	historical	resolution,	which	was	unprecedented	 in	 the	history	of	 the	CCP.	 See	Huang	Li	 黃黎,	 “Guanyu	 jiangguo	yilai	 dang	de	
ruogan	lishi	wenti	de	jueyi	qicao	de	taiqian	muhou	《關於建國以來黨的若干歷史問題的決議》起草
的台前幕後”	(How	the	Resolution	on	Certain	Questions	in	the	History	of	Our	Party	Since	the	Founding	
of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	was	drafted),	CCP	News	Online,	http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/144956/9070784.html	(last	visited	on	May	9,	2015).	
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Zedong	Thought,”	and	how	to	evaluate	Mao’s	rights	and	wrongs.	Regarding	these	three	problems,	the	draft	of	the	resolution,	written	by	Hu	Qiaomu	and	others,	was	challenged	strenuously	by	senior	cadres	at	the	meetings.	 		 	 In	the	draft	of	the	resolution,	the	first	seventeen	years	of	the	PRC	was	portrayed	as	a	period	when	the	“correct	line”	was	carried	out	on	most	occasions	while	both	the	Party	and	the	country	made	great	achievements.	Attendees	disagreed	with	this	account	 because	 it	 ignored	 the	 obvious	 errors	 the	 Party	 had	 made	 during	 that	period,	 especially	 the	Anti-rightist	Campaign	and	 the	Great	Leap	Forward.	 In	 the	draft,	“Mao	Zedong	Thought”	was	defined	as	being	all	 the	correct	thought	of	Mao	and	 other	 CCP	 leaders.	 Attendees	 also	 found	 it	 unreasonable	 and	 illogical	 to	include	other	people’s	“correct	thought”	while	omitting	Mao’s	wrong	thought	from	this	 concept.	 As	 for	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 to	 assess	 Mao,	 attendees	 exchanged	 their	views	freely.	Deng	and	his	colleagues,	however,	failed	to	find	much	praise	for	Mao	in	 the	conference	newsletters	 submitted	 to	 them.	As	many	cadres	 recalled	Mao’s	capriciousness	and	arbitrary	actions,	 these	discussion	meetings	became,	 to	 some	extent,	 meetings	 that	 criticized	 Mao.	 Because	 senior	 cadres	 spoke	 out,	 Chinese	intellectuals	later	highly	praised	these	discussions	about	writing	the	resolution	on	historical	 issues.	 One	 attendee	 commented	 that	 “cadres	 enjoyed	 unprecedented	intraparty	 democracy	 and	 freedom	 of	 speech,”	 and	 this	 fact	 “indicated	 that	thought[s]	 were	 not	 controlled	 by	 Mao’s	 verdicts	 any	 longer.”26	 Ironically,	 the	Party	Center	did	not	adopt	the	cadres’	suggestions	to	revise	the	resolution	draft	at	all.	 Instead,	 the	dissenting	opinions	that	emerged	during	the	discussion	meetings	were	ignored	entirely.	 		 	 The	final	version	of	the	“Resolution	of	1981”	was	contradictory:	it	criticized	the	Party’s	mistakes	in	a	series	of	political	movements,	yet	made	a	judgment	that	most	of	 the	 time	 after	 1949	 the	 Party’s	 practices	 were	 correct,	 or	 at	 least	 basically	correct.	The	resolution	defined	“Mao	Zedong	Thought”	as	the	crystallization	of	the	collective	wisdom	of	 the	 first	 generation	of	 leaders,	while	 also	describing	 “Mao’s	mistakes	 in	 his	 later	 years”	 (Mao	 Zedong	 wannian	 cuowu	 毛澤東晚年錯誤)	 as	irrelevant	 to	 “Mao	 Zedong	Thought.”	 Finally,	 the	 resolution	 negated	 the	 Cultural	Revolution	 completely,	 as	 well	 as	 Mao’s	 theory	 in	 launching	 it,	 but	 emphasized	nonetheless	that	Mao	had	made	so	many	contributions	to	China	that	his	mistakes	
																																																								26	 Guo	Daohui,	2010.	
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were	secondary.27		 	 At	the	time,	Deng	spoke	highly	of	this	Resolution.	He	assumed	that	it	would	help	the	 leadership	achieve	 its	dual	 goals—to	 remove	 the	 contradiction	between	new	policies	and	 the	Party’s	principles,	and	 to	maintain	Mao’s	positive	 image.	 Ideally,	this	resolution	would	put	the	debates	about	Party	History	to	an	end,	and	the	whole	Party	would	“unite	and	look	to	the	future”(tuanjie	yizhi	xiangqian	kan	 團結一致向
前看).28	 It	 cannot	 be	 denied	 that	 this	 resolution	 had	 considerable	 influence	 in	maintaining	 intra-Party	 stability,	 because	 it	 provided	 cadres	 with	 an	 official	evaluation	of	Mao,	while	enjoining	them	to	move	on	from	their	obsession	with	the	issue.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 however,	 the	 resolution	 actually	 failed	 to	 cool	 senior	cadres’	enthusiasm	for	specific	historical	problems.	By	adopting	the	“Resolution	of	1981,”	the	Party	Center	unexpectedly	inflamed	the	cadres’	passion	to	take	part	in	investigations	 of	 Party	 history.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 senior	 cadres	were	 summoned	together	 to	 discuss	 historical	 issues	 broadly	 and	 intensively.	 By	 doing	 this,	 their	desire	to	reassess	Party	history	according	to	their	understanding	was	aroused.	On	the	other	hand,	because	 the	Party	Center	did	not	adopt	 their	views,	 these	cadres	had	 to	 look	 for	 other	ways	 to	 fulfill	 their	 passion	 to	 rewrite	 Party	 history.	 As	 a	result,	after	the	“Resolution	of	1981”	was	issued,	even	more	questions	about,	and	challenges	to,	official	Party	History	emerged.	A	few	years	later,	Deng	admitted	that	the	resolution	had	not	done	a	good	job	of	assessing	Mao’s	merits	and	demerits.29	At	that	time,	Deng	may	have	realized	that	the	resolution	was	not	as	satisfying	as	he	had	once	imagined.	 	
4.1.3	Senior	Cadres	Investigated	Their	Own	Histories		 	 At	the	beginning	of	the	Reform	Era,	 in	addition	to	expressing	their	opinions	on	significant	historical	problems,	 senior	 cadres	had	 two	other	ways	 to	 take	part	 in	rewriting	Party	history.	One	was	to	write	memoirs	or	to	be	heroes	of	biographies,	both	of	which	 required	 them	 to	 recollect	 their	entire	personal	histories.	Another	was	 to	 attend	 “historical	 material	 collection	 meetings”	 or	 join	 teams	 that	investigated	 historical	 problems	 and	 contribute	 their	 recollections	 of	 specific																																																									27	 Resolution	 on	 Certain	 Questions	 in	 the	 History	 of	 Our	 Party	 Since	 the	 Founding	 of	 the	 People’s	
Republic	of	China,	2010,	pp.	97-111.	28	 Deng	Xiaoping	 鄧小平,	 “Zai	 dang	 de	 shiyijie	 liu	 zhong	 quanhui	 yubei	 huiyi	 gezu	 zhaojiren	 hui	shang	de	jianghua 在黨的十一屆六中全會預備會議各組召集人會上的講話”	(Talk	at	the	Conveners	Meeting	 for	 the	 Sixth	Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	Eleventh	Central	 Committee)	 (on	 June	22,	 1981),	 in	Leng	Rong	and	Wang	Zuoling,	eds.,	2004,	p.	750.	29	 Guo	Daohui,	2010.	
		
139	
139	
events.	Compared	to	the	situation	in	the	Mao	Era,	in	the	1980s,	senior	cadres	had	relatively	 more	 freedom	 to	 make	 arguments	 that	 expressed	 their	 own	 opinions	about	Party	history,	rather	than	simply	repeat	Mao’s	judgments	of	certain	figures	and	 events.	 Moreover,	 although	 the	 Party’s	 archives	 remained	 inaccessible	 to	ordinary	 people,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 senior	 cadres	 and	 their	 aides	 had	 the	opportunity	to	use	primary	materials	to	investigate	the	history	in	which	they	once	had	 personally	 taken	 part.	 Therefore,	 although	 conducted	 under	 the	 Party’s	supervision,	these	projects	led	to	some	unexpected	results.	 		 	 At	the	time,	the	Party	Center	encouraged	senior	cadres	to	publish	memoirs	and	biographies	primarily	because	it	needed	propaganda.	In	the	first	sixty	years	of	the	PRC,	 the	 CCP	 tried	 three	 times	 to	 gain	 legitimacy	 by	 exploring	 its	 revolutionary	history—in	the	early	1950s,	when	the	Party	had	 just	assumed	national	power,	at	the	 beginning	 years	 of	 the	 Reform	 Era,	 and	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	 when	 the	Tiananmen	Massacre	 shook	 the	Party’s	 rule.	 Similar	 to	 the	 situation	 in	 the	 early	1950s	discussed	in	the	last	chapter,	at	the	beginning	of	the	Reform	Era,	the	Party	Center	 again	 encouraged	 senior	 cadres	 to	 recall	 their	 revolutionary	 experiences.	CCP	senior	cadres,	however,	were	not	as	enthusiastic	about	writing	memoirs	as	the	Party	 Center	 had	 hoped.	 Having	 experienced	 so	 many	 political	 campaigns,	 and	even	having	been	exposed	by	close	friends	and	family	members,	some	cadres	were	hesitant	 to	write	 anything	 serious.	The	Party	Center	 attempted	 to	mobilize	 their	participation	by	assigning	great	importance	to	the	collection	of	relevant	historical	materials,	 as	 well	 as	 by	 presenting	 powerful	 leaders	 as	 models.30	 Nonetheless,	senior	cadres’	motivation	remained	low.		 	 When	the	Party	Center	realized	the	limited	effect	of	mobilization,	projects	were	launched	 to	 encourage	 senior	 cadres	 to	 write	 autobiographies	 and	 biographies,	beginning	with	the	project	for	marshals.	These	projects	were	conducted	as	follows:	the	autobiographer	dictated,	while	writers	recorded	and	collected	more	materials	in	the	archives;	then,	writers	submitted	drafts	to	the	autobiographer	to	correct	or	approve	 before	 they	 finalized	 their	 writings	 and	 sent	 them	 to	 a	 particular	institution	for	censorship.	To	which	institution	the	draft	should	be	submitted,	and																																																									30	 Then	deputy	director	of	 the	Party	History	Materials	Collection	Committee	Xie	Xiaonai	said	at	a	conference	 in	1982,	 “Comrade	 [Hu]	Yaobang	puts	a	high	value	on	writing	memoirs.	He	 let	 senior	comrades	 compare	 the	 importance	 of	 having	 a	 specific	 position	 in	 the	Party	with	 that	 of	writing	memoirs.	In	his	opinion,	the	latter	is	more	important.”	Xie	also	said,	“Comrade	Deng	Xiaoping	told	us	 he	 had	 started	 recalling	 his	 history;	 Comrade	 Chen	 Yun	 is	 doing	 it	 too,	 with	 his	 secretary	assisting	 him;	 elder	 sister	 Deng	 [Yingchao]	 is	 also	 recalling	 and	 has	 made	 some	 records.”	 (Xie	Xiaonai,	1982,	p.14.)	In	fact,	none	of	these	three	leaders	published	any	memoirs.	
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whether	the	writings	indeed	needed	to	be	censored	by	higher	institutions,	such	as	the	 Central	 Military	 Committee,	 depended	 on	 the	 autobiographer’s	 career	 and	position.	 In	 early	 1980,	 the	 Central	 Military	 Committee	 ordered	 several	universities	 and	military	 regions	 to	 organize	writing	 teams	 to	make	 five	 sets	 of	biographical	 materials	 for	 marshals. 31 	 Although	 they	 did	 not	 launch	 such	large-scale	 projects	 for	 other	 senior	 cadres,	 the	 Party	 Center	 also	 arranged	 for	writers	 to	 interview	 them	 and	 record	 their	 recollections.	 As	 a	 result,	 for	 these	“autobiographers,”	writing	memoirs	 or	 autobiographies	was	more	 likely	 to	 have	been	a	collective	undertaking	than	a	personal	recollection.	 		 	 The	 Party	 Center	 made	 this	 arrangement	 to	 guarantee	 that	 senior	 cadres’	personal	 recollections	were	 consistent	with	 official	 Party	History,	 i.e.,	 to	 prevent	their	 narratives	 from	 contradicting	 the	 Party’s	 standard	 interpretations	 of	historical	events.	 Interestingly,	 in	doing	this,	certain	historical	 issues	were	raised	again,	and	official	 interpretations	of	 these	 issues	were	challenged.	This	made	 the	Party	 Center	 uncomfortable.	 The	 issue	 of	 the	 WRA	 is	 one	 example	 and	 will	 be	explored	in	the	next	section.32		 	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 Party’s	 original	 intention	 to	 publish	 senior	 cadres’	biographical	 works	 to	 shape	 a	 positive	 image	 for	 the	 Party,	 the	 arrangement	 of	allowing	 relevant	 cadres	 to	 recollect	materials	 on	 certain	 issues	 served	 a	 totally	
																																																								31	 In	1955,	ten	military	commanders	were	rewarded	as	Marshals	of	China.	These	ten	commanders	were:	 Zhu	 De,	 Peng	 Dehuai,	 Lin	 Biao	 林彪	 (1907-1971),	 Liu	 Bocheng,	 He	 Long,	 Chen	 Yi	 陳毅	(1901-1972),	Luo	Ronghuan	 羅榮桓	 (1902-1963),	Xu	Xiangqian,	Nie	Rongzhen	and	Ye	Jianying.	By	1976	when	Mao	died,	six	of	them	had	passed	away.	Among	the	six	deceased	marshals,	Lin	Biao,	as	an	alleged	traitor,	did	not	deserve	any	set	of	biographical	materials.	Peng	Dehuai’s	case	was	more	complicated.	Peng	was	purged	by	Mao	in	1959	and	died	in	1974.	Although	he	was	rehabilitated,	the	Party	Center	thought	it	was	still	too	sensitive	to	write	a	biography	for	him	at	that	time.	Therefore,	this	 project	 actually	 included	 eight	 marshals.	 The	 set	 of	 biographical	 materials	 included	biographical	documents,	biography,	selected	works,	photograph	album	and	memoirs.	For	the	four	deceased	 marshals,	 organizing	 people	 to	 write	 memoirs	 for	 them	 was	 unnecessary,	 but	 the	compilation	of	the	other	four	sets	of	materials	was	put	into	action	successively.	For	each	of	the	four	marshals	still	living	at	the	time,	Liu	Bocheng,	Xu	Xiangqian,	Nie	Rongzhen	and	Ye	Jianying,	the	task	of	 compiling	 all	 five	 sets	 of	 biographical	 materials	 started	 immediately.	 The	 Military	 Science	Academy,	the	PLA	National	Defense	University,	Beijing	Military	Region	and	other	institutions	took	part	in	this	project.	See	Shu	Yun	 舒雲,	“Canyu	bawei	yuanshuai	zhuanjizu	de	yixie	huiyi	 參與八位
元帥傳記組的一些回憶”	 (Memories	 about	 working	 in	 the	 writing	 team	 for	 biographies	 of	 eight	marshals),	Dangshi	bolan	 黨史博覽,	2014(8),	pp.	42-46.	32	 Another	example:	General	Xiao	Ke’s	recollection	of	the	early	years	of	the	Central	Soviet	Region	initiated	 the	reinvestigation	of	 the	 “Purging	 the	 ‘Anti-Bolshevik	Group’	campaign”	 (su	AB	tuan	 肅
“AB 團”).	Xiao	Ke’s	recollections	on	this	issue	were	published	in	Party	History	Research	Material	in	 1982	 and	 became	 a	 foundation	 of	 further	 research	 on	 this	 issue.	 Heng	 Zhaoyang	 衡朝陽,	
Zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	de	xin	wenxian	he	xin	shiyu	(1978-2008)	 中共黨史研究的新文獻與新視
閾（1978-2008）	 (The	new	books	and	review	on	the	history	of	the	CCP),	PhD	Dissertation,	Shanghai:	East	China	Normal	University	 華東師範大學,	2008,	p.	173.	 	
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different	 purpose.	 Political	 movements	 in	 the	 Mao	 Era	 had	 created	 complex	relationships	among	cadres,	and	 feuds	within	the	Party	had	an	adverse	 influence	on	 the	 Party’s	 new	 career	 in	 the	 Reform	 Era.33	 Therefore,	 the	 Party	 Center	attempted	 to	 permit	 cadres	 to	 achieve	 consensus	 on	 certain	 controversial	problems	by	holding	“historical	material	collection	meetings.”	Ultimately,	however,	these	 meetings	 were	 more	 effective	 in	 raising	 problems	 and	 triggering	 debates	than	 in	 resolving	 issues.	 Consequently	 a	 number	 of	 research	 teams	 were	assembled	 to	 conduct	 further	 investigations.	 Some	 were	 organized	 by	 local	governments	 and	 conducted	 research	 under	 their	 supervision,	while	 some	 elder	comrades	organized	their	own	teams	as	well.34	 The	subjects	they	researched	were	broad,	 and	 in	 most	 cases,	 their	 conclusions	 differed	 from	 the	 official	 historical	narratives.		 	 In	 short,	 although	 the	 Party	 Center	 launched	 several	 projects	 to	 write	 Party	history	 in	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	Reform	Era,	 their	 intention	was	 to	make	 use	 of	revolutionary	 history	 to	 gain	 legitimacy,	 rather	 than	 to	 overthrow	 the	 former	official	History.	 These	methods	 achieved	undeniable	 results,	 but	 they	 also	 led	 to	more	and	more	questions	about,	and	challenges	to,	the	official	historical	narratives.	How	did	 the	official	Party	History	 institutions	and	 the	 top	 leadership	 respond	 to	these	challenges?	This	response	was	manifested	fully	in	the	case	of	the	WRA.	 	
4.2	The	Emergence	and	Resolution	of	the	WRA	Issue	 		 	 At	the	beginning	of	the	Reform	Era,	a	new	interpretation	of	the	WRA	emerged.	The	 first	 challenge	 to	 the	orthodox	 interpretation	was	 initiated	by	a	 teacher	 in	a	military	college.	His	accounts	gained	immediate	support	from	the	survivors	of	the	WRA	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army.	This	situation	drew	the	attention	of	 ideological	officials	 who	 decided	 to	 defend	 the	 orthodox	 interpretation,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	debates	between	the	two	sides	ensued.	Shortly	thereafter,	top	leaders	in	the	CCP,	Li	Xiannian	and	Chen	Yun,	became	involved	in	investigating	the	issue	of	the	WRA	and	drew	their	own	conclusions,	although	the	ultimate	decision	would	have	been																																																									33	 One	 of	 the	 most	 active	 Party	 ideologues,	 Deng	 Liqun	 鄧力群	 (1915-2015),	 once	 said,	 “When	discussing	actual	issues,	[comrades]	inevitably	mention	historical	issues,	including	the	relationship	between	comrades.	Leaders	at	all	 levels	cannot	help	raising	historical	 issues	and	debating	who	 is	right	 on	 these	 issues.	 Because	 these	 comrades	 once	 purged	 others,	 now	 this	 kind	 of	 problem	[tangling	historical	 issues	with	actual	 issues]	 is	 inevitable.”	Deng	Liqun	said	the	above	words	 in	a	talk	on	the	October	14,	1994.	Cited	from	Xiao	Donglian,	2008,	p.	257.	34	 Feng	Wenbin	 馮文彬,	“Jinyibu	duanzheng	dangshi	ziliao	zhengji	gongzuo	de	zhidao	sixiang	 進一
步端正黨史資料徵集工作的指導思想”	(Streamline	the	directing	thought	of	collecting	Party	history	materials),	Sichuan	dangshi	yanjiu	ziliao	 四川黨史研究資料,	1983(5),	p.	12.	
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made	by	Deng	Xiaoping.	Scholars	have	pointed	out	that	in	the	1980s,	the	Chinese	political	 system	 focused	 to	 a	 great	 degree	 on	 Deng’s	 personal	 authority.35	 This	section	will	show	that	the	field	of	Party	history	was	no	exception.	 	
4.2.1	Challenge	and	Resistance		 	 The	 challenge	 to	 the	 orthodox	 interpretation	 of	 the	WRA	 originated	 from	 the	team	writing	Marshal	Xu	Xiangqian’s	biography.	As	related	previously,	the	writing	team	was	established	in	1980	on	instructions	from	the	Central	Military	Committee,	and	 each	 writer	 was	 responsible	 for	 one	 or	 two	 chapters	 of	 Xu’s	 biography.	 A	teacher	of	the	Politics	Institute	of	the	PLA	(Jiefangjun	zhengzhi	xueyuan	 解放軍政
治學院),36	 Zhu	 Yu	 朱玉	 (1933-	 ),	 was	 assigned	 to	 write	 chapters	 about	 the	Sichuan-Shaanxi	 Revolutionary	 Base	 (Chuan-Shaan	 genjudi	 川陝根據地)	 period	(1932-1935),	and	the	WRA	period.	Zhu	was	also	in	charge	of	helping	Xu	recollect	his	experiences	and	the	actual	writing	of	the	memoirs.	Together	with	other	writers,	there	 was	 a	 period	 when	 Zhu	 spent	 considerable	 time	 in	 the	 Central	 Archives	collecting	primary	materials.37	 After	Zhu	copied	some	telegrams	sent	to	the	WRA	by	 the	 Party	 Center,	 he	 believed	 he	 had	 found	 contradictions	 to	 the	 official	interpretation.	 The	 telegrams	 that	 Zhu	mentioned	were	 published	 in	 the	 1990s,	and	 have	 become	 basic	 primary	 materials	 for	 studies	 of	 the	 WRA’s	 history.	However,	 in	 1980,	 after	 having	 been	 kept	 secret	 for	 decades,	 these	 telegrams	stunned	Zhu.		 	 The	 first	 thing	Zhu	decided	 to	do	was	write	 a	 short	 article,	 “Doubts	 about	 the	WRA.”	 The	 article	 was	 only	 two	 thousand	 characters	 long	 and	 provided	 no	introduction	 to	 the	 problem.	 Obviously,	 it	 was	 written	 for	 veterans	 and	 Party	historians,	 not	 for	 ordinary	 readers.	 The	 article	 did	 not	 present	 any	 argument	explicitly;	instead,	it	presented	three	contradictions	in	the	official	narratives.	First,	Zhu	 challenged	 the	 official	 interpretation	 of	 the	 WRA’s	 original	 intention—to	retreat	to	Xinjiang	and	build	a	route	to	the	Soviet	Union	in	order	to	achieve	Zhang	Guotao’s	 personal	 ambition.	 Zhu	 emphasized	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 army	did	not	 stop	marching	north	towards	Ningxia	until	the	Party	Center	named	the	army	“Xilujun,”																																																									35	 Harry	 Harding,	 China’s	 Second	 Revolution:	 Reform	 After	 Mao.	Washington	 D.C.:	 The	 Brookings	Institution,	1987,	p.	236.	36	 The	 Politics	 Institute	 of	 the	 PLA	 was	 combined	 with	 the	 PLA	 Military	 Institute	 and	 Logistics	Institute	and	renamed	National	Defense	University	in	1985.	37	 Zhu	 was	 relatively	 privileged	 as	 the	 only	 writer	 who	 stayed	 with	 Xu’s	 family	 in	 case	 the	 old	Marshal	would	like	to	talk	about	his	past	at	any	time.	He	even	joined	the	annual	recuperating	trips	with	Xu’s	family	to	famous	health	resorts.	Xu	Xiaoyan 徐小岩,	interview,	Beijing,	October	15,	2013.	 	
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which	means	“the	army	that	marches	west.”	He	asked:	“If	the	WRA	had	made	up	its	mind	to	go	west	without	the	Party	Center’s	orders,	why	did	it	bother	to	go	the	long	way	 round?”	 The	 second	 question	 Zhu	 raised	 was	 why	 had	 the	 official	 History	condemned	the	army	for	fleeing	from	battlefields	because	of	timidity,	despite	the	fact	that	they	had	spent	nearly	two	months	building	revolutionary	bases	in	certain	areas	 where	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 enemy	 had	 settled,	 rather	 than	 retreating	 to	Xinjiang	 as	 soon	 as	 possible?	The	 last	 contradiction	 concerned	 the	 record	 of	 the	official	History,	according	to	which	the	WRA	had	ignored	the	Party	Center’s	orders	and	 refused	 to	 return	 to	 the	 east	 bank	 of	 the	 Yellow	 River.	 Zhu	 asked	 why	 no	evidence,	such	as	telegrams	between	the	Party	Center	and	the	WRA	headquarters,	was	 presented	 to	 support	 such	 a	 serious	 charge. 38 	 Interestingly,	 when	 he	published	his	article,	Zhu	concealed	the	relationship	between	himself	and	Marshal	Xu	discreetly	by	using	a	homophonic	pen-name,	and	explaining	that	he	found	the	issue	of	the	WRA	debatable	because	he	had	“read	some	pamphlets	recently,”	rather	than	mentioning	that	he	found	material	in	the	primary	archives.39		 	 Although	Zhu’s	first	article	was	more	like	a	study	note	than	an	academic	article	and	 was	 not	 published	 publicly,40	 it	 attracted	 the	 attention	 of	 former	 WRA	commanders	and	soldiers	swiftly.	Encouraged	by	their	response,	Zhu	answered	the	questions	he	had	raised	in	“Doubts	about	the	WRA”	systematically,	and	drew	three	major	conclusions	in	his	second	article.	First,	he	argued	that	the	WRA’s	goal	was	to	connect	with	the	Soviet	Union	to	conduct	the	strategy	of	“opening	an	international	route”	 (datong	 guoji	 luxian	 打通國際路線).	 Further,	 Zhu	 contended	 that	 this	strategy	had	been	upheld	and	supported	for	several	years	by	the	Party	Center	and	Mao.	 The	 fact	 that	 it	 became	 identified	 mistakenly	 as	 a	 product	 of	 the	 “Zhang	Guotao	 Line”	 reflected	 leftist	 errors	 in	 the	 field	 of	 Party	 history	 and	 military	history	studies.	Second,	the	decision	to	establish	the	WRA	was	made	by	the	Party	
																																																								38	 Zhu	Yu	 竹鬱,	“Xilujun	yi	 西路軍疑”	(Doubts	about	the	WRA),	Dangshi	yanjiu	ziliao	 黨史研究資
料,	Vol.	74	(September	1983),	pp.	25-27.	 	39	 Ibid.	40	 Zhu	 sent	 “Doubts	 about	 the	 WRA”	 to	 two	 authoritative	 Party	 History	 periodicals,	 but	 both	rejected	 the	 submission.	 One	 of	 them	 was	 Neibu	 weiding	 gao 內部未定稿	 (Internal	 draft),	 an	internal	 periodical	 edited	 by	 the	 editorial	 department	 of	 Lishi	 yanjiu 歷史研究 	 (Historical	Research).	 Although	 Lishi	 yanjiu	 was	well-known	 at	 the	 time	 for	 its	 openness	 and	 boldness,	 the	editorial	 department	 did	 not	 accept	 Zhu’s	 article	 but	 submitted	 it	 to	 “the	 most	 extreme	 leftist	within	 the	 Party”	 (zuo	wang	 左王)	 Deng	 Liqun,	 then	 vice	 director	 of	 CASS,	 for	 examination	 and	subsequently	rejected	the	submission	on	the	basis	of	Deng’s	order.	Eventually	it	was	published	in	an	internal	magazine	of	the	Chengdu	Military	Region	with	the	help	of	a	WRA	survivor,	Chen	Mingyi	
陳明義,	who	at	the	time	was	the	Deputy	Commander	of	Chengdu	Military	Region.	
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Center	and	the	Military	Committee	on	the	basis	of	changing	exigencies.	Initially,	the	troops	were	ordered	to	march	northward	towards	Ningxia,	as	part	of	the	Ningxia	Campaign.	Two	weeks	 later,	because	of	 several	unforeseeable	 changes,	 the	Party	Center	 directed	 the	 army	 to	 go	westward	 and	 titled	 it	 “Xilujun.”	 Third,	 the	WRA	made	a	significant	contribution	to	the	Red	Army’s	victory	in	northwestern	China.	Although	it	failed,	it	did	so	only	in	part,	and	was,	in	fact,	an	indispensible	element	in	 the	 overall	 victory.41	 To	 summarize,	 Zhu	 sought	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 WRA’s	legitimacy	 from	 three	 perspectives:	 political	 correctness,	 proper	 process,	 and	beneficial	outcomes.	 		 	 Faced	 with	 such	 a	 bold	 challenge	 to	 official	 Party	 History,	 the	 Central	 Party	History	 Research	 Office	 (hereafter	 CPHRO)	 asked	 a	 researcher	 in	 the	 office	 to	respond	 to	 Zhu’s	 views,	 and	 they	 compiled	 this	 researcher’s	 article	 and	 Zhu’s	second	 article	 into	 a	mimeographed	pamphlet	 published	 internally	 in	November	1981.	 At	 the	 time,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 nation-wide	 “liberation	 of	 thought	movement”	 (sixiang	 jiefang	yundong	 思想解放運動),	 the	CPHRO	was	determined	to	publish	a	series	of	such	pamphlets,	each	with	a	controversial	issue	as	the	theme.	They	 entitled	 this	 series	Reference	Materials	 for	 Party	 History	 Studies,	 indicating	that	 their	 purpose	 was	 to	 “provide	 important	 reference	 materials	 and	 different	views	 on	 controversial	 issues.”42	 However,	 the	 first	 volume	 that	 focused	 on	 the	WRA	was	also	the	last	[Fig.	4-1].		 	 In	contrast	to	Zhu,	Ye	Xinyu,	the	CPHRO	researcher	who	was	assigned	the	task	of	investigating	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 WRA,	 insisted	 on	 the	 orthodox	 interpretation.	According	 to	Ye,	 the	WRA’s	existence	was	not	 related	 to	 the	plan	of	 “opening	an	international	route”	proposed	by	the	Party	Center	and	agreed	to	by	the	Comintern,	because	 the	 plan	 was	 “to	 connect	 with	 Mongolia	 and	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 through	Ningxia,	not	Xinjiang.”	Neither	was	the	WRA	a	part	of	the	Ningxia	Campaign	Plan,	as	Zhu	had	insisted,	because	according	to	this	plan,	it	was	the	First	Front	Army,	not	Zhang	Guotao’s	 troops,	 that	would	march	westward	 to	obtain	 the	 Soviet	Union’s	assistance.	With	respect	 to	the	 fact	 that	 the	Party	Center	gave	permission	for	the	Thirtieth	Army	to	cross	the	Yellow	River,	Ye	pointed	out	that	the	army	should	have	stayed	 near	 Jingyuan	 and	 Zhongwei	 中衛,	 after	 it	 crossed	 the	 river,	 and	 it	 was																																																									41	 Zhu	 Yu	 朱玉,	 “Ba	 lishi	 de	 neirong	 huaigei	 lishi—Xilujun	 wenti	 chutan	 把歷史的內容還給歷
史——西路軍問題初探”	(Return	the	contents	of	history	to	history:	a	preliminary	exploration	of	the	WRA	issue),	printed	copy,	1982.	42	 “Fakan	shuoming	 發刊說明”	(Editors’	words),	Dangshi	cankao	ziliao	 黨史參考資料,	1981,	p.	1.	
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Zhang	Guotao	who	took	advantage	of	the	Party	Center’s	order	and	made	the	army	go	farther	west.	In	short,	in	Ye’s	opinion,	Zhang	plotted	all	of	those	military	actions	because	he	“intended	to	retreat	to	Qinghai,	Ningxia	and	Xinjiang	as	early	as	1935	and	 insisted	on	doing	so	even	 though	 it	had	been	pointed	out	as	an	error	by	 the	Party	 Center	 several	 times.”	 In	 response	 to	 Zhu’s	 argument	 that	 the	 WRA’s	establishment	 was	 under	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 directive,	 Ye	 explained	 that	 the	operations	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	troops	placed	the	Party	Center	in	a	dilemma:	 	[The	Party	Center]	had	no	choice	but	to	establish	the	WRA	only	after	the	Thirtieth,	Ninth	and	Fifth	Armies	had	already	crossed	the	Yellow	River	 under	 Zhang	 Guotao’s	 orders.	 On	 several	 occasions	 the	 Party	Center	asked	the	WRA	not	to	march	west	and	ordered	it	to	cooperate	with	 armies	 on	 the	 east	 bank	 of	 the	 Yellow	River.	 The	 Party	 Center	never	 directed	 the	 troops	 to	 go	 to	 Xinjiang	 where	 they	 were	disastrously	 defeated	 and	 had	 no	 possibility	 to	 return	 to	 the	 east	bank.43	 		 	 To	 illustrate	 these	points,	Ye	 selected	220	pieces	of	 information	 from	archives	and	 documents.	 Controversially,	 some	 primary	 materials	 that	 Zhu	 provided	 to	support	his	views	were	also	included	in	Ye’s	materials,	which	meant	that	these	two	researchers	had	used	similar	materials	to	draw	diametrically	opposed	conclusions.	Ye’s	article	was	the	CPHRO’s	first,	and	only,	formal	response	to	Zhu’s	challenge.		 	 Not	long	after,	Zhu	wrote	a	third	article	to	refute	Ye’s	views.	He	said	that	Ye	had	tried	 her	 best	 to	 argue	 against	 his	 opinions	 while	 ironically	 providing	 many	materials	that	supported	him.	Zhu	believed	that	if	the	telegrams	Ye	provided	were	rearranged	 chronologically,	 her	 views	 would	 collapse	 without	 being	 attacked.44	Zhu	sent	his	third	article	to	Liao	Gailong	 廖蓋隆	 (1918-2001),	then	vice	director	of	the	CPHRO.	Liao	agreed	to	publish	it	in	the	second	volume	of	Reference	Materials	
for	 Party	History.	 At	 this	 point,	 however,	Hu	Qiaomu	 suggested	 that	 there	 be	 no	further	 debate	 on	 the	 issue.45	 Thus,	 the	 debates	 about	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 WRA	between	Zhu	and	the	CPHRO	came	to	an	abrupt	conclusion.46																																																									43	 Ye	 Xinyu	 葉心瑜 ,	 “Guanyu	 Xilujun	 wenti	 de	 ziliao	 xuanbian	 關於西路軍問題的資料選編”	(Selected	materials	on	the	issue	of	the	WRA),	Dangshi	cankao	ziliao	 黨史參考資料,	1981,	pp.	2-110.	44	 Zhu	 Yu,	 “Bei	 fouding	 de	 lishi	 yu	 bei	 lishi	 de	 fouding	 被否定的歷史與被歷史的否定”	 (Negated	history	and	negation	by	history),	printed	copy,	1982.	45	 Ibid.;	Zhu	Yu	 朱玉,	interview,	Beijing,	June	3,	2013.	46	 Besides	these	debates	there	were	also	some	other	papers	representing	the	opinions	of	both	sides	
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	 	 The	 contradiction	 between	 the	 two	 debaters	 focused	 on	 two	main	 questions:	whose	order	was	 carried	out	when	a	part	 of	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	 crossed	 the	Yellow	River—the	Party	Center’s	or	Zhang’s?	Whose	order	was	followed	when	the	WRA	marched	west	towards	Xinjiang	along	the	Hexi	Corridor—the	Party	Center’s	or	 Zhang’s?	 The	 disparate	 answers	 to	 these	 questions	 led	 directly	 to	 different	interpretations	of	Mao’s	 and	 the	Party	Center’s	 famous	 indictment	 that	 the	WRA	had	carried	out	Zhang’s	erroneous	line.	 		 	 From	 1981	 to	 1982,	 the	 two	 sides	maintained	 their	 own	 opinions	 firmly,	 and	failed	 to	 achieve	 any	 consensus.	 It	 was	 not	 long	 before	 they	 realized	 that	 the	involvement	of	two	top	leaders	had	made	the	situation	even	more	complex.	 	
4.2.2	“I	Was	Involved”:	The	Investigation	of	Top-ranking	Leaders		 	 As	soon	as	the	WRA	became	a	subject	of	intra-Party	debate,	the	Party’s	Central	Leading	 Group	 of	 Party	History	 (Zhonggong	 zhongyang	 dangshi	 gongzuo	 lingdao	
xiaozu	 中共中央黨史工作領導小組)	 realized	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 matter,	 and	reassigned	 the	 Military	 Science	 Academy	 to	 compile	 primary	 materials	 on	 this	issue	 in	 case	 the	 Party	 Center	 needed	 to	 discuss	 it.47	 Leaving	 the	 leadership	 to	decide	 difficult	 historical	 problems	 was	 a	 convention	 of	 the	 CCP,	 and	 they	anticipated	 a	 series	 of	 conferences,	 intra-Party	 discussions,	 and	 a	 new	 decision	issued	by	the	Party	Center	either	supporting	the	new	interpretation	or	maintaining	the	old	one.	Instead,	on	this	issue,	no	convention	was	followed.		 	 Three	Party	Leaders:	Li,	Chen,	and	Xu		 	 Not	long	after	Zhu	published	his	article	“Doubts	about	the	WRA,”	and	sent	it	to																																																																																																																																																																			during	this	period.	Zhu	Yu’s	good	friend	and	colleague	Cong	Jin	 叢進,	for	example,	wrote	an	article	to	question	the	verdict	made	on	the	WRA	in	Mao’s	article	“Strategic	Issues	of	Chinese	Revolutionary	War”	 which	 instigated	 a	 small-scale	 debate	 with	 Zhang	 Yimin	 張亦民,	 an	 academic	 at	 the	 PLA	Military	Institute.	Zhang	Yimin	published	an	article	 titled	“Bo	Zhang	Guotao	zai	Wode	huiyi	zhong	youguan	 Xilujun	 de	 miulun	 駁張國燾在〈我的回憶〉中有關西路軍的謬論”	 (Refutation	 of	 Zhang	Guotao’s	 ridiculous	 accounts	 about	 the	WRA	 in	 his	memoirs)	 in	 1982	 [Dangshi	 yanjiu	 黨史研究,	1982(1).].	Cong	Jin	wrote	an	article	to	criticize	Zhang’s	views.	[“Youguan	Xilujun	de	jige	wenti:	yu	Zhang	 Yimin	 tongzhi	 shangque	 有關西路軍的幾個問題——與張亦民同志商榷”	 (Several	 issues	about	 the	 WRA:	 to	 discuss	 with	 Comrade	 Zhang	 Yimin),	 Dangshi	 yanjiu	 ziliao	 黨史研究資料,	1982(5),	pp.	27-30.]	After	that,	Zhang	Yimin	also	tried	to	publish	his	article	[“Lun	Xilujun	de	shimo	yu	 Zhang	 Guotao	 de	 zeren:	 da	 Cong	 Jin	 tongzhi	 論西路軍的始末與張國燾的責任——答叢進同
志 ”(The	 WRA’s	 history	 and	 Zhang	 Guotao’s	 responsibility:	 answers	 to	 Comrade	 Cong	 Jin’s	questions)	]	in	Dangshi	yanjiu	ziliao	to	debate	with	Cong	Jin,	but	at	this	time,	according	to	Zhang,	the	editorial	 department	 had	 received	 notice	 from	upper	 organs	 about	 not	 debating	 the	 issue	 of	 the	WRA	 any	 longer,	 and	 therefore	 his	 article	 was	 rejected	 by	 Dangshi	 yanjiu	 ziliao.	 Zhang	 later	disseminated	his	article	at	some	conferences	and	put	his	recollections	on	the	debate	with	Cong	Jin	on	some	websites.	 	http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=8143354	(last	visited	on	June	1,	2015).	47	 Xu	Zhanquan	 徐占權,	interview,	Beijing,	September	11,	2013.	
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veterans	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	a	copy	arrived	on	Deng’s	desk.48	 Deng	sent	it	to	Li	Xiannian,	the	former	commander	of	the	Thirtieth	Army	and	then	President	of	the	PRC.	After	reading	it,	Li	sought	advice	from	Chen	Yun.	In	1937,	Chen	met	Li	and	the	 remaining	 troops	of	 the	WRA	at	 the	Gansu-Xinjiang	border	and	arranged	 for	them	to	study	technologies	in	Xinjiang.	In	response	to	Li’s	request	for	advice,	Chen	suggested	that	Li	do	some	research	on	the	subject	and	write	a	report.49	 Li	followed	his	 suggestion	 and	 began	 to	 investigate	 the	WRA’s	 history.	 At	 the	 time,	 it	was	 a	secret	project	unknown	to	most	of	the	top	leaders.50		 	 Chen	played	a	significant	role	in	supporting	Li	on	the	issue	of	the	WRA,	not	only	by	encouraging	him	to	write	a	report,	but	also	by	providing	 instructions	through	various	means.	 According	 to	 Chen’s	 official	 chronological	 biography,	 during	 this	period,	 he	 thrice	 took	 up	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 WRA	 in	 conversations	 with	 Li	 and	expressed	his	opinions	explicitly.	On	the	November	22,	1981,	Chen	said,	“The	WRA	problem	should	not	be	skirted;	the	decision	to	let	them	cross	the	Yellow	River	was	made	by	 the	Party	Center,	 so	 it	was	wrong	 to	call	 it	a	product	of	Zhang	Guotao’s	separatist	 line.”51	 On	 February	 27,	 1982,	 Chen	 repeated	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 and	recalled	that	he	saw	munitions	the	Soviet	Union	had	prepared	for	the	WRA	on	the	border	of	Xinjiang	and	the	Soviet	Union.	“It	is	an	issue	in	which	I	was	involved,”	he	said	to	Li,	 “I	am	already	77	years	old	and	have	to	make	the	things	clear	[before	I	die].”52	 Chen’s	 opinion	 of	 the	 WRA	 was	 significant	 to	 Li	 for	 two	 reasons.	 First,	around	the	mid-1930s,	Chen	was	part	of	the	CCP	leadership	and	once	became	the	CCP’s	representative	in	the	Comintern,	while	Li	was	still	an	ordinary	commander	in	the	Red	Army.	In	this	respect,	although	both	had	personal	relationships	with	the	WRA,	 Chen	 was	 more	 qualified	 to	 assess	 the	WRA	 from	 a	 broader	 perspective.	Second,	in	the	1980s,	although	Li’s	position	was	higher	than	that	of	Chen,	the	latter	actually	 had	 greater	 influence	 within	 the	 Party.53	 As	 a	 result,	 to	 a	 considerable	extent,	Chen’s	opinion	on	a	specific	historical	issue	represented	the	attitude	of	the																																																									48	 Xu	 Xiangqian’s	 secretary,	 Li	 Erbing	 李而炳	 (1945-	 ),	 said	 they	 had	 not	 figured	 out	 by	 which	means	the	article	was	sent	to	Deng	yet.	Li	Erbing,	interview,	Beijing,	November	13,	2013.	49	 Li	Xiannian	 李先念,	“Guanyu	Xilujun	lishi	shang	jige	wenti	de	shuoming	 關於西路軍歷史上幾個
問題的說明”	(Statement	about	several	issues	in	the	history	of	the	WRA),	printed	copy,	1983.	50	 Zhu	Yu,	interview,	2013;	Xu	Zhanquan,	interview,	2013;	Li	Erbing,	interview,	2013.	51	 Zhonggong	zhongyang	wenxian	yanjiushi	 中共中央文獻研究室	 (The	Party	Literature	Research	Center	of	the	CCP	Central	Committee),	ed.,	Chen	Yun	nianpu	 陳雲年譜	 (Chronological	biography	of	Chen	Yun),	Volume	3.	Beijing:	Zhongyang	wenxian	chubanshe	 中央文獻出版社,	2000,	p.	282.	 	52	 Ibid.,	p.	291.	53	 Among	the	six	standing	committee	members	of	the	CCP	Politburo	elected	in	the	Twelfth	National	Party	Congress	in	1982,	Deng	Xiaoping	and	Chen	Yun	ranked	the	third	and	the	sixth	respectively,	but	they	actually	were	the	two	most	powerful	figures	in	the	Party.	
		
148	
148	
top	leadership.54	 		 	 In	addition	to	Li	and	Chen,	there	was	another	important	figure	who	was	playing	a	 subtle	 role	 in	 reassessing	 the	 WRA.	 This	 was	 Marshal	 Xu	 Xiangqian.	 Because	Chen	Changhao	died	in	1967,	and	Zhang	Guotao	defected	long	before,	and	died	in	Canada	 in	 1979,	 Xu	was	 the	 only	 surviving	 top	 commander	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Front	Army.	Although	it	was	his	memoir	writer,	Zhu,	who	challenged	the	official	account,	there	 is	 no	 indication	 in	 his	 chronological	 biography	 that	 Xu	 gave	Zhu	direction,	encouragement,	or	acquiescence.55	 Evidence	shows,	however,	that	Marshal	Xu	did	not	 distance	 himself	 from	 this	 issue.	 In	 1982,	 when	 four	 CPHRO	 researchers	interviewed	him,	Xu	was	quite	unequivocal:	“I	led	the	Fourth	Front	Army	to	cross	the	Yellow	River	according	to	the	orders	of	Chairman	Mao,	Zhou	Enlai	and	Zhang	Wentian,	all	 sent	by	 telegrams.	 [The	WRA’s	crossing	of	 the	Yellow	River]	was	on	the	 command	 of	 the	 Central	 Military	 Committee.” 56 	 During	 the	 interview,	researchers	mentioned	a	newspaper	article	published	five	years	before	on	the	first	page	of	the	People’s	Daily	under	Xu’s	name,	to	commemorate	the	first	anniversary	of	Mao’s	death.	The	article	recalled	conflicts	between	Mao	and	Zhang	from	1935	to	1936	 [Fig.	4-2].	With	 respect	 to	 the	origin	of	 the	WRA,	 the	article	 stated,	 “Zhang	Guotao	ignored	the	whole	situation	and	insisted	on	the	right-wing	opportunist	line,	vainly	attempting	to	occupy	an	area	in	west	China	and	rule	there.”	The	statement	made	 it	 quite	 clear	 that	 Zhang	 had	 directed	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	without	 the	Party	Center’s	approval.57	 During	the	interview	five	years	after	its	publication,	Xu	told	 the	 interviewers	 that	 the	 accounts	 in	 the	 article	 were	 incorrect.58	 He	 said,																																																									54	 As	Xiao	Donglian	points	out,	at	the	time,	although	Chen	and	Deng	held	different	views	on	some	financial	 issues,	 they	 basically	 had	 a	 consensus	 on	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 intra-Party	 affairs.	 Xiao	Donglian,	2008,	pp.	239-337.	55	 At	 the	 time,	 Li	 Erbing,	was	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 organization	 and	 coordination	 of	 the	 biographical	project.	Zhu	Yu	had	Li	Erbing’s	support	and	assistance	from	the	very	beginning,	but	both	of	them	firmly	denied	Xu	Xiangqian’s	involvement	in	challenging	the	official	historical	narratives.	According	to	 them,	Xu	had	nothing	 to	do	with	 the	writing	and	publishing	of	 “Doubts	about	 the	WRA”.	They	said	 they	deliberately	kept	Xu	 ignorant	because	 they	believed	 it	was	not	 the	right	 time	to	ask	 for	Xu’s	opinion	as	 they	were	not	quite	sure	whether	 the	conditions	 for	discussing	 the	WRA	publicly	were	ripe.	According	to	Li	Erbing,	Li	Xiannian	and	Xu	Xiangqian	met	frequently	at	the	time,	and	Li	Xiannian	 once	 conveyed	 Deng	 Xiaoping’s	 suggestion	 that	 Xu	 should	 not	 involve	 himself	 in	 the	debate	about	the	WRA;	Xu	was	not	aware	of	the	details	of	the	debate	until	Li	finished	the	draft	of	his	report	and	sent	it	to	Xu	for	advice.	Zhu	Yu,	interview,	2013;	Li	Erbing,	interview,	2013.	 	56	 Liao	Gailong	 廖蓋隆,	 “Xu	Xiangqian	yuanshuai	 shengqian	de	 feifu	zhiyan	 徐向前元帥生前的肺
腑之言”	 (The	 sincere	 words	 of	 Marshal	 Xu	 Xiangqian),	 Sichuan	 dangshi	 四川黨史,	 1994(6),	 pp.	31-37.	57	 Xu	Xiangqian	 徐向前,	“Yongyuan	jianchi	dang	zhihui	qiang	de	yuanze	 永遠堅持黨指揮槍的原則”	(Forever	 uphold	 the	 principle	 that	 the	 Party	 commands	 the	 Army),	Renmin	 ribao	 人民日報,	 the	September	19,	1977,	p.	1.	58	 One	of	Xu	Xiangqian’s	secretaries,	Liao	Chunfu	 廖春福,	explained:	“At	the	time,	the	People’s	Daily	
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“There	were	many	restraints	before;	they	all	have	gone	now.	Only	if	the	restraints	were	 broken,	 could	 right	 conclusions	 be	 drawn.”59	 Vice	 director	 of	 the	 CPHRO,	Liao	Gailong,	attended	this	 interview.	Xu’s	secretary,	Li	Erbing,	 recalled	 that	Liao	was	 influenced	 greatly	 by	 Xu’s	 remarks;	 he	 had	 supported	 the	 orthodox	interpretation	before	the	interview,	but	changed	his	mind	thereafter.60	 	
	 	 Li	Xiannian’s	Report		 	 With	support	 from	Chen	and	Xu,	Li’s	 report	was	progressing	well.	 In	February	1983,	 after	 several	months	 of	 collecting	 and	 compiling	material,	 Li’s	 secretaries	finished	a	report	entitled,	“Explanation	of	several	issues	in	the	history	of	the	WRA.”	This	 report	 divided	 the	 WRA’s	 military	 actions	 into	 four	 phases	 and	 proved	subsequently	that	all	of	the	troops’	actions—firstly	the	move	northward,	then	the	march	 westward	 and	 their	 occasional	 stationing	 in	 various	 regions—were	 in	accordance	 with	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 directives,	 with	 telegrams	 as	 evidence.61	Because	Li	was	the	Political	Commissar	of	the	Thirtieth	Army,	he	described	some	details	of	battles	conducted	by	 the	Thirtieth	Army	as	well.	At	 the	end,	 the	report	drew	the	following	conclusions:	 	The	 foregoing	 historical	 facts	 have	 proved	 that	 the	 mission	 of	 the	WRA	was	decided	by	the	Party	Center.	From	the	very	beginning	the	WRA	 was	 led	 by	 the	 Central	 Military	 Committee,	 who	 directed	 or	approved	all	of	the	main	military	actions	of	the	WRA.	For	this	reason,	the	 matter	 of	 the	 WRA	 is	 essentially	 different	 from	 the	 matter	 in	which	 Zhang	 Guotao	 ordered	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 to	 march	southward	without	 the	Party	Center’s	approval	 in	September	1935.	According	to	the	Party	Center’s	directions,	the	WRA’s	mission	was	to	establish	 revolutionary	 bases	 in	 the	 Hexi	 corridor	 and	 to	 make	 a	connection	 to	 the	 Soviet	 Union.	 Therefore,	 the	WRA	 should	 not	 be	
																																																																																																																																																																		asked	 Marshal	 Xu	 to	 write	 an	 article	 for	 the	 first	 anniversary	 of	 Chairman	 Mao’s	 death.	 The	newspaper	 office	 recommended	 a	 couple	 of	 comrades	 in	 the	Military	 Science	 Academy	 to	 do	 it.	They	 submitted	a	manuscript	 to	me,	 and	Marshal	Xu	asked	me	 to	 read	 it	 first.	 I	was	not	 familiar	with	this	history.	I	have	to	bear	responsibility	for	this	mistake.”	Xu	declared	responsibility	as	well.	See	Liao	Gailong,	1994.	59	 Liao	Gailong,	1994.	 	60	 Li	Erbing,	interview,	2013.	61	 The	 first	 phase	 was	 when	 the	 Ningxia	 Campaign	 Plan	 was	made	 and	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	crossed	the	Yellow	River	according	to	it.	During	the	second	phase,	the	Ningxia	Campaign	Plan	was	abandoned,	and	the	troops	on	the	west	bank	were	titled	the	“WRA”	and	told	to	march	to	Xinjiang.	The	third	phase	was	before	and	after	the	Xi’an	Incident	when	the	WRA	tried	to	settle	in	Wuwei	and	Zhangye.	In	the	last	phrase	the	army	tried	to	build	revolutionary	bases	in	Linze	and	Gaotai.	
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condemned	as	“carrying	out	Zhang	Guotao’s	line”.62	 		 	 Although	 Li’s	 report	 clearly	 separated	 the	 WRA	 from	 the	 so-called	 “Zhang	Guotao	Line”,	it	did	not	try	to	defend	Zhang	and	the	line.	With	respect	to	whether	Zhang	had	conspired	to	take	advantage	of	the	WRA	to	split	the	Red	Army	and	the	Party,	this	report	strategically	adopted	an	obscure	expression:	 	As	for	Zhang	Guotao,	some	comrades	think	that	because	Zhang	split	the	Party	and	Red	Army	during	the	Long	March	period,	he	might	be	cunning	enough	 to	 take	advantage	of	 the	Party	Center’s	decision	 in	order	 to	 advance	 his	 own	 power	 on	 the	 west	 bank	 of	 the	 Yellow	River	 and	 to	 stand	 up	 to	 the	 Party	 Center.	 This	 theory	 is	 not	unreasonable.63		 	 Moreover,	 Li’s	 report	 did	 not	 even	 attempt	 to	 deny	 Zhang’s	 influence	 on	 the	WRA.	When	summarizing	the	reasons	for	the	failure	of	the	WRA,	besides	domestic	and	 international	 circumstances,	 inappropriate	 tactics,	 and	 geographical	difficulties,	 the	 influence	 of	 “Zhang	Guotao’s	 Errors”	were	 also	 listed.64	 In	 short,	Li’s	main	point,	which	 is	 also	 the	major	 difference	between	his	 interpretation	of	the	WRA	and	the	official	narratives,	is	that	the	Party	Center	directed	the	WRA,	so	that	its	failure	could	not	be	attributed	to	the	“Zhang	Guotao	Line.”	As	for	Zhang	and	his	errors,	Li	adhered	fully	to	the	Party	Center’s	conclusions.	
	 	 A	New	Interpretation	of	the	WRA		 	 Li’s	report,	together	with	Zhu’s	articles,	created	a	new	interpretation	of	the	WRA,	one	 that	 still	 prevails	 in	 China	 today.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 most	 obvious	difference—the	conflicting	explanations	about	the	relationship	between	the	WRA	and	the	so-called	“Zhang	Guotao	Line”—this	new	interpretation	also	diverged	from	the	 orthodox	 version	 of	 the	 WRA’s	 mission	 and	 the	 reasons	 for	 its	 failure	 that	dominated	during	the	Mao	Era	(See	Table	4-1).		 	 In	 creating	 the	 orthodox	 interpretation,	 Mao	 and	 his	 writers	 provided	 only	conclusions	without	any	evidence.	In	contrast,	advocates	of	the	new	interpretation	emphasized	 the	 use	 of	 primary	materials.	 Li	 attached	 fifty-two	 telegrams	 to	 his	report,	 including	 correspondence	 between	 the	 Party	 Center,	 the	 Military	Committee,	 the	 Red	 Army	 Headquarters	 and	 commanders	 of	 the	WRA,	 and	 the																																																									62	 Li	Xiannian,	1983,	pp.	22-23.	63	 Ibid.,	p.	7.	64	 Ibid.,	pp.	25-26.	
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Second	Front	Army	from	late	June	1936	to	May	1937.	This	made	Li’s	conclusions	more	persuasive.	As	 also	mentioned,	 the	CPHRO’s	 response	 to	 Zhu	Yu	 also	 cited	and	 attached	 a	 huge	 number	 of	 telegrams.	 Interestingly,	 both	 sides	 accused	 the	other	of	misusing	telegrams	as	evidence.	Li’s	report	was	criticized	in	particular	for	selecting	materials	for	its	own	purposes	and	misleading	top	leaders,	such	as	Deng	and	Chen	(especially	in	the	21st	century;	see	Chapter	6).	 		 	 Using	 telegrams	as	evidence	 is,	 in	 fact,	questionable	 for	 three	reasons:	 first,	 as	pointed	 out	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 the	 Party	 and	 the	 Red	 Army	 were	 experiencing	 an	ever-changing	 situation	 on	 the	 battlefield	 between	 late	 1936	 to	 early	 1937,	 and	accordingly,	their	plans	also	changed	constantly.	Therefore,	words	in	telegrams	at	the	time	could	only	represent	the	Party	Center’s	decisions	in	part.	They	also	were	too	concise	to	be	understood	fully	without	being	put	into	a	comprehensive	context.	Second,	 although	 the	 Central	 Archives	 provided	most	 of	 the	 telegrams	 sent	 and	received	 by	 the	 Party	 Center	 and	 the	 Central	Military	 Committee	 that	 had	 been	preserved,	there	was	still	a	considerable	number	of	them	too	sensitive	to	be	read,	even	by	the	aides	of	top	leaders.65	 Thus,	drawing	conclusions	based	principally	on	the	existing	telegrams	was	unreliable,	and	served	only	to	advance	the	researchers’	own	purposes.	Third,	as	for	the	main	question—whether	the	WRA	was	part	of	the	“Zhang	 Guotao	 Line”—there	 were	 no	 accepted	 criteria.	 Did	 the	 answer	 lie	 in	whether	Zhang	directed	the	troops	himself,	or	whether	they	retreated,	or	whether	the	major	commanders	explicitly	claimed	their	break	up	with	Zhang?	In	summary,	in	 the	 early	1980s,	 both	 those	who	 supported	 the	new	 interpretation,	 and	 those	who	 supported	 the	main	points	 in	 the	orthodox	 interpretation	of	 the	WRA	were	using	an	inadequate	body	of	evidence	to	prove	a	weak	argument.	As	a	result,	both	sides	 drew	 general	 and	 ambiguous	 conclusions.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 unnecessary	 to	determine	which	side	is	more	reasonable.	 	
4.2.3	Deng	Xiaoping’s	Decision	to	Silence	the	Debates		 	 Li	Xiannian’s	report	was	circulated	to	all	standing	members	of	the	Politburo	in	March	1983.	Thereafter,	it	was	filed	in	the	Party’s	Central	Archives	and	kept	secret	from	other	leaders,	and	certainly	from	ordinary	Party	members.	On	the	surface,	Li	suggested	 dealing	with	 it	 in	 this	way;66	 Chen	Yun	 agreed,	 and	 ultimately,	 it	was																																																									65	 Zhu	Yu,	interview,	2013.	66	 At	 the	end	of	 the	statement,	Li	Xiannian	said:	 “Nowadays	as	many	 facts	have	been	 figured	out,	accounts	need	to	be	revised	according	to	those	facts.	It	will	help	achieve	[intra-Party]	unity.	”	At	the	
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approved	by	Deng	Xiaoping.	What	it	actually	reveals	are	the	principles	and	means	by	which	“senior	leaders”	dealt	with	intra-Party	historical	problems.	 		 	 As	soon	as	Li	finally	finished	his	report,	he	sent	it	to	Chen.	After	reading	it,	Chen	wrote	 a	 letter	 to	 Li	 in	which	 he	 commented,	 “All	 the	 attachments	 are	 historical	telegrams,”	and	agreed	to	keep	them	in	the	Central	Party	History	Research	Office	and	 the	 Party’s	 Central	 Archives.	 Chen	 also	 enjoined	 Li	 to	 submit	 the	 report	 to	Deng	before	circulating	it	among	other	Politburo	standing	members,	and	Li	again	followed	Chen’s	advice.	Deng’s	comments	were	brief:	“[I]	agree	with	the	statement	[about	the	WRA	submitted	by	Li	Xiannian]	and	agree	to	keep	[this	statement	and	the	materials	 attached	 to	 it]	 in	 the	Central	Archives.”67	 Subsequently,	 the	 report	became	 the	 891st	 circulating	 document	 of	 the	 CCP	 Central	 Committee;	 the	 other	three	Politburo	standing	members,	Hu	Yaobang,	Ye	Jianying,	and	Zhao	Ziyang	 趙紫
陽	 (1919-2005)	 circled	 their	 own	 names	 on	 the	 cover	 to	 indicate	 that	 they	 had	read	 it,	 but	 made	 no	 written	 comments.	 Chen’s	 and	 Deng’s	 words,	 therefore,	became	the	new	verdicts	on	the	issue	of	the	WRA	[Fig.	4-3;	4-4;	4-5].	Nevertheless,	due	 to	 the	vagueness	of	 their	 language,	 the	supporters	of	 the	new	 interpretation	failed	 to	make	use	of	Deng’s	and	Chen’s	comments	 to	overthrow	Mao’s	orthodox	interpretation	of	the	WRA.	This	point	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	6.	 		 	 We	 can	draw	 two	 inferences	 from	Chen’s	 and	Deng’s	 comments:	 one	was	 that	they	did	not	oppose	Li’s	statement.	The	other	was	that	the	new	interpretation	had	to	be	limited	to	the	top	leadership,	and	was	not	to	be	delivered	to	ordinary	Party	members	and	others.		 	 Why	 did	 the	 CCP	 leadership	 of	 the	 Reform	 Era	 deal	 with	 such	 a	 significant	historical	event	in	this	way?	For	quite	some	time	after	1978,	the	legitimacy	of	the	reform	 policy	 and	 opening	 up	 relied	 on	 the	 repudiation	 and	 correction	 of	 the	serious	 errors	 that	 the	 Party	 had	 committed	 after	 1949.	 This	 might	 give	 the	misleading	impression	that	at	the	time,	Party	history	in	its	entirety	was	about	to	be	reinterpreted.	 The	 reality,	 however,	 was	 that	 resolution	 of	 a	 debate	 about	 a	particular	 historical	 event	 before	 1949—whether	 the	 orthodox	 interpretation																																																																																																																																																																			same	 time,	however,	he	 suggested	not	 to	discuss	 those	 “historical	 facts”	publicly:	 “At	present	 the	whole	Party	and	all	Chinese	people	are	busy	constructing	socialist	modernization.	The	issue	of	the	WRA	 has	 become	 a	 historical	 problem	 that	 should	 not	 be	 argued	 publicly.”	 He	 suggested	 the	statement	not	be	published,	but	 instead,	 “if	 the	Party	Center	thinks	 it	 feasible,	 it	might	be	kept	 in	the	Central	Archives	and	Central	Party	History	Research	Office	as	a	reference	for	comrades	who	do	research	on	the	WRA,	so	that	when	referring	to	this	issue	people	will	notice	the	directives	that	the	Party	Center	delivered	and	try	their	best	to	tally	with	historical	facts.”	Li	Xiannian,	1983,	p.	28.	67	 Deng	Xiaoping’s	handwritten	comment	on	Li	Xiannian’s	report,	1983.	
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should	 be	 re-evaluated,	 maintained,	 or	 set	 aside—depended	 on	 the	 balance	 of	interests	between	participants	in	those	events	and	the	whole	Party.		 	 Most	 of	 the	 reassessments	 of	 historical	 problems	 in	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	Reform	Era	were	 either	 initiated	or	 supported	by	 senior	 cadres	who	at	 the	 time	had	 influence	 within	 the	 Party.68	 When	 there	 were	 conflicts	 about	 whether	 a	specific	issue	should	be	reassessed,	a	decisive	factor	was	which	side	could	obtain	the	personal	support	of	top	leaders.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	senior	cadres	who	advocated	reinvestigation	were	not	necessarily	the	victims.	Instead,	in	some	cases,	it	was	those	who	caused	the	injustices,	directly	or	indirectly,	who	played	a	decisive	role	 in	 instigating	 the	 reinvestigation	 of	 specific	 cases.69	 They	 had	 conducted	purges	in	the	Mao	Era,	but	rethought	their	behavior	after	Mao	died	and	made	new	judgments	 that	differed	 from	 those	 they	had	been	 taught	decades	before.	 In	 this	way,	they	in	turn	became	drivers	of	new	historical	interpretations.	 		 	 In	addition	to	 those	people	who	had	been	 involved	personally	 in	 the	historical	issues,	 another	 group	 also	 cared	 greatly	 about	 reassessments	 of	 historical	problems—the	producers	of	the	official	Party	History	framework.	Any	challenge	to	orthodox	Party	History,	 especially	 that	which	might	 overthrow	 the	 verdicts	Mao	had	made,	was	a	serious	affront	to	this	group.	As	discussed	in	the	last	section,	the	new	leadership	of	the	Reform	Era	faced	two	challenging	tasks	simultaneously—to	legitimize	 their	 reform	policies	 and	 to	maintain	Mao’s	 and	 the	 Party’s	 authority.	Both	tasks	were	seen	as	essential.	For	those	leaders	who	took	charge	of	ideology,																																																									68	 One	 example	 is	 the	 CCP’s	 high-ranking	 intelligence	 official	 Pan	 Hannian’s	 潘漢年 case.	 In	 the	early	 1980s,	 Chen	 Yun	 intervened	 in	 the	 reinvestigation	 of	 Pan’s	 case	 and	 directly	 helped	rehabilitate	 Pan.	 See	 Chen	 Yun	 nianpu,	 Volume	 2,	 2000,	 pp.	 254,	 269.	 Song	 Renqiong	 mentions	several	other	examples	in	his	memoirs.	See	Song	Renqiong,	2007,	pp.	442-446.	 	69	 For	 instance,	 the	 famous	victim	of	 the	Rectification	Campaign	 in	Yan’an,	Wang	Shiwei	 王實味,	would	 not	 have	 been	 thoroughly	 rehabilitated	 if	 Li	 Weihan	 had	 not	 insisted	 on	 reinvestigation.	Wang	 Shiwei	 was	 a	 writer	 and	 translator	 in	 the	 Yan’an	 Central	 Research	 Academy	 (Yan’an	zhongyang	yanjiuyuan	 延安中央研究院).	He	wrote	an	essay	“Wild	Lilies”	(野百合花)	to	criticize	the	unfairness	 in	Yan’an	at	the	beginning	of	 the	Rectification	Campaign	and	in	1946	was	convicted	of	being	a	“counterrevolutionary	Trotskyist”	(反革命托派分子)	and	for	spying.	In	July	1947	when	the	CCP	 left	 Yan’an,	 he	 was	 quickly	 killed.	 Li	 Weihan	 was	 a	 leader	 of	 the	 Yan’an	 Central	 Research	Academy	when	Wang	Shiwei	was	purged.	In	the	early	1980s,	Li	tried	his	best	to	rehabilitate	Wang.	See	Li	Rui	 李銳,	Li	Rui	koushu	wangshi	 李銳口述往事	 (Oral	history	by	Li	Rui).	Hong	Kong:	Dashan	wenhua	chubanshe	 大山文化出版社,	2013,	p.	186.	For	more	 information	about	Wang	Shiwei	and	his	case,	see	Dai	Qing	 戴晴,	edited	by	David	E.	Apter	and	Timothy	Cheek,	translated	by	Nancy	Liu	and	 Lawrence	 R.	 Sullivan,	Wang	 Shiwei	 and	 Wild	 Lilies:	 Rectification	 and	 Purges	 in	 the	 Chinese	
Communist	Party,	1942-1944.	Armonk,	N.	Y.:	M.	E.	Sharp,	1993;	and	Timothy	Cheek,	“The	Fading	of	Wild	 Lilies:	Wang	 Shiwei	 and	Mao’s	 Yan’an	 Talks	 in	 the	 First	 CPC	 Rectification	Movement”,	The	
Australian	 Journal	 of	 Chinese	 Affairs,	 No.	 11.	 (January	 1984),	 pp.	 25-28.	 For	 the	 rehabilitation	 of	Wang	Shiwei	in	the	1980s,	see	Wen	Jize	 溫濟澤,	ed.,	Wang	Shiwei	yuanan	pingfan	jishi	 王實味冤案
平反紀實	 (Actual	records	of	 the	rehabilitation	of	Wang	Shiwei).	Beijing:	Qunzhong	chubanshe	 群
眾出版社,	1993.	 	 	
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however,	the	latter	task	was	much	more	important.	Li	Honglin	made	the	following	observation	 about	 the	 ideological	 struggles	 in	 the	 Reform	 Era:	 “When	Mao	 was	alive,	he	personally	launched	almost	every	round	of	ideological	struggles....	It	was	different	 in	 the	 new	 era,	 as	 most	 struggles	 were	 initiated	 by	 some	 second	 or	third-tier	 theorists	 who	 considered	 themselves	 as	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	Party.”70	 One	 possible	 explanation	 is	 that	 because	 it	 was	 these	 people’s	 lifelong	careers	 to	 perfect	 and	 propagandize	 “Mao	 Zedong	 Thought”—and	 reforms	 had	little	to	do	with	their	 interests—they	showed	great	determination	to	maintain	all	the	 fait	 accompli	 concerning	Mao,	 his	 thoughts,	 and	his	 behaviors,	 as	well	 as	 his	interpretations	 of	 historical	 issues.	 Hu	 Qiaomu	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	figures	in	this	group.	As	the	writer	of	“Thirty	Years,”	and	one	of	the	creators	of	the	official	Party	History	framework	who	had	led	the	CPHRO	since	1980,	Hu	was	still	in	charge	of	writing	official	History	during	the	Reform	Era.	Although	he	advocated	removing	strong	language	from	official	Party	History,	he	tended	to	maintain	Mao’s	judgments	on	important	issues.	 		 	 Due	 to	 the	 above	 complicated	 relationships,	 the	 leadership’s	 primary	 concern	when	dealing	with	sensitive	historical	problems	was	to	prevent	different	 interest	groups	within	the	Party	from	bursting	into	conflict.	To	draw	historical	conclusions	was	 a	 secondary,	 if	 not	 the	 least	 important,	 goal.	 During	 the	 period	 when	erroneous	cases	were	being	rehabilitated	and	resolutions	on	historical	issues	were	being	discussed,	Deng	had	discovered	that	any	change	to	Mao’s	decisions	had	the	potential	 to	 trigger	 strong	 reactions	among	different	 interest	groups.	On	 the	one	hand,	he	was	unable	to	maintain	all	of	Mao’s	 judgments;	on	the	other,	he	did	not	want	Mao’s	image	to	be	damaged	due	to	the	necessary	revisions	of	his	verdicts.71	When	 confronted	 by	 this	 dilemma,	 Deng’s	 solution	 was	 to	 adopt	 ambiguous	language.	 	
																																																								70	 Li	 Honglin 李洪林,	 Zhongguo	 sixiang	 yundong	 shi:	 1949-1989	 中國思想運動史：1949-1989	 (A	history	of	thoughts	in	China,	from	1949	to	1989).	Hong	Kong:	Tiandi	tushu	youxian	gongsi	 天地圖
書有限公司,	1999,	p.	266.	71	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 said	 the	 following	 words	 during	 a	 meeting	 with	 Hu	 Yaobang,	 Hu	 Qiaomu	 and	Deng	Liqun:	 “We	rehabilitated	Comrade	Liu	Shaoqi	at	 the	Fifth	Plenum	of	 the	Eleventh	Congress.	After	 this	 decision	 was	 conveyed	 [to	 Party	 members	 and	 ordinary	 people]	 some	 people	 were	confused.	 Some	 people	 opposed	 the	 rehabilitation	 of	 Comrade	 Liu	 Shaoqi,	 arguing	 that	 this	rehabilitation	 was	 contrary	 to	 Mao	 Zedong	 Thought.	 Some	 other	 people	 considered	 the	rehabilitation	 of	 Comrade	 Liu	 Shaoqi	 as	 showing	 that	Mao	 Zedong	 Thought	was	wrong.	 Both	 of	these	opinions	were	wrong.	We	must	eliminate	these	confusing	opinions.”	Deng	Xiaoping	 鄧小平,	
Deng	Xiaoping	wenxuan	 鄧小平文選（第 2卷）	 (Selected	works	of	Deng	Xiaoping,	Volume	2).	Beijing:	Renmin	chubanshe 人民出版社,	p.	291.	
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	 	 Deng’s	Dictum		 	 Specifically,	Deng	invented	and	followed	a	now	well-known	dictum	to	supervise	the	works	associated	with	Party	history:	“It	is	better	to	be	vague	than	meticulous	(yi	cu	buyi	xi	 宜粗不宜細).”	Party	scholars	have	summarized	the	meanings	of	this	dictum	as	follows.	 	 	To	abstract	the	nature	of	things	and	sum	up	experiences	and	lessons	[from	Party	History];	to	capture	the	major	contradiction	and	the	main	aspects	of	the	contradiction	instead	of	getting	trapped	by	details	and	so	to	keep	some	problems	off	the	table	until	history	develops;	to	avoid	some	problems	that	conflict	with	current	policies.72	 		 	 Although	impressive,	 this	summary	has	over-interpreted	Deng.	What	he	meant	by	 this	dictum	was	actually	 as	 simple	as,	 “to	 avoid	 talking	about	 those	historical	problems	that	we	cannot	deal	with	now.”	In	his	own	words,	“For	the	problems	that	our	generation	cannot	resolve,	leave	them	to	the	next	generation,”	because,	“things	will	become	clearer	and	clearer	with	the	passage	of	time.”73	 Deng’s	close	colleague,	Yang	Shangkun,	made	this	point	more	explicitly:	Avoidance	(huibi	 回避)	does	not	mean	to	delete	all	the	contents	about	this	problem,	but	means	not	to	research	it	in	detail...For	some	serious	and	controversial	problems,	I	think	adopting	the	method	of	avoidance	is	 feasible.	 Compiling	 internal	 materials	 [materials	 with	 restricted	circulation]	is	also	an	option...If	there	still	are	different	opinions	about	a	problem,	then	it	would	be	better	to	put	this	problem	aside;	for	those	problems	 on	 which	 consensuses	 have	 been	 achieved,	 we	 can	 draw	conclusions.74		 	 By	filing	Li’s	report	in	the	archives	while	not	openly	supporting	or	opposing	its	contents,	Deng	allowed	all	of	these	three	relevant	groups	of	people	to	feel	that	they																																																									72	 Zhang	 Jiafang	 張家芳	 and	Wang	Xianjun	 王先俊,	 “Dui	Deng	 Xiaoping	 ‘yicu	 buyi	 xi’	 yuanze	 de	kaobian	 對鄧小平宜粗不宜細原則的考辨”	 (Research	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 “it	 is	 better	 to	 be	 vague	than	meticulous”),	Beijing	dangshi	 北京黨史,	2003(3),	pp.	23-25.	73	 Zhonggong	 zhongyang	 wenxian	 yanjiushi	 中共中央文獻研究室 ,	 ed.,	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 sixiang	
nianpu	 (1975-1997)	 鄧小平思想年譜 	 (1975-1997)	 (Chronology	 of	 Deng	 Xiaoping’s	 thought).	Beijing:	Zhongyang	wenxian	chubanshe	 中央文獻出版社,	1998,	p.	92.	74	 Yang	 Shangkun	 楊尚昆,	 “Guanyu	 zhengji	 dangshi	 junshi	 ziliao	 he	 bianzhuan	 junshi	 shiliao	congshu	de	jige	wenti	 關於徵集黨史軍史資料和編纂軍事史料叢書的幾個問題”	(Several	 issues	on	the	 selection	 of	 military	 history	 materials	 and	 the	 compilation	 of	 military	 history	 books),	
Zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	 中共黨史研究,	1990(5),	pp.	1-5.	
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had	 secured	 his	 support.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Deng	 did	 not	 subvert	 the	 orthodox	assessments;	 in	 this	 way	 senior	 cadres	 who	 advocated	 the	 authority	 of	 official	Party	History	and	Mao’s	verdicts	would	not	be	irritated.	On	the	other	hand,	as	the	new	 interpretation	 was	 included	 in	 the	 official	 archives	 of	 the	 WRA,	 the	 WRA	veterans’	 requirements	 were	 met	 to	 some	 extent.	 By	 doing	 this,	 Deng	 tried	 to	maintain	 intra-Party	stability,	or	 in	his	own	words,	 to	make	 the	Party	 “unite	and	look	 to	 the	 future.”	 Li’s	 and	 Chen’s	 attitudes	 about	 dealing	 with	 the	 new	interpretation	 indicated	 that	 their	 personal	 relationship	 with	 the	 WRA	 did	 not	prevent	 them	 from	addressing	historical	 issues	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	Party	leadership.	 		 	 After	 Deng	 wrote	 his	 comment	 on	 Li’s	 report,	 his	 request	 to	 discontinue	 the	debate	was	 acted	 upon	 immediately.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 comparatively	 free	 debates	that	 occurred	 in	 1980	 and	 1981	 came	 to	 an	 end.	 In	 September	 1983,	 the	 Party	History	 Studies	 Office	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Revolutionary	Museum	 decided	 to	 publish	three	 articles	 by	 Zhu	 and	 Cong	 Jin	 in	 their	 internal	 periodical,	 Party	 History	
Research	Material,	which	made	the	WRA	the	theme	of	the	74th	volume.	The	editors	wrote:	 “Research	 on	 the	WRA	 has	 gained	 gratifying	 results.”75	 Not	 surprisingly,	this	 special	 volume	 was	 withdrawn	 in	 response	 to	 an	 order	 given	 by	 Yang	Shangkun,	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Central	 Leading	 Group	 of	 Party	 History,	 who	 in	 the	1930s,	was	a	high-ranking	commander	in	the	First	Front	Army,	and	in	a	short	time,	a	new	74th	volume	was	compiled	and	printed	with	entirely	different	contents.76	 It	was	because	of	this	event	that	people	with	an	interest	in	the	WRA	matter	realized	that	debates	on	the	matter	had	once	again	been	placed	under	strict	control.		 	 The	 final	 point	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 noted	 is	 that,	 like	 other	 senior	 Party	 cadres,	Deng	also	insisted	on	certain	historical	verdicts	and	used	his	authority	to	maintain	or	 promote	 his	 preferred	 historical	 interpretations.	 Interpretations	were	 chosen	because	they	were	advantageous	to	his	image,	a	motivation	he	shared	with	Li,	Xu,	and	 other	 leaders	 who	 have	 been	 discussed	 previously.	 The	 two	 most	 obvious	examples	of	Deng’s	personal	concerns	about	historical	issues	are	the	“Gao	Gang	 高																																																								75	 “Bianzhe	 de	 hua	 編者的話”	 (Editors’	 words),	 Dangshi	 yanjiu	 ziliao	 黨史研究資料,	 Vol.	 74	(September	1983),	p.	2.	76	 However,	before	this	happened,	the	Liberation	Daily	(解放日報)	based	in	Shanghai	reported	the	publication	 of	 the	 internal	 periodical	 in	 its	 provocative	 tabloid	 Baokan	 wenzhai	 (報刊文摘)	 on	October	4,	1983.	The	report	was	titled	“Pleasing	research	outcomes	have	been	gained	on	the	WRA”	(Xilujun	yanjiu	qude	kexi	chengguo	 西路軍研究取得可喜成果”).	It	was	the	first	time	that	the	new	interpretation	was	released	to	the	public.	See	Cong	Jin,	2005.	
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崗	 (1905-1954)	 and	 Rao	 Shushi	 饒漱石	 (1903-1975)	 Anti-Party	 Group	 Case,”77	and	 the	 Anti-Rightist	 Movement.	 In	 the	 1980s,	 Hu	 Yaobang	 was	 determined	 to	rehabilitate	Gao	and	Rao,	but	was	stopped	by	Deng,	who	insisted	on	the	conclusion	that	 the	 two	constituted	an	anti-Party	alliance.78	 By	 the	mid-1980s,	almost	all	of	the	alleged	“rightists”	(youpai	 右派)	had	been	rehabilitated,79	 but	the	Anti-rightist	Movement	was	still	presented	as	an	inevitable	event	in	official	Party	History.	One	of	 the	major	 reasons	 that	 these	 two	matters	 could	not	 be	 rehabilitated	was	 that	Deng	had	played	an	essential	role	in	them.80		 	 Taiwanese	 scholar,	 Chen	 Yongfa,	 provides	 an	 illuminating	 analysis	 of	 Deng’s	dual	identity:	as	both	one	of	the	important	leaders	in	the	Mao	Era	and	as	the	“chief	designer”	of	the	Reform	Era:	 	In	1978	when	Deng	Xiaoping	began	to	apply	reform	and	opening	up	policies,	he	was	actually	 carrying	a	heavy	historical	burden.	Due	 to	the	new	policies’	divergence	from	the	established	policies	of	the	Mao	Era,	although	people	all	over	the	country	ostensibly	supported	Deng	Xiaoping,	his	new	policies	indeed	were	facing	serious	resistance.	As	a	result,	there	were	both	old	and	new	elements	in	Deng’s	policies:	On	the	one	hand,	Deng	gave	up	Mao’s	theory	of	“continuous	revolution”	(buduan	geming	 不斷革命),	attempting	to	create	a	new	method	that																																																									77	 Gao	Gang	was	the	Minister	of	Planning	Commission	in	People’s	Government	 人民政府計劃委員
會	 and	Rao	 Shushi	was	 the	Minister	 of	Organization	Department	 of	 the	CCP	 in	 1953.	 They	were	charged	 with	 organizing	 an	 anti-Party	 clique	 and	 were	 ousted	 from	 Party	 memberships.	 Gao	committed	suicide	in	1954.	The	case	of	Gao	and	Rao	was	one	of	the	most	serious	false	and	unjust	convictions	in	the	PRC’s	history.	For	more	details	about	the	“Gao	and	Rao	Affair”,	see	Frederick	C.	Teiwes,	Politics	at	Mao’s	Court:	Gao	gang	and	Party	Factionalism	in	the	Early	1950s.	Armonk,	N.	Y.:	M.	E.	Sharpe,	inc.	1990.	78	 Shi	 Jian	 史鑒,	 ed.,	Pingfan	Gao	Gang	de	 xuanji	 平反高崗的玄機	 (The	mystery	of	 rehabilitating	Gao	Gang).	Hong	Kong:	Nanfeng	chuang	chubanshe	 南風窗出版社,	2013,	p.	13.	Guo	Dehong	 郭德宏,	“Zhonggong	lishi	shang	‘fandang	jituan’	de	jieju	 中共歷史上「反黨集團」的結局”	(The	endings	of	anti-Party	cliques	in	CCP’s	history),	Yan-Huang	chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	2010(9),	pp.	27-33.	79	 By	1980,	among	the	550,000	plus	“rightists”	only	96	of	them	remained	“un-rehabilitated”.	80	 In	 existing	 scholarship	 on	 these	 two	 matters,	 considerable	 attention	 has	 been	 paid	 to	 Deng	Xiaoping’s	 role.	 See	 Frederick	 C.	 Teiwes,	 1990;	 Huang	 Jing,	 Factionalism	 in	 Chinese	 Communist	
Politics.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2000;	David	S.	G.	Goodman,	Deng	Xiaoping	and	the	
Chinese	Revolution:	A	Political	Biography.	London:	Routledge,	1994;	etc.	Taiwanese	scholar	Zhong	Yanlin	 鍾延麟	 published	 two	 articles	 specially	 discussing	 Deng	 Xiaoping’s	 role	 on	 these	 two	matters.	Zhong	Yanlin,	“Deng	Xiaoping	zai	‘Gao	Rao	shijian’	zhong	zhi	juese	yu	zuowei	 鄧小平在「高
饒事件」中之角色與作為”	 (Deng	 Xiaoping’s	 roles	 and	 activities	 in	 the	 Gao	 Gang-Rao	 Shushi	Incident),	Renwen	 ji	 shehui	kexue	 jikan	 人文及社會科學集刊,	Vol.	22,	No.	4	 (December	2010),	pp.	521-562.	Zhong	Yanlin,	“Deng	Xiaoping	zai	1957	nian	Zhonggong	zhengfeng,	‘fan	youpai’	zhong	zhi	juese	 鄧小平在 1957 年中共整風、「反右派」中之角色”	(Deng	Xiaoping’s	role	and	activities	in	the	Rectification	and	Anti-Rightist	Campaign	of	1957),	Zhongguo	dalu	yanjiu	 中國大陸研究,	Vol.	50,	No.	4	(December	2007),	pp.	87-116.	
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differed	 from	Mao’s,	 in	 order	 to	 realize	 China’s	 modernization.	 On	the	other	hand,	Deng	clearly	knew	that	he	personally	helped	Mao	to	conduct	 his	 theories	 of	 “usurping	 power	 through	 revolution”	(geming	 duoquan	 革命奪權)	 and	 “continuous	 revolution”,	 so	 he	could	 not	 fully	 negate	 Mao	 and	 his	 revolutionary	 legacy	 [without	hurting	 himself].	 For	 this	 reason,	 Deng’s	 speeches	 and	 decisions	were	 contradictory	 and	 confusing,	 as	 he	 seemed	 to	 oppose	 the	“leftist”	 views	 and	 to	 oppose	Mao,	while	 also	 opposing	 the	 rightist	views	and	always	standing	up	for	Mao.81		 	 The	paragraph	above	targets	Deng’s	reform	policies,	but	Chen’s	analysis	can	be	applied	 to	Deng’s	 control	 of	 Party	History	 as	well.	 Deng’s	method	 of	 eliminating	historical	 issues	 was	 also	 confusing,	 as	 he	 seemed	 simultaneously	 to	 encourage	and	 prevent	 new	 interpretations	 that	 would	 challenge	 Mao’s	 authority.	 This	contradiction	 reflects	 Deng’s	 dual	 identity	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 his	 policy	 on	historical	issues.	 	
4.3	The	New	Interpretation	of	the	WRA	in	the	Official	Party	History		 	 In	theory,	the	issue	of	the	WRA	should	have	had	a	new	standard	interpretation	after	Deng,	the	most	authoritative	leader,	expressed	his	opinion	on	it.	As	shown	in	the	 previous	 discussion,	 however,	 because	 of	 Deng’s	 ambiguous	 attitude,	supporters	 of	 both	 the	orthodox	 and	 the	new	 interpretations	 felt	 that	 there	was	space	to	negotiate.	 		 	 After	Li’s	report	was	filed	 in	the	Party’s	archives	according	to	Deng’s	directive,	the	CCP’s	most	senior	agency	on	Party	history—the	Central	Party	History	Leading	Group—issued	an	 instruction	about	narrating	 the	WRA’s	history,	 including	 those	that	specialized	 in	writing	Party	history,	such	as	 the	CPHRO	and	 institutions	 that	were	in	charge	of	writing	the	histories	of	the	Red	Army	and	the	People’s	Liberation	Army.	 At	 the	 time,	 the	Military	 Science	 Academy	was	writing	 a	 general	military	history	of	 the	CCP.	When	 the	Party	Center’s	 instruction	about	 the	WRA’s	history	was	conveyed	to	the	writing	team,	these	compilers	read	two	major	points	 into	it.	First,	the	Party	Center	considered	the	WRA	to	be	a	significant	historical	issue,	so	it	had	 investigated	 it	and	drawn	its	own	conclusions.	However,	 the	compilers	were																																																									81	 Chen	 Yongfa	 陳永發,	 Zhongguo	 gongchan	 geming	 qishi	 nian	 中國共產革命七十年	 (Seventy	years	of	Chinese	Communist	revolution).	Taipei:	Lianjing	chuban	shiye	gongsi	 聯經出版事業公司,	1998,	p.	10.	
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not	informed	what	those	conclusions	were.	Second,	in	future,	all	narratives	about	the	WRA	should	avoid	discussing	the	following	three	aspects	of	that	history—how	the	 troops	 crossed	 the	 Yellow	River;	 the	WRA’s	mission,	 and	 the	 reasons	 for	 its	defeat.82	 This	instruction	was	the	Party	Center’s	way	of	signaling	to	the	advocates	of	 the	 new	 interpretation	 that	 their	 appeals	 had	 been	 noted.	 It	 also	 served	 to	prevent	the	new	interpretation	from	being	disseminated	to	a	wider	audience.		 	 From	 the	perspective	of	 official	History	writers,	 the	 above	 instruction	 actually	represented	 a	 challenge	 for	 them,	 because	 discussions	 on	 some	 basic,	 but	important,	 issues	 of	 this	 history	were	 forbidden,	making	narration	 of	 the	WRA’s	history	even	more	difficult	than	it	had	been	during	the	Mao	Era.	These	writers	had	no	 choice	 but	 to	 juggle	 with	 words	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 criticism	 from	 both	 the	advocates	 of	 the	 orthodox	 and	 the	 new	 interpretations.	 In	 1991,	 the	 CPHRO	compiled	 and	 published	 an	 official	 version	 of	History	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	
Party.	In	this	book,	the	three	questions	above	were	avoided,	and	the	WRA’s	history	was	narrated	simply	as,	“marched	to	the	west	bank	of	the	Yellow	River	according	to	 orders.”	 It	 was	 an	 exceedingly	 ambiguous	 account	 that	 failed	 to	 provide	 any	indication	of	who	gave	 the	 “orders.”	At	 the	 time,	Xu	Xiangqian	had	passed	away,	but	 Li	 Xiannian	 was	 still	 alive.	 Li	 was	 irate	 and	 wrote	 a	 letter	 to	 the	 CPHRO	immediately,	 urging	 them	 to	 revise	 relevant	 paragraphs	 in	 the	 book.	 Li	 wrote	harshly:	“‘Orders!’	‘Orders!’	Whose	in	the	hell’s	orders	were	they?	I	wrote	a	report	on	the	issue	of	the	WRA	and	now	it	is	kept	in	the	CPHRO.	Are	you	too	ignorant	to	know	the	report	was	there?	Or	do	you	pretend	to	be	ignorant?”83	 One	solution	Li	suggested	was	 to	add	several	words	 to	 the	book,	pointing	out	explicitly	 that	 “the	WRA	carried	out	the	Central	Military	Committee’s	orders.”	Ultimately,	the	CPHRO	asked	the	publisher	to	withdraw	all	copies	that	had	been	delivered	to	distribution	companies	and	bookstores	and	revised	the	paragraph	according	to	Li’s	demand.84		 	 Despite	 the	 interventions	 on	 the	 part	 of	 Li	 and	 the	 CPHRO,	 the	 new	interpretation	failed	to	replace	the	orthodox	one	and	become	the	official	version	of	the	WRA	narratives.	Rather	than	following	Li’s	major	points	of	view,	the	writers	of	official	 History	 tried	 their	 best	 to	 imply	 that	 the	 WRA	 had	 violated	 the	 Party	Center’s	directives.	They	achieved	this	goal	by	two	main	methods:	one	was	to	list																																																									82	 Xu	Zhanquan,	interview,	2013.	83	 Yuan	 Lishi	 原立是	 (A	 penname	 of	 Xia	 Yuli	 夏宇立),	 Xuese	 liming 血色黎明	 (Bloody	 dawn).	Hong	Kong:	Jinling	shushe	chuban	gongsi	 金陵書社出版公司,	2008,	p.	8.	84	 Cong	Jin,	2005;	Li	Qingying,	2005.	
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selected	 primary	 materials	 without	 drawing	 any	 conclusions,	 but	 the	 materials	listed	suggested	that	the	WRA	disobeyed	the	Party	Center’s	orders	and	any	reader	who	 was	 familiar	 with	 the	 historical	 background	 would	 easily	 grasp	 this	suggestion.	 The	 authoritative	 version	 of	 the	 CCP’s	 military	 history	 published	 in	1987	 adopted	 this	 method.85	 The	 second	 was	 to	 display	 materials	 that	 might	support	 the	 new	 interpretation	 in	 official	 publications,	 but	 to	 exclude	 the	 new	interpretation’s	conclusions.	For	example,	the	official	version	of	the	Chronological	
Biography	 of	 Mao	 publicized	 Mao’s	 agreement	 to	 dispatch	 troops	 to	 secure	 the	Soviet	Union’s	assistance	and	also	 included	the	telegrams	Mao	sent	 to	 the	troops	on	the	west	bank	of	 the	Yellow	River	 in	order	to	name	them	the	“Western	Route	Army,”	 but	 refused	 to	 build	 any	 connection	 between	 Mao’s	 intention	 to	 secure	assistance	 and	 the	WRA’s	military	 operations.86	 Such	 narratives	 in	 official	 Party	History	 were	 confusing,	 because	 they	 admitted	 generally	 that	 the	 WRA	 was	supervised	 by	 the	 Party	 Center,	 while	 implying	 that	 the	WRA	 commanders	 had	disobeyed	the	Party	Center’s	directives;	further,	they	admitted	the	authenticity	of	the	 supporting	materials	 issued	 by	 the	 advocates	 of	 the	 new	 interpretation,	 but	refused	 to	 accept	 the	 new	 interpretation’s	 explanations	 of	 these	 materials.	Meanwhile,	 control	 of	 the	 WRA	 archives	 became	 stricter	 and	 stricter,	 and	 the	cables	 that	 had	 been	 used	 as	 supporting	 materials	 by	 advocates	 of	 the	 new	interpretation	and	by	their	opponents	have	been	inaccessible	since	the	1990s.		 	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 cautious	 accounts	 in	 official	 Party	 History,	 when	 matters	concerned	 the	 evaluation	 of	 particular	 commanders,	 the	 WRA	 always	 was	commended	 highly.	 For	 example,	 after	 Xu	 Xiangqian	 died	 in	 1989,	 both	 the	obituary	and	articles	describing	his	 life	 that	were	published	 in	 the	People’s	Daily	spoke	highly	of	the	WRA.	One	article	stated:	After	 the	 three	 front	 armies	 joined	 in	Huining,	 the	 Central	Military	Committee	 ordered	 a	 part	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 to	 cross	 the	Yellow	 River	 to	 conduct	 the	 Ningxia	 Campaign	 Plan.	 Later	 [Xu	Xiangqian]	 became	 the	 chief	 director	 of	 the	 Western	 Route	 Army																																																									85	 Junshi	kexue	yuan	junshi	lishi	yanjiusuo	 軍事科學院軍事歷史研究所	 (Military	History	Institute	of	 PLA	Military	 Science	 Academy),	 ed.,	Zhongguo	 renmin	 jiefangjun	 zhanshi	 中國人民解放軍戰史	(Military	history	of	the	PLA).	Beijing:	Junshi	kexue	chubanshe	 軍事科學出版社,	1987,	pp.	357-369.	86	 Zhonggong	 zhongyang	 wenxian	 yanjiushi	 中共中央文獻研究室	 (The	 CCP	 Central	 Literature	Research	Center),	ed.,	Mao	Zedong	nianpu	 毛澤東年譜	 (Chronological	biography	of	Mao	Zedong),	Volume	1.	Beijing:	Renmin	chubanshe	 人民出版社,	Zhongyang	wenxian	chubanshe	 中央文獻出版
社,	1993,	pp.	592-608.	
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according	 to	 the	 Central	 Military	 Committee’s	 orders.	 [Xu]	 led	 the	troops	marching	westwards	and	 fought	with	 the	enemy	 in	 the	Hexi	Corridor.	 [Their	 operations]	 effectively	 assisted	 the	 military	operations	on	the	east	bank	of	the	Yellow	River.87	 		 	 This	evaluation	was	actually	a	concise	version	of	 the	new	interpretation	of	 the	WRA.	Similar	statements	were	repeated	again	and	again	on	public	occasions	that	commemorated	 Xu’s	 100th	 and	 110th	 birthdays.88	 The	 history	 that	 had	 once	troubled	the	old	marshal	became	a	hard-earned	victory.	Other	WRA	commanders,	including	 Li	 Xiannian	 and	 Li	 Zhuoran	 also	 received	 positive	 posthumous	evaluations	and	the	statements	 in	their	official	biographies	were	a	consolation	to	their	families.89		 	 In	 summary,	 generally	 speaking,	 the	CCP’s	official	narratives	of	 the	WRA	dealt	with	 this	 historical	 event	 by	 concealing	 criticism	of	 it	 behind	 the	 exhibition	 of	 a	huge	 number	 of	 historical	 facts,	 while	 also	 praising	 the	 relevant	 people’s	contributions	 to	 this	historical	 event	openly.	This	 is	 still	 a	 common	way	 that	 the	CCP	deals	with	intra-Party	controversies.	
	 	 Four	Interpretations	of	the	WRA		 	 By	the	time	the	CCP	made	the	changes	above	to	official	Party	History,	there	had	been	four	interpretations	of	the	WRA	in	total.	The	first,	which	is	referred	to	as	“the	orthodox	 interpretation”	 in	 this	 thesis,	was	 created	by	Mao	 and	his	writers.	 The	major	point	of	this	interpretation	is	that	Zhang	ordered	the	WRA	to	go	to	Gansu	to	further	 his	 own	 ambitions,	 and	 the	 WRA’s	 defeat	 was	 because	 of	 Zhang’s	erroneous	political	line.	The	second	interpretation	emerged	almost	simultaneously.	The	 WRA	 commanders	 held	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 deemphasizing	 the	 relationship																																																									87	 “Zhongguo	renmin	jiefangjun	de	dizaozhe	zhiyi	Xu	Xiangqian	shishi	 中國人民解放軍的締造者之
一徐向前逝世”	(One	of	the	founders	of	the	PLA,	Xu	Xiangqian,	passed	away),	Renmin	ribao	 人民日
報,	on	September	21,	1990,	p.	1.	88	 See	Jiang	Zemin	 江澤民,	“Jiang	Zemin	zai	jinian	Xu	Xiangqian	danchen	yibai	zhounian	zuotanhui	shang	 de	 jianghua	 江澤民在紀念徐向前誕辰一百週年座談會上的講話”	 (Jiang	 Zemin’s	 speech	 at	the	Memorial	Meeting	 for	Xu	Xiangqian’s	100th	Anniversary),	Xinhua	wang	 新華網	 (Xinhua	News	Agency	Online)	 	http://news.xinhuanet.com/news/2001-11/07/content_104289.htm	(last	visited	on	May	9,	2015).	89	 For	senior	 leaders	one	of	 their	major	concerns	 in	 the	Reform	Era	was	 to	have	 their	 “historical	flaws”	 removed	when	 they	were	still	 alive.	 In	all	of	 the	Party’s	previous	political	movements,	 the	WRA	 had	 been	 used	 as	 an	 excuse	 to	 purge	 senior	 commanders.	 Thus	 the	 disconnection	 of	 this	historical	 event	with	 the	 so-called	 “Zhang	Guotao	Line”	would	help	 them	 to	 secure	 a	much	more	politically	 privileged	 position.	 This	 goal	was	 achieved	when	 Li	 Xiannian’s	 report	was	 filed	 in	 the	Party’s	archives.	Li	Erbing	said	that	in	conversations	with	Marshal	Xu	he	once	commented	that	Xu	had	a	perfect	life	and	the	only	flaw	was	the	assessment	on	the	WRA;	Xu	agreed	with	him.	Li	Erbing,	interview,	2013.	
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between	the	WRA	and	the	so-called	“Zhang	Guotao	Line,”	and	emphasizing	instead	various	 reasons	 for	 the	 WRA’s	 defeat.	 The	 conflicts	 between	 the	 two	interpretations	 above	 focused	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 the	WRA,	 rather	than	 on	 facts	 such	 as	 who	 gave	 the	 order	 to	 establish	 it.	 These	 relevant	 events	happened	not	long	before,	so	at	the	time,	the	factual	problems	that	later	bothered	researchers	were	not	 problems	 at	 all.	 As	was	presented	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 there	was	intense	competition	between	these	two	interpretations	in	1937	and	1938,	and	the	orthodox	interpretation	prevailed.	 		 	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 Reform	 Era,	 the	 third	 interpretation	 was	 raised	 by	former	WRA	commanders	and	their	aides.	Although	this	interpretation	contained	considerable	similarities	with	the	second,	a	major	innovation	was	that,	for	the	first	time,	 the	advocates	released	cables	 that	had	been	sent	between	the	Party	Center	and	the	WRA,	which	provoked	a	direct	challenge	to	the	orthodox	interpretation.	To	respond	 to	 this	 challenge,	 the	 official	 organ	 for	 Party	 History	 created	 a	 fourth	interpretation.	This	interpretation	agreed	with	Mao’s	verdicts	on	the	WRA,	but	was	more	flexible,	making	concessions	on	several	points	that	some	significant	figures,	such	 as	 Li	 Xiannian,	 demanded	 be	 changed,	 while	 insisting	 on	 other	 narratives.	During	the	Mao	Era,	the	orthodox	interpretation	remained	unchallenged,	while	in	the	 Reform	 Era,	 neither	 the	 “new	 interpretation”	 nor	 the	 “new-official	interpretation”	was	able	to	secure	a	decisive	victory.	They	compromised	with	each	other	and	both	were	included	in	official	Party	History	[Table	4-1].		 	 The	 case	 of	 the	WRA	proves	 that	 Party	 historiography	 in	 the	Reform	Era	was	more	 complicated	 than	 that	 in	 the	 Mao	 Era.	 What	 did	 not	 change	 is	 that	 Party	historiography	 still	 reflected	 intra-Party	 politics	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 exploring	Party	historiography	 was	 still	 an	 effective	 way	 to	 understand	 the	 CCP’s	 political	preferences	and	culture.	 	
Conclusion		 	 This	 chapter	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 emergence	 and	 resolution	 of	 the	 issue	 of	 the	WRA	in	the	1980s,	and	answered	the	following	two	questions:	why	such	debates	on	Party	History	took	place	in	the	early	years	of	the	Reform	Era,	and	how	the	top	leadership	 eliminated	 such	 problems.	 The	 answers	 to	 these	 two	 questions	 are	critical	in	understanding	the	transformation	of	the	Party	historiography	of	the	Mao	Era	into	that	of	the	Reform	Era.	 		 	 After	 the	Cultural	Revolution,	 the	Party	Center	paid	much	attention	 to	writing	
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Party	 history	 primarily	 for	 two	 reasons.	 One	was	 to	make	 official	 Party	 History	consistent	with	the	new	policies,	while	the	other	was	to	maintain	Mao’s	image	as	a	great	leader.	Leaders	at	the	time	believed	that	by	so	doing,	different	factions	within	the	 Party	 could	 be	 mollified.	 Guided	 by	 this	 principle,	 the	 Party	 invested	considerable	 effort	 in	 reinvestigating,	 reevaluating,	 and	 rewriting	 Party	 history.	Although	 the	 leaders	 soon	 found	 that	 this	 rewriting	 had,	 to	 some	 extent,	moved	beyond	their	control	and	tried	to	stop	it,	there	were	already	unexpected	challenges	to	 existing	 official	 narratives,	 and	 conflicts	 among	 supporters	 of	 different	interpretations	 of	 a	 certain	 historical	 issue	 became	 a	 serious	 problem	 that	 the	Party	leadership	needed	to	address.	 		 	 The	leadership’s	principle	in	dealing	with	these	conflicts	was	a	principle	created	and	 practiced	 by	Deng:	 “It	 is	 better	 to	 be	 vague	 than	meticulous.”	 Just	 like	Mao,	Deng	was	also	a	strongman	who	exerted	strict	control	over	Party	historiography,	but	the	method	he	adopted	was	different	 from	that	of	Mao.	Mao	controlled	Party	historiography	in	a	prescriptive	way,	telling	historians	and	writers	what	they	could	write.	 Deng’s	 method	 was	 relatively	 passive.	 His	 leadership	 attended	 to	 every	sensitive	historical	issue,	but	at	the	same	time,	attempted	to	avoid	changing	Mao’s	interpretations	of	Party	history,	and	even	listed	issues	that	should	not	be	discussed.	In	 this	regard,	 the	role	 that	Party	history	played	had	changed	 in	 the	Reform	Era.	Mao	used	Party	history	as	a	powerful	tool	in	intra-Party	power	struggles,	but	Deng	viewed	 Party	 history	 as	 leverage	 to	 help	 him	 maintain	 the	 balance	 between	different	interest	groups	within	the	Party	and	avoid	conflicts	among	factions.	For	this	reason,	even	though	many	so-called	taboos	of	history	(or	“black	holes”)	were	eliminated,	 and	previously	unknown	historical	 facts	were	 revealed	 to	 the	public,	the	Party	leadership	still	exerted	close	supervision	of	studies	of	these	issues.		 	 As	for	the	issue	of	the	WRA,	Deng’s	goal	was	achieved	to	some	extent,	because	both	sides	accepted	the	contradictory	official	narratives.	This	consensus,	however,	was	built	on	 the	base	of	a	small	group	of	determined	participants	who	held	high	positions.	The	balance	between	advocates	of	these	two	conflicting	interpretations	was	 unsteady	 and	 tentative.	 As	 the	 following	 chapters	 will	 show,	 since	 the	 late	1990s,	by	which	 time	most	of	 the	 first	generation	 leaders	had	died	and	 the	 then	current	Party	leaders	increasingly	had	less	personal	experience	of	events	in	Party	history,	 the	 balance	 has	 gradually	 broken	 down	 and	more	 drastic	 debates	 on	 a	number	 of	 sensitive	 historical	 issues	 have	 staged	 a	 comeback.	 There	 is	 an	 old	
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Chinese	saying:	“When	one’s	coffin	 is	closed,	the	evaluation	on	one	is	conclusive”	(gaiguan	dinglun	 蓋棺定論).	Historiography,	however,	especially	 that	of	 the	CCP,	does	not	work	in	this	way.	
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Table	4-1	Comparison	of	the	Four	Interpretations	of	the	WRA	
Mao	Era	 Time	 Reform	Era	
Orthodox	
Interpretation	
Alternative	
Interpretation	
Interpretations	 New	Interpretation	 New-official	
Interpretation	Mao;	Kai	Feng;	Hu	Qiaomu;	Tian	Jiaying;	⋯⋯	 Zhang	Guotao;	Chen	Changhao;	Xu	Xiangqian;	⋯⋯	 Writers	 Zhu	Yu;	Li	Erbing;	 	Li	Xianian’s	secretaries;	⋯⋯	 OCPHR;	The	Military	Science	Academy;	⋯⋯	The	Party	Centre	 The	Fourth	Front	Army	 Supporters	 Chen	Yun;	Li	Xiannian;	Xu	Xiangqian;	The	Fourth	Front	Army	veterans	⋯⋯	
Yang	Shangkun;	Hu	Qiaomu;	The	First	Front	Army	veterans;	⋯⋯	Conclusions	only	 Conclusions	only	 Method	of	
arguing	 Provided	a	huge	amount	of	evidence	 Provided	a	huge	amount	of	evidence	To	establish	a	new	base	for	Zhang	Guotao	 To	conduct	the	Ningxia	Campaign	Plan	 Purpose	 To	build	a	connection	with	the	Soviet	Union	(“open	an	international	route”)	and	gain	military	assistance	
Ostensibly	to	carry	out	the	Party	Centre’s	plan,	but	actually	to	serve	Zhang	Guotao’s	ambitions	Ordered	by	Zhang	Guotao.	The	Party	Center	did	not	know.	
According	to	the	Red	Army	Headquarters	and	the	Party	Center’s	directives	
Crossed	the	
Yellow	River	 Ordered	by	the	Party	Center	(Mao)	 The	Party	Center	had	to	approve	their	operations	because	they	had	already	crossed	the	Yellow	River.	Commanded	by	Zhang	Guotao	 Commanded	by	the	Red	Army	Headquarters	and	the	Party	Center	
Military	
operation	 Commanded	by	the	Party	Center	(Mao)	 Some	orders	were	issued	by	the	Party	Center,	but	the	WRA	did	not	carry	out	these	orders	in	the	right	way	The	WRA	carried	out	the	“Zhang	Guotao	Line”.	The	WRA	did	not	overcome	Zhang	Guotao’s	erroneous	thoughts.	(	
Enemy	had	much	stronger	forces;	The	“United	Front”	method	did	not	work	on	Ma	brothers;	Harsh	conditions	in	Gansu;	Tactical	mistakes;	⋯⋯	
Reason	of	failure	 Harsh	conditions	in	Gansu；	Enemy	had	much	stronger	forces;	The	Center’s	orders	were	changeable;	underestimated	the	difficulties	(which	was	a	manifestation	of	Zhang	Guotao’s	errors)	⋯⋯	
The	WRA	commanders	had	no	confidence	to	defeat	enemies	by	themselves;	 	When	confronting	difficulties	they	chose	to	retreat;	⋯⋯	
The	WRA	was	Zhang	Guotao’s	“running	dog.”	 The	WRA	was	loyal	to	the	Party	Center	rather	than	Zhang	Guotao.	
Relationship	
between	the	
WRA	and	Zhang	 The	WRA	was	influenced	by	Zhang,	but	had	nothing	to	do	with	the	so-called	“Zhang	Guotao	Line”.	
The	WRA	were	Zhang’s	supporters,	and	their	operations	were	consistent	with	Zhang’s	political	line.	The	final	bankruptcy	of	the	Zhang	Guotao	Line	 N/A	 Evaluation	 An	indivisible	part	of	the	overall	victory	 The	WRA’s	operations	had	caused	serious	loss	for	the	Party.	Official	interpretation	of	the	WRA	in	the	Mao	Era.	
A	dissenting	opinion	in	1937	and	1938;	Disappeared	from	records	after	the	early	1940s	
Influence	 	 A	popular	interpretation	of	the	WRA	in	contemporary	China;	Some	of	arguments	are	included	in	the	official	Party	History.	
Held	by	some	of	authoritative	organs	
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		Fig.	4-1	Reference	Materials	for	Party	History	(photo	by	author	on	August	1,	2013).	
		Fig.	 4-2	 The	 People’s	 Daily	 of	 the	 19th	 of	September	1977,	with	Xu	Xiangqian’s	article	on	lower	part	of	the	1st	page.	
		
167											 		 			Fig.	 4-3	 Cover	 of	 Li	 Xiannian’s	 report	(photo	by	author	on	August	1,	2013).	
		Fig.	 4-5	 Deng	 Xiaoping’s	 comment	 on	Li	 Xiannian’s	 report	 (photo	 by	 author	on	August	1,	2013).	
		Fig.	4-4	Chen	Yun’s	letter	to	Li	Xiannian	(photo	by	author	on	August	1,	2013).	
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Chapter	5:	Professional	Historians	and	Their	Responses	
to	the	Historical	Issue	of	the	Western	Route	Army	
Introduction	This	chapter	divides	professional	Party	historiography	during	the	post-Mao	period	into	 three	 phases.	 In	 the	 first,	 professional	 historians	 built	 a	 cooperative	relationship	with	politicians,	criticizing	the	Gang	of	Four’s	historiography	actively	and	taking	part	in	rehabilitating	the	figures	in	Party	History	against	whom	certain	accusations	had	been	made	erroneously.	Their	research	at	the	time	was	basically	in	accordance	with	the	Party	Center’s	agendas.	 	 		 	 During	 the	 first	 phase,	 the	 cooperation	 between	 Chinese	 academicians	 and	politicians	was	smooth.	When	condemnation	of	the	Gang	of	Four	in	political	circles	and	 academia	 gradually	 faded,	 however,	 scholars	 found	 themselves	 in	 such	 a	politically	weak	position	that	they	had	limited	access	to	primary	materials	and	so	were	puzzled	by	the	leadership’s	maneuvers	in	Party	history	writing.	Thus,	in	the	second	 phase,	 Chinese	 academics	 began	 to	 develop	 a	 profession	 of	 Party	historiography.	 This	 did	 not	 mean	 that	 historians	 wanted	 to	 sever	 their	relationship	 with	 politics	 and	 achieve	 absolute	 freedom	 to	 conduct	 research	 on	Party	 history.	 In	 fact,	 they	 emphasized	 both	 serving	 the	 Party	 and	 being	 more	professional,	 thereby	attempting	 to	create	a	balance	between	political	needs	and	academic	freedom.	It	was	during	this	phase	that	scholars	were	pleased	to	see	the	emergence	of	the	“new	interpretation”	of	the	WRA,	which	they	considered	to	be	an	indicator	 that	Party	 leaders	had	regained	 their	 courage	 to	 change	Mao’s	verdicts	on	 historical	 events,	 and	 also	 an	 indicator	 that	 to	 reveal	 historical	 facts	was	 not	necessarily	contrary	to	the	Party’s	interests.	However,	as	the	previous	chapter	has	shown,	the	issue	of	the	WRA	was	much	more	complicated	than	scholars	believed,	and	their	attention	to	this	issue	was	interrupted	immediately.	 		 	 In	the	third	phase,	when	a	new	generation	of	historians	(usually	those	who	were	born	after	1949	and	entered	higher	education	after	1978)	had	secured	positions	in	academia,	some	historians	distinguished	their	research	explicitly	from	that	which	served	 political	 needs.	 In	 this	 phase,	 which	 is	 ongoing,	 some	 professional	historians	once	again	avoided	topics	 like	the	WRA.	They	did	this	not	because	the	Party	 Center	 forbade	 them	 from	 working	 on	 these	 topics,	 but	 because	 they	believed	that	these	topics	were	influenced	strongly	by	political	need,	and	thus	they	
		
170	could	 not	 be	 discussed	 using	 academic	methods.	 During	 this	 same	 period,	 other	professional	historians	emphasized	their	ability	to	meet	political	needs	and	uphold	academic	 standards	 simultaneously.	 Thus,	 in	 the	 third	 phase,	 professional	historians	in	the	field	of	Party	history	divided	themselves	into	two	groups.	 		 	 The	 three	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 address	 these	 phases.	 A	 scholar	 referred	 to	frequently	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 the	 retired	 CASS	 researcher,	 Chen	 Tiejian	 陳鐵健	(1934-	 ).	 Chen	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 criticizing	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four’s	historiography,	 and	 his	 research	 on	 Qu	 Qiubai	 was	 related	 closely	 to	 Qu’s	rehabilitation	 in	 the	 1980s.	 This	 is	 a	 typical	 case	 of	 scholars	 taking	 part	 in	rehabilitating	political	 figures.	Then,	 as	described	 in	 the	 second	section,	 in	1987,	Chen	first	announced	the	“new	interpretation”	of	the	WRA	to	the	broader	field	of	Chinese	historical	studies.	The	conclusion	of	this	chapter	is	based	on	analysis	of	a	variety	 of	 materials.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 above	 three	 examples	 center	 on	 a	 single	historian	serves	to	underscore	that	the	three	phases	are	continuous	and	connected	closely.	 	
5.1	Serving	the	Post-Mao	Party	Leadership	(1976	to	the	Early	1980s)	 		 	 Historical	 studies	 during	 the	 post-Cultural	 Revolution	 period	 began	 by	criticizing	 historical	 studies	 during	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 especially	 historical	writings	 that	 were	 believed	 to	 have	 been	 supported	 by	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four.	 Most	articles	 on	 history	 published	 during	 the	 first	 two	 years	 after	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four’s	downfall	 in	 late	1976	fell	 into	this	category.	From	1977	to	the	early	1980s,	when	millions	of	cadres	were	in	the	process	of	being	rehabilitated,	some	historians	also	took	 part	 in	 this	 nationwide	 movement.	 Criticizing	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four’s	historiography	and	helping	rehabilitate	certain	historical	 figures	were	 two	of	 the	main	achievements	of	Chinese	historians	in	this	period.	Participation	in	these	two	activities	both	revealed	the	political	attitudes	of	the	historians	involved,	as	well	as	the	mode	of	interaction	between	academia	and	politics	during	the	early	post-Mao	era.	 	
5.1.1	Criticizing	“Innuendo	Historiography”		 	 During	the	Cultural	Revolution,	the	majority	of	history	articles	were	written	by	a	number	 of	 “writing	 teams”	 (xiezuo	 zu	 寫作組 ).	 These	 organizations	 were	established	 by	 official	 agencies	 and	 consisted	 of	 writers	 who	 specialized	 in	different	 fields.	The	articles	 that	 they	wrote	were	not	 for	academic	 research,	but	
		
171	were	designed	to	serve	political	purposes.	After	the	end	of	the	Cultural	Revolution,	this	 type	 of	 historical	 writing	 and	manner	 of	writing	 history	was	 referred	 to	 as	“innuendo	 historiography”	 (yingshe	 shixue	 影射史學).	 Although	 the	 content	 of	these	 articles	was	 Chinese	 dynastic	 history,	 they	 referred	 to	many	 Party	 figures	from	 different	 periods.	 The	 criticism	 of	 these	 writing	 teams	 focused	 on	 their	distortion	of	Party	History,	rather	than	on	their	views	of	dynastic	history.	As	such,	both	innuendo	historiography	and	its	criticism	are	aspects	of	Party	historiography.		 	 Immediately	after	the	Cultural	Revolution,	the	Chinese	academic	world	began	to	express	 its	discontent	with	 innuendo	historiography.	The	pioneer	 in	this	wave	of	criticism	 was	 China’s	 most	 important	 history	 journal,	 Lishi	 yanjiu	 (Historical	
Research	 歷 史 研 究 ),	 headed	 by	 the	 prominent	 historian,	 Li	 Shu	 黎 澍	(1912-1988). 1 	 Li	 began	 his	 work	 by	 criticizing	 the	 two	 most	 famous	 and	productive	“writing	teams”—“Liang	Xiao”	 梁效	 and	“Luo	Siding”	 羅思鼎.2	 Under	Li’s	 supervision,	 a	 small	 number	 of	 young	 writers	 collected	 a	 large	 amount	 of	material	 about	 the	 two	 teams	 and	 published	 a	 series	 of	 articles	 that	 provoked	fierce	debates	 from	1977	 to	1978.3	 Chen	Tiejian	was	one	of	 them.	Scholars	 later																																																									1	 Historical	 Research	 was	 the	 sole	 history	 periodical	 in	 China	 immediately	 after	 the	 Cultural	Revolution.	It	was	taken	over	by	the	Gang	of	Four	for	several	years	and	returned	to	the	Institute	of	Modern	History	of	CASS	in	1976.	Chen	Tiejian,	phone	interview,	November	19,	2013.	2	 Liang	 Xiao	was	 a	 pseudonym	 for	 Peking	University	 and	Tsinghua	University’s	 Great	 Criticizing	Team	 (Beijing	 daxue	 Qinghua	 daxue	 da	 pipan	 zu	 北京大學清華大學大批判組).	 Liang	 Xiao	 is	 a	homophone	for	liangxiao	(兩校,	two	universities).	This	writing	team	was	established	in	1973,	with	academics	in	the	Peking	University,	the	Tsinghua	University	and	the	Renmin	University	as	the	main	members.	 The	 total	 of	 thirty-plus	 writers	 were	 divided	 into	 several	 teams	 that	 took	 charge	 of	history,	 politics,	 research	on	 the	Dream	of	Red	Mansion,	Marxist	 and	Leninist	 theories,	 literature,	international	 issues,	 the	history	of	philosophy	and	the	history	of	 literature.	Over	 three	years,	 this	team	published	181	articles	 in	the	name	of	Liang	Xiao	and	other	pseudonyms.	Luo	Siding	 羅思鼎	was	the	major	pseudonym	of	the	Shanghai	Party	Committee	Writing	Team	(Shanghai	shiwei	xiezuo	
zu	 上海市委寫作組).	 Luo	 Siding	 is	 a	 homophone	 for	 luosiding	 螺絲釘 	 (screw),	 which	 is	 a	quotation	attributed	to	Lei	Feng	 雷鋒	 who	said	he	wanted	to	be	a	revolutionary	screw	that	would	never	rust.	The	team	was	formed	in	1971,	directly	led	by	two	members	of	the	Gang	of	Four,	Zhang	Chunqiao	 張春橋 	 (1917-2005)	 and	 Yao	 Wenyuan	 姚文元 	 (1931-2005).	 It	 had	 a	 very	 large	number	 of	 members,	 reaching	 more	 than	 500	 people	 by	 1976.	 More	 than	 800	 articles	 were	published	 on	 history,	 literature,	 philosophy	 and	 so	 forth.	 Ding	 Dong	 丁東,	 “Wenge	 xiezuozu	xingshuai	 lu	 文革寫作組興衰錄”	 (The	 rise	 and	 fall	 of	 writing	 teams	 in	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution),	
Wenshi	bolan	 文史博覽,	2005(19),	pp.	4-11.	3	 Li	 Shu	 and	 Historical	 Research	 spared	 no	 efforts	 in	 criticizing	 these	 two	 writing	 teams.	 As	 a	periodical	based	in	Beijing,	it	sent	editors	to	Shanghai	to	investigate	and	collect	materials	about	Luo	Siding	and	its	journal	Study	and	Criticism	(Xuexi	yu	pipan	 學習與批判).	Chen	Shizhi	 陳石之	 (Chen	Shizhi	is	one	of	Chen	Tiejian’s	pennames),	“Ping	Sirenbang	fayanren	Liang	Xiao	 評四人幫發言人梁
效”	(Comments	on	the	spokesman	of	the	Gang	of	Four,	Liang	Xiao),	Lishi	yanjiu	 歷史研究,	1977(4),	pp.	 3-11.	 Chen	 Shizhi,	 “Er	 ping	 Sirenbang	 fayanren	 Liang	 Xiao	 二評四人幫發言人梁效”	 (Further	comments	on	the	spokesman	of	the	Gang	of	Four,	Liang	Xiao),	Lishi	yanjiu	 歷史研究,	1977(5),	pp.	75-83.	 Chen	 Zhong	 陳中	 (Chen	 Zhong	 is	 one	 of	 Chen	 Tiejian’s	 pennames),	 “Ba	 Sirenbang	 zazhi	‘Xuexi	yu	pipan’	yashang	shenpan	tai	 把四人幫雜誌《學習與批判》押上審判台	 (Bring	the	Gang	of	
		
172	evaluated	 Li	 and	 his	 team	 highly,	 identifying	 Historical	 Research’s	 criticism	 of	innuendo	historiography	as	the	starting	point	of	the	Thought	Liberation	Campaign	in	the	field	of	historical	studies.4	 Some	even	compared	the	influence	of	Historical	
Research	at	that	time	to	Xin	qingnian	(New	Youth;	 新青年)	before	the	May	Fourth	Movement.5		 	 After	 a	 series	 of	 articles	 was	 published	 in	Historical	 Research,	 a	 critical	 wave	spread	throughout	the	country.	Very	quickly,	historians	and	researchers,	as	well	as	college	journals	and	provincial	periodicals,	wrote	a	great	number	of	critical	articles	about	innuendo	historiography.	Their	work	focused	on	two	points.	First,	scholars	believed	that	the	Gang	of	Four	used	history	to	purge	senior	cadres,	especially	Zhou	Enlai.	 Second,	 they	 claimed	 that	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four	 had	 deliberately	 paid	 much	attention	to	female	leaders	in	China’s	history	because	they	were	planning	to	take	over	 the	 Party’s	 power	 and	 establish	 Jiang	 Qing	 江青	 (1914-1991),	 Mao’s	 wife	and	a	member	of	the	Gang	of	Four,	as	the	Empress	of	China.6		 	 Criticism	of	innuendo	historiography	was	a	part	of	Chinese	academia’s	criticism	of	the	Gang	of	Four,	and	corresponded	with	the	Party	Center’s	overall	strategy	of	eliminating	 their	 influence.	 At	 the	 time,	 the	 Party	 Center	 needed	 academia’s	participation	in	order	to	discredit	the	Gang	of	Four	comprehensively.7	 Historians	did	not	disappoint	Hua	Guofeng	and	the	new	leadership,	because	their	criticism	of	innuendo	 historiography	 was	 entirely	 consistent	 with	 the	 political	 line	 that	 the	new	leadership	had	advocated	after	Mao’s	death.	This	point	can	be	illustrated	from	three	perspectives.	 		 	 First,	 historians	 portrayed	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four	 as	 opposing	 the	 Party,	 and	 thus	argued	 that	 to	 attack	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four’s	 historiography	 was	 a	 manifestation	 of	loyalty	for	the	Party.	Chen	wrote	in	1977:																																																																																																																																																																			Four’s	magazine	Study	and	Criticism	to	trial),	Lishi	yanjiu	 歷史研究,	1977(1),	pp.	29-39.	4	 Chen	Tiejian,	phone	interview,	2013.	5	 Wang	Xuedian	 王學典,	“	‘Bashi	niandai’	shi	zenyang	bei	‘chonggou’	de?	Ruogan	xiangguan	lunzhu	jianping	「八十年代」是怎樣被「重構」的？若干相關論著簡評”	(How	was	the	1980s	reconstructed:	brief	comments	on	several	works),	Kaifang	shidai	 開放時代,	2009(6),	pp.	44-58.	6	 Qian	 Zongfan	 錢宗範,	 “Yingshe	 shixue	 de	 yige	 hei	 biaoben	 影射史學的一個黑標本”	 (An	 evil	example	of	innuendo	historiography),	Guangxi	shifan	daxue	xuebao	(zhexue	shehui	kexue	ban)	 廣西
師範大學學報（哲學社會科學版）,	1978(2),	pp.	34-38.	7	 In	his	political	report	at	the	Eleventh	National	Party	Congress	in	1977,	the	Chief	Secretary	of	the	CCP,	 Hua	 Guofeng	 stated:	 “The	 Gang	 of	 Four	 needs	 to	 be	 criticized	 not	 only	 from	 political	 and	organizational	 perspectives,	 but	 also	 from	 the	 fields	 of	 philosophy,	 political	 economics,	 social	science	and	scientific	socialist	theory.”	Database	of	CCP	Congresses,	 	http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64563/65449/4526439.html	 (last	 visited	 on	September	28,	2015).	
		
173	The	 furious	 bark	 of	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four	 and	 their	 running	 dogs	 has	proved	 that	 they	are	a	group	of	 counterrevolutionaries	who	have	a	deep	 class	 hatred	 of	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party	 and	 our	 great	leader	 Chairman	 Mao.	 Their	 ultimate	 goal	 was	 to	 overthrow	 and	replace	 the	 Communist	 Party	 and	 conduct	 counterrevolution	restoration	 to	 take	 China	 back	 to	 a	 semi-colonial,	 semi-feudal	situation.	The	writings	of	those	so-called	history	articles	mostly	were	to	serve	this	evil	goal.8	 		 	 Why	 did	 their	 treacherous	 plot	 fail?	Historians	 said	 it	was	 because	 “the	 Party	Center,	headed	by	 the	wise	 leader	Chairman	Hua	 [Guofeng],	 inherited	 the	will	of	the	great	leader	and	tutor	Chairman	Mao,	and	smashed	the	anti-party	clique	of	the	Gang	of	Four.”	Consequently,	it	was	the	academic	world’s	mission	to	“continue	our	triumphant	advance	and	eliminate	their	politically,	 ideologically	and	theoretically	pernicious	influence.”9	 In	fact,	it	is	ridiculous	to	portray	the	Gang	of	Four	as	being	in	 opposition	 to	 the	 Party,	 because	 all	 of	 them	 were	 among	 the	 Party’s	 top	leadership.10	 The	 attitude	 on	 the	 part	 of	 academics	 at	 the	 time,	 however,	 was	highly	 consistent	 with	 that	 of	 the	 Party	 Center,	 which	 emphasized	 the	 Gang	 of	Four’s	violation	of,	and	Hua’s	loyalty	to,	Mao’s	intentions.	 		 	 Second,	 scholars	completely	differentiated	 the	Gang	of	Four	and	Mao,	 claiming	certain	decisions	that	had	caused	serious	consequences	were	actually	the	result	of	plots	 by	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four,	 rather	 than	 Mao’s	 intentions.	 For	 example,	 consider	“Criticize	 Lin	 Biao,	 Confucius	 and	 the	 Duke	 Zhou	 Campaign”	 (pi	 Lin,	 pi	 Kong,	 pi	
Zhou	Gong	 批林批孔批周公),	which	began	 in	1974.	This	 campaign	was	 the	most	intensive	 political	 movement	 in	 the	 1970s,	 and	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four	 paid	 much	attention	to	it.	In	the	opinion	of	some	scholars,	this	campaign	needed	to	be	divided	into	 two	 parts,	 “Criticizing	 Lin	 and	 Confucius,”	 and	 “Criticizing	 the	 Duke	 Zhou.”	According	to	them,	Mao	launched	a	movement	to	criticize	Lin	Biao	and	Confucius																																																									8	 Chen	Zhong,	1977.	 	9	 Xu	Xiaoqiu	 許曉秋,	“Sirenbang	shi	zenyang	liyong	Wang	Anshi	bianfa	da	zao	fangeming	yulun	de	
四人幫是怎樣利用王安石變法大造反革命輿論的”	 (How	 did	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four	 take	 advantage	 of	Wang	Anshi’s	new	policies	to	create	counterrevolutionary	public	opinion),	Liaoning	daxue	xuebao	
(zhexue	shehui	kexue	ban)	 遼寧大學學報（哲學社會科學版）,	1977(5),	pp.	54-60.	10	 Positions	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	Gang	 of	 Four	 in	 1976:	Wang	Hongwen	 王洪文	 (1935-1992),	Standing	Member	of	the	CCP	Politburo,	Vice	President	of	China;	Zhang	Chunqiao,	Standing	Member	of	the	CCP	Politburo,	Vice	Premier,	Head	of	the	General	Political	Department	of	PLA;	Yao	Wenyuan,	Member	of	the	CCP	Politburo,	in	charge	of	national	public	opinion;	Jiang	Qing,	Member	of	the	CCP	Politburo.	
		
174	for	good	reasons:	Lin	betrayed	 the	country	and	 the	Party,	and	Confucius	 tried	 to	restore	 the	 politics	 of	 the	 Zhou	 Dynasty	 in	 the	 Spring	 and	 Autumn	 period,	 an	attempt	that	was	counter	to	society’s	progress.11	 In	contrast,	as	some	scholars	said,	the	 Gang	 of	 Four	 had	 added	 “criticizing	 the	Duke	 Zhou”	 for	 their	 own	 nefarious	purposes.	The	Gang	of	 Four	nominally	 criticized	 the	Duke	Zhou,	who	 lived	2000	years	before,	but	their	actual	target	was	Zhou	Enlai,	who	supposedly	held	a	similar	position	within	 the	 leadership	 to	 that	 held	by	 the	Duke	Zhou	 in	 the	 court	 of	 the	Zhou	Dynasty.	As	 for	 the	role	Mao	played	 in	purging	Zhou,	 scholars	argued,	 “our	great	 leader	and	tutor	Chairman	Mao	had	clearly	seen	through	their	[the	Gang	of	Four]	 wild	 ambition	 of	 usurping	 power	 for	 a	 long	 time	 and	 had	 scathed	 them	repeatedly.”12	 According	 to	 the	 recollections	 of	 some	 members	 of	 the	 writing	teams,	as	well	as	other	records,	Mao	in	fact	had	a	close	relationship	with	innuendo	historiography.	 One	 piece	 of	 evidence	 is	 that	 the	 notorious	 Liang	 Xiao	 was	instructed	by	Mao	himself	through	a	woman	whom	Mao	trusted	in	his	late	years.13	Third,	only	innuendo	historiography	that	served	the	interests	of	the	Gang	of	Four	was	 criticized.	Of	 course,	 neither	 establishing	writing	 teams	nor	using	history	 to	serve	 political	 goals	 was	 initiated	 by	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four.	 Historians,	 however,	ignored	those	facts	deliberately.14	 Given	these	three	factors,	we	can	conclude	that,	in	the	first	 few	years	after	Mao’s	death,	criticism	of	the	Gang	of	Four’s	“innuendo	historiography”	was	neither	fair	nor	comprehensive.	This	can	be	attributed	in	part	to	political	pressure,	because	ideological	control	at	the	time	was	still	intense.	This	unfair	 criticism	 also	 reflected	 the	 fact	 that	 at	 the	 time,	 Chinese	 historians	 still	considered	Mao	and	his	words	to	be	irrefutable.	The	results	of	thought	remodeling	conducted	 during	 the	Mao	Era	would	 not	 be	 eliminated	 in	 a	 short	 time.	Overall,	“the	end	of	 an	era	of	 judging	everything	according	 to	Mao’s	 standards”15	 had,	 at	least	in	the	field	of	Party	history,	yet	to	be	realized.	 	
5.1.2	Historians	and	the	“Rehabilitation	of	Erroneous	Cases”		 	 Almost	as	soon	as	 the	Party	Center	began	 to	rehabilitate	 “erroneous,	 fake,	and																																																									11	 For	instance,	Chen	Shizhi,	1977.	12	 Qian	Zongfan,	1978.	13	 Ding	Dong,	2005.	14	 For	example,	Li	Shu	 firmly	argued,	 “Misinterpreting	 the	concept	of	 ‘using	 the	past	 to	serve	 the	present’	and	conducting	 innuendo	historiography	was	a	creation	of	 the	Gang	of	Four,	 in	 this	way	they	replaced	scientific	argument	with	nonsense	and	made	historiography	their	plaything.”	Li	Shu,	1977.	15 	 Li	 Zehou	 李澤厚 ,	 Zhongguo	 xiandai	 sixiang	 shilun	 中國現代思想史論 	 (Chinese	 modern	intellectual	history	and	comments).	Beijing:	Dongfang	chubanshe	 東方出版社,	1987,	p.	199.	
		
175	unfair	 cases”	 in	 late	1977,	 historians	 took	part	 in	 this	movement,	 consciously	or	unconsciously.	 Among	 all	 the	 cases	 in	which	historians	 contributed	 their	 efforts,	the	case	of	Qu	Qiubai	is	one	of	the	most	famous,	and	Chen	Tiejian	played	a	role	in	it.	Given	this,	a	review	of	Qu’s	rehabilitation	will	help	clarify	the	relationships	among	history,	academia,	and	the	political	world	in	1980s	China,	and	will	also	help	explain	Chen’s	 lavish	 praise	 of	 Xu’s	 new	 analyses	 of	 the	 issue	 of	 the	WRA	 several	 years	later.	 	
	 	 The	Case	of	Qu	Qiubai		 	 Qu	 Qiubai	 瞿秋白	 (1899-1935)	was	 one	 of	 the	 few	 leaders	 of	 the	 CCP	 in	 the	Party’s	early	years.	He	held	the	position	of	Chief	Secretary	of	the	CCP	from	1927	to	1928,	but	was	criticized	seriously	in	1928	at	the	Sixth	Congress	of	the	CCP.	When	the	 Central	 Red	 Army	 and	 the	 Party	 Center	 decided	 to	 leave	 the	 Central	 Soviet	Region	 in	 Jiangxi	and	started	the	Long	March	 in	1934,	Qu	was	ordered	to	stay	 in	the	Soviet	Region	and	conduct	guerilla	warfare.	Ultimately,	Qu	was	captured	by	the	Nationalist	Party’s	troops	and	executed	after	months	of	 imprisonment.	 In	his	 last	few	months,	Qu	wrote	a	twenty-thousand	word	article-cum-memoir,	“Superfluous	Words”	 (Duoyu	 de	 hua	 多餘的話).	 Initially,	 as	 an	 ex-Party	 leader,	 Qu	 received	 a	positive	 posthumous	 assessment	 by	 the	 Party	 Center	 in	 the	 1940s.16	 In	 1963,	however,	 almost	 thirty	 years	 after	 his	 death,	 he	 suddenly	 became	 a	 target	 of	criticism,	with	 the	official	Party	History	portraying	him	as	a	 traitor.	 “Superfluous	Words”	was	considered	to	be	the	main	evidence	of	Qu’s	betrayal.	In	the	following	years,	the	authorities	banned	all	revolutionary	exhibitions	about	Qu	and	closed	the	memorial	 halls	 built	 for	 him.	 The	 ultimate	 indignity	 came	 during	 the	 Cultural	Revolution	when	the	graves	of	Qu	and	his	relatives	were	exhumed.	 In	1972,	Mao	included	 Qu’s	 “left”-leaning	 putschism	 officially	 in	 his	 definition	 of	 the	 “ten	 line	struggles”	in	Party	History	(see	Chapter	3).	Mao	said,	“After	he	was	captured	by	the	Nationalist	Party,	Qu	wrote	‘Superfluous	Words’	and	betrayed	[the	Party].”17																																																									16	 The	Resolution	issued	in	1945	was	the	first	document	that	officially	made	an	assessment	on	Qu	Qiubai.	It	described	Qu	as	“one	of	the	authoritative	leaders	in	the	Party,	who	did	a	lot	of	beneficial	work	 even	 after	 being	 attacked	within	 the	 Party.	 He	 heroically	 sacrificed	 himself	 in	 June	 1935”.	
Guanyu	 ruogan	 lishi	 wenti	 de	 jueyi	 關於若干歷史問題的決議	 (Resolution	 on	 several	 historical	issues).	Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe,	2010,	p.	16.	17	 “Mao	zhuxi	zai	waidi	xuncha	qijian	tong	yantu	gedi	fuze	tongzhi	de	tanhua	jiyao	 毛主席在外地巡
查期間同沿途各地負責同志的談話紀要”	 (Chairman	 Mao’s	 talks	 with	 some	 comrades	 during	 his	inspection),	 in	 Zhonggong	 jimi	 wenjian	 huibian	 中共機密文件彙編	 (Compilation	 of	 the	 CCP’s	confidential	documents).	Taipai:	Guoli	zhengzhi	daxue	guoji	guanxi	yanjiu	zhongxin	 國立政治大學
國際關係研究中心,	1978,	pp.	31-37.	This	document	is	well	known	as	“No.	12	Document”.	It	was	one	of	the	most	broadly	circulated	and	most	influential	documents	during	the	Cultural	Revolution.	
		
176		 	 After	Mao’s	 death,	Qu’s	 stepdaughter	began	her	quest	 to	 rehabilitate	Qu.	With	the	help	of	a	number	of	high-ranking	leaders	and	celebrities	who	once	had	worked	with,	 or	 were	 familiar	 with,	 her	 stepfather,	in	 1977,	 the	 young	 Qu	 succeeded	 in	making	 the	 Commission	 for	 Discipline	 Inspection	 of	 the	 Central	 Committee	establish	 a	 specific	 team	 to	 reinvestigate	 Qu’s	 case.18	 Almost	 simultaneously,	
Historical	 Research	 published	 an	 article	 by	 Chen	 Tiejian,	 “Re-evaluation	 of	‘Superfluous	Words’,”	in	which	he	argued	that	Qu	did	not	betray	the	Party	and	his	goal	 in	 writing	 “Superfluous	 Words”	 was	 not	 to	 ingratiate	 himself	 with	 the	Nationalist	 Party.19	 Chen	was	 invited	 immediately	 to	 join	 the	 investigating	 team	and	he	participated	in	interviewing	and	writing.	After	joint	efforts	by	Qu’s	relatives	and	 certain	 Party	 leaders,	 Qu	 was	 finally	 rehabilitated	 at	 the	 Twelfth	 National	Party	Congress	in	1982.	Chen	also	benefited	from	this	experience.20	 He	published	
The	 Biography	 of	 Qu	 Qiubai	 in	 1986	 and	 became	 the	 top	 scholar	 in	 Qu	 Qiubai	studies.	 	
	 	 The	Role	of	Historians	in	the	Early	Post-Mao	Period		 	 Because	Chen	Tiejian	was	involved	in	Qu’s	rehabilitation,	and	also	because	of	the	depth	 and	 influence	 of	 his	 research	 on	Qu’s	 life	 and	 thought,	 over	 the	 following	decades,	 Chinese	 scholars	 considered	 the	 case	 of	 Qu	 to	 be	 a	 strong	 piece	 of	evidence	 that	 academia,	 historians,	 and	 their	 research,	 in	 particular,	 could	influence	 political	 decision-making.	 This	 point	 of	 view	 was	 popular	 among	historians	 in	 the	 early	 1980s,	 as	 evidenced	 in	 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik’s	 study	 of	Party	historiography.	On	the	basis	of	interviews	with	a	number	of	Party	historians	that	she	conducted	in	the	early	1980s,	Weigelin-Schwiedrzik	concluded	that	some	first-rank	historians	who	had	leading	positions	in	the	Academy	of	Social	Sciences,	the	 Central	 Party	 School,	 and	 important	 universities	 “had	 access	 to	 primary	materials	 and	 acted	 as	 advisors	 to	 the	 Central	 Committee	 on	 questions	 of	 Party	History.” 21 	 Due	 to	 the	 limited	 access	 to	 materials	 in	 the	 early	 1980s,																																																									18	 Qu	 Duyi 瞿獨伊,	 “Qu	 Qiubai	 shi	 ruhe	 pingfan	 de	 瞿秋白是如何平反的”	 (How	 was	 Qu	 Qiubai	rehabilitated),	Yan-Huang	chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	2010(9),	pp.	34-37.	19 	 Chen	 Tiejian	 陳鐵健 ,	 “Chongping	 ‘Duoyu	 de	 hua’	 重評《多餘的話》 ”	 (Reevaluation	 of	“Superfluous	Words”),	Lishi	yanjiu	 歷史研究,	1979(3),	pp.	25-35.	20	 During	the	reinvestigation	of	the	case	of	Qui	Qiubai,	Chen	Tiejian	got	access	to	some	confidential	materials,	 such	as	all	 the	 files	on	 this	case	created	by	 the	Security	Ministry.	Chen	Tiejian	 陳鐵健,	“Qu	 Qiubai	 an	 fucha	 jishi	 瞿秋白案複查紀事”	 (The	 reinvestigation	 of	 the	 case	 of	 Qu	 Qiubai),	
Yan-Huang	chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	2003(5),	pp.	33-39.	21 	 Susanne	 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik	 once	 divided	 Party	 historians	 into	 three	 ranks	 reflecting	differences	 in	 age,	 political	 background	 and	 training,	 based	 on	 her	 interviews	 and	 analysis	 of	documents.	According	to	her,	the	university	professors	of	Party	history	and	younger	generations	of	
		
177	Weigelin-Schwiedrzik’s	 research	 relied	 solely	 on	 interviewees’	 accounts.	 In	 this	respect,	 her	 conclusion	 was	 indeed	 based	 on	 the	 self-identity	 of	 the	 Party	historians	 whom	 she	 had	 interviewed,	 rather	 than	 on	 the	 role	 these	 historians	really	were	playing	in	writing	Party	history.	 		 	 The	materials	released	later	show	that	historians’	influence	from	the	late	1970s	to	the	early	1980s	was	not	as	strong	as	Weigelin-Schwiedrzik	believed.	Specifically,	in	the	case	of	Qu’s	rehabilitation,	first,	the	investigation	team	asked	Chen	to	join	it	only	 after	 it	 was	 sure	 that	 Chen’s	 opinions	 were	 favorable.	 Thus,	 it	 was	 in	 fact	political	 agencies	 that	 had	 the	 power	 to	 choose	 historians	 to	 serve	 them,	 rather	than	 historians	 influencing	 political	 agencies	 through	 their	 research.	 Second,	whether	 or	 not	 a	 researcher	 could	 gain	 access	 to	 primary	 materials	 was	 not	determined	by	his/her	academic	position.	Privilege	was	given	to	those	who	were	carrying	out	the	Party’s	assignments,	and	they	were	not	necessarily	high-ranking	scholars.	 In	most	cases,	scholars	were	allowed	to	 investigate	sensitive	 issues	and	use	 confidential	 materials	 only	 when	 they	 were	 asked	 to	 conduct	 the	 Party’s	missions.	 Strictly	 speaking,	 their	 research	 under	 these	 conditions	 was	 not	academic.	 Just	 as	 Chinese	 scholar,	 Lei	 Yi,	 said:	 “By	 recalling	 the	 process	 of	 the	origin	 of	 Qu	 Quibai’s	 case,	 its	 determination	 and	 his	 rehabilitation,	 one	 could	clearly	see	how	power	controlled	and	dominated	historiography.”22		 	 To	 summarize,	 in	 the	 first	 few	 years	 after	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 the	 Party	leadership	allied	with	Chinese	academia	to	eradicate	the	Gang	of	Four’s	influence	and	 address	 historical	 problems.	 As	 scholars	 have	 commented,	 in	 the	 field	 of	history	 during	 this	 period,	 “politics	 and	 academic	 research	 remained	 integrated	and	political	appeals	and	academic	concepts	penetrated	into	each	other.”23	 When	historiography	 is	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 in	 political	 struggles,	 however,	 it	 is	 always	short-lived,	 because	 once	 the	 political	 struggle	 itself	 is	 resolved;	 historiography	that	 is	related	closely	to	political	needs	will	 lose	its	value	immediately.	When	the	actual	 need	 to	 purge	 the	 Gang	 of	 Four	 faded,	 academia’s	 criticism	 of	 so-called	“innuendo	 historiography”	 also	 disappeared	 gradually	 and	 was	 gone	 by	approximately	1983.	Similarly,	after	the	wave	of	rehabilitation	ended,	academia’s																																																																																																																																																																			teachers	 as	 the	 second	 and	 third	 ranks	 were	 strictly	 kept	 away	 from	 such	 achieves.	 Susanne	Weigelin-Schwiedrzik,	1993.	22	 Lei	Yi	 雷頤,	“Qu	Qiubai	yuan’an	de	qiyuan	yu	pingfan	 瞿秋白冤案的起源與平反”	(The	origin	of	Qu	Qiubai’s	unjust	case	and	 the	rehabilitation	of	Qu),	Yan-Huang	Chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	2011(1),	pp.	17-21.	23	 Wu	Zhijun,	2011.
		
178	participation	ended	as	well.	 	
5.2	Attempts	to	Balance	Political	Needs	and	Intellectual	Pursuits	(1980s)	 		 	 In	the	first	half	of	the	1980s,	many	Party	historians	expressed	their	aspiration	to	serve	the	Party’s	needs	and	pursue	academic	values.	Their	discussion	at	the	time	about	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 so-called	 “principle	 of	 Party	 spirit”	 and	“principle	of	scientificity	”	was	an	expression	of	this	aspiration.	Their	opinions	on	this	 issue,	 however,	 had	 changed	by	 the	 end	of	 the	1980s.	 This	 section	will	 first	examine	professional	historians’	changing	opinions	on	those	principles.	Then,	the	section	will	use	the	issue	of	the	WRA	once	again	as	an	example	to	explain	further	why	 some	 historians	 abandoned	 their	 attempts	 to	 balance	 political	 needs	 and	intellectual	pursuits.	 	
5.2.1	 From	 Emphasizing	 the	 “Principle	 of	 Party	 Spirit”	 to	 Highlighting	 the	
“Principle	of	Scientificity”	 	 	
	 	 Searching	for	Scientific	Elements	in	“Party	Spirit”		 	 Since	the	1940s,	the	“principle	of	Party	spirit”	(dangxing	yuanze	 黨性原則)	has	been	an	official	guideline	for	academic	research	in	the	humanities,	arts,	and	social	sciences.	To	comply	with	the	“principle	of	Party	spirit	”	was	to	accept	serving	the	Party	as	a	priority.	A	relevant,	but	sometime	conflicting,	concept	is	the	“principle	of	scientificity”	 (kexuexing	 yuanze	 科學性原則),	 which	 means	 that	 scholars	 should	remain	 objective	 and	 apply	 scientific	methods	 in	 their	 research.	 In	 this	 respect,	when	people	discuss	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 “principle	of	Party	 spirit”	 and	the	 “principle	 of	 scientificity,”	 they	 actually	 are	 talking	 about	 the	 relationship	between	politics	and	academic	research.	In	the	Mao	Era,	a	considerable	number	of	intellectuals	advocated	explicitly	the	idea	that	academic	research	on	Party	history	should	 serve	 politics,	 or	 in	 their	 words,	 it	 should	 comply	 with	 the	 “principle	 of	Party	spirit.”	At	the	same	time,	however,	there	were	claims	that	specialists	in	Party	history	should	avoid	commenting	on,	or	being	influenced	by,	political	reality.	The	opinions	 historians	 expressed	 in	 the	 Hundred	 Flowers	 period	 (1956-1957)	 are	evidence	of	this	(see	Chapter	3).	 		 	 In	most	cases,	historians	who	maintained	that	Party	history	research	should	not	concern	itself	with	political	realities	hesitated	to	involve	themselves	in	the	field	of	Party	 history	 studies.	 The	 experience	 of	 Li	 Shu	 is	 typical	 and	 cogent.	 In	 the	mid-1950s,	Li	was	invited	by	a	leader	of	the	CCP	Central	Propaganda	Department	
		
179	to	write	official	Party	History.	At	 the	 time,	Li	knew	that	 to	compile	Party	History	involved	accepting	leaders’	speeches	as	decrees	and	interpreting	them,	rather	than	exploring	 issues	 independently	on	the	basis	of	reliable	materials.	Finding	himself	in	this	situation,	Li	“profoundly	understood	that	the	‘principle	of	Party	spirit’	and	the	 ‘principle	 of	 scientificity’	were	 incomparable”	 and	as	 a	 result,	 he	 refused	 the	high	position	that	he	was	offered.24		 	 The	 new	 political	 situation	 after	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution	 prompted	 historians,	such	 as	 Li,	 who	 had	 been	 trying	 to	 keep	 out	 of	 trouble	 for	 decades,	 to	 devote	themselves	to	rewriting	the	history	of	the	Party.	Interestingly,	when	these	scholars	criticized	“innuendo	historiography”	actively	and	rehabilitated	maltreated	cadres,	they	 also	 sparked	 considerable	 discussion	 about	 the	 role	 that	 the	 “principle	 of	Party	 spirit”	 had	 played	 in	 research	 on	 Party	 history,	 and	 their	 views	 about	 the	“principle	 of	 Party	 spirit”	 changed	 subtly.	 The	main	 argument	 that	 Li	 and	 other	scholars	 advanced	 was	 that	 research	 on	 Party	 history	 could	 manage	 to	 comply	both	with	the	“principle	of	Party	spirit”	and	the	“principle	of	scientificity”,	and	thus,	it	 could	 serve	 politics,	 while	 also	 pursuing	 intellectual	 goals.	 To	 make	 this	argument	reasonable,	historians	strategically	appropriated	the	multiple	meanings	of	the	Chinese	term	“dangxing”.	 		 	 “Dangxing”	 (黨性)	was	 used	 originally	 as	 the	 Chinese	 equivalent	 of	 the	 Soviet	term	partiinost,	a	concept	about	the	correlations	between	ideas	and	social	groups.	
Partiinost	was	coined	by	Lenin	in	1895,	and	recurred	frequently	to	attack	ideas	put	forward	 in	 the	 name	 of	 disinterested	 objectivity.	 From	 a	 Marxist-Leninist	perspective,	 there	 is	 no	 true	 objectivity,	 because	 class	 interests	 and	 material	conditions	 jointly	 determine	 ideology.25	 Although	 this	 term	 has	 been	 translated	variously	as	“party	spirit,”	“partisanship,”	“partyness,”	or	“party-mindedness,”	the	Russian	partiinost	 is	 not	 related	 exclusively	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 “party”	 (especially	the	 political	 one).26	 In	 the	 CCP’s	 political	 discourse,	 however,	 Lenin’s	 use	 of	 the	term	 “party”	 in	 connection	with	 “party	 spirit”	 gradually	was	 taken	 literally,	 and																																																									24	 Li	 Shu	 jinian	 wenji	 bianji	 zu	 黎澍紀念文集編輯組	 (Compiling	 Team	 of	 Collective	 Works	 for	Commemorating	Li	Shu),	Li	Shu	shinian	 ji	 黎澍十年祭	 (Commemorating	 the	 tenth	anniversary	of	Li	Shu’s	death).	Beijing:	Zhongguo	shehui	kexue	chubanshe	 中國社會科學出版社,	1998,	p.	274.	25	 C.D.	Kernig,	ed.,	Marxism,	Communism	and	Western	Society:	A	Comparative	Encyclopedia,	Volume	6.	New	York:	Herder	and	Herder,	1973,	pp.	203-210.	26	 Partiinost	 is	 also	 related	 to	 the	 term	 “part”.	 Valerii	 Kuvakin,	 “The	 Phenomenon	 of	 Partiinost:	Structure,	Dynamics,	and	Dialectics:	An	Exposition”,	International	Phenomenological	Society,	Vol.	37,	No.	 1	 (September	 1976),	 pp.	 25-45.	 In	 Chinese,	 before	 the	 character	 dang	 had	 the	 meaning	 of	political	party,	from	at	least	Han	times	onwards,	it	was	used	to	refer	to	partisan	groups.	
		
180	was	used	to	refer	to	communist	parties,	and	the	CCP	in	particular.	Since	the	1940s,	Chinese	 Communists	 have	 used	 the	 word	 dangxing	 to	 express	 both	 the	 original	meaning	introduced	by	Lenin,	and	the	extended	meaning	that	refers	specifically	to	“serving	 the	 CCP.”27	 To	 avoid	misunderstanding,	 in	 this	 thesis	 when	 “dangxing”	refers	 to	 the	 original	 meaning	 of	 the	 Russian	 partiinost,	 it	 will	 be	 translated	 as	“partisanship,”	and	when	 it	 is	used	to	emphasize	 the	CCP,	 it	will	be	 translated	as	“Party	spirit.”		 	 As	noted	above,	by	the	early	1980s,	Chinese	 intellectuals	had	for	decades	used	“dangxing”	as	a	synonym	for	“to	do	what	the	Party	asks	us	to	do”	(ting	dang	de	hua	
聽黨的話).	This	time,	however,	historians	reintroduced	the	original	meaning	of	the	word.	They	summarized	the	concept	of	partiinost	as	employed	by	Lenin:	“Different	social	 classes	 have	 different	 interests,	 and	 consequently	 hold	 different	 attitudes	towards	 history	 and	 use	 different	 methods	 to	 study	 history.	 This	 is	 the	 role	 of	partisanship	 (dangxing)	 in	 the	 science	of	history.”28	 Subsequently,	 scholars	 tried	to	build	a	connection	between	partisanship	and	scientificity.	In	a	landmark	article	concerning	Party	history	research,	Li	Honglin	explained	the	relationship	between	partisanship	 and	 scientificity	 by	 comparing	 the	 situations	 of	 the	 exploiting	 class	and	the	proletariat.	 	The	exploiting	class	is	constrained	or	forced	by	its	own	interests,	so	the	exploiters	are	unable	to	use	a	scientific	approach	to	study	history.	The	 exploiters	 always	 hide	 certain	 facts,	 while	 exaggerating	 or	distorting	 other	 facts.	 They	 might	 even	 fabricate	 historical	materials….This	is	how	the	partisanship	of	the	exploiting	class	works	in	 the	 field	 of	 history.	 This	 kind	 of	 partisanship	 is	 against																																																									27	 Take	two	pieces	of	Mao’s	writings	as	examples.	In	1941	Mao	said	in	his	famous	speech	“Reform	our	 study”	 (Gaizao	 women	 de	 xuexi	 改造我們的學習):	 “If	 [a	 person]	 does	 not	 have	 scientific	attitudes,	or	 in	other	words,	 if	 [he]	does	not	have	a	desire	 to	unify	Marxist-Leninist	 theories	and	practices,	then	he	should	be	considered	as	not	having	dangxing,	or	as	not	having	enough	dangxing.”	
Mao	 Zedong	 xuanji	 毛澤東選集	 (Selected	 Works	 of	 Mao	 Zedong),	 Volume	 3.	 Beijing:	 Renmin	chubanshe,	 1991,	 p.	 800.	 In	 this	 context,	 dangxing	 means	 partisanship.	 In	1945,	 the	 Seventh	National	Congress	of	 the	CCP	was	held	 in	Yan’an,	where	Mao	handwrote	 four	Chinese	 characters	“tigao	dangxing”	 (提高黨性,	 improve	Party	spirit)	 to	direct	Party	members	 to	continue	to	 fight	 to	achieve	 communism	 and	 to	 set	 examples	 for	 other	 people.	 Huang	 Youtai	 黃有泰,	 “Mao	 Zedong	haozhao	‘tigao	dangxing’	zuo	jianqiang	de	gongchan	zhuyi	zhanshi	 毛澤東號召「提高黨性」做堅強
的共產主義戰士 ”	 (Mao	 Zedong	 calls	 to	 ‘improve	 Party	 spirit’	 and	 become	 strong-minded	communist	fighters),	Zhongguo	gongchandang	xinwen	wang	 中國共產黨新聞網	http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/85038/8619079.html	 (last	 visited	 on	 October	 25,	 2015).	Here	the	word	dangxing	means	“Party	spirit”.	28	 Li	 Honglin	 李洪林,	 ”Dapo	 dangshi	 jinqu	 打破黨史禁區”	 (Invade	 the	 forbidden	 zones	 of	 Party	history),	Lishi	yanjiu	 歷史研究,	1979(1),	pp.	20-32.	
		
181	scientificity....	 The	 proletariat’s	 partisanship	 is	 consistent	 with	scientificity,	because	the	proletariat	has	no	personal	 interest....	Only	by	 faithfully	 reflecting	 historical	 facts	 can	 the	 proletariat	 achieve	their	interests.29		 	 In	the	opinion	of	Li	and	other	scholars,	scientificity	is	an	inseparable	part	of	the	partisanship	of	the	proletariat.	On	the	basis	of	this	argument,	they	made	another,	claiming	that	dangxing	did	not	conflict	with	scientificity.	The	word	dangxing	in	the	second	argument,	however,	meant	“Party	spirit”	rather	than	partisanship.	 		 	 From	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1970s	 to	 the	 early	 1980s,	 historians	 made	 considerable	efforts	 to	 prove	 that	 Party	 history	 research	 supervised	 by	 the	 Party	 could	 be	scientific	 and	 objective.	 This	 reflected	 their	 hopes	 to	 professionalize	 Party	historical	studies.	At	 the	time,	however,	Party	historians	still	stressed	that	“Party	spirit”	 was	 superior	 to	 scientificity,	 as	 they	 believed	 that	 only	 with	 the	 Party	leadership’s	 attention,	 approval,	 and	 direction	 could	 historians	 apply	 scientific	methods	 to	 study	 the	 history	 of	 the	Party.	 Concerning	 the	 specific	way	 in	which	historians	 should	 do	 their	 job,	 they	 said	 “we	 not	 only	 need	 to	 study	 resolutions	issued	by	 the	Party	Center	and	speeches	and	writings	by	Party	 leaders,	and	 take	them	 as	 directives,	 but	 we	 also	 need	 to	 pay	 attention	 to	 historical	 facts	 and	 do	further	investigation.”30	 	
	 	 The	Science	of	Party	History		 	 However,	by	the	end	of	the	1980s,	Party	historians’	attitudes	on	the	relationship	between	politics	and	academia	had	undergone	an	obvious	change.	The	“principle	of	 scientificity”	approach	 to	Party	history	research	was	receiving	more	emphasis	and	some	historians	began	to	treat	this	principle	as	an	essential	issue,	rather	than	as	a	part	of	the	so-called	“Party	spirit.”	 		 	 Remarks	 made	 by	 historians	 at	 a	 1988	 national	 conference	 on	 Party	 history	research	 illustrate	 this	 change.	 First,	 scholars	 complained	 that	Party	history	was	not	being	 treated	as	a	 science.	At	 the	conference,	a	 senior	Party	historian,	Zhang	Jingru,	 stated	 that	 at	 least	 seventy	 percent	 of	 the	 existing	 official	 historical	narratives	must	be	replaced	by	new	narratives,	and	before	rewriting	Party	history																																																									29	 Ibid.	30	 Guo	Dehong	 郭德宏	 and	Li	Mingsan	 李明三,	“Zhengque	chuli	dangshi	yanjiu	zhong	dangxing	yu	kexuexing	de	guanxi	 正確處理黨史研究中黨性與科學性的關係”	(Handle	the	relationship	between	Party	spirit	and	scientificity	in	Party	history	research	correctly),	Lilun	zhanxian	 理論戰線,	No.123	(1981),	pp.	1-5.	
		
182	“the	 first	 thing	historians	need	 to	do	 is	 to	clarify	 that	Party	historiography	 is	 the	science	 of	 history.”31	 The	 question	 of	 how	 Chinese	 social	 science	 could	 achieve	independence	and	autonomy	has	been	a	core	concern	of	Chinese	intellectuals	since	the	 end	 of	 the	 1970s.32	 To	 be	 independent	 and	 autonomous	means	 to	 eradicate	the	influence	of	politics.	Although	Party	history	research	is	related	inherently	and	closely	 to	 politics,	 intellectuals	 made	 no	 exceptions.	 Zhang’s	 words	 at	 the	conference	represented	historians’	demands	that	the	history	of	the	CCP	should	be	studied	 in	 an	 academic	 environment	 without	 any	 intervention	 from	 the	authorities.	 		 	 Second,	 historians	 argued	 that	 Party	 historiography	 was	 in	 crisis.	 In	 Chinese	academia,	 discussions	 of	 the	 “crisis	 of	 historiography”	 (shixue	 weiji	 史學危機)	began	in	the	early	1980s.	Scholars	believed	that	historiography	in	China	was	faced	with	 an	 unprecedented	 crisis	 and	 that	 only	 by	 introducing	Western	 theories	 on	history	and	scientific	research	methodology,	could	Chinese	historians	find	a	way	to	overcome	this	problem.33	 Specialists	 in	Party	History	were	inevitably	affected	by	this	trend	of	thought.	They	said	the	so-called	“crisis	of	historiography”	in	the	field	of	 Party	 History	 was	 indeed	 a	 reflection	 of	 people’s	 suspicions	 about	 the	authenticity	of	official	Party	history.34		 	 Third,	 historians	 criticized	 the	way	 in	 which	 Party	 History	was	 studied.	 They	said	that	the	Party’s	resolutions	and	Party	 leaders’	writings	were	supposed	to	be	subjects	of	research,	but	they	were	 in	 fact	used	as	directives.35	 This	critique	was	not	at	all	new.	Similar	opinions	had	been	held	by	historians	as	early	as	the	1950s.	The	 difference	 in	 this	 case	 is	 that	 historians	 were	 not	 only	 referring	 to	 the	resolutions	issued	in	the	Mao	Era,	but	also	to	those	created	in	the	first	few	years	of	the	Reform	Era.	As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	new	Party	Center	created																																																									31	 Ding	 Xiaoqiang 丁曉強,	 “Dangshi	 xuyao	 chongxie:	 1988	 nian	 quanguo	 Zhonggong	 dangshi	yanjiusheng	yu	daoshi	xueshu	jiaoliuhui	shuping	 黨史需要重寫：1988 年全國中共黨史研究生與導
師學術交流會述評”	 (Party	 history	 needs	 to	 be	 rewritten:	 review	 of	 the	 National	 Conference	 of	Supervisors	 and	 Postgraduate	 Students	 of	 Party	 History	 of	 1988),	 Zhejiang	 xuekan	 浙江學刊,	1989(2),	pp.	13-14.	 	32	 Deng	Zhenglai	 鄧正來,	Yanjiu	yu	fansi	:	guanyu	Zhongguo	shehui	kexue	zizhuxing	de	sikao	 研究與
反思：關於中國社會科學自主性的思考	 (Research	and	reflection:	on	the	issue	of	the	independence	of	Chinese	social	science).	Beijing:	Zhongguo	zhengfa	daxue	chubanshe	 中國政法大學出版社,	2004,	pp.	1-35.	33	 For	more	 information	 about	 how	Chinese	 historians	 searched	 for	 change	 in	 historiography	 in	this	 period,	 see	 Q.	 Edward	 Wang,	 “Historical	 Writing	 in	 20th	 Century	 China:	 Methodological	Innovation	and	Ideological	Influence”,	in	Rolf	Torstendahl,	ed.,	An	Assessment	of	Twentieth-Century	
Historiography.	Stockholm:	The	Royal	Academy	of	Letters,	History	and	Antiquities,	2000,	pp.	43-69.	 	 	34	 Ding	Xiaoqiang,	1989.	 	35	 Ibid.	 	
		
183	a	new	collection	of	official	narratives	in	the	early	1980s.	In	Wu	Zhijun’s	words,	the	“Resolution	 of	 1981”	 and	 the	 new	 historical	 narratives	 authorized	 by	 the	 new	leadership	 provided	 historians	 with	 a	 new	 “meta-knowledge	 system”	 of	 Party	history	 research.36	 As	 they	 found	 that	 the	 right	 to	 interpret	 significant	 and	sensitive	issues	was	still	controlled	tightly	by	the	Party,	historians	began	to	require	a	greater	separation	from	politics.		 	 From	 highlighting	 the	 “principle	 of	 Party	 spirit”	 to	 emphasizing	 that	 Party	history	 should	 be	 researched	 in	 a	 scientific	 manner,	 the	 shift	 in	 historians’	attitudes	 in	 the	 1980s	 is	 obvious.	 This	 shift	 reflects	 the	 attempts	 by	 Chinese	academia	 to	 transform	 the	 writing	 of	 Party	 history	 from	 a	 highly	 subjective	exercise	serving	a	political	agenda	into	an	academic	endeavor	governed	by	its	own	scholarly	norms	and	conventions.	 		 	 Historians’	 attitudes	 did	 not	 change	 overnight,	 and	 it	was	 not	 simply	 through	rational	thinking	that	some	scholars	changed	their	minds.	In	the	1980s,	historians’	attempts	 both	 to	 serve	 the	 Party	 and	 pursue	 academic	 values	 suffered	 setbacks.	These	experiences	also	contributed	to	historians	changing	their	minds.	The	 issue	of	the	WRA	provides	a	concrete	example.	 	
5.2.2	Between	Politics	and	Academic	Research:	The	Case	of	the	WRA		 	 In	1987,	Marshal	Xu	Xiangqian	published	his	memoirs.	As	noted	in	the	previous	chapter,	 Zhu	 Yu	 actually	wrote	 Xu’s	memoirs,	 and	 it	was	while	 undertaking	 this	task	 that	 Zhu	 found	 some	 evidence	 essential	 to	 a	 reinterpretation	 of	 the	WRA’s	history,	which	drew	the	attention	of	Li	Xiannian	and	Deng	Xiaoping	subsequently.	All	this	was	kept	secret	within	the	Party	leadership,	so	that	Xu’s	memoirs	were	the	first	 public	 publication	 that	 conveyed	 the	 “new	 interpretation”	 of	 the	 WRA	 to	academia	and	ordinary	readers.	 	
	 	 Chen	Tiejian’s	Article	“On	the	WRA”		 	 Almost	immediately	after	the	publication	of	Xu’s	memoirs,	Chen	Tiejian	wrote	an	article	 entitled,	 “On	 the	Western	 Route	 Army:	 Notes	 on	 Xu	 Xiangqian’s	 Looking	
Back	on	History”	and	published	it	in	Historical	Research.	The	main	arguments	Chen	provided	are	 consistent	with	Xu’s	 accounts	 in	his	memoirs,	 but	Chen	 cited	 some	primary	 materials	 that	 were	 not	 included	 in	 Xu’s	 book,	 and	 provided	 his	 own																																																									36	 Wu	Zhijun	 吳志軍,	“Xueshu	hua	chuantong	de	shengcheng:	Ershi	shiji	bashi	niandai	tou	sannian	de	 dangshi	 yanjiu	 學術化傳統的生成：二十世紀八十年代頭三年的黨史研究”	 (The	 creation	 and	development	 of	 academic	 tradition:	 Party	 history	 research	 in	 the	 first	 three	 years	 of	 the	 1980s),	
Zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	 中共黨史研究,	2012(4),	pp.	49-60.	
		
184	analysis	of	certain	key	issues,	which	made	his	article	not	only	a	review	of,	but	also	a	supplement	to,	Xu’s	memoirs.	 In	 this	respect,	Chen’s	article	was	actually	one	of	the	 most	 significant	 aspects	 of	 the	 production	 and	 dissemination	 of	 the	 new	interpretation	 of	 the	 WRA,	 because	 it	 argued	 the	 main	 points	 of	 the	 new	interpretation	 in	 academic	 language	 and	 addressed	 these	 points	 to	 academia.	 In	addition	to	his	serious	analysis,	Chen’s	high	praise	of	Xu’s	courage	in	providing	a	new	interpretation	of	a	sensitive	issue	in	Party	history	impressed	readers	strongly.	Chen	wrote:	 	There	are	successes	in	one’s	experience,	and	failures	as	well.	Writing	about	 success	 is	 not	 easy;	 however,	 writing	 about	 failure	 is	 much	harder.	That	the	top	commander	of	the	WRA,	Marshal	Xu	Xiangqian,	with	his	profound	thoughts	as	a	proletarian	strategist	and	his	broad	heart	as	a	Marxist,	produced	such	an	educational	work	shows	loyalty	to	 history	 and	 to	 martyrs,	 which	 will	 be	 passed	 down	 to	 future	generations.	It	is	admirable.37		 	 Believing	that	Xu	had	written	what	he	had	truly	experienced,	Chen	portrayed	Xu	as	a	role	model	for	professional	historians	in	writing	Party	history	in	the	new	era.	He	 said,	 “I	 sincerely	 appreciate	 him	 and	 will	 learn	 from	 him	 and	 do	 my	 work	well.”38	 		 	 Chen’s	article	attracted	great	attention	 from	historians.	They	were	encouraged	and	inspired	by	the	rewriting	of	the	history	of	the	WRA	because	they	saw	a	hope	of	rescuing	Party	history	from	ideology	and	transforming	it	into	a	genuine	academic	discipline.	 This	 view	 came	 from	 a	 consensus	 among	 scholars	 concerning	 the	emergence	 of	 the	 “new	 interpretation”	 of	 the	WRA:	 the	 new	 interpretation	was	drawn	 from	 Marshal	 Xu’s	 personal	 experience,	 but	 Xu	 and	 other	 insiders	 were	unable	to	speak	about	the	facts	until	the	new	era	allowed	them	to	do	so.	Now	that	senior	cadres	within	the	Party	leadership	had	begun	to	challenge	the	official	Party	History	authorized	by	Mao,	there	was	no	longer	any	excuse	to	forbid	intellectuals	from	delving	into	the	Party’s	history.	 		 	 Historians	 also	 attended	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 the	WRA	 for	 a	more	 practical	 reason.	Chen	Tiejian	cited	some	essential	primary	materials	that	had	never	been	released																																																									37	 Chen	Tiejian	 陳鐵健,	“Lun	Xilujun:	Du	Xu	Xiangqian	‘Lishi	de	huigu’	zhaji	 論西路軍——讀徐向
前《歷史的回顧》札記”	 (On	 the	Western	 Route	 Army:	 notes	 on	 Xu	 Xiangqian’s	 Looking	 back	 on	
History”,	Lishi	yanjiu	 歷史研究,	1987(2),	pp.	3-15.	38	 Ibid.	
		
185	before.	As	 for	 the	 source	of	 these	materials,	 Chen	admitted	 that	he	had	 read	 the	articles	written	by	Zhu	Yu	and	published	internally,	and	had	been	inspired	by	them.	Considering	the	role	that	Zhu	had	played	in	writing	Xu’s	memoirs,	this	meant	that	as	more	 and	more	high-ranking	 leaders	 began	 to	write	 such	memoirs,	 the	 CCP’s	confidential	 achieves	 would	 probably	 be	 released	 gradually	 and	 indirectly.	 This	was	definitely	good	news	for	Party	history	researchers	who	had	suffered	the	lack	of	access	to	primary	materials	for	decades.	 		 	 In	summary,	historians	at	the	time	demanded	to	be	able	to	examine	the	history	of	the	Party	objectively,	but	to	a	great	degree,	they	based	their	hope	for	this	on	the	open-mindedness	 of	 the	 Party	 leadership.	 Thus,	 they	 expected	 that	 the	 Party’s	official	narratives	would	 reveal	more	historical	 facts,	 or,	 in	 a	more	abstract	way,	they	 hoped	 that	 the	 implications	 of	 “Party	 spirit”	 for	 the	 field	 of	 Party	 History	would	 become	more	 compatible	with	 scientific	 research.	 It	was	 thus	 natural	 for	historians	 to	 respond	 positively	 to	 the	 reinterpretation	 of	 sensitive	 historical	problems,	 such	 as	 the	 issue	 of	 the	WRA.	Historians’	 enthusiasm	 about	 the	WRA,	however,	was	soon	curbed	by	the	authorities’	responses	to	Chen’s	article.	 		 	 The	Authorities’	Responses	to	Chen’s	Article		 	 As	noted	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	main	opponents	of	the	“new	interpretation”	among	the	leadership	were	Yang	Shangkun	and	Hu	Qiaomu,	who	represented	the	First	Front	Army	veterans	and	Party	theoreticians,	respectively.	On	this	occasion,	the	two	again	played	a	role	in	preventing	the	wide	dissemination	of	Chen’s	article.	As	 soon	 as	 he	 learned	 about	 Chen’s	 article,	 Yang	 approached	 Hu	 Qiaomu,	 who	ordered	Hu	Sheng	 胡繩	 (1918-2000),	then	director	of	the	CASS,	to	take	care	of	the	problem.	Hu	Sheng	summoned	the	editorial	department	of	Historical	Research	and	Chen	 to	 a	meeting,	 at	which	 Hu	 read	 them	 the	 comments	 on	 the	WRA	 by	 Deng	Xiaoping,	 Chen	 Yun,	 and	 Li	 Xiannian,	 and	 told	 the	 attendees	 that	 because	 Party	leaders	 had	 already	 reached	 a	 conclusion	 on	 the	 issue,	 it	 was	 inappropriate	 to	publish	Chen’s	article.	Surprisingly,	Hu	also	said	that	neither	Chen	nor	the	editorial	department	 of	 Historical	 Research	 could	 be	 blamed,	 because	 they	 were	 not	informed	 about	 the	 circumstances	 above.39	 Yang’s	 and	 Hu	 Qiaomu’s	 attitude	
																																																								39	 Chen	Tiejian,	phone	 interview,	2013.	Chen	Tiejian	 陳鐵健,	 “Chen	 fan	duobian	gan	qiuzhen:	Hu	Sheng	 xiansheng	 yinxiang	 塵凡多變敢求真：胡繩先生印象”	 (Searching	 for	 truth	 in	 the	 ever	changing	 world:	 my	 impression	 of	 Mr.	 Hu	 Sheng),	 in	 Zheng	 Hui	 鄭惠	 and	 Yao	 Hong	 姚鴻,	 eds.,	
Simu	 ji:	 huainian	 Hu	 Sheng	 wenji	 思慕集：懷念胡繩文輯	 (Commemorating	 Hu	 Sheng).	 Beijing:	Shehui	kexue	wenxian	chubanshe	 社會科學文獻出版社,	2003,	pp.	184-189.	
		
186	towards	Chen’s	article	showed	that	sensitivity	about	 this	historical	 issue	had	not	diminished	at	all	during	the	previous	four	years	since	Deng	wrote	his	comments	on	Li’s	report.	The	way	in	which	Hu	Sheng	dealt	with	the	problem,	however,	indicated	that	 the	 low-key	 method	 Deng	 advocated	 had	 been	 implemented.	 The	 main	consideration	at	the	time	was	not	to	trigger	any	further	debate	on	the	issue	of	the	WRA.	This	goal	was	achieved,	because,	although	many	intellectuals	paid	attention	to	the	fact	that	Mao’s	orthodox	interpretation	was	challenged	by	Xu’s	new	accounts,	there	was	almost	no	further	research	on	this	topic.	Academic	research	on	the	WRA,	an	 important	and	sensitive	event	 in	 the	history	of	 the	CCP,	had	been	suppressed	again	in	a	subtle	manner.	 		 	 The	case	of	the	WRA	was	not	an	extreme	example;	however,	it	was	through	this	kind	of	setback	that	some	historians	 found	that	 their	attempt	to	balance	political	needs	and	academic	endeavors	had	come	to	an	end.	 	
5.3	Academic	or	Political?	The	Split	between	Historians	(since	the	1990s)		 	 When	China’s	 universities	 reinstated	 recruitment	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cultural	Revolution,	 although	Marxist	 theories	 and	 the	 official	 historical	 narratives	 were	still	part	of	the	curriculum,	undergraduate	and	graduate	students	gained	access	to	alternative	knowledge.	Some	senior	historians	who	had	received	higher	educations	and	begun	their	academic	careers	during	the	Republican	period	and	were	purged	after	1949	because	of	their	non-Marxist	views,	became	the	main	force	in	teaching.	These	 senior	 historians	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	generation	 of	 historians	 during	 the	 Reform	 Era.	 By	 the	 1990s,	 historical	methodology	and	certain	viewpoints	had,	to	different	degrees,	regained	dominant	positions.	Fu	Sinian’s	emphasis	on	the	correct	scientific	methodology	of	historical	research,	and	his	point	of	view	that	historians	should	remain	aloof	from	politics	to	safeguard	 their	 independence	 and	 objectivity	 exerted	 influence	 on	 young	historians	in	particular.	It	is	no	wonder	that	Xie	Yong	summarized	the	tendency	of	1990s’	 historiography	 as	 “going	 back	 to	 [the	 historical	 methodology	 of]	 Fu	Sinian.”40	 This	is	the	phenomenon	of	“skipping	a	generation”	(gedai	yichuan	 隔代
遺傳)	 in	 Chinese	 academia.41	 Further,	 students	 were	 allowed	 to	 study	 Western																																																									40	 Xie	Yong	 謝泳,	“Huidao	Fu	Sinian	 回到傅斯年”	(Going	back	to	[the	historical	methodology	of]	Fu	Sinian),	Ershiyi	shiji	 二十一世紀,	2010	(10),	pp.	151-153.	41	 Peking	 University	 professor	 Chen	 Pingyuan	 陳平原	 is	 the	 person	 who	 first	 uses	 “skipping	 a	generation”	 to	describe	 the	 relationship	between	 the	academic	 research	of	 the	1980s	and	 that	 in	
		
187	historiography,	which	 inspired	 them	 to	 experiment	with	 new	methods	 from	 the	West	and	to	engage	in	critical	reflections	on	historical	studies	after	1949.42		 	 Deriving	methodology	both	from	non-Marxist	historiography	in	the	Republican	period	and	Western	historiography,	historians	of	the	new	generation	became	more	critical	 and	sensitive	 to	 the	need	 to	develop	a	new	relationship	with	 the	 state	 in	order	to	achieve	greater	autonomy.	Further,	as	scholars	have	pointed	out,	Chinese	intellectuals’	 social	 position	 had	 been	 strengthened	 by	 the	 improved	socioeconomic	opportunities	and	relatively	relaxed	sociopolitical	context	in	which	they	 lived.43 	 It	 was	 under	 these	 circumstances	 that	 some	 scholars	 deviated	gradually	from	the	official	historical	narratives,	and	tried	to	create	a	pure	academic	domain	in	which	to	study	the	CCP’s	history.	 	 	 	
5.3.1	Creating	“Academic	Party	Historiography”		 	 Since	the	early	years	of	the	21st	century,	there	has	been	a	new	tendency	to	divide	Party	History	research	into	two	mutually	exclusive	categories.	Although	these	two	categories	have	been	referred	to	by	different	pairs	of	names,	either	as	“academic	Party	History	research”	(xueshu	de	dangshi	yanjiu	 學術的黨史研究)	and	“political	Party	 History	 research”	 (zhengzhi	 de	 dangshi	 yanjiu	 政治的黨史研究)44	 or	 as	“unofficial	research”	(minjian	yanjiu	 民間研究)	and	“mainstream	research”	(zhuliu	
yanjiu	 主流研究:	 sometimes	 “official	 research,”	 guanfang	 yanjiu	 官方研究),45	there	is	a	consensus	on	the	classification	criteria.	Scholars	in	universities	and	other	professional	 research	 institutions	 belong	 to	 the	 first	 category,	while	 researchers																																																																																																																																																																			the	1930s	and	the	1940s.	That	means	1980s’	university	students	inherited	the	academic	tradition	of	 the	scholars	of	Republican	generation,	 rather	 than	the	generation	of	 the	1950s	and	1960s.	See	Zha	 Jianying	 查建英,	 Bashi	 niandai	 fangtanlu	 八十年代訪談錄	 (The	 1980s:	 interviews).	 Beijing:	Shenghuo	 dushu	 xinzhi	 sanlian	 shudian	 生活讀書新知三聯書店,	 2006,	 p.	 146.	 This	 statement	 by	Chen	Pingyuan	has	been	widely	quoted	by	Chinese	scholars.	 	42	 For	more	about	the	enthusiasm	of	Chinese	historians	and	students	 for	Western	historiography	since	late	1970s,	see	Q.	Edward	Wang,	“Encountering	the	World:	China	and	Its	Other(s)	in	Historical	Narratives,	1949-89”,	Journal	of	World	History,	Vol.	14,	No.	3	(September	2003),	pp.	327-358.	  43	 Mok	Ka-ho,	Intellectuals	and	the	State	 in	Post-Mao	China.	New	York:	St.	Martin’s	Press,	1998,	p.	228.	44	 Yang	Kuisong	 楊奎松,	“Guanyu	zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	de	teshuxing	 關於中共黨史研究的特
殊性”	(The	particularity	of	Party	history	research),	Jiaoxue	yu	yanjiu	 教學與研究,	2001(5),	p.	9.	45	 Han	Gang	 韓鋼,	“Zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	de	ruogan	redian	nandian	wenti	 中共黨史研究的若
干熱點難點問題”	 (Several	 popular	 and	 problematic	 topics	 in	 the	 field	 of	 Party	 history	 research),	
Gongshi	wang	 共識網,	November	15,	2012.	 	http://www.21ccom.net/articles/lsjd/lsjj/article_2012111571076.html	(last	visited	on	September	21,	2015).	This	article	was	originally	published	in	2005	as	a	book	chapter.	Zhou	Ruijin	 周瑞金,	ed.,	
Yong	tou	xingzou	 用頭行走	 (Walking	on	heads).	Shanghai:	Wenhui	chubanshe	 文彙出版社,	2005,	pp.	87-105.	Since	then	this	article	has	been	revised	and	expanded	several	times.	The	latest	version	was	published	on	Gongshi	wang.	
		
188	who	have	positions	 in	official	agencies	 constitute	 the	second	category.	As	 for	 the	differences	 between	 the	 two	 categories	 of	 researchers,	 Han	 Gang’s	 following	comments	are	representative.	 	The	latter	(“official	research”	or	“political	research	on	Party	History”)	is	a	part	of	the	official	ideology,	directed	by	politics,	aiming	to	prove	the	reasonableness	and	 legitimacy	of	previous	and	current	policies.	The	 former	 (“unofficial	 research”	 or	 “academic	 research	 on	 Party	history”)	 is	 not	 expected	 to	 draw	 any	 political	 conclusions,	 as	 it	pursues	 academic	 values,	 aiming	 to	 restore	 the	 truth	 and	 interpret	history.46		 	 Advocates	 of	 this	 classification	 categorize	 themselves	 as	 members	 of	 the	“unofficial”	division,	although	they	are	professional	historians	and	have	positions	in	 research	 institutes.47	 They	 prefer	 to	 set	 boundaries	 between	 themselves	 and	those	 researchers	 who	 have	 an	 apparent	 connection	 with	 the	 authorities.	 By	emphasizing	 their	 “unofficial”	 or	 “non-mainstream”	 status,	 they	 intend	 to	underscore	 the	 academic	 characteristics	 of	 their	 research.	 According	 to	 these	scholars,	 the	 essence	 of	 their	 work	 is	 to	 remain	 scientific	 and	 independent;	independence	 is	 the	most	 significant	 factor,	because	whether	a	 scholar	 is	able	 to	conduct	objective	research	depends	on	whether	s/he	has	independent	status.	 		 	 With	 respect	 to	 specific	 aspects,	 scholars	 stress	 the	 following	 three	 points	 in	defining	their	work	as	“academic	research	on	Party	history”.	First,	apart	from	the	top	 leadership,	 their	research	also	 focuses	on	the	 local	 level	and	the	masses,	and	examines	 the	 implementation	 of	 policies,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 creation	 and	 issue	 of	policies.	Second,	they	rely	on	local	and	foreign	archives,	as	well	as	other	materials	that	 have	 been	 scattered	 throughout	 the	 second-hand	 market	 and	 private	collections.	 Third,	 they	 prefer	 empirical	 research	 and	 case	 studies. 48 	 These	scholars	 show	 little	 interest	 in	 building	 a	 new	 framework	 of	 Party	 History	 or	challenging	 the	 grand	 narratives	 created	 by	 the	 Party.	 They	 seem	 to	 believe	instead	 that	 as	 long	 as	 they	 continue	 to	 pursue	 historical	 facts	 by	 conducting																																																									46	 Han	Gang	 韓鋼,	 “Zhonggong	 lishi	 de	minjian	yanjiu	 中共歷史的民間研究”	 (Unofficial	 research	of	the	history	of	the	CCP),	Shehui	kexue	bao	 社會科學報,	June	16,	2011,	p.	8.	47	 The	Chinese	word	minjian	 民間	 (as	an	adjective)	means	both	unofficial	and	nonprofessional.	48	 Han	Gang,	2011.	Han	Gang,	2012.	Han	Gang	 韓鋼,	“Minjian	dang’an	he	shizheng	yanjiu	 民間檔案
和實證研究”	 (Unofficial	 archives	 and	 empirical	 research),	Beijing	 dangshi	 北京黨史,	 2005(4),	 pp.	35-36.	
		
189	empirical	 research	 and	 case	 studies,	 and	 to	 build	 objective	 historical	 narratives,	the	incorrect	narratives	eventually	will	be	replaced.49		 	 Based	 on	 these	 ideas	 about	 Party	 history,	 since	 the	 early	 1990s,	 a	 number	 of	influential	 specialists	 in	 Party	 history	 have	 concentrated	 on	 mining	 historical	materials	and	reconstructing	historical	facts.50	 The	academic	preference	of	leading	scholars	has	influenced	the	research	interests	of	young	researchers	greatly,	and	in	recent	years,	a	growing	number	of	researchers	fall	into	the	category	of	“unofficial	Party	History.”51		 	 While	defining	their	own	research	as	“unofficial,”	these	historians	also	comment	on	 “official”	 or	 “mainstream”	 Party	 historiography.	 First,	 they	 defined	 “official”	Party	History	research	as	an	aspect	of	the	political	propaganda	process.	Because	it	necessarily	 serves	 politics,	 they	 claim,	 this	 type	 of	 research	 had	 always	 been	controlled	by	power	struggles,	and	thus	was	unable	to	make	objective	judgments	on	 historical	 issues.52	 They	 say	 that,	 in	 part	 because	 of	 this,	 “official”	 Party	historiography	has	had	 little	 influence	 in	 international	 academia	 in	 recent	 years,	despite	the	high	position	it	enjoyed	during	the	Mao	Era.53	 Second,	these	historians	maintained	 that	 official	 Party	 History	 research	 focused	 merely	 on	 the	 Party	leadership,	neglecting	Party	organizations	at	the	local	level,	and	society’s	response	to	top-down	decisions.54	 Third,	and	most	importantly,	these	historians	portray	the	official	Party	History	framework	as	an	ossified	system.	They	claim	that	under	the	constraints	of	this	 framework,	researchers	can	only	select	primary	materials	that	support	already	existing	conclusions.		 	 These	 comments	 on	 the	 research	 of	 both	 “official	 Party	 historians”	 and	“unofficial	Party	historians”	are	fair	and	reasonable.	The	problem	is	that,	as	a	field	that	 attempts	 to	 study	 the	 history	 of	 the	 ruling	 party,	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	 Party	history	research	to	exist	in	a	vacuum	apart	from	political	reality,	and	therefore,	it	is	unrealistic	for	professional	historians	to	hold	the	illusion	that	they	are	absolutely																																																									49	 Han	Gang,	2012.	50	 Han	 Gang,	 Yang	 Kuisong,	 Shen	 Zhihua	 沈志華	 and	 late	 Gao	 Hua	 高華	 are	 representatives	among	these	specialists.	Heng	Zhaoyang,	2008,	p.	206.	51	 As	Han	Gang	observed,	 in	recent	years,	more	and	more	postgraduate	students	of	Party	history	and	modern	Chinese	history	chose	topics	that	fall	into	the	“unofficial”	category.	(Han	Gang,	2011)	A	cursory	 survey	 of	 Doctoral	 Dissertation	 Database	 on	 Zhongguo	 zhiwang	 中國知網	 (cnki.net)	supports	Han’s	conclusion.	 	52	 Yang	Kuisong	 楊奎松,	“Wushi	nian	lai	de	Zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	 五十年來的中共黨史研究”	(Party	historiography	over	the	past	fifty	years),	Jindaishi	yanjiu	 近代史研究,	1999(5),	pp.	178-202.	53	 Han	Gang,	2012.	54	 Ibid.	
		
190	independent	 in	 this	 regard.	 Their	 declaration	 of	 incompatibility	 with	 politics	 is	more	 a	 form	 of	 self-protection	 than	 an	 actual	 belief.	 As	 both	 observers	 and	historians	 have	 to	 admit,	 research	 on	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Party	 today	 has	experienced	 less	pressure	because	the	Party	no	 longer	 forbids	historical	writings	to	express	opinions	that	differ	from	those	of	official	Party	History.55	 Despite	this,	historians	still	perceive	risk.	As	a	prominent	Party	history	specialist,	Yang	Kuisong,	said,	 “Because	 [Party	 History]	 concerns	 the	 ruling	 party’s	 near	 contemporary	history,	any	change	of	orthodox	narratives	might	have	an	effect	on	certain	current	leaders	or	on	their	families’	emotions	or	interests.”56	 The	way	in	which	Yang	dealt	with	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 WRA	 evidences	 his	 fears.	 Two	 of	 Yang’s	 research	projects—the	 relationship	 between	 Zhang	 Xueliang	 and	 the	 CCP,	 and	 the	relationship	 between	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 the	 CCP—are	 related	 directly	 to	 the	WRA.	The	leading	figures	among	advocates	of	the	“new	interpretation”	of	the	WRA,	including	Zhu	Yu,	attempted	to	contact	Yang,	expecting	to	find	ways	to	cooperate,	but	 Yang	 declined.57	 Considering	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Yang	 and	 other	 historians	define	“official	Party	historiography”	and	“unofficial	Party	historiography,”	it	is	not	too	 far-fetched	 to	 say	 that	 from	 Yang’s	 perspective,	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 WRA	 is	 a	political	problem,	not	an	academic	one.	By	avoiding	any	connection	with	“political	research	on	Party	history,”	historians,	as	represented	by	Yang,	are	trying	to	protect	their	research	domain.	
5.3.2	The	“Hu	Sheng	School”:	Using	Academic	Research	to	Serve	Politics	 		 	 Although	the	historians	discussed	in	the	 last	subsection,	such	as	Yang	and	Han	Gang,	share	the	same	views	about	writing	the	history	of	the	CCP,	they	did	not	build	any	 kind	 of	 structure,	 even	 a	 loose	 one,	 to	 strengthen	 their	 influence.	 Their	self-identity	 as	 “unofficial”	 Party	 historians	 is	 based	 merely	 on	 a	 common	aspiration	 of	 distinguishing	 themselves	 and	 their	 research	 from	 “official”	 Party	historiography.	 In	 contrast,	 those	 researchers	 who	 have	 been	 categorized	 as	“official”	 historians	have	 a	 complete	 system	 through	which	 to	produce	historical	narratives.	 The	 bureaucratic	 center	 of	 this	 system	 is	 the	 CPHRO	and	 the	Central																																																									55	 Zhang	Yinhai	 張銀海,	 “Dangshi	 yanjiu	 ying	 you	 geng	 kuanguang	de	 siwei:	 zhuanfang	 zhuming	xiandaishi	yanjiu	zhuanjia,	Huadong	shida	jiaoshou	Yang	Kuisong	 黨史研究應有更寬廣的思維——
專訪著名現代史研究專家、華東師大教授楊奎松	 (Party	history	research	requires	broader	thinking:	interview	 of	 famous	 modern	 history	 specialist,	 Professor	 of	 Eastern	 China	 Normal	 School,	 Yang	Kuisong),	Nanfeng	chuang	 南風窗,	2011(11),	pp.	26-28.	 	56	 Yang	Kuisong,	1999.	57	 Zhu	Yu,	interview,	2013.	
		
191	Party	Literature	Research	Office	 (Zhongyang	wenxian	yanjiushi	 中央文獻研究室).	The	research	performed	by	these	institutions	has	continued	to	proceed	strictly	in	accordance	with	the	official	History	framework	and	the	official	explanation	of	the	history	of	the	Party	as	analyzed	in	Chapters	3	and	4.	This	is	reflected	fully	in	two	of	the	most	important	routine	tasks	of	these	institutions,	commemorating	late	Party	leaders	and	compiling	their	chronological	biographies.58	 On	sensitive	issues,	such	as	that	of	the	WRA,	official	institutions	repeated	the	standard	explanations	created	according	 to	 Deng’s	 principle	 of	 addressing	 historical	 problems	 cautiously,	 not	daring	 to	 conduct	 any	 further	 studies.	 In	 only	 two	 cases	 did	 official	 historians	permit	themselves	to	be	creative.	First,	every	time	the	CCP	leadership	raised	a	new	idea	 or	 concept	 about	 the	 history,	 reality,	 or	 future	 of	 China,	 official	 historians	searched	vigorously	 for	historical	evidence	 to	 support	 the	CCP’s	 idea	or	 concept.	The	 considerable	 amount	 of	 research	 on	 the	 so-called	 “China	 dream”	 (Zhongguo	
meng	 中國夢)	 is	 a	 recent	 example.	 Second,	 historians	 allowed	 themselves	 to	 be	creative	 when	 the	 Party	 Center	 asked	 them	 to	 explain	 certain	 historical	 issues,	especially	 those	 that	 were	 important	 for	 propaganda,	 such	 as	 “whether	 the	Anti-Japanese	War	lasted	for	eight	years	or	fourteen	years.”59	 		 	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 actual	 task	 of	 official	 researchers	 today	 does	 not	 differ	essentially	 from	what	certain	Party	historians,	 such	as	Hu	Hua,	did	 in	 the	1950s,	constraining	 themselves	 within	 the	 official	 Party	 History	 framework	 and	endeavoring	to	perfect	the	ambiguous	and	sometimes	unreasonable	concepts	put	forward	 by	 the	 Party	 leaders,	 as	 analyzed	 in	 Chapter	 3.	 There	 is,	 however,	 a	difference	in	their	goals	with	respect	to	their	own	positions.	Since	the	beginning	of	the	 21st	 century,	 as	 “unofficial”	 Party	 historians	 have	 become	 increasingly																																																									58	 CPHRO	is	required	to	hold	several	ceremonies	to	commemorate	Party	leaders	and	senior	cadres.	There	are	strict	regulations	about	the	scale	and	form	of	commemoration.	See	Huang	Xiaotong	 黃小
同,	 “Dangshi	 renwu	 jinian	 huodong	 diandi	 huigu	 黨史人物紀念活動點滴回顧”	 (Commemorating	historical	 figures	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Party),	 Bainian	 chao	 百年潮,	 2010(7),	 pp.	 10-11.	 When	compiling	chronological	biographies,	official	researchers	always	delete	content	that	they	consider	to	 be	 inappropriate.	 For	 example,	 when	 compiling	 the	 chronological	 biography	 for	 Zhu	 De,	 the	following	content	was	removed:	criticism	of	prominent	 figures	both	within	 the	Party	and	outside	the	Party,	 some	 telegrams	deemed	 incorrect	 from	a	posthumous	perspective,	 etc.	 See	Li	Qi	 李琦,	“Guanyu	 bianxie	 nianpu	 de	 jige	 wenti	 關於編寫年譜的幾個問題”	 (On	 several	 issues	 about	compiling	 chronological	 biographies),	 Wenxian	 he	 yanjiu	 文獻和研究,	 1986(4).	 Cited	 in	 Heng	Zhaoyang,	2008.	 	59	 Yi	 Xiangnong	 易向農,	 “Quanguo	 dangshi	 bumen	 dangshi	 zizheng	 gongzuo	 jingyan	 jiaoliu	 hui	zongshu	 全國黨史部門黨史資政工作經驗交流會綜述”	 (Review	 on	 the	 National	 Conference	 of	Party	History	Research	Divisions	on	the	Work	of	Providing	Advice),	Fujian	dangshi	yuekan	 福建黨
史月刊,	2012(18),	pp.	35-37.	
		
192	influential,	some	“official”	Party	historians	have	begun	to	create	a	new	self-identity.	As	 with	 those	 historians	 who	 identify	 themselves	 as	 “unofficial,”	 these	 “official”	historians	 are	 also	 attempting	 to	 strengthen	 their	 positions	 and	 protect	 their	research	domain	by	highlighting	the	value	of	their	research.	 		 	 The	 former	 deputy	 director	 of	 the	 CPHRO,	 Shi	 Zhongquan,	 has	 on	 several	occasions	in	his	writings	and	speeches,	defined	a	school	of	Party	history	research	that	 is	 composed	 of	 top	 historians	who	 served	 or	 are	 serving	 in	 official	 organs,	including	Shi	himself.	 	There	are	quite	a	lot	of	scholars	conducting	research	on	the	basis	of	Marxist	theories.	Among	them	there	is	a	[special]	group	of	scholars,	constituting	 a	 school	 [of	 Party	 History	 research]…	 Scholars	 of	 this	school	hold	positions	as	leaders	[of	official	agencies	or	institutions].	They	 not	 only	 write	 academic	 works,	 but	 also	 link	 up	 politics	 and	academic	research,	studying	and	propagandizing	Marxist	theories,	in	order	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	Party,	of	people	and	of	our	time.60	 		 	 Although	 in	 Shi’s	 accounts,	 two	 figures	 in	 particular—Hu	 Qiaomu	 and	 Hu	Sheng—stand	out	 for	 their	contributions	 in	shaping	the	contours	of	official	Party	History,	for	two	reasons,	it	 is	Hu	Sheng	that	Shi	and	other	official	historians	have	adopted	 as	 a	 role	 model	 in	 recent	 years.	 First,	 Hu	 Sheng	 was	 a	 prominent	 and	productive	historian.	As	Shi	said,	“[Hu	Sheng’s]	academic	style	has	exerted	a	great	influence	on	CPHRO	researchers,”	and	“many	other	scholars	also	highly	praise	and	try	 to	 follow	 this	 style.”61	 More	 importantly,	 Hu	 Sheng	 spent	 most	 of	 his	 life	conducting	historical	research.	Although	he	once	held	positions	as	the	director	of	CASS	 and	 CPHRO,	 he	 neither	 formed	 a	 close	 relationship	 with	 Mao,	 nor	 did	 he	become	a	member	of	 the	Party	 leadership,	as	did	Hu	Qiaomu.	Consequently,	as	a	historian,	 Hu	 Sheng	 is	 representative	 of	 those	 scholars	who	were	 asked	 to	 take	leadership	positions	because	of	their	excellent	performance	in	academic	research.	On	the	basis	of	Shi’s	comments	about	this	special	group	of	Party	historians,	Heng	Zhaoyang	titled	the	school	of	history	study	appropriately	as	the	“Hu	Sheng	School”	(Hu	Sheng	xuepai	 胡繩學派).62																																																									60	 Shi	 Zhongquan	 石仲泉,	 Wo	 guan	 dangshi	 我觀黨史	 (My	 opinions	 on	 Party	 historiography).	Jinan:	Jinan	chubanshe	 濟南出版社,	2001,	pp.	496-501.	 	 	61	 Shi	Zhongquan	 石仲泉,	“Wo	shi	de	xueshu	dianjiren	Hu	Sheng	 我室的學術奠基人胡繩”	(One	of	the	founders	of	CPHRO,	Hu	Sheng),	Bainian	chao	 百年潮,	2010(7),	pp.	15-16.	62	 Heng	Zhaoyang	 衡朝阳,	“Shilun	‘Hu	Sheng	xuepai’	de	Zhonggong	dangshixue	yiyi	 試論‘胡繩學派’
		
193		 	 Historians	 who	 identify	 themselves	 with	 the	 “Hu	 Sheng	 School”	 tend	 to	emphasize	 that	 their	 research	 functions	 to	 serve	 politics.	 For	 many	 senior	historians,	 such	 as	 Hu,	 who	 had	 been	 performing	 research	 on	 modern	 Chinese	history	 or	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Party	 since	 the	 1940s	 or	 the	 early	 1950s,	 it	 was	 a	natural	and	universal	belief	that	“to	study	history	is	to	serve	present	practices.”63	More	 recently,	 whether	 or	 not	 a	 historian	 advocates	 such	 a	 belief	 is	 a	 major	criterion	 used	 to	 differentiate	 official	 and	 unofficial	 historians.	 In	 the	 1990s,	 to	direct	 the	work	 of	 Party	 historians,	 the	 Party	 Center	 led	 by	 Jiang	 Zemin	 江澤民	(1925-	)	issued	a	new	slogan—“to	provide	advice	to	the	authorities	and	to	educate	people”	(zizheng	yuren	 資政育人).	According	to	the	official	explanation,	in	order	to	provide	 advice	 to	 the	 authorities,	 historians	 must	 summarize	 the	 Party’s	experience	in	the	past,	“coming	up	with	research	outcomes	that	meet	the	needs	of	our	time.”	With	respect	to	the	goal	of	“educating	people,”	historians	are	expected	to	 help	 cadres	 and	 the	masses—the	 younger	 generation	 in	 particular—to	 “build	stronger	 confidence	 to	 realize	 the	 great	 rejuvenation	 of	 the	 Chinese	 nation.”64	Thus,	it	is	fair	to	say	that	“to	provide	advice	to	authorities	and	to	educate	people”	is	the	 updated	 version	 of	 “using	 the	 past	 to	 serve	 the	 present.”	 Since	 then,	 some	historians	 have	 considered	 that	 this	 slogan	 encapsulates	 the	 ultimate	mission	 of	official	Party	history	research.	What	the	former	director	of	CPHRO,	Ouyang	Song,	said	is	more	plain	and	direct:	“Whatever	the	Party	needs,	Party	history	should	be	written	to	meet	this	need”	(Dang	you	suoxu,	shi	you	suowei	 黨有所需，史有所為).65	 		 	 These	 advocates	 of	 the	 “Hu	 Sheng	 School”	 believe	 that	 they	 have	 better	knowledge	of	 theory	than	do	those	historians	who	focus	on	historical	 facts.	They	also	believe	that,	with	regard	to	historical	research,	theory	is	much	more	essential	than	facts.	Hu	Sheng’s	comment	below	represents	one	of	their	consensus	views:	It	 is	 necessary	 to	 figure	 out	 what	 happened	 in	 history,	 and	 our																																																																																																																																																																			
的中共黨史學意義”	(The	historiographical	significance	of	the	“Hu	Sheng	School”),	Dangshi	yanjiu	yu	
jiaoxue	 黨史研究與教學,	2010(3),	pp.	72-77.	63	 Hu	 Sheng	 胡繩,	Hu	 Sheng	 quanshu	 胡繩全書	 (The	 complete	 works	 of	 Hu	 Sheng),	 Volume	 3.	Beijing:	Renmin	chubanshe	 人民出版社,	1998,	p.	594.	 	64	 Zhang	Qihua	 張啟華,	 “Cong	dangshi	de	 jingyan	jiaoxun	zhong	 jiqu	zhihui	 從黨史的經驗教訓中
汲取智慧 ”	 (Draw	 lessons	 from	 Party	 history),	 Liaowang	 dongfang	 zhoukan	 瞭望東方周刊 ,	2011(25),	pp.	20-21.	65	 Ke	Wen	 柯文,	“Quanguo	dangshi	bumen	dangshi	zizheng	gongzuo	jingyan	jiaoliuhui	zongshu	 全
國黨史部門黨史資政工作經驗交流會綜述”	 (Review	 of	 the	 National	 Conference	 of	 Official	 Party	History	Researchers	on	How	to	Advise	 the	Authorities),	Zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	 中共黨史研究,	2012(7),	pp.	117-118.	
		
194	 research	would	in	no	way	be	scientific	 if	we	did	not	do	so.	Figuring	out	 facts,	 however,	 is	 only	 the	 start	 of	 historical	 research.	 If	 a	researcher	 has	 no	 knowledge	 about	 philosophy,	 economics	 or	historical	materialism,	it	is	impossible	for	him	to	do	serious	research	on	history.66	 	In	the	opinion	of	these	official	historians,	acquiring	a	firm	grasp	of	Marxist	theories	means	 that	 they	 are	 foremost	 “revolutionaries	 and	 soldiers,”67	 rather	 than	mere	professional	 scholars.	 Consequently,	 they	 expect	 their	 research	 results	 to	 be	consistent	 with	 their	 status.	 To	 illustrate	 this	 issue,	 official	 historians	 since	 the	1990s	have	once	again	employed	the	concept	of	“Party	spirit,”	or	 its	counterpart,	“revolutionary	 spirit”	 (geming	 xing	 革命性),	 arguing	 that	 their	 research	 on	 the	history	of	the	CCP	is	designed	to	achieve	a	high	unity	between	“revolutionary	spirit”	and	the	“principle	of	scientificity.”68	 		 	 In	summary,	the	difference	between	the	ways	in	which	“official”	and	“unofficial”	historians	position	 themselves	 is	 twofold.	At	a	practical	 level,	 “official”	historians	stress	the	significance	of	Marxist	theories,	while	“unofficial”	historians	emphasize	academic	 training	 in	 history.	 A	 more	 essential	 difference	 is	 that	 “unofficial”	historians	declare	that	only	a	piece	of	research	on	the	history	of	the	Party	that	was	performed	 independently	 of	 political	 considerations	 could	 be	 objective	 and	scientific.	 “Official”	 historians	 hold	 the	 opposite	 opinion,	 arguing	 that	 their	research,	which	was	conducted	under	the	Party’s	supervision,	and	for	the	purpose	of	serving	the	Party,	is	at	the	same	time	both	objective	and	scientific.	
Conclusion	 		 	 The	end	of	the	Cultural	Revolution	in	1976	and	the	reforms	that	began	two	years	later,	marked	China’s	 transition	 into	 a	new	era.	 In	 this	 new	era,	 research	on	 the	history	of	the	CCP,	just	as	with	studies	in	other	areas	of	the	humanities	and	social																																																									66	 Hu	 Sheng 胡繩,	 “Tan	 dangshi	 yanjiu	 gongzuo	 談黨史研究工作	 (On	 Party	 history	 research),	
Dangshi	tongxun	 黨史通訊,	1984(1),	cited	in	Yang	Kuisong,	1999.	67	 Gong	 Yuzhi 龔育之,	 Gong	 Yuzhi	 huiyi:	 “Yanwang	 dian”	 jiushi	 龔育之回憶：“閻王店”舊事	 (My	memories	of	the	“Palace	of	Yama”).	Nanchang:	Jiangxi	renmin	chubanshe	 江西人民出版社,	2008,	p.	1.	68	 A	 number	 of	 officials	 who	 were	 also	 specialists	 of	 Party	 history	 held	 this	 point	 of	 view.	 Shi	Zhongquan,	2010.	Gong	Yuzhi	 龔育之,	“Lilun,	dangxing,	fangfa:	guanyu	jianguo	yilai	dangshi	yanjiu	de	 jige	wenti	 理論、黨性、方法：關於建國以來黨史研究的幾個問題”	 (Theories,	Party	Spirit	 and	methods:	on	some	issues	about	Party	history	research	after	1949),	Tequ	lilun	yu	shijian	 特區理論與
實踐,	1999(7),	pp.	5-7.	
		
195	science,	underwent	massive	changes.	These	changes,	however,	did	not	usher	 in	a	new	paradigm.	As	Weigelin-Schwiedrzik	pointed	out,	 in	 the	 field	of	history,	 “The	Cultural	 Revolution	 itself	 did	 not	 bring	 a	 change	 of	 paradigm,	 overthrowing	 the	consensus	of	the	field.”69	 As	examined	in	this	chapter,	in	the	field	of	Party	history,	the	 practices	 of	 Party	 historians	 from	 1977	 to	 the	 early	 1980s	 reveal	 that	 they	intended	to	restore	the	paradigm	with	which	they	were	already	familiar	before	the	Cultural	Revolution.	 		 	 With	 the	 dramatic	 changes	 in	 Chinese	 society	 and	 academia	 in	 the	 1980s,	however,	 Party	 historians	 realized	 quickly	 that	 returning	 to	 the	 period	 of	 the	pre-Cultural	 Revolution	 was	 not	 a	 solution	 to	 their	 problem.	 After	 criticizing	“innuendo	 historiography”	 and	 rehabilitating	 classic	 Party	 History,	 some	historians	began	to	look	for	a	way	to	make	Party	history	a	genuine	discipline.	This	idea	 was	 consistent	 with	 the	 call	 by	 Chinese	 intellectuals	 at	 the	 time	 for	 the	independence	of	academia.	As	Xiao	Donglian	argued,	 “These	calls	by	 intellectuals	inevitably	 conflicted	with	 [the	 interests	 of]	 some	 leaders	who	held	 actual	 power	within	the	Party,	and	who,	with	Hu	Qiaomu	as	a	representative,	at	the	time	had	a	need	 to	 reconstruct	 their	 authority	 [through	 ideological	 control].”70	 This	 is	 the	reason	that	historians’	efforts	to	pursue	academic	values	in	Party	history	research	were	to	a	considerable	degree	suppressed	by	some	Party	leaders.	 		 	 Having	experienced	both	excitement	and	disappointment	in	the	1980s,	since	the	1990s,	 some	 specialists	 in	 Party	 history	 have	 begun	 to	 stress	 the	 practice	 of	writing	Party	history	without	any	political	pressure	or	purpose.	On	the	other	hand,	official	 historians	 consciously	 emphasize	 the	 difference	 between	 themselves	 and	those	 historians	who	 conduct	 “purely	 academic”	 (chun	 xueshu	 純學術)	 research.	In	 this	way,	 professional	 historians	 have	 gradually	 come	 to	 be	 divided	 into	 two	camps.	 To	 some	 extent,	 the	 self-identification	 of	 historians	 is	 also	 a	 form	 of	self-limitation,	 because	 one	 of	 the	 essential	 aspects	 of	 their	 self-identities	 is	 to	exclude	certain	topics	from	their	research.	In	the	case	of	the	WRA,	those	historians	who	 define	 themselves	 as	 conducting	 research	 that	 is	 “useful”	 to	 the	 Party	cautiously	avoid	creating	any	additional	narratives,	in	case	they	might	conflict	with																																																									69	 Susanne	 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik	 examined	 the	 discussion	 among	 Chinese	 historians	 on	 the	relationship	between	historical	materials	and	historical	 theory	 from	1957	to	 the	1980s	and	drew	this	 conclusion.	 Susanne	 Weigelin-Schwiedrzik,	 “History	 and	 Truth	 in	 Chinese	 Marxist	Historiography”,	 in	Helwig	 Schmidt-Glintzer,	 Achim	Mittag	 and	 Jörn	Rüsen,	 eds.,	Historical	 Truth,	
Historical	 Criticism,	 and	 Ideology:	 Chinese	 Historiography	 and	 Historical	 Culture	 from	 a	 New	
Comparative	Perspective.	Leiden:	Brill,	2005,	pp.	421-464.	70	 Xiao	Donglian,	2008,	p.	10.	
		
196	the	ambiguous,	but	standard,	explanations	authorized	by	the	Party	Center.	Those	historians	who	insist	on	researching	nonpolitical	topics	also	refuse	to	include	the	WRA	in	 their	scope.	 In	short,	 in	recent	years,	although	Party	History	has	become	more	 important	 in	 public	 discussions,	 professional	 historians	 largely	 have	abandoned	 some	 topics.	 As	 a	 result,	 since	 the	 late	 1990s,	 some	 nonprofessional	historians	have	been	rushing	to	fill	their	void.	This	will	be	examined	in	Chapter	6.	
		
197	
Chapter	6:	Quasi-official	Party	Historiography	and	
Debates	on	“Historical	Nihilism”	
Introduction	The	previous	chapter	has	shown	that	professional	historians	have	reasons	to	avoid	discussing	 certain	 aspects	 of	 the	 history	 of	 the	WRA.	 Since	 the	 2000s,	 however,	stories	 about	 the	 WRA	 have	 become	 increasingly	 popular	 among	 the	 Chinese	people,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 new	 debates	 have	 emerged.	 An	 interesting	phenomenon	 is	 that	 many	 of	 these	 popular	 narratives	 and	 fierce	 debates	 are	created	 by	 nonprofessional	 researchers.	 As	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 this	chapter,	 these	 nonprofessional	 researchers	 publish	 their	 points	 of	 view	 as	freelance	writers,	but	they	actually	have	connections	with	those	who	are	involved	personally	in	the	issue	of	the	WRA.	This	chapter	will	first	present	the	new	debates	on	 the	WRA,	 and	 will	 address	 the	 question	 of	 why	 this	 kind	 of	 historical	 issue	remains	significant	 in	 contemporary	China.	On	 the	basis	of	 this	 case	study,	 I	will	define	 and	 analyze	 further	 the	 history	 writers	 who	 have	 emerged	 recently	 and	their	 writings	 (“quasi-official	 Party	 historiography”).	 Subsequently,	 this	 chapter	will	analyze	the	criticism	of	“historical	nihilism”	that	began	in	2013.	By	presenting	Party	 theoreticians’	 and	 scholars’	 arguments	 about	 this	 concept,	 this	 chapter	argues	that	the	Party	leadership	headed	by	Xi	Jinping	 習近平	 (1953-	)	intends	to	silence	 these	 increasingly	 vocal	 debates,	 including	 the	 quasi-official	 historical	narratives	discussed	in	the	first	section,	in	order	to	avoid	conflicts	among	factions.	The	current	 leadership	 is	 faced	with	a	situation	similar	 to	 that	Deng	 faced	 in	 the	early	 1980s	 about	 assessing	 the	 Party’s	 past.	 However,	 the	 current	 situation	 is	more	 complicated,	 so	 that	 attempts	 to	 emulate	 Deng’s	 method	 of	 managing	historical	problems	are	unlikely	to	be	effective.	 	
6.1	 Quasi-official	 Party	 Historiography	 and	 the	 CCP’s	 Political	
Perspectives	 	
6.1.1	The	New	Debates	on	the	WRA		 	 There	 are	 two	 popular	 opinions	 today	 concerning	 the	 WRA.	 Because	 the	assessment	of	Mao	is	one	of	the	core	distinctions	between	these	two	opinions,	and	has	been	a	major	point	in	dividing	advocates	into	two	“factions,”	this	thesis	refers	
		
198	to	 these	 two	opinions,	and	 the	 two	groups	of	advocates	as	 the	 “pro-Mao	 faction”	and	 the	 “Mao	detractors.”	These	 labels	are	 created	on	 the	basis	of	 the	 “orthodox	interpretation”	and	the	“new	interpretation”	of	the	WRA,	respectively,	which	Party	historians	and	some	leaders	debated	fiercely	in	the	early	1980s.		 	 There	are	four	main	topics	of	disagreement	between	the	“pro-Mao	faction”	and	the	“Mao	detractors”:	 		 	 First,	the	two	factions	hold	extremely	divergent	opinions	about	the	reasons	for	the	WRA’s	defeat.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	one	of	the	main	distinctions	between	the	“new	interpretation”	and	the	“orthodox	interpretation”	of	the	WRA	lies	in	the	reason	for	its	defeat.	The	two	factions	discussed	in	this	chapter	have	constructed	their	 arguments	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 “new	 interpretation”	 and	 the	 “orthodox	interpretation”,	 respectively,	 but	 both	 have	 extended	 these	 interpretations.	 As	 a	result,	their	disagreement	about	the	WRA’s	defeat	is	even	more	serious	than	it	was	during	 the	 1980s.	 The	 “pro-Mao	 faction”	 attributes	 the	 WRA’s	 failure	 to	 the	so-called	 “Zhang	Guotao	 line,”	 just	 as	Mao	did	nearly	 eighty	years	 ago.	However,	unlike	Mao’s	 orthodox	 interpretation,	 which	 blamed	 Zhang	 and	 Chen	 Changhao,	the	 “pro-Mao	 faction”	believes	 that	Xu	Xiangqian	bore	a	 large	 responsibility.	The	“new	interpretation”	 insists	on	the	point	that	the	WRA	was	directed	by	the	Party	Center,	but	 it	does	not	criticize	 the	Party	Center’s	decision	explicitly.	 In	contrast,	the	“Mao	detractors”	claim	clearly	that	it	was	Mao’s	strategic	mistakes	that	led	to	the	army’s	failure.	Further,	there	are	even	some	clues	that	Mao	conspired	to	send	the	22,000	troops	to	Gansu,	in	order	to	weaken	his	rival,	Zhang’s,	position	within	the	Party.	This	idea	is	quite	popular	today.	For	example,	when	a	Fourth	Front	Army	commander’s	son,	Zhou	Honglin,	who	also	classifies	himself	as	a	WRA	researcher,	was	 interviewed	 by	 an	 official	 newspaper	 in	 2012,1 	 his	 analysis	 about	 the	relationship	 between	 the	 WRA’s	 defeat	 and	 the	 campaign	 to	 criticize	 Zhang	 in	1937	led	to	the	conclusion	that	the	Party	Center,	led	by	Mao,	had	been	motivated	to	frame	the	WRA.	In	fact,	after	the	interview	with	Zhou	was	posted	and	reposted	on	Chinese	websites,	most	commentators	said	that	they	believed	that	Mao	sent	the																																																									1	 “Tiexue	Xilujun:	cong	Jingsha	shuo	dao	Xilujun	de	beizhuang	lishi	 鐵血西路軍:從《驚沙》說到西
路軍的悲壯歷史”	 (The	 brave	 WRA:	 the	 movie	 Jingsha	 and	 the	 miserable	 history	 of	 the	 WRA),	
Beijing	 ribao	 北京日報,	March	28,	2011,	p.	20.	This	article	 is	 the	 record	of	a	 collective	 interview.	The	interviewer	is	Li	Qingying	 李慶英,	and	three	interviewees	are	Chen	Tiejian,	Xia	Yuli	and	Zhou	Honglin	 周宏林,	the	son	of	Zhou	Chunquan.	Zhou	Chunquan	was	the	Commissar	of	the	Thirty-first	Army	and	Director	of	Political	Department	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army.	Zhou	did	not	attend	the	WRA,	but	was	one	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	commanders	that	were	criticized	in	Yan’an	after	the	WRA’s	defeat	in	1937	(See	Chapter	2).	
		
199	troops	to	be	destroyed	deliberately,	as	a	sacrifice	to	his	own	ambition	[Fig.	6-1].	In	another	 article	 that	 has	 been	 disseminated	widely	 in	 the	 cyber	world,	 the	most	important	writer	of	the	“Mao	detractor”	faction	offers	a	more	direct	accusation.	He	argues	that	the	only	reason	that	Mao,	a	militarist,	committed	mistakes	in	directing	the	WRA,	lies	in	the	fact	that	he	prioritized	power	struggles.	“Everything	[that	Mao	did]	was	for	intra-Party	power	struggles.	In	order	to	get	the	upper	hand	within	the	Party	leadership,	[Mao]	did	not	hesitate	to	let	the	Red	Army	run	risks.”2	 Whether	it	be	condemning	a	marshal	explicitly	or	charging	the	great	 leader	Mao	implicitly	with	a	devilish	conspiracy,	the	new	interpretation	advanced	by	either	of	these	two	factions	challenges	the	official	narratives	to	varying	degrees.		 	 Second,	these	two	factions	assess	Mao	in	distinctly	different	ways.	The	“pro-Mao	faction,”	as	the	name	implies,	considers	Mao	to	have	been	a	leader	superior	to	all	other	Party	leaders,	whether	with	respect	to	knowledge,	understanding	of	China’s	national	condition,	or	political	consciousness.	Consistent	with	this	idea,	the	faction	argues	 that	 it	 was	 only	 under	 Mao’s	 leadership	 that	 the	 CCP	 could	 achieve	 the	victory	 of	 revolution.3	 In	 contrast,	 the	 “Mao	 detractors”	 see	 Mao	 as	 far	 from	perfect.	The	most	 important	writer	 in	 this	 faction	stated	that,	when	directing	the	WRA,	Mao’s	 thoughts	 about	military	 issues	were	not	 yet	mature.	He	 argued	 that	the	WRA’s	defeat	provided	Mao	with	a	lesson	from	which	he	learnt	a	good	deal.	As	a	result,	Mao	committed	no	similar	mistakes	during	the	Anti-Japanese	War	and	the	Liberation	War	(the	Civil	War).4	 		 	 The	 perspective	 of	 the	 “Mao	 detractors”	 on	 the	 two	 disagreements	 above	 are	contradictory.	Among	the	“Mao	detractors,”	the	same	writer	made	two	conflicting	arguments.	The	first	was	that	Mao’s	deliberate	goal	was	to	destroy	the	WRA,	while	his	second	argument	was	that	the	WRA	was	destroyed	because	of	Mao’s	immature	military	strategies.	Clearly,	 if	 the	destruction	of	 the	WRA	was	 the	result	of	Mao’s	inability,	then	it	could	not	also	have	been	the	outcome	of	a	deliberate	intention	to																																																									2	 Xia	Yuli	 夏宇立,	“Duoqu	Ningxia	jihua	shoucuo	yuanyin	tanjiu	 奪取寧夏計劃受挫原因探究”	(On	the	reasons	for	why	the	Ningxia	Campaign	Plan	was	not	realized),	Hong	Kong	chuanzhen	 香港傳真,	2009(30),	p.	32.	http://www.strongwindhk.com/pdfs/HKFax/No_HK2009-30.pdf	 (last	 visited	 on	 September	 19,	2015).	3	 For	example,	 in	his	book	about	the	WRA’s	history,	Shuang	Shi	wrote:	“[Zhang	Guotao]	aimed	to	avoid	 being	 involved	 in	 fights	 with	 invaders	 and	 sought	 to	 guarantee	 his	 own	 safety	 first.	 This	attitude	 has	 simply	 nothing	 to	 compare	with	 the	wisdom	 of	Mao,	 who	 tried	 to	make	 his	 troops	survive	by	 taking	part	 in	 the	 fight	 for	national	 liberation.”	Shuang	Shi	 雙石,	Fuqu	 lishi	de	chen’ai:	
Xilujun	 wenti	 zai	 kaobian	 拂去歷史的塵埃：西路軍問題再考辯	 (Reinvestigating	 the	 issue	 of	 the	WRA).	Hong	Kong:	Dafeng	chubanshe	 大風出版社,	2013,	p.	15.	4	 Beijing	ribao,	2011.	 	
		
200	destroy	 them.	 In	 the	previous	 chapters,	we	have	 seen	 that	 official	 Party	History,	both	 during	 the	 Mao	 and	 post-Mao	 Eras,	 made	 considerable	 efforts	 to	 close	loopholes	 and	 create	 self-justifying	 narratives,	 although	 these	 efforts	 were	sometimes	unsuccessful.	In	contrast,	the	two	factions	discussed	here	do	not	seem	to	care	whether	their	narratives	are	self-contradictory.5		 	 Third,	 both	 sides	 see	 Deng	 Xiaoping’s	 comment	 on	 Li	 Xiannian’s	 report	 as	 an	important	piece	of	evidence	to	support	their	points	of	view,	but	they	interpret	his	comment	 in	 opposite	ways.	 The	 “pro-Mao	 faction”	 claims	 that	 both	 Li	 and	Deng	were	 deceived	 by	 a	 group	 of	 people	 headed	 by	 Zhu	 Yu	 (the	 actual	writer	 of	 Xu	Xiangqian’s	 autobiography;	 see	 Chapter	 4).	 They	 argue	 that	 it	 was	 because	 Zhu	provided	Li	exclusively	with	primary	materials	that	supported	Zhu’s	opinion	that	Li’s	 report	 drew	 incorrect	 conclusions.6	 Similarly,	 advocates	 of	 the	 “pro-Mao	faction”	doubt	the	authenticity	of	Xu’s	autobiography.	They	refuse	to	believe	 that	Xu	 truly	 attributed	 the	WRA’s	 defeat	 to	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 directives	 and	 actual	conditions	 at	 the	 time,	 claiming	 that	 Zhu	 must	 have	 fabricated	 the	 story. 7	Interestingly,	 some	 advocates’	 enthusiasm	 for	 this	 issue	 is	 even	 stronger	 than	 is	their	 enthusiasm	 about	 the	 WRA’s	 history.	 In	 the	 past	 few	 years,	 some	 retired	researchers	from	the	Central	Archives	have	continued	to	condemn	Zhu	by	various	means	[Fig.	6-2].8	 One	of	them	printed	pamphlets	privately,	designed	specifically	to	 “expose”	 Zhu’s	 “crimes”	 [Figs.	 6-3,	 6-4,	 6-5].	 Controversially,	 the	 “pro-Mao	faction”	 accuses	 Zhu	 of	 cheating	 Deng,	 while	 also	 insisting	 that	 Deng	 was	 wise	enough	to	see	through	Zhu’s	conspiracy.	As	shown	in	Chapter	4,	after	he	read	Li’s	report,	Deng	wrote,	“[I]	agree	with	this	 shuoming.”	The	Chinese	word	“shuoming”	can	be	 translated	as	 “note,”	 “explanation,”	 or	 “interpretation,”	 etc.,	 depending	on																																																									5	 On	another	occasion,	 this	author	said	he	disagreed	with	 the	opinion	 that	Mao	deliberately	 sent	the	WRA	to	be	destroyed.	Xia	Yuli	 夏宇立,	“Ping	Fuqu	lishi	de	chen’ai:	Xilujun	wenti	zai	kaobian	 評
《拂去歷史的塵埃：西路軍問題再考辯”	 (Comments	 on	 Reinvestigating	 the	 Issue	 of	 the	 WRA),	
Gongshi	wang	 共識網	 	http://www.21ccom.net/articles/read/dushu/2014/0706/108926.html	 (last	 visited	 on	August	 2,	2015).	6	 As	 noted	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 it	 in	 fact	 was	 Li	 Xiannian’s	 secretaries	 that	 took	 charge	 of	 collecting	primary	materials	and	drafting	the	report	about	the	WRA,	not	Zhu	Yu.	 	7	 Geng	 Zhonglin	 耿仲琳,	 a	 retired	 Central	 Archives	 researcher	wrote:	 “[Xu	 Xiangqian’s	 accounts	about	 the	 WRA]	 were	 deliberately	 created	 by	 Zhu	 Yu	 so	 as	 to	 condemn	 the	 Party	 Center	 and	Chairman	Mao.	This	was	not	the	kind	of	thing	that	Marshal	Xu	Xiangqian	would	have	done.	Marshal	Xu	would	have	never	uttered	these	kind	of	words….[Zhu	Yu’s]	aim	of	staining	Chairman	Mao’s	and	the	 Party	 Center’s	 image	will	 never	 be	 achieved.	 He,	 however,	 did	 exert	 a	 negative	 influence	 on	Marshal	Xu’s	reputation.”	Geng	Zhonglin,	Bolao	zazhi	 伯勞雜誌,	privately	printed.	8	 In	2005,	they	compiled	a	book	titled	Lantai	gaocun	 蘭臺稿存	 (internally	printed,	edited	by	Tian	Fenglu	 田逢祿).	About	a	quarter	of	the	articles	in	this	book	concern	the	WRA.	
		
201	the	context.	The	“pro-Mao	faction”	argues	that	in	this	case,	“shuoming”	could	only	refer	 to	 the	 short	 letter	 that	Li	wrote	 to	Deng	and	attached	 to	 the	 report,	 rather	than	the	report	itself.	According	to	this	interpretation,	Deng	actually	did	not	agree	with	 Li’s	 account	 about	 the	WRA’s	 history,	 and	was	 determined	 to	 prevent	 this	intra-Party	problem	from	being	made	public.9	 Quite	naturally,	the	“Mao	detractors”	insist	 that	 the	object	of	Deng’s	 “agreement”	was	 the	 content	of	Li’s	 report.	Thus,	according	 to	 them,	Deng	agreed	 that	 the	WRA	was	directed	by	 the	Party	Center,	and	its	defeat	was	not	due	to	the	“Zhang	Guotao	line.”10		 	 The	 fourth	 disagreement	 concerns	 the	 reassessment	 of	 the	WRA’s	 history	 by	official	 Party	 historians.	 Official	 Party	 history	 has	 revised	 its	 assessment	 of	 the	WRA;	 it	no	 longer	mentions	 the	 “Zhang	Guotao	 line,”	and	also	praises	 the	WRA’s	contribution.	 Chinese	 mass	 media	 has	 been	 propagandizing	 the	 WRA’s	 history	according	 to	 this	 revision.	Concerning	 this	change,	 the	 “pro-Mao	 faction”	and	 the	“Mao	detractors”	respond	differently.	The	“Mao	detractors”	argue	that	the	revision	of	 the	 WRA’s	 history	 was	 a	 manifestation	 of	 the	 Party’s	 respecting	 its	 history,	which	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 Party	 is	 “great,	 glorious	 and	 correct.”11	 In	 striking	contrast,	 the	 “pro-Mao	 faction”	 says	 the	 revision	 of	 official	 Party	 History	 on	 the	issue	of	 the	WRA	 is	a	 threat	 to	 the	Party’s	 regime.	There	 is	no	direct	 connection	between	the	evidence	cited	and	the	conclusions	drawn.	The	advocates	of	the	latter	faction	present	their	argument	in	three	steps.	They	argue	first	that	reinterpreting	the	WRA	is	equivalent	to	“demonizing”	(yaomo	hua	 妖魔化)	Mao.12	 Because	Mao	was	a	national	 leader	who	was	chosen	by	the	Party	and	the	Chinese	people,	 they	say	 that	denying	Mao’s	 contribution	 is	 tantamount	 to	 condemning	 the	Party	 and	the	 Chinese	 people’s	 choice	 for	 their	 future.13	 Therefore,	 they	 argue	 that	 the	legitimacy	of	the	Chinese	revolution	in	the	20th	century	is	undermined.	In	this	way,																																																									9	 Geng	 Zhonglin	 耿仲琳,	 Jiao	 Chengyi 焦成毅,	 “Guanyu	 Xilujun	 wenti	 de	 huangyan	 yingdang	chuochuan	 關於西路軍問題的謊言應當戳穿”	 (To	 debunk	 the	 lies	 about	 the	WRA),	 Hongse	 lüyou	
wang	 紅色旅遊網，January	23,	2007.	 	http://www.crt.com.cn/news2007/News/shmw/2007-1/23/01231339.html	 (last	 visited	 on	September	21,	2015).	 	10	 Zhang	Peirong	 張佩榮,	“Dianping	‘Guanyu	Xilujun	wenti	de	huangyan	yingdang	chuochuan	 點評
《關於西路軍問題的謊言應當戳穿》”	(Comments	on	“To	debunk	the	lies	about	the	WRA”),	Hongse	
lüyou	wang	 紅色旅遊網,	February	15,	2007.	 	http://www.crt.com.cn/news2007/News/shmw/2007-2/15/02156143.html	 (last	 visited	 on	September	21,	2015).	11	 Yuan	Lishi,	2002,	pp.	6-7.	12	 Gao	Geli	 高戈里,	“Xilujun	‘datong	guoji’	zhanlüe	juece	‘bu	cunzai	fenqi’	ma?	 西路軍「打通國際」
戰略決策	 ‘不存在分歧’嗎?”	(Is	there	any	disagreement	on	the	strategic	decision	of	the	WRA	about	creating	an	‘international	route’?),	Hong	Kong	chuanzhen	 香港傳真,	2012(15),	pp.	7-56.	13	 Shuang	Shi,	2013,	p.	2.	
		
202	they	 assert	 that	 those	 who	 are	 determined	 to	 revise	 the	 WRA’s	 history	 and	 to	condemn	Mao’s	 directives	 on	 this	 issue	 are	 indeed	 providing	 the	 anti-Party	 and	anti-China	 forces,	 both	 domestic	 and	 foreign,	 with	 historiographical	 evidence	 to	initiate	“color	revolutions.”14		 	 In	 summary,	 the	 two	 factions	 that	 have	 emerged	 in	 the	 past	 decade	 have,	 to	different	degrees,	eliminated	the	constraints	of	official	Party	History.	However,	this	does	not	mean	 that	 they	have	begun	 to	 study	 this	 history	 on	 a	more	 rational	 or	professional	 basis.	 Instead,	 their	 radical	words,	 as	well	 as	 the	 enmity	 they	 have	expressed	towards	their	opponents,	indicate	their	obsessive	concern	with	political	assessments.	Further,	the	last	two	points	of	disagreement	reflect	a	shift	in	research	focus.	Both	the	first	round	of	debates	on	the	WRA	that	took	place	in	the	1930s,	and	the	 debates	 in	 the	 1980s,	 focused	 on	 the	 WRA’s	 history.	 Although	 Li’s	 report	contained	opinions	divergent	from	the	official	narratives	of	the	Mao	Era,	neither	Li	nor	Deng	attempted	to	criticize	Mao’s	behavior	concerning	the	WRA,	or	the	Party	Center’s	resolution	issued	in	1937.	In	contrast,	 the	evaluation	and	analysis	of	Li’s	report	 and	 Deng’s	 comments	 have	 become	 a	 new	 focus	 of	 both	 the	 “pro-Mao	faction”	and	the	“Mao	detractors.”	This	shift	has	made	discussions	about	the	WRA	even	more	complicated,	because	now	they	concern	not	only	the	Mao	Era,	but	also	are	related	closely	to	Deng’s	decisions	on	historical	issues.	 		 	 The	Formation	of	the	Two	Factions		 	 The	major	points	 of	 view	of	 the	 two	 factions	 above	 are	 expressed	best	 in	 two	monographs,	both	of	which	were	published	in	Hong	Kong,	and	are	forbidden	to	be	sold	in	Mainland	China	because	of	their	sensitive	themes	[Figs.	6-6,	6-7].	One	of	the	two	 authors,	 Zhou	 Jun	 (penname	 “Shuang	 Shi”),	 is	 a	 computer	 engineer	 at	 a	Chengdu	 TV	 station.	 The	 other,	 Xia	 Yuli	 (penname	 “Yuan	 Lishi”)	 is	 a	 freelance	writer.	Zhou	and	Xia	are	the	most	important	writers	of	the	“pro-Mao	faction”	and	the	 “Mao	 detractors,”	 respectively.	 Superficial	 observation	 gives	 the	 impression	that	 they	 neither	 have	 anything	 to	 do	 with	 any	 of	 the	 figures	 involved	 in	 this	historical	event,	nor	with	any	figures	who	have	taken	part	in	writing	this	history.	In	fact,	although	it	is	difficult	to	determine	whether	these	writers	have	made	their																																																									14	 Writers	usually	use	the	phrase	“color	revolution”	to	refer	to	the	movements	that	use	nonviolent	measures	 to	overthrow	 leaders	and	request	elections.	Gao	Geli,	 “Jiu	Beijing	ribao	deng	wei	Zhang	Guotao	luxian	fan’an	zhi	Beijing	shiwei	bing	Renmin	ribao	she	xin	 就《北京日報》等為張國燾路線
翻案致北京市委並人民日報社信”	 (A	 letter	 to	 the	 Beijing	 Committee	 of	 the	 CCP	 and	 the	 People’s	
Daily	on	the	Beijing	Daily’s	attempt	to	reassess	the	Zhang	Guotao	Line),	Xianggang	chuanzhen	 香港
傳真,	2012(15),	pp.	1-6.	 	
		
203	arguments	 out	 of	 personal	 interest,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 dissemination	 of	 their	writings,	to	a	considerable	extent,	is	due	to	the	support	of	certain	people	who	have	close	 relationships	 with	 the	 participants	 in	 this	 historical	 event.	 Zhou’s	 book	 is	prefaced	 by	 Ye	 Jianying’s	 nephew,15	 while	 Xia	 has	 received	 support	 from	many	Fourth	 Front	 Army	 commanders’	 children,	 including	 Xu	 Xiangqian’s	 son. 16	Hypocritically,	each	condemns	the	other	for	being	supported	financially	by	people	who	are	related	to	the	WRA,	especially	from	the	“Xu	family”	(Xu	jia	 徐家)	and	the	“Ye	 family”	(Ye	 jia	 葉家).	The	“pro-Mao	faction”	and	the	“Mao	detractors”	charge	each	other	with	 failing	 to	write	history	objectively	 in	 order	 to	 further	 their	 own	financial	 interests	 and	 personal	 relationships,	while	 refusing	 to	 accept	 the	 other	side’s	 criticism.17	 There	 is	 insufficient	 evidence	 to	 make	 any	 judgment	 on	 this	issue,	but	 it	 is	quite	clear	 that	Xu	and	Ye	held	 the	highest	positions	among	 those	commanders	whose	offspring	have	taken	part	in	the	debates	about	the	WRA.	 		 	 Xu’s	personal	connection	with	the	WRA	is	obvious.	But	how	is	Ye	related	to	this	historical	issue?	It	has	to	do	with	the	complicated	relationship	between	the	Party	Center	 and	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	 in	 the	1930s,	 especially	with	 the	 issue	of	 the	“secret	cable”	(midian	 密電)	that	was	sent	during	the	Long	March.	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	1,	according	to	the	official	Party	History,	when	Zhang	Guotao	planned	to	take	over	intra-Party	power	by	military	means	in	September	1935,	it	was	Ye	who	discovered	 his	 conspiracy	 after	 he	 read	 a	 secret	 cable	 sent	 by	 Zhang	 to	 Chen	Changhao,	and	 then	reported	 this	 to	Mao.	When	Mao	recalled	 this	 incident	 three	decades	 later,	 he	 praised	 Ye	 as	 having	 saved	 him	 and	 the	 Party.	 Since	 the	 early	1980s,	scholars	and	people	who	were	involved	in	this	issue	have	debated	fiercely	whether	the	so-called	“secret	cable”	actually	existed.	This	issue	is	as	sensitive	as	is	that	of	the	WRA’s	history,18	 and	both	are	listed	by	Chinese	scholars	as	among	the																																																									15	 Ye	Xuanji	 葉選基,	“Preface”,	in	Shuang	Shi,	2013.	16	 Xia	Yuli	was	a	teacher	in	a	small	town	when	he	was	young.	In	the	1980s,	a	senior	military	officer	who	was	 a	 former	 commander	 in	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army,	Wang	 Hongkun	 王宏坤	 (1909-1993),	chose	Xia	Yuli	to	be	his	biographer.	Since	then,	Xia	Yuli	has	been	writing	memoirs	and	biographies	for	commanders	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	and	doing	research	on	the	army’s	history.	 	17	 Gao	Geli,	2012,	pp.	7-56.	18	 In	2012	He	Jiesheng	 賀捷生,	the	daughter	of	one	of	the	ten	marshals	of	the	PRC,	He	Hong,	who	was	 the	 Chief	 Director	 of	 the	 Second	 Front	 Army,	 published	 an	 article	 in	 the	 People’s	 Daily	 to	commemorate	 Xu	 Xiangqian.	 He	 Jiesheng	 recalled	 that	 she	 once	 witnessed	 Ye	 Jianying	 and	 Xu	Xiangqian	discussing	the	 issue	of	 the	“secret	cable”	 face	to	 face	 in	the	1980s.	He	 Jiesheng	 implied	that	both	Ye	and	Xu	admitted	that	the	“secret	cable”	did	not	exist.	He	Jiesheng,	“Yi	nü’er	de	mingyi	
以女兒的名義”	(Writing	as	his	daughter),	Renmin	ribao	 人民日報,	January	11,	2012.	http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/16848412.html	 (last	 visited	on	August	 1,	 2015).	Not	 long	 after	the	publication	of	He’s	article,	a	notification	in	the	name	of	“former	officials	in	the	Ye	Jianying	Office”	
		
204	top	 ten	most	 difficult	 problems	 in	 Party	History.19	 Ye	 neither	 directed	 the	WRA	personally,	 nor	 did	 he	 take	 part	 in	 writing	 or	 rewriting	 the	WRA’s	 history,	 but	because	 of	 his	 close	 relationship	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 “secret	 cable,”	 and	with	 the	official	assessment	of	Zhang	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	both	he	and	his	children	have	paid	much	attention	to	the	issue	of	the	WRA.	In	the	1950s,	Marshal	Ye	wrote	a	poem	to	commemorate	Dong	Zhentang,	who	once	worked	with	him,	 in	which	he	said	Dong	 died	 “on	 a	wrong	 road.”20	 This	 apparent	 condemnation	 of	 the	 Fourth	Front	Army	made	many	former	commanders	angry.	 		 	 In	 addition	 to	 supporting	 nonprofessional	writers,	 the	 children	 of	 people	who	were	 involved	 in	 the	 WRA	 also	 express	 their	 points	 of	 view	 by	 other	 means.	Several	identify	themselves	as	“WRA	researchers,”	and	are	interviewed	frequently	in	the	media	and	articles	posted	on	social	media.21		 	 In	addition	to	the	commanders’	children,	another	group	that	exerts	influence	on	the	 “pro-Mao	 faction”	 and	 the	 “Mao	 detractors”	 consists	 of	 professional	 Party	historians.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	after	Deng	wrote	his	comment	on	the	issue	of	the	 WRA,	 Party	 historians	 were	 ordered	 to	 keep	 silent	 about	 certain	 sensitive	aspects	of	 this	history.	These	 restrictions,	however,	have	not	prevented	all	Party	historians	 from	 addressing	 this	 topic.	 Some,	 now	 retired,	 but	 still	 active,	 have	provided	 significant	 support	 to	 these	 nonprofessional	 history	 writers.	 The	nonprofessional	writers	do	not	necessarily	need	to	follow	the	ideologically	driven	supervision	 offered	 by	 official	 agencies,	 in	 the	 way	 that	 historians	 who	 have	positions	 within	 the	 Party’s	 bureaucratic	 system	must,	 so	 some	 historians	 have	asked	these	writers	to	speak	for	them.	Before	he	published	his	book	in	Hong	Kong,	Zhou	 Jun	 had	 received	 advice	 from	 several	 senior	 researchers	 from	 four	authoritative	institutions,	the	Central	Archives,	the	Central	Party	History	Research	Office,	the	PLA	Military	Science	Academy,	and	the	Central	Party	School.	When	Zhou																																																																																																																																																																			(原葉劍英辦公室工作人員)	emerged	on	some	websites,	which	 insisted	 that	 “from	the	start	of	 the	Cultural	Revolution	to	the	year	when	Marshal	Ye	passed	away,	Marshal	Ye	never	went	to	Marshal	Xu’s	 home,	 and	 the	 statement	 about	 the	 two	 marshals	 discussing	 the	 issues	 of	 ‘secret	 cable’	 is	completely	 fictional”.	 http://club.kdnet.net/dispbbs.asp?boardid=1&id=8588708	 (last	 visited	 on	August	 1,	 2015).	 Ten	 months	 later	 when	 He	 published	 her	 article	 in	 a	 journal,	 the	 relevant	paragraph	was	deleted.	The	statement	and	the	revision	of	He’s	article	indicate	that	the	issue	of	the	“secret	 cable”	 remains	 sensitive.	He	 Jiesheng,	 “Yi	 nü’er	 de	mingyi	 以女兒的名義”	 (Writing	 as	 his	daughter),	Xin	xiang	pinglun	 新湘評論,	2012(22),	pp.	51-53.	19	 Han	Gang,	2012.	20	 Lin	Xuelun,	2012.	21	 Besides	 Zhou	Hongling,	 already	mentioned	 in	 this	 chapter,	 Cai	 Xiaoxin	 蔡小心	 (his	 father	 Cai	Changyuan	 蔡長元	 worked	 in	 the	 Cavalry	 Division	 of	 the	 WRA)	 and	 Ren	 Xiaoping	 任小平	 (his	father	Ren	Daoxian	 任道先	 was	a	soldier	in	the	WRA)	are	two	more	examples.	
		
205	was	criticized	by	the	“Mao	detractors,”	these	senior	researchers	supported	him	in	various	ways.	Xia	Yuli	has	a	close	relationship	with	Zhu	Yu,	who	has	retired	from	his	position	in	the	National	Defense	University.	 		 	 In	 assembling	 all	 of	 these	 pieces,	we	 can	 see	 that	 none	 of	 the	 three	 groups	 of	people	who	attempted	either	 to	change	or	sustain	the	orthodox	narratives	of	 the	WRA	in	the	early	1980s—people	who	once	served	in	the	First	Front	Army	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army	and	who	were	involved	in	writing	official	Party	history,	as	well	as	their	families—have	given	up	their	appeals	in	the	way	that	Deng	and	other	Party	leaders	once	expected	and	hoped.	Today,	 these	 three	groups	are	still	exerting	an	influence	on	the	writing	of	the	WRA’s	history.	People	related	to	the	WRA	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army	support	the	“Mao	detractors,”	while	those	related	to	the	First	Front	 Army	 and	 to	 Party	 historians	 who	 once	 contributed	 to	 the	 official	 Party	History	of	the	Mao	Era,	support	the	“pro-Mao	faction.”	The	new	debates	between	these	two	factions	should	therefore	be	seen	as	a	continuation	of	the	debates	in	the	early	1980s.	In	this	sense,	the	Party	leadership’s	attempt	to	silence	these	debates	by	producing	an	ambiguous	and	eclectic	official	history	has	failed.	More	ironically,	because	 of	 the	 official	 restrictions,	 most	 historians	 today	 avoid	 this	 topic,	 but	sometimes	encourage	nonprofessional	researchers,	such	as	Zhou	and	Xia,	to	write	about	 it.	 Because	 these	 nonprofessionals	 have	 no	 position	 in	 official	 agencies	 or	universities,	 they	 are	 under	 less	 pressure,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 enjoy	 the	 relative	freedom	 of	 being	 able	 to	 produce	 new	 narratives.	 In	 short,	 the	 Party	 Center’s	restrictions	 on	 writing	 History	 have	 led	 indirectly	 to	 the	 prevalence	 of	 these	unorthodox	historical	narratives.	 	
	 	 New	Media	and	Old	Habits		 	 Although	neither	Zhou	nor	Xia	is	able	to	publish	their	books	about	the	WRA	in	Mainland	China,	 their	writings	are	easily	accessible	 to	Chinese	readers,	 thanks	to	the	internet.	Some	parts	of	their	manuscripts	were	even	posted	online	before	they	were	published	in	Hong	Kong.	An	apparent	reason	for	their	preference	to	use	the	internet	 is	 the	 inability	 to	 publish	 their	 writings	 in	 official	 media.	 Although	 the	internet	is	theoretically	under	the	regime’s	censorship,	it	provides	a	much	broader	platform	 through	 which	 to	 discuss	 sensitive	 topics.	 Another	 reason	 lies	 in	 the	convenience	of	being	able	to	discuss	or	debate	what	the	new	media	has	provided.	Some	nonprofessional	history	writers	argue	that	they	have	more	courage	than	do	official	historians	because	they	dare	to	allow	netizens	to	challenge	their	points	of	
		
206	view.22	 On	 almost	 all	 Chinese	 websites	 about	 military	 issues,	 people	 can	 find	discussions	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 WRA.23	 The	 language	 these	 writers	 use	 on	 the	internet	is	plain	and	powerful,	and	sometimes	even	rude	and	violent.		 	 Interestingly,	although	both	 factions	are	 investing	great	effort	 in	exploiting	the	internet,	they	also	adopt	certain	administrative	methods,	such	as	petitions,	to	ask	the	government	to	resolve	their	disagreement.	Not	long	after	the	aforementioned	interview,	which	attributes	the	WRA’s	defeat	to	Mao’s	conspiracy,	was	published	in	the	Beijing	Daily	(Beijing	ribao	 北京日報),	a	retired	official,	Gao	Geli,	who	is	a	son	of	a	middle-ranking	PLA	commander,	wrote	to	the	Beijing	Committee	of	 the	CCP,	charging	 the	 interview	with	 “attempting	 to	 change	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 verdict	 on	Zhang	Guotao”	and	he	asked	 for	 “an	opportunity	 to	speak	out	 for	Mao	and	other	Party	 leaders	 [who	 struggled	with	 Zhang	Guotao].”24	 The	 “Mao	detractors”	 have	also	applied	administrative	methods	to	stop	the	distribution	of	certain	books	that	present	opinions	opposite	to	their	own.25	 		 	 While	 the	 intensive	 use	 of	 the	 internet	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	 main	characteristics	 of	 the	 new	 debates	 about	 the	WRA,	 the	 debaters’	 persistence	 in	using	 administrative	 means	 reflects	 these	 new	 debates’	 close	 connection	 with	certain	 old	 questions.	 It	 is	 because	 these	 old	 questions	 still	 have	 political	significance	that	these	debaters	feel	the	government	has	reason	to	intervene.	 																																																									22	 Gao	Geli,	2012,	pp.	1-6.	23	 Take	one	of	the	most	popular	online	military	forums	Feiyang	junshi	 飛揚軍事	 (www.fyjs.cn)	for	example.	There	are	several	posts	about	the	WRA’s	history	in	this	website,	some	of	which	have	kept	active	for	a	couple	of	years	[Fig.	6-8;	6-9].	 	24	 Gao	Geli,	2012,	pp.	1-6.	The	Beijing	Committee	of	the	CCP	did	not	reply,	nor	did	the	Beijing	Daily	allow	Gao	Geli	 to	publish	articles	to	refute	the	points	of	view	of	 the	 interviewees.	 In	the	end,	Gao	Geli	published	his	letter	and	an	article	in	an	internally	distributed	journal	Sunny	Research	Advance	(the	 Chinese	 name	 of	 this	 journal	 is	 Xianggang	 chuanzhen	 香港傳真),	 which	 was	 edited	 by	 an	official	 and	 was	 directly	 delivered	 to	 high-level	 officials	 and	 senior	 cadres	 every	 month.	 (This	journal	was	managed	 by	 a	 compary	 called	 “Sunny	Research	 Limited”,	which	was	 registered	 as	 a	private	company	in	Hong	Kong	in	2004,	but	the	editorial	department	of	this	 journal	was	based	in	Beijing.)	Many	children	of	the	first	generation	revolutionaries	like	to	publish	articles	in	this	journal.	Before	Gao’s	letter,	this	journal	had	published	articles	written	by	the	“pro-Mao	faction”	and	by	the	“Mao	detractors”.	Despite	the	journal’s	relationship	with	some	high-ranking	officials,	ten	days	after	it	published	Gao’s	letter,	this	journal	was	announced	to	be	an	“illegal	publication”	and	the	editorial	department	 was	 closed	 down	 by	 the	 Beijing	 government.	 The	 chief	 editor	 believed	 that	 this	incident	had	everything	 to	do	with	 the	 issue	of	 the	WRA.	Wang	 Jian	 王劍,	 “Xianggang	chuanzhen	beijin	beihou	 香港傳真被禁背後”	 (Why	Xianggang	 chuanzhen	was	banned?),	Boxun	 xinwen	wang	
博訊新聞網,	http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2012/08/201208091515.shtml#.Vb3qw-vAaXI	 	(last	visited	on	August	2,	2015).	25	 For	instance,	the	“Mao	detractors”	stopped	a	publishing	house	from	reprinting	a	book	about	the	WRA	 [Hu	 Chuangzhang	 胡傳章 ,	 Zhuiri	 ji	 追日集 	 (Chasing	 the	 sun).	 Wuhan:	 Hubei	 renmin	chubanshe	 湖北人民出版社,	 2001],	 because	 the	 author	of	 that	 book	held	different	 opinions	with	them.	Zhu	Yu,	interview,	2013.	
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6.1.2	Quasi-official	Party	historiography		 	 This	 thesis	refers	 to	 the	way	 in	which	Party	History	 is	written,	as	described	 in	the	 last	 subsection,	 as	 “quasi-official	 Party	 historiography.”	 This	 term	 does	 not	mean	that	these	writers	and	their	writings	have	any	official	status,	but	is	intended	to	 emphasize	 that	 there	 are	 some	 official	 elements	 in	 their	 narratives.	 Simply	speaking,	quasi-official	Party	History	discusses	the	questions	that	were	created	in	the	 Mao	 Era,	 but	 with	 answers	 not	 necessarily	 in	 accordance	 with	 official	interpretations.	To	 explain	 this	 point,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 return	 to	 the	 case	of	 the	WRA.	 As	 analyzed	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 during	 the	 Mao	 Era,	 the	 official	 Party	 History	framework	consisted	of	two	types	of	content,	the	Party’s	contribution	and	the	“line	struggles”	within	the	Party.	Every	selected	historical	event	had	a	fixed	position	in	this	 framework,	 as	well	 as	 in	 their	 corresponding	 narratives.	 The	WRA’s	 history	belongs	to	the	category	of	“line	struggles”	and	the	official	conclusion	stated,	“The	WRA	 was	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Zhang	 Guotao	 Line.”	 This	 conclusion	 implies	 that	 a	political	line,	the	“Zhang	Guotao	Line,”	existed	within	the	Party	leadership.	In	1937,	and	 over	 the	 past	 thirty-odd	 years	 thereafter,	 almost	 all	 debates	 on	 the	 WRA	centered	on	a	single	question:	whether	or	not	the	WRA’s	failure	was	a	result	of	this	political	 line.	 The	 supporters	 of	 the	 orthodox	 interpretation	 had	 to	 provide	evidence	to	prove	the	connection	between	the	WRA	and	the	“Zhang	Guotao	Line,”	while	the	advocates	of	the	new	interpretation	tried	their	best	to	separate	the	WRA	from	the	“Zhang	Guotao	Line.”	As	noted	 in	Chapter	1,	 there	 is,	however,	no	clear	criterion	to	address	the	relationship	between	an	historical	event	and	this	political	line.	Overall,	the	core	question	is:	does	the	“Zhang	Guotao	Line”	really	exist,	or	is	it	actually	a	notion	created	to	serve	power	struggles?	Although	in	recent	years,	some	nonprofessional	 historians,	 such	 as	 Zhou	 Jun	 and	 Xia	 Yuli,	 have	 created	 certain	new	 narratives,	 these	 still	 center	 on	 the	 old	 question	 about	 the	 “connection	between	 the	 WRA	 and	 the	 Zhang	 Guotao	 Line.”	 As	 long	 as	 they	 focus	 on	 this	question,	 they	are	still	 serving	 the	official	Party	History	 framework	of	separating	events	 into	wrong	 and	 right	 lines.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 that	 this	 thesis	 terms	 them	“quasi-official.”	 		 	 The	New	Importance	of	the	Old	Questions		 	 Quasi-official	Party	History	is	popular	in	China	today,	and	the	issue	of	the	WRA	is	among	a	number	of	topics	debated	intensely	by	nonprofessional	historians.	Why	do	questions	 such	as	 “whether	or	not	 the	WRA	was	 related	 to	 the	Zhang	Guotao	
		
208	Line”	 still	matter	 in	 the	21st	 century,	 almost	eighty	years	after	 the	WRA’s	defeat,	and	almost	forty	years	after	Mao’s	death?	To	a	great	extent,	the	answer	lies	in	the	mentality	 and	behavior	of	 a	 group	of	people	 called	 the	 “second	generation	 reds”	(hong er dai 紅二代).26	 		 	 Generally	 speaking,	 children	 (and	 secretaries	 in	 some	 cases)	 of	 the	 deceased	Party	leaders	or	high-ranking	officials	who	were	involved	in	controversial	issues	in	the	Party’s	history	tend	to	pay	the	most	attention	to	the	rewriting	of	history	and	the	 reassessment	 of	 relevant	 figures.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 WRA,	 the	history	of	the	New	Fourth	Army	and	that	of	the	Northwest	Revolutionary	Base	are	two	 more	 examples.27	 Some	 of	 the	 “second	 generation	 reds’”	 enthusiasm	 for	historical	 issues	 is	 based	 on	 family.	 Although	 they	 are	 now	 in	 their	 sixties	 or	seventies,	 these	 people	 still	 consider	 the	 maintenance	 or	 rehabilitation	 of	 their	parents’	reputation	as	the	most	important	issue	in	their	lives.	Some	of	the	offspring	of	the	first	generation	revolutionaries	hold	high	positions	within	the	Party	or	in	the	government.	 For	 them,	 their	 parents’	 history	 is	 related	 directly	 to	 their																																																									26	 A	similar	concept	that	has	drawn	more	attention	from	Western	observers	is	“Chinese	princelings”	(taizi	 dang	 太子黨),	which	 refers	 to	 “a	 cohesive	 group	 of	 current	 leaders	who	 have	 family	 links	going	 back	 to	 earlier	 generations	 of	 elite	 figures	 in	 the	 PRC”.	 (Kerry	 Brown,	The	New	 Emperors:	
Power	and	the	Princelings	in	China.	London:	I.	B.	Tauris,	2014,	pp.	16-17.)	As	Brown	writes,	“there	was	a	decision	in	1982	to	ask	leaders	to	retire	from	executive	positions	at	the	age	of	70,	but	to	allow	each	 family	 to	 choose	 one	 younger	member	 to	 carry	 on	 their	 interests….Therefore,	 there	were	 a	select	group	of	new	leaders	who	were	the	children	of	 former	senior	 leaders,	and	the	concept	of	a	Party	family	aristocracy	took	root.”	The	princeling	faction	is	considered	to	be	an	important	political	power	that	is	competing	with	the	Shanghai	faction	and	the	China	Youth	League	faction,	two	other	intraparty	 factions.	 Several	 members	 of	 each	 faction	 currently	 or	 once	 held	 positions	 in	 the	Standing	Committee	of	the	Politburo.	Different	from	the	princelings,	who	have	blood	links	to	senior	officials	 who	 served	 at	 vice-ministerial	 level	 or	 above	 in	 previous	 administrations,	 the	 “second	generation	 reds”	 are	 usually	 defined	 as	 the	 offspring	 of	 high	 ranking	 cadres	 appointed	 at	 “the	thirteenth	administrative	level”	position	or	above.	(The	Chinese	government	set	up	a	criterion	for	wage	 levels.	 Cadres	 were	 divided	 into	 24	 levels.	 A	 deputy	 division	 commander	 in	 the	 PLA	 or	 a	deputy	director	of	a	bureau	was	at	the	thirteenth	administrative	level,	while	a	vice-minister	was	at	the	seventh	administrative	level.)	This	means	a	princeling	must	be	a	second	generation	red,	but	the	reverse	is	not	the	case.	The	number	of	“second	generation	reds”	substantially	exceeds	the	number	of	 princelings.	 Further,	 a	 princeling	 is	 supposed	 to	 hold	 a	 high	 position	within	 the	 Party,	 in	 the	government,	 in	the	PLA	or	in	state-owned	firms,	while	a	“second	generation	red”	is	very	likely	an	ordinary	 official.	 In	 other	words,	 while	 the	 title	 of	 “princelings”	 emphasizes	 a	 transformation	 of	political	capital	from	a	former	elite	leader	to	a	younger	generation,	the	title	of	“second	generation	reds”	mostly	 focuses	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 “a	 bloodline	 inheritance”.	 Besides	 Brown’s	 above-mentioned	book,	there	are	other	monographs	about	Chinese	princelings	and	the	“second	generation	reds”.	For	instance,	 John	Garnaut,	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	 the	House	of	Bo:	How	A	Murder	Exposed	The	Cracks	In	
China's	Leadership	(Penguin,	Kindle	Edition,	2013).	27	 On	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 New	 Fourth	 Army,	 as	 Yang	 Kuisong	 observed,	 “many	 cadres	 who	 once	worked	 in	 the	New	Fourth	Army	 led	 by	 Xiang	 Ying	 項英	 (1989-1941)	 on	 the	 south	 bank	 of	 the	Yangzi	River	and	in	the	New	Fourth	Army	led	by	Chen	Yi	and	Liu	Shaoqi	on	the	north	bank	of	the	Yangzi	 River	 have	 participated	 in	 the	 debates	 about	 the	 New	 Fourth	 Army’s	 history,	 directly	 or	indirectly.	Once	a	researcher	starts	to	discuss	this	historical	issue,	they	usually	are	encouraged	by	one	side	while	being	criticized	by	the	other	side.”	Yang	Kuisong,	1999.	 	
		
209	relationship	 with	 other	 “second	 generation	 officials”	 (some	 should	 be	 called	“princelings,”	 as	 their	 fathers	 held	 vice-ministry	 positions	 or	 above).	 For	 this	reason,	 these	second	generation	officials	also	pay	close	attention	 to	quasi-official	Party	History.	In	both	of	the	cases	above,	these	“second	generation	reds”	have,	to	different	 degrees,	 inherited	 either	 the	 alliance	 or	 rivalry	 formed	during	 the	Mao	Era	when	factional	struggles	occurred	within	the	Party.	Thus,	 it	 is	fair	to	say	that	personal	 emotions	 and	 interests	 are	 an	 undeniable	 reason	 for	 the	 prevalence	 of	quasi-official	 Party	 History.	 However,	 it	 is	 too	 simplistic	 to	 attribute	 such	 a	complex	 phenomenon	 to	 this	 reason	 alone.	 To	 put	 it	 in	 a	 larger	 context,	quasi-official	 Party	 History	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 conflicts	between	divergent	views	of	the	Party’s	future	political	choices,	which	have	divided	some	high-ranking	 officials,	 and	 some	 “second	 generation	 officials”	 in	 particular,	into	two	factions.	
	 	 The	“Left	Faction”	and	the	“Right	Faction”	 		 	 In	2007,	at	about	the	time	that	the	17th	National	Congress	of	the	CCP	was	held,	a	number	of	children	of	the	founding	fathers	of	the	PRC	assumed	high	official	posts,	and	began	to	exercise	immense	influence	on	Chinese	politics.	Since	then,	political	divisions	have	developed	among	them.	There	are	two	incompatible	factions	among	the	 “second	 generation	 reds”	 today—the	 “left	 faction”	 and	 the	 “right	faction”—with	 the	 latter	 advocating	 political	 reforms,	 while	 the	 former	 believe	that	political	 reforms	would	 lead	only	 to	 the	 subversion	of	 the	Party’s	 regime.	A	landmark	incident	in	the	conflict	between	these	two	factions	was	a	quarrel	in	2012	between	 Kong	 Dan	 孔丹	 (1947-	 )28	 and	 Qin	 Xiao	 秦曉	 (1947-	 ).29	 Both	 Kong	and	 Qin	 are	 sons	 of	 senior	 cadres,	 and	 the	 two	 had	 developed	 a	 close	 personal	relationship	since	their	childhoods.	During	the	Cultural	Revolution,	they	shared	the	leadership	 of	 a	 famous	 Red	 Guard	 organization.	 Despite	 a	 similar	 family	constellation	 and	 their	 overlap	 in	 experiences,	 Kong	 and	 Qin	 hold	 extremely	different	 opinions	 about	 Chinese	 politics.	 Although	 many	 Chinese	 media	organizations	based	outside	of	 the	Mainland	reported	 the	quarrel	between	 these	
																																																								28	 Kong	Dan’s	parents,	Kong	Yun	 孔原	 and	Xu	Ming	 許明,	were	high-ranking	officials	within	 the	Party.	Kang	Dan	was	the	president	of	CITIC	Group	Corporation,	a	state-owned	company,	and	retired	in	2010.	29	 Qin	 Xiao’s	 father,	 Qin	 Lisheng	 秦力生,	 was	 a	 leader	 in	 the	National	 Academy	 of	 Sciences.	 Qin	Xiao	was	 the	 president	 of	 China	Merchants	 Group,	 a	 state-owned	 company,	 before	 he	 retired	 in	2010.	 	
		
210	two	 “second	 generation	 reds”	 at	 a	 class	 reunion	 enthusiastically,30 	 the	 real	scenario	was	 not	made	 available	 to	 ordinary	 readers.	 Yet	 it	 is	 not	 hard	 to	 infer	what	 happened,	 because	 their	 political	 differences	 have	 been	 expressed	sufficiently	 on	 other	 occasions.	 Simply	 put,	 the	 “left	 faction”,	 with	 Kong	 as	 its	representative,	 insists	 that	 “China’s	 development	 should	 follow	 a	 path	 that	 is	chosen	and	led	by	the	CCP,”	rather	than	copying	the	values	and	political	systems	of	Western	countries.31	 Thus,	they	refuse	to	adopt	democracy	or	to	pursue	personal	freedom	and	human	rights,	which	they	consider	to	be	Western	concepts.	 Instead,	they	emphasize	 the	 stability	of	Chinese	 society	and	national	 interests.	The	 “right	faction,”	 of	 which	 Qin	 serves	 as	 the	 spokesman,	 believes	 in	 “universal	 values,”	another	 concept	 that	 the	 Party	 has	 forbidden	 to	 be	mentioned,	 arguing	 that	 the	ruling	 group	 should	 stop	 using	 economic	 development	 as	 the	 source	 of	 the	legitimacy	of	political	power	and	should	stop	adopting	Marxist	economics	and	the	theory	of	class	struggle	to	understand	China	and	the	world.32		 	 Because	both	 factions	of	 these	 “second	generation	 reds”	have	a	 close	personal	connection	 with	 the	 CCP’s	 revolutionary	 past,	 and	 because	 their	 opinions	 are	formed	in	part	by	their	or	their	parents’	personal	experiences,	they	very	often	have	used	 Party	 History	 as	 evidence	 to	 support	 their	 arguments.	 Naturally,	 their	narratives	 and	 explanations	 of	 Party	 History	 differ	 significantly.	 The	 clearest	example	is	the	issue	of	the	Cultural	Revolution.	The	“left	faction”	insists	that	if	the	Cultural	Revolution	had	not	taken	place,	then	reforms	and	opening	up	would	have	been	 impossible,	because	 it	was	 the	Cultural	Revolution	that	made	the	Party	and	Chinese	 people	 consider	 eliminating	 those	 political,	 economic,	 and	 cultural	thoughts	and	ideas	that	had	led	China	down	the	wrong	path.	In	short,	 they	argue	that,	 although	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution	 itself	 was	 an	 unprecedented	 disaster,	 it	ultimately	 rejuvenated	 the	 nation	 greatly,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 it	 should	 not	 be	evaluated	 in	 a	 completely	 negative	 light. 33 	 The	 “right	 faction”	 advocates	comprehensive	criticism	and	retrospection	with	respect	to	the	Cultural	Revolution.																																																									30	 Almost	all	these	media	reports	were	based	on	the	accounts	of	Hu	Dehua	 胡德華,	the	third	son	of	Hu	Yaobang.	31	 Wu	Xiaoli	zhuanfang	Kong	Dan	 吳小莉專訪孔丹	 (Wu	Xiaoli	interviewed	Kong	Dan),	Fenghuang	
weishi	 鳳凰衛視	 (Phoenix	TV),	July	4,	July	11,	2015.	http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20150711/13833708_0.shtml	(last	visited	on	September	21,	2015).	32	 Qin	 Xiao	 秦曉,	 “Qu	 yishixingtai	 hua,	 huigui	 pushi	 jiazhi	去意識形態化	 回歸普世價值”	 (To	 Get	rid	of	the	influence	of	[Marxist]	ideology	and	to	reclaim	universal	values),	Zhongguo	gaige	 中國改
革,	2010(10),	pp.	102-104.	33	 “Wu	Xiaoli	interviewed	Kong	Dan”,	2015.	
		
211	To	 emphasize	 this	 point,	 one	 representative	 of	 this	 faction,	 Hu	 Deping	 胡德平	(1942-	 ),	 the	 oldest	 son	 of	 Hu	 Yaobang,	 organized	 a	 seminar	 in	 2011	 to	commemorate	 the	 thirtieth	 anniversary	 of	 the	 Party’s	 second	 resolution	 on	historical	 issues.34	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 the	 two	factions	also	hold	distinct	opinions	on	many	other	important	events	in	the	Mao	Era,	such	as	the	Great	Famine	(1959-1961),	and	the	split	of	China	and	the	Soviet	Union	in	1956.	In	general,	the	“right	faction”	would	like	to	reinterpret	history,	while	the	“left	faction”	tends	to	insist	on	Mao’s	verdicts	on	historical	issues;	both	make	use	of	historical	narratives	 to	 legitimize	 their	arguments	about	 the	Party’s	 future.	Thus,	the	divergence	of	perspectives	about	the	CCP’s	future	has	become	the	second	most	direct	cause	for	the	prevalence	of	the	quasi-official	Party	History.	 	
	 	 “Red	Complex”		 	 Moreover,	 the	 prevalence	 of	 quasi-official	 Party	 historiography	 is	 also	 related	directly	to	the	psychological	connection	that	some	“second	generation	reds”	have	with	Mao	and	his	era—a	mentality	referred	to	in	this	thesis	as	the	“red	complex.”	The	 “second	 generation	 reds”	 in	 China	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 two	 categories	according	 to	 their	 current	 social	 status.	 Red	 offspring	 in	 the	 first	 category	 have	relied	on	their	families	to	obtain	certain	resources	or	positions	that	were	secured	in	the	early	years	of	the	Reform	Era.	Today,	they	are	enjoying	favorable	social	and	economic	 status,	 not	 because	 of	 their	 identity	 as	 “second	 generation	 reds,”	 but	because	of	the	successful	transformation	of	this	 identity	into	political	or	financial	resources	 that	occurred	at	 least	 twenty	years	ago.	People	 in	 the	second	category	did	 not	 make	 such	 a	 transformation.	 They	 have	 felt	 increasingly	 unfulfilled	 in	recent	years,	as	the	glory	of	the	revolution	has	continued	to	fade,	and	because	the	perceived	 decline	 in	 their	 status	 has	 affected	 their	 social,	 political,	 and	 financial	positions.	Regarding	themselves	as	a	 living	 link	to	 the	Party’s	revolutionary	past,	they	associate	with	each	other	voluntarily	to	reinforce	this	self-identity.	As	Chinese	media	have	observed	correctly,	“they	take	part	in	collective	activities	and	actively	express	their	opinions,	and	establishing	a	variety	of	associations	and	performing	in	choirs	 are	 their	main	vehicles	 to	 carry	on	 their	 real	 existence	 and	 their	 sense	of	
																																																								34	 Li	Weidong	 李偉東,	Cheng	Min	 程敏,	“Jinian	‘Guanyu	jianguo	yilai	dang	de	ruogan	lishi	wenti	de	jueyi’	fabiao	sanshi	zhounian	zuotanhui	zongshu	 紀念《關於建國以來黨的若干歷史問題的決議》
發表三十週年座談會綜述”	(A	summary	of	the	Commemoration	Seminar	for	the	30th	Anniversary	of	the	Issue	of	the	Resolution	on	Certain	Questions	in	the	History	of	Our	Party	Since	the	Founding	of	the	
People’s	Republic	of	China”),	Yan-Huang	chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	2011(10),	pp.	10-16.	 	
		
212	mission.”35	 		 	 The	majority	of	their	forefathers	were	purged	by	Mao	and	most	of	these	“second	generation	 reds”	 suffered	 personally	 in	 different	 ways	 during	 the	 Mao	 Era,	 and	especially	 during	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution.	 However,	 none	 of	 their	 suffering	 has	helped	 them	 reflect	 critically	 on	 Mao	 and	 his	 administration.	 Obsessing	 about	Maoist	 ideology	 and	 even	Maoist	 lifestyle,	 some	of	 them	use	 their	 poverty	 as	 an	indicator	to	claim	that	they	are	the	real	heirs	of	Mao’s	regime.	To	a	great	degree,	the	behavior	of	 these	 “second	generation	reds”	proves	what	historians	have	said	about	history’s	significance	to	certain	contemporary	people:	“For	those	who	do	not	have	 power	 or	who	 feel	 that	 they	 do	 not	 have	 enough,	 history	 can	 be	 a	way	 of	protesting	 against	 their	 marginalization,	 or	 against	 trends	 or	 ideas	 they	 do	 not	like.”36	 		 	 To	protect	 their	supposed	status	as	 “red	heirs,”	 these	people	work	against	any	serious	reevaluation	of	the	Mao	Era.	For	the	same	reason,	they	are	also	sensitive	to	the	possibility	 that	 the	Party	will	gradually	change	 its	 faith	 in	Marxism	and	“Mao	Zedong	 Thought,”	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 they	 voluntarily	 assume	 the	 responsibility	 of	keeping	the	Party	on	its	Maoist	track.	As	a	daughter	of	a	PLA	general,	Xu	Wenhui	
徐文惠	 (1939-	)	retired	as	an	ordinary	official	a	number	of	years	ago.37	 Today,	she	holds	the	title	of	president	of	the	Beijing	Association	for	Promoting	the	Culture	of	the	Founding	Fathers	of	the	Country	(Beijing	kaiguo	yuanxun	wenhua	cujin	hui	 北
京開國元勳文化促進會),	and	is	active	in	organizing	“second	generation	reds”	who	share	the	same	admiration	for	Mao	to	sing	“red	songs”	and	attend	other	activities	related	 to	 “red	 culture.”	 In	 a	 dialogue	with	 a	 journalist,	 Xu	 often	mentioned	 her	concerns	 that	 the	Party	and	the	country	were	“going	 to	change	color”	 (bianse	 變
色),	by	which	she	means	“to	lose	their	faith	in	communism,”	or	“to	change	to	other	political	 systems.”	 Her	words	 in	 the	 dialogue	 below	 reflect,	 among	 other	 things,	that	the	behavior	of	the	second	generation	reds	results	from	obsession,	rather	than	rational	thinking:	 	Xu:	Belief	 is	 the	most	 important	 thing.	We	are	going	 to	pass	on	 the																																																									35	 Fan	Chenggang	 范承剛,	“Guojia	zhi	zi	 國家之子”	(The	sons	of	the	country),	Nanfang	zhoumo	 南
方週末,	 November	 11,	 2013.	 http://www.infzm.com/content/96083	 (last	 visited	 on	 August	 5,	2015).	 	36	Margret	MacMillan,	 Dangerous	Games:	The	Uses	and	Abuses	of	History.	 New	York:	Modern	Library,	2009,	p.	53. 	37	 Xu	Wenhui’s	father	is	Xu	Haidong	 徐海東	 (1900-1970).	Xu	Wenhui	and	Hu	Muying	 胡木英,	Hu	Qiaomu’s	daughter,	are	the	most	active	organizers	among	the	“second	generation	reds”.	
		
213	red	culture	from	generation	to	generation,	preventing	[our	Party	and	our	country]	from	“turning	to	other	colors.”	Journalist:	 What	 do	 you	 think	 is	 threatening	 the	 red	 color	 [of	 the	Party	and	the	country]?	Xu:	Everybody	knows	 the	USA	would	 like	 to	see	 future	generations	[of	Chinese]	abandon	the	red	color.38		 	 The	reason	 for	 their	sensitivity	 to	 the	potential	of	bianse	 is	because,	 to	a	great	extent,	 they	 have	 bound	 the	 reputation	 and	 social	 status	 of	 their	 parents	 and	themselves	 to	 China’s	 “color,”	 which	 for	 them	 is	 reflected	 basically	 in	 the	leadership	and	in	the	majority	of	Chinese	people’s	assessment	of	Mao	and	his	era.	This	mentality	has	made	them	susceptible	to	the	use	of,	and	belief	in,	quasi-official	historical	narratives,	and	 this	emotional	attachment	has,	 in	 turn,	been	reinforced	further	 by	 these	 kinds	 of	 historical	 writings.	 The	 following	 paragraph	 in	 the	concluding	section	of	Shuang	Shi’s	 (Zhou	 Jun)	book	about	 the	WRA,	 for	example,	attempts	blatantly	to	provoke	its	target	readers’	emotions.	Mao	 is	a	great	political	 symbol,	which	represents	 the	history	of	 the	Chinese	 revolution…[If	 the	 “second	 generation	 reds”	 criticize	Mao,]	then	their	parents	will,	in	the	near	future,	be	labeled	as	“communist	bandits”	 and	 will	 go	 to	 hell	 without	 any	 chance	 of	 rebirth.	 Just	imagine	what	will	happen	if	those	people	who	have	been	deprived	of	their	possessions	by	the	Communists	come	back	 into	power?	When	they	 start	 to	 slaughter	 “communist	 bandits,”	 they	 will	 not	 identify	which	faction	[your	forefathers	belonged	to].	To	abandon	Mao	means	also	to	abandon	your	forefathers	and	yourselves.	I	suggest	people	my	age	 and	 young	 people	 be	 careful	 [when	 they	 deal	 with	 historical	issues]!39		 	 To	summarize,	I	have	discussed	here	a	total	of	three	types	of	“second	generation	reds.”	 The	 first	 is	 constituted	 by	 those	 people	 whose	 families	 were	 involved	 in	certain	historical	events,	and	their	opinions	depend	on	the	role	that	their	parents	played	 in	 history.	 The	 second	 type	 of	 “second	 generation	 reds”	 hold	 clear	 ideas	about	 Chinese	 politics,	 and	 their	 interpretations	 of	 historical	 issues	 are	 in	accordance	with	their	current	political	thought.	The	third	set	of	“second	generation																																																									38	 Fan	Chenggang,	2013.	39	 Shuang	Shi,	2013,	p.	444.	
		
214	reds”	are	obsessed	with	protecting	the	Party	and	the	country’s	“color,”	partially	by	means	of	maintaining	Mao’s	verdicts	on	historical	issues.		 	 The	 last	 two	 groups’	 thoughts	 and	 practices	 require	 more	 attention,	 because	they	 have	 wider	 social	 foundations	 and	 reflect	 China’s	 social	 reality	 more	extensively.	China	never	lacks	requests	for	freedom	and	democracy.	This	trend	of	thought	culminated	in	2008	when	the	“Charter	08”	(零八憲章)	was	issued.	At	the	same	time,	there	are	many	Chinese	people	who	continue	to	sing	the	praises	of	Mao	and	the	years	under	his	rule.	Although	the	“Mao	Craze”	of	the	1990s40	 has	faded,	the	 “Red	 complex”	 phenomenon	 remains	 quite	 common	 among	 Chinese	 people.	Thus,	 quasi-official	 Party	 historiography	 provides	 evidence	 of	 the	 argument	 of	both	of	the	social	psychologies	above.	 		 	 Why	Does	Quasi-official	Party	Historiography	Matter?		 	 The	majority	of	quasi-official	Party	historical	writings	centers	on	the	questions	that	were	created	by	Party	leaders	and	historians	during	certain	historical	periods	and	for	certain	political	purposes.	The	new	explanations	to	these	old	questions	are	of	no	 academic	 importance,	 but	 the	 fact	 that	 they	have	emerged	 in	 an	 age	when	revolutionary	history	should	have	faded,	and	the	fact	that	they	have	attracted	the	interest	of	both	top	leaders	and	ordinary	audiences	is	worthy	of	attention.	 		 	 Most	 importantly,	 quasi-official	 Party	 historiography	 is	 an	 inseparable	 part	 of	China’s	 contemporary	 politics	 because	 of	 its	 relationship	 with	 the	 “second	generation	reds.”	No	observer	can	afford	 to	underestimate	 the	 influence	 that	 the	“second	generation	reds”	are	exercising	on	Chinese	politics,	not	only	because	some	of	them	hold	or	recently	held	high	positions,	but	also	because	they	exert	influence	at	 a	 personal	 level	 on	 current	 leaders,	 Xi	 Jinping	 in	 particular.	While	 both	 Jiang	Zemin	 and	 Hu	 Jintao	 胡錦濤	 (1942-	 )	 derived	 legitimacy	 from	 being	 supported	and	 groomed	 by	 Deng,41	 Xi	 has	 benefited	 greatly	 from	 the	 reputation	 and	 good	personage	 of	 his	 father,	 Xi	 Zhongxun	 習仲勳 	 (1913-2002).	 As	 a	 result,	 the	opinions	of	 the	“second	generation	reds,”	which	are	reflected	 in	 their	debates	on	historical	issues,	are	of	special	significance	to	Chinese	politics	in	the	Xi	regime.	
																																																								40	 For	the	“Mao	Craze”,	or	Mao	re	 毛熱,	see	“The	Irresistible	Fall	and	Rise	of	Mao”,	 in	Geremie	R.	Barmé,	Shades	of	Mao:	The	Posthumous	Cult	of	the	Great	Leader.	Armank,	N.	Y.:	M.	E.	Sharpe,	1996,	pp.	3-73.	41	 Kjeld	 Erik	 Brodsgaard,	 “China’s	 Communist	 Party	 and	 the	 Evolving	 Political	 Order”,	 in	 David	Shambaugh,	 ed.,	 Charting	 China’s	 Future:	 Domestic	 and	 International	 Challenges.	 New	 York:	Routledge,	2011,	pp.	13-21.	
		
215		 	 Moreover,	these	quasi-official	historical	writings	are	playing	an	essential	role	in	shaping	 the	 Chinese	 people’s	 political	 ideas.	 To	 a	 considerable	 extent,	 the	prevalence	 of	 quasi-official	 Party	 historiography	 reflects	 the	 absence	 of	 political	transparency.	 Because	 there	 is	 little	 opportunity	 and	 effective	 channels	 for	 both	the	elites	 and	 the	masses	 to	express	 their	opinions,	discussing	Party	History	has	become	an	indirect	means	for	the	Chinese	people	to	participate	in	politics,	even	if	it	is	 sometimes	 only	 in	 a	 psychological	 sense.	 Because	 the	 workings	 and	decision-making	of	the	leadership	are	shrouded	in	much	mystery,	Chinese	people	have	become	sensitive	 to	everything	 that	 the	 leaders	and	 those	who	are	close	 to	them	do.	In	the	past	few	years,	the	activities	of	the	“second	generation	reds,”	like	singing	 “revolutionary	 songs”	 (or	 “red	 songs”,	hongge	 紅歌)	 and	 apologizing	 for	their	 practices	 during	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 have	 aroused	 enormous	 interest.	Their	 attitudes	 towards	 Party	 History	 are	 exerting	 influence	 on	 the	 Chinese	people’s	 understanding	 of	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution,	 of	 the	 95-year	 history	 of	 the	Party,	and	on	the	current	administration	of	the	CCP.		 	 In	this	context,	 in	2013,	the	Party	Center	began	to	criticize	“historical	nihilism”	as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 prevalence	 of	 quasi-official	 Party	 historiography	 and	 as	 a	response	to	the	pressure	they	face	concerning	historical	problems.	 	 	
6.2	Genuine	vs.	Fake	“Historical	Nihilism”42		 	 In	the	early	1990s,	a	wave	of	criticism	was	directed	at	“historical	nihilism”	(lishi	
xuwu	 zhuyi	 歷史虛無主義).	 At	 the	 time,	 the	 primary	 target	 was	 the	 idea	 of	“farewell	 to	 revolution”	 (gaobie	 geming	 告別革命)	 raised	 by	 Li	 Zehou	 李澤厚	(1930-	 )	 and	 Liu	 Zaifu	 劉再復	 (1941-	 ),	 which	 represented	 the	 attempts	 to	reinterpret	 modern	 Chinese	 history	 in	 a	 way	 that	 deviated	 from	 the	 CCP’s	historical	materialist	interpretation.43	 As	Li	Huaiyin	argues,	the	historiography	of	modern	China	 in	 the	1980s	and	1990s	underwent	a	paradigm	shift	 in	which	 the	modernization	 paradigm	 shook	 the	 status	 of	 the	 traditional	 revolutionary																																																									42	 The	 first	 thing	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 clarified	 is	 that	 here	 the	 concept	 of	 “historical	 nihilism”	 has	nothing	to	do	with	the	concept	of	the	same	name	that	 is	 found	in	the	history	of	Western	thought.	The	 “historical	 nihilism”	 discussed	 in	 this	 thesis	 must	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 context	 of	 modern	Chinese	politics.	43	 These	articles	 that	were	opposed	 to	 “historical	nihilism”	were	 later	 compiled	 into	 a	book.	 Sha	Jiansun	 沙健孫	 and	Gong	Shuduo	 龔書鐸,	 eds.,	Zou	 shenme	 lu:	 guanyu	Zhongguo	 jin	 xiandai	 lishi	
shang	 de	 ruogan	 zhongda	 shifei	 wenti	 走什麼路：關於中國近現代歷史上的若干重大是非問題	(Which	is	our	road:	on	several	crucial	 issues	in	modern	Chinese	history).	 Jinan:	Shandong	renmin	chubanshe	 山東人民出版社,	1997.	
		
216	historiography.44	 The	 first	 wave	 of	 criticism	 of	 “historical	 nihilism”	 was	 the	authorities’	 response	 to	 this	 shift.	 Compared	 to	 the	 criticism	 in	 the	 1990s,	 the	on-going	 campaign	of	 criticism	 towards	 “historical	nihilism”	 is	more	 intense	and	has	a	high-level	background,	as	it	was	launched	officially	in	a	document	issued	by	the	Politburo,	 and	 the	 relevant	 articles	 are	published	by	 some	of	 the	Party’s	 top	official	 organs.	China	observers	 could	not	help	but	presume	 the	Xi	 government’s	reasons	 and	 goals	 for	 doing	 this.	 Scholars	 such	 as	 David	 Shambaugh	 see	 the	document	as	evidence	of	a	 lack	of	confidence	 in	controlling	Chinese	society.45	 As	this	 section	will	 argue,	 in	addition	 to	a	 lack	of	 confidence,	 criticism	of	 “historical	nihilism”	 also	 has	 been	 generated	 by	 a	 series	 of	 dilemmas	 concerning	 historical	issues	that	the	Party	leadership	is	facing.	 	
6.2.1	Criticizing	the	So-called	“Historical	Nihilism”	 		 	 Document	No.	9,	issued	in	April	2013,	and	referred	to	above,	defined	the	concept	of	 “historical	nihilism”	officially.	According	to	 this	document,	 “historical	nihilism”	in	 contemporary	 China	 contains	 three	 aspects:	 (1)	 denying	 the	 importance	 of	revolution,	 and	 claiming	 that	 the	 revolution	 led	 by	 the	 CCP	has	 destroyed	China	[rather	than	enabled	China’s	construction];	(2)	denying	the	historical	inevitability	of	China’s	becoming	a	socialist	country,	and	considering	the	Party’s	history	and	the	PRC’s	history	as	a	 series	of	mistakes,	and	 (3)	denying	 the	existing	evaluations	of	historical	 events	 and	 historical	 figures,	 and	 disparaging	 revolutionary	predecessors	and	Party	leaders.46		 	 Since	2013,	Party	theoreticians	have	produced	more	detailed	descriptions	of	this	concept.	 For	 example,	 they	 argue	 that	 the	manifestations	 of	 “historical	 nihilism”	include:	denying	the	Party’s	history	as	a	whole	by	criticizing	the	Party’s	mistakes;	denying	 the	 importance	 of	 Mao’s	 entire	 life	 by	 criticizing	 the	 mistakes	 he	committed	 in	 his	 last	 years,	 and	 denying	 the	 history	 of	 the	 international	communist	 movement	 by	 pointing	 out	 the	 mistakes	 in	 the	 movement	 and	 the	
																																																								44	 Li	Huaiyin,	2010.	45	 David	Shambaugh,	“The	Coming	Chinese	Crackup”,	The	Wall	Street	Journal,	March	6,	2015.		 http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198	 (last	 visited	 on	September	21,	2015).	46	 Zhonggong	 zhongyang	 bangongting	 中共中央辦公廳	 (The	 General	 Office	 of	 the	 CCP	 Central	Committee),	2013.	
		
217	defects	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 model.47	 Combining	 all	 of	 these	 elements,	 Party	theoreticians	accuse	“historical	nihilists”	of	having	adopted	two	incorrect	methods	to	write	Party	History.	One	is	to	subvert	the	accepted	conclusions	about	the	Party’s	history,48	 in	 particular	 the	 attempt	 to	 change	 the	 official	 assessments	 of	 Party	leaders	who	are	 considered	 to	have	 committed	 serious	mistakes.	The	other	 is	 to	reveal	 the	 mistakes	 that	 the	 Party	 committed,	 thereby	 “creating	 a	 general	impression	that	the	CCP	did	nothing	good.”49	 		 	 The	 reinterpretation	 of	 the	 WRA	 in	 the	 1980s	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 manifestation	 of	historical	nihilism.	In	the	report	of	a	research	project	sponsored	by	the	Ministry	of	Education,	 a	Wuhan	 University	 professor	 ranked	 the	 issue	 of	 the	WRA	 together	with	 two	 other	 sensitive	 events	 in	 the	 Party’s	 history—the	 Eliminating	 of	 the	Counter-revolutionary	 Campaign	 in	 the	 Central	 Soviet	 Region	 and	 the	 Yan’an	Rectification	 Campaign—among	 the	 topics	 most	 contaminated	 by	 historical	nihilism.50		 	 What	 then,	 is	 the	 correct	way	 to	write	 Party	History?	 The	 Party	 theoreticians	who	criticize	“historical	nihilism”	quote	Deng	frequently:	“generally	speaking,	our	Party’s	history	is	a	glorious	history.”51	 They	admit	that	the	CCP	and	Party	leaders	have	 committed	 many	 mistakes,	 but	 they	 argue	 that,	 “this	 is	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	experience	and	because	of	historical	 limitations,	rather	than	because	of	the	Party	or	 socialism.”52	 Following	 this	 argument,	 they	 state	 that	 historians	 should	write	about	 the	 Party’s	 contributions,	 rather	 than	 its	 mistakes.	 With	 respect	 to	 the	question	of	how	to	assess	Mao,	which	Party	theoreticians	consider	to	be	one	of	the	core	issues	of	“historical	nihilism,”53	 they	believe	firmly	that	Mao’s	achievements																																																									47	 Ma	Xueke	 馬學軻,	 “2014	nian	yishixingtai	 lingyu	shige	redian	wenti	2014年意識形態領域十個
熱點問題”	(The	top	ten	subjects	in	the	field	of	ideology	in	2014),	Makesi	zhuyi	yanjiu	 馬克思主義研
究,	2015(2),	pp.	116-129.	48	 Gong	Yun	 龔雲,	“Yan-Huang	chunqiu:	lishi	xuwu	zhuyi	sichao	de	zhongyao	zhendi	《炎黃春秋》：
歷史虛無主義思潮的重要陣地”	 (Yan-Huang	 chunqiu	 is	 one	 of	 the	 main	 vehicles	 of	 historical	nihilism).	The	author	Gong	Yun	is	a	researcher	of	the	Marxism	Research	Academy	(馬克思主義研究
院).	This	article	became	popular	on	some	Chinese	websites	around	2012.	On	June	3,	2015,	one	day	before	 the	 26th	 anniversary	 of	 Tiananmen	 Massacre,	 the	 official	 media	 of	 the	 Central	 Military	Committee	 of	 the	 CCP,	 Jiefangjun	 bao	 解放軍報,	 republished	 Gong’s	 article	 and	 consequently	aroused	a	new	wave	of	debates	about	“historical	nihilism”.	 	49	 Ibid.	50	 Yang	Jun 楊軍,	“Lishi	xuwu	zhuyi	sichao	bu	cunzai	ma?	 歷史虛無主義思潮不存在嗎？”(Does	not	historical	nihilism	exist?),	Hongqi	wengao	 紅旗文稿,	2014(18),	pp.	21-24.	51	 Deng	Xiaoping,	1994,	pp.	289-290.	52	 Gong	Yun,	2013.	53	 Liang	Zhu	 梁柱,	“Lishi	xuwu	zhuyi	‘chongxie	lishi’	youhe	suqiu	 歷史虛無主義「重寫歷史」有何
訴求”	(What	are	the	“historical	nihilists’”	purposes	of	rewriting	history),	Zhongguo	shehui	kexue	bao	
		
218	outweigh	his	errors.	 		 	 The	criticism	of	historical	nihilism	not	only	targets	the	writings	of	Party	History.	Party	 theoreticians	 state	 that	 “historical	 nihilism”	 denies	 the	 entire	 knowledge	system	of	Chinese	history	 that	was	built	 according	 to	Marxism.	 Specifically,	 they	believe	 that	 many	 aspects	 of	 modern	 Chinese	 history,	 for	 example,	 certain	significant	incidents,	such	as	the	Boxer	Movement,	the	Xinhai	Revolution,	and	the	Taiping	Rebellion,	 have	 already	 been	 contaminated	 by	 “historical	 nihilism.”	 Two	articles	written	by	the	Shanghai	Research	Center	for	the	Theory	of	Socialism	with	Chinese	Characteristics,	which	were	published	in	two	top-ranking	official	journals,	accuse	“historical	nihilism”	of	the	following:	(1)	advocating	“farewell	to	revolutions”	and	denying	the	significance	of	all	the	revolutions	in	modern	Chinese	history;	(2)	preaching	 an	 idea	 that	 China’s	 modernization	 would	 only	 be	 realized	 through	following	 those	 Western	 imperialists	 that	 invaded	 China;	 (3)	 believing	 that	modernization	equaled	Westernization	and	insisting	on	realizing	globalization	and	modernization	 through	 introducing	 ideas	 from	 the	 West;	 (4)	 reinterpreting	historical	figures	and	criticizing	[some	positive	figures]	such	as	Sun	Yat-sen,	Mao,	and	 Lu	 Xun,	 and	 (5)	 beautifying	 the	 ruling	 class	 in	 modern	 Chinese	 history	 by	reinterpreting	 figures	 like	 the	 Empress	 Dowager	 Cixi	 and	 Li	 Hongzhang.54	 In	summary,	 the	vast	majority	of	research	topics	about	modern	Chinese	history	has	been	included	within	the	scope	of	potential	“historical	nihilism.”		 	 Party	History	and	modern	Chinese	history	are	inextricably	entwined,	and	Party	theoreticians	 consider	 both	 to	 be	 important	 to	 political	 reality.	 The	 relationship	between	Party	History	and	the	Party’s	regime	is	obvious.	As	Document	No.	9	states,	denying	the	Party’s	historical	status	facilitates	denying	the	Party’s	legitimacy	as	a	long-term	governing	party.55	 As	for	modern	Chinese	history,	critics	draw	a	similar	conclusion.	They	argue	 that	 to	deny	 the	history	of	 the	Chinese	people’s	struggles	against	foreign	aggressors	or	to	assess	the	ruling	class	before	1949	positively	also																																																																																																																																																																			
中國社會科學報,	April	23,	2014.	Zhongguo	shehui	kexue	Online,	 	http://www.csstoday.net/xueshuzixun/guoneixinwen/89185.html	 (last	 visited	 on	 the	 August	 24,	2015).	 The	 author	 Liang	 Zhu	 is	 a	 professor	 of	 the	 Research	 Center	 for	 Theoretical	 System	 of	Socialism	 with	 Chinese	 Characteristics	 (中國特色社會主義理論體系研究中心)	 in	 The	 Peking	University.	 	54	 Ma	Xueke,	2015;	Gao	Qiqi	 高奇琦,	Duan	Gang	 段鋼,	“Dui	lishi	de	zijue	zixin	shi	dizhi	lishi	xuwu	zhuyi	de	 jishi	 對歷史的自覺自信是抵制歷史虛無主義的基石”	(The	confidence	 in	[official]	History	is	the	main	weapon	to	fight	against	“historical	nihilism”),	Qiushi	 求是,	2013(1).	Qiushi	Online,	http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2013/201301/201212/t20121227_202428.htm	(last	visited	on	the	August	24,	2015)	55	 Zhonggong	zhongyang	bangongting	(The	General	Office	of	the	CCP	Central	Committee),	2013.	
		
219	is	 designed	 to	 weaken	 the	 CCP’s	 legitimacy.56	 Thus,	 the	 criticism	 of	 “historical	nihilism”	can	be	reduced	to	the	issue	of	the	Party’s	legitimacy.	Because	China	has	adopted	“reform	and	opening	up”	policies	for	nearly	forty	years,	and	has	become	the	 second	 largest	 economy	 in	 the	 world,	 many	 China	 observers	 see	 economic	development	as	the	major	source	of	the	CCP’s	legitimacy.57	 The	Party	leadership,	however,	believes	it	cannot	afford	to	ignore	its	historical	legitimacy.	 		 	 The	 scope	 of	 the	 targets	 criticized	 as	 being	 tainted	 by	 nihilism	 continues	 to	expand.	 For	 example,	 regarding	 methodology,	 case	 studies	 are	 criticized	 as	 a	violation	 of	 the	 Marxist	 principles	 of	 observing	 societies	 and	 the	 world	comprehensively.58	 Some	 literature	 and	 media	 programs	 are	 also	 accused	 of	“historical	nihilism,”	as	they	“attribute	the	occurrence	of	some	significant	events	to	fortuitous	 and	 novel	 reasons.”59	 More	 importantly,	 a	 number	 of	 theoreticians	refuse	 to	 believe	 that	 some	 scholars	 have	 misinterpreted	 the	 Party’s	 glorious	history	in	a	negative	way	or	have	challenged	the	classic	narratives	about	modern	Chinese	history	merely	 for	academic	purposes.	 Instead,	 they	argue	that	 there	are	some	 “appeals	 behind	 [these	 writers’]	 writings” 60—that	 is,	 “to	 attempt	 to	overthrow	 the	 socialist	 regime	 of	 our	 country.”61	 The	 former	 Director	 of	 the	Chinese	 Academy	 of	 Social	 Science,	 Li	 Tieying	 李鐵映	 (1936-	 ),	 who	 is	 also	 a	“second	generation	red,”62	 wrote,	“There	are	many	people	who	are	determined	to	tamper	with	our	history	 in	order	make	us	anxious.”	 In	Li’s	opinion,	 these	people	want	 to	 prevent	 China	 from	 developing	 and	 to	 prevent	 Chinese	 people	 from	becoming	 wealthy,	 so	 they	 are	 deliberately	 fabricating	 history.63	 As	 for	 those	people’s	ultimate	aim,	a	popular	opinion	is	that	they	want	China	to	collapse,	as	did	the	Soviet	Union,	and	become	a	capitalist	country.	Chinese	theoreticians	argue	that	these	 evil	 people’s	 plan	 is	 quite	 feasible,	 given	 the	 fact	 that	 “historical	 nihilism”																																																									56	 Gong	Yun,	2013.	57	 Peter	 Sandby-Thomas,	 Legitimating	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	 Party	 since	 Tiananmen:	 A	 Critical	
Analysis	of	the	Stability	Discourse.	OX:	Routledge,	2011,	p.	6.	58	 Gao	Qiqi	and	Duan	Gang,	2013.	59	 Ibid.	60	 Liang	Zhu,	2014.	61	 Ibid.	62	 Li	 Tieying’s	 father,	 Li	Weihan	was	 one	 of	 the	 Party	 leaders	 in	 the	 early	 1920s.	 After	 1949	 Li	Weihan	was	assigned	to	be	the	Minister	of	United	Front	Work.	Li	Tieying’s	mother,	Jin	Weiying	 金
維映	 (1904-1941),	was	also	a	revolutionary,	and	once	was	married	to	Deng	Xiaoping	in	the	early	1930s.	63	 Li	Tieying	 李鐵映,	 “Yao	 you	 ziji	 de	 lishi	 guan	 要有自己的歷史觀”	 ([We]	 should	have	our	 own	view	of	history),	Zhongguo	shehui	kexue	bao	 中國社會科學報,	Feb	27,	2015.	http://sscp.cssn.cn/xkpd/xszx/gn/201502/t20150227_1524895.html	 (last	 visited	 on	 September	19,	2015).	
		
220	was	prevalent	in	the	Soviet	Union	before	its	collapse.64	 		 	 On	 the	 issue	of	 the	WRA,	 these	criticisms	of	 “historical	nihilism”	are	similar	 to	the	arguments	of	the	“pro-Mao	faction,”	which	claims	that	those	who	are	trying	to	change	Mao’s	verdicts	on	historical	problems	actually	intend	to	challenge	the	CCP’s	status	as	the	ruling	party.	We	should	not,	however,	simply	see	this	criticism	as	an	attempt	 to	maintain	 the	official	historical	narratives	 created	during	 the	Mao	Era.	This	 campaign	 of	 criticism	 might	 have	 been	 launched	 as	 one	 step	 in	 stopping	scholars	 and	writers	 from	 arguing	 continually	 about	 historical	 issues,	 but	 it	 has	deviated	 from	 its	 original	 intention,	 and	 it	 is	 probably	 the	 reason	 that	 more	attention	is	being	paid	to	sensitive	aspects	of	Party	History.		 	 Xi	Jinping’s	Dilemma	 		 	 China’s	 current	 leadership	 under	 Xi	 is	 facing	 more	 pressure	 concerning	 the	problem	 of	 how	 to	 assess	 Party	 history	 than	 did	 its	 predecessors	 over	 the	 past	twenty	 some	 years.	 First,	 as	 analyzed	 previously,	 the	 increasingly	 fierce	discussions	 about	 historical	 issues	 among	 officials,	 “second	 generation	 reds,”	writers,	 and	 ordinary	 people	 have	 put	 significant	 pressure	 on	 the	 leadership.	Secondly,	 because	 of	 Xi’s	 personal	 connection	 with	 certain	 controversial	 issues,	many	people,	from	surviving	senior	cadres	to	ordinary	Chinese	people,	expect	him	to	 be	 more	 motivated	 than	 are	 other	 leaders	 in	 reinterpreting	 Party	 History,	especially	 with	 respect	 to	 those	 issues	 in	 which	 his	 father,	 Xi	 Zhongxun,	 was	involved.65	 		 	 The	situation	that	Xi	is	facing	is	to	some	extent	similar	to	that	Deng	encountered	from	 the	 late	1970s	 to	 the	early	1980s,	when	both	appeals	within	 the	Party	and	public	opinion	forced	the	new	leadership	to	attempt	to	resolve	historical	problems	almost	 immediately	 after	 they	 took	 power.	 The	 current	 leadership,	 however,	 is	confronted	 by	 more	 difficulties,	 because	 it	 must	 assess	 two	 different	 eras—the	Mao	Era	and	the	Reform	Era.	While	Mao	represents	the	 legitimacy	that	the	Party	achieved	from	its	struggles	in	the	revolutionary	years,	Deng	symbolizes	the	Party’s	new	path	of	“socialism	with	Chinese	characteristics.”	Because	Xi	and	his	colleagues																																																									64	 Tian	 Jujian 田居儉,	 “Qizhi	 xianming	 fandui	 lishi	 xuwu	 zhuyi	 旗幟鮮明反對歷史虛無主義”	(Firmly	oppose	historical	nihilism),	Qiushi	 求是,	 2013(19),	pp.	44-46.	The	author	Tian	 Jujian	 is	 a	research	 of	 the	 Research	 Center	 for	 the	 Theoretical	 System	 of	 Socialism	 with	 Chinese	Characteristics	(中國特色社會主義理論體系研究中心)	in	CASS.	 	65	 For	 instance,	 after	 Gao	 Gang’s	 widow	 and	 son	 were	 invited	 to	 attend	 the	 commemoration	ceremony	for	the	centenary	of	the	birth	of	Xi	Zhongxun,	there	was	speculation	that	Xi	Jinping	might	have	 been	 preparing	 to	 rehabilitate	 Gao,	 Xi	 Zhongxun’s	 close	 colleague	 in	 the	 1930s	 at	 the	Northwest	Revolutionary	Base.	 	
		
221	have	 inherited	 the	 political	 legacy	 of	 both	Mao	 and	 Deng,	 they	 need	 to	 face	 the	difficult	 problem	 of	 interpreting	 these	 two	 prominent	 figures	 logically,	 and	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	 acceptable	 to	 the	 majority	 of	 Party	 cadres	 and	 to	 as	 many	 Chinese	citizens	 as	 possible.	 The	 current	 Party	 leaders	 might	 be	 happy	 to	 make	 some	changes	 to	 the	 official	 narratives	 of	 certain	 events	 or	 figures,	 due	 to	 numerous	appeals	 and	 public	 opinion,	 but	 they	 definitely	 do	 not	 want	 to	 risk	making	 any	conclusive	assessments	of	 the	Mao	or	 the	Reform	Eras.	One	more	 factor	 that	has	made	the	situation	even	more	complex	is	that	some	thirty	years	ago,	Deng	made	an	official	assessment	of	Mao	that	 is	neither	clear	nor	 logical.	This	means	that	when	Deng’s	 successors	 consider	 whether	 they	 should	 reassess	 Mao,	 they	 must	 think	simultaneously	 about	 whether	 they	 are	 ready	 to	 evaluate	 Deng’s	 assessment	 of	Mao	and	how	to	do	so.	 		 	 Further,	 the	Mao	Era	and	the	Reform	Era	are	not	completely	separate	periods.	Those	 cadres,	 intellectuals,	 and	 ordinary	 Chinese	 citizens	 who	 are	 paying	 close	attention	to	the	leadership’s	attitude	to	the	Mao	Era	also	anticipate	changes	in	the	verdicts	pertaining	to	certain	figures	and	events	under	Deng’s	administration,	with	Hu	 Yaobang,	 Zhao	 Ziyang,	 and	 the	 Tiananmen	 Massacre	 as	 the	 three	 major	candidates.	 The	 words	 of	 Li	 Rui,	 Mao’s	 former	 secretary,	 and	 one	 of	 the	 most	senior	 cadres	 still	 living,	 represent	 the	expectations	of	 a	 considerable	number	of	influential	 figures.	 He	 said,	 “It	 is	 an	 ordeal	 for	 the	 new	 generation	 leaders	 [to	assess	the	Party’s	past].	It	depends	on	whether	they	have	the	courage	to	make	the	third	resolution	on	historical	issues,	to	resolve	[historical	problems],	including	the	June	4th	 Incident.”66	 Because	 the	 rehabilitation	 of	 Zhao	Ziyang,	Hu	Yaobang,	 and	the	 Tiananmen	 Massacre	 will	 definitely	 receive	 strong	 opposition	 from	conservatives	within	the	Party,	and	will	also	lead	to	more	expectations	of	political	reforms,	the	current	Party	Center	has	no	desire	to	do	this.	As	a	result,	although	Xi	and	 his	 colleagues	 have	 incentives	 to	 resolve	 certain	 historical	 problems	 that	occurred	during	the	Mao	Era,	they	remain	discreet	when	dealing	with	them.	 		 	 As	analyzed	previously,	Deng	encouraged	senior	cadres	 to	write	Party	History.	In	 doing	 so,	 the	 pressure	 on	 the	 leadership	 to	 resolve	 historical	 problems	 was	relieved	 in	part.	 In	 the	meantime,	Deng	promoted	 a	 dictum	of	 “It	 is	 better	 to	 be	vague	 than	 meticulous,”	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 the	 challenges	 to	 Mao’s	 orthodox	historical	 narratives	 under	 his	 control.	 Under	 Deng’s	 supervision,	 a	 number	 of																																																									66	 Li	Rui,	2013,	p.	190.	
		
222	verdicts	were	changed,	but	 in	 the	end,	an	official	resolution	once	again	defined	a	new	Party	History	 framework.	 Through	 this	 tortuous	 process,	Deng	 reduced	 the	number	of	debates	within	the	Party	temporarily,	but	left	many	unsolved	problems	to	 his	 successors.	 Looking	 at	 how	 the	 current	 Party	 leadership	 is	 dealing	 with	debates	on	historical	issues,	Xi’s	attempts	to	emulate	Deng’s	methods	are	evident.	At	the	beginning	of	2013,	Xi	pronounced	an	ambiguous	principle	about	assessing	the	 Party’s	 past:	 “[People]	 cannot	 deny	 what	 was	 done	 before	 the	 ‘reform	 and	opening-up’	 period	 based	 on	 what	 happened	 after	 it,	 and	 vice	 versa”67	 (In	 the	CCP’s	 discourse	 this	 principle	 is	 called	 “double-cannot-deny,”	 liangge	 buneng	
fouding	 兩個不能否定).	 To	 put	 it	more	 directly,	 Xi	 is	 actually	 telling	 people	 that	the	Party	acted	correctly	both	during	the	Mao	and	the	Reform	Eras.	The	strongest	indication	that	Xi	provides	here	is	simply	“Do	not	debate	historical	issues	anymore.”	Three	months	after	Xi	produced	the	rule	of	“double-cannot-deny,”	the	Party	Center	issued	Document	No.	9	and	began	its	criticism	of	“historical	nihilism.”	This	might	be	one	more	manoeuvre	that	the	Party	has	adopted	to	address	historical	problems.	Because	 “historical	 nihilism”	 remains	 a	 very	 ambiguous	 concept,	 the	 authorities	could	easily	redefine	this	concept	in	the	future	and	make	the	critics	the	new	targets	of	 criticism.	 In	 doing	 this,	 the	Party	Center	might	 have	 expected	 to	 silence	 all	 of	them.	However,	and	likely	contrary	to	the	authorities’	expectation,	the	criticism	of	“historical	nihilism”	has	not	stopped	scholars	from	discussing	historical	issues,	but	instead	has	provoked	attacks	by	these	supposed	“historical	nihilists.”	 	
6.2.2	Responses	of	“Historical	Nihilists”	 		 	 First,	and	quite	naturally,	scholars	deny	that	their	research	amounts	to	historical	nihilism.	They	argue	that	making	adverse	assessments	of	certain	leaders	or	of	the	Party’s	 work	 during	 certain	 historical	 periods	 should	 not	 be	 deemed	 historical	nihilism.	 Even	 if	 there	 are	 different	 opinions	 on	 these	 issues,	 they	 are	 merely	academic	debates,	rather	than	indications	of	a	harmful	paradigm.68																																																									67	 Zhonggong	 zhongyang	 dangshi	 yanjiushi	 中共中央黨史研究室 	 (The	 Central	 Party	 History	Research	 Office),	 “Zhengque	 kandai	 gaige	 kaifang	 qianhou	 liangge	 lishi	 shiqi—xuexi	 Xi	 Jinping	zongshuji	guanyu	‘liangge	buneng	fouding’	de	zhongyao	lunshu	 正確看待改革開放前後兩個歷史時
期——學習習近平總書記關於‘兩個不能否定’的重要論述”	(To	study	the	Chief	Secretary	of	the	CCP,	Xi	 Jinping’s	 account	 about	 “double-cannot-deny”	 and	 to	 rightly	 understand	 the	 two	 historical	periods—before	and	after	1978),	Renmin	ribao	 人民日報	http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/1108/c40531-23472265.html	 (last	 visited	 on	 August	 24,	2015).	68	 Ma	 Longshan	 馬龍閃,	 “Lishi	 xuwu	 zhuyi	 de	 lailongqumai	 歷史虛無主義的來龍去脈”	 (The	genesis	of	historical	nihilism),	Yan-Huang	chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	2014(5),	pp.	23-28.	Ma	Longshan	is	a	
		
223		 	 Refusing	to	accept	the	condemnations	of	them,	these	scholars	in	turn	charge	that	those	 who	 criticize	 them	 are	 the	 real	 historical	 nihilists.	 The	 retired	 deputy	director	of	the	Theoretical	Research	Office	in	the	Central	Party	School,	Du	Guang,	divides	historical	nihilism	into	two	categories.	The	first	is	referred	to	as	“historical	nihility,”	which	means	avoiding	discussing	some	historical	issues	in	order	to	make	people	 forget	 them.	 The	 other	 is	 called	 “nihilistic	 history,”	 which	 refers	 to	 the	fabrication	of	historical	narratives.	According	to	Du,	the	CCP’s	official	Party	History	contains	 both	 of	 the	 above	 two	 categories	 of	 nihilistic	 historical	 narratives,	with	the	“Purging	the	‘AB	Group’	Campaign”	in	the	Central	Soviet	Region	and	the	WRA	as	the	most	important	examples	in	each	category,	respectively.69	 		 	 Scholars	also	underscore	 that	historical	nihilism	was	not	only	prevalent	 in	 the	Mao	Era,	but	also	existed	in	the	Reform	Era.	Ma	Longshan	writes	that	an	extreme	manifestation	of	“historical	nihilism”	in	modern	China	is	expressed	by	some	people	who	 assert	 that	 a	 new	 Cultural	 Revolution	will	 help	 deal	with	 the	 corruption	 of	officialdom	and	destroy	the	“new	capitalists”	(xinsheng	“zou	zi	pai”	 新生“走資派”)	in	 China.	 Ma	 considers	 that	 forbidding	 people	 from	 talking	 about	 the	 Cultural	Revolution	 in	 order	 to	 make	 the	 new	 generation	 of	 Chinese	 people	 forget	 this	history	 is	 a	 mild	 expression	 of	 “historical	 nihilism.”70	 Du	 Guang	 also	 criticizes	“historical	nihilism”	in	both	the	Mao	Era	and	the	Reform	Era.	With	respect	to	the	issue	of	the	WRA,	Du	says	that	in	the	Mao	Era,	“historical	facts	were	replaced	with	fictional	lies.	As	a	result	people	mistakenly	took	these	lies	as	truth.”	Du	said	that	in	the	Reform	Era,	although	the	official	Party	History	was	changed	in	some	ways,	it	is	still	 taboo	to	discuss	 the	reasons	 for	 the	WRA’s	defeat.	 In	 this	sense,	 “the	core	of	this	historical	issue	is	still	kept	nihilistic.”71		 	 Moreover,	 the	 above-mentioned	 scholars’	 targets	 of	 criticism	 not	 only	 include	the	 official	 Party	History,	 but	 also	 the	Marxist	 system	 of	 theories.	 Yin	 Baoyun,	 a	Beijing	University	professor,	wrote:	“The	system	adopts	a	nonexistent	communist	society	as	the	sole	standard	to	judge	everything,”	thereby	“preventing	people	from	appropriately	understanding	history	and	reality.”	In	a	word,	“it	is	a	big	obstacle	to	
																																																																																																																																																																		researcher	in	the	Global	History	Institute,	CASS.	69	 Du	Guang	 杜光,	“Lishi	xuwu	zhuyi	de	xuwu	he	zhuyi	 歷史虛無主義的虛無和主義”	(The	nihilism	of	 nihilistic	 history).	 http://wlc01.tumblr.com/post/75029597326/杜光历史虚无主义的虚无和主
义	 	 posted	on	January	30,	2014	(last	visited	on	August	24,	2015).	70	 Ma	Longshan,	2014.	71	 Du	Guang	 杜光,	2014.	
		
224	[China’s]	 reforms	 and	 opening	 up,	 as	well	 as	 the	 progress	 of	 Chinese	 society.”72	Similar	 to	 the	 criticism	 of	 “historical	 nihilism”	 discussed	 in	 the	 last	 subsection,	these	scholars	also	consider	“historical	nihilism”	to	be	a	contributing	factor	to	the	Soviet	 Union’s	 collapse.	 By	 historical	 nihilism,	 however,	 they	 mean	 Marxist	historiography,	rather	than	intellectuals’	dissenting	opinions.73		 	 The	most	striking	aspect	of	these	scholars’	criticism	targets	the	CCP	regime.	First,	they	condemn	the	Party	as	having	made	use	of	 the	state’s	propaganda	system	to	fight	 so-called	 “historical	 nihilism,”	 a	 label	 that	 has	 been	 placed	 upon	 them	artificially.	They	 consider	 the	anti-“historical	nihilism”	 campaign	 to	be	a	political	movement,	similar	 to	 the	movements	 in	 the	Mao	Era	and	those	conducted	under	Deng’s	supervision.74	 Secondly,	these	scholars’	criticisms	go	beyond	ideology,	and	consider	 other	 aspects	 of	 the	 Party’s	 governance.	 They	 argue	 that	 because	 the	authorities	have	failed	to	realize	that	they	are	the	real	historical	nihilists,	they	have	done	many	contradictory	things.	For	example:	[They]	emphasize	that	Marxism	is	a	universal	truth,	while	opposing	“universal	values.”	They	 talk	a	 lot	about	 the	rule	of	 law	as	well	as	the	 constitution,	 while	 considering	 the	 word	 “xianzheng	 憲政”	(constitutionalism)	as	sensitive	and	forbid	the	media	to	mention	it.	[They]	highly	praise	the	violent	revolutions	of	the	Chinese	masses,	while	 encouraging	 [local	 governments	 and	 other	 agencies]	 to	forcibly	destroy	residents’	houses	and	stop	people	from	petitioning.	[They]	emphasize	that	the	[Chinese]	people	are	not	qualified	to	be	democratic,	while	claiming	 that	 the	Chinese	people	are	enjoying	a	high-level	democracy	and	human	rights.75		 	 Because	 these	criticisms	 target	 ideological	management	and	other	parts	of	 the	Party’s	 administration,	 it	 is	 only	 a	 matter	 of	 time	 before	 the	 authorities	 take	further	steps	to	eliminate	the	influence	of	these	writers.	 	
																																																								72	 Yin	Baoyun	 尹保雲,	“Yao	jingti	shenmeyang	de	lishi	xuwu	zhuyi	 要警惕什麼樣的歷史虛無主義”	(What	 kind	 of	 historical	 nihilism	 should	 we	 pay	 attention	 to),	 Yan-Huang	 chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	2014(5),	pp.	29-34.	 	73	 Ibid.	74	 Guo	 Shiyou	 郭世佑,	 “Lishi	 xuwu	 zhuyi	 de	 shi	 yu	 xu	 歷史虛無主義的實與虛”	 (The	 substantial	and	meaningless	parts	of	“historical	nihilism”),	Yan-Huang	chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	2014(5),	pp.	35-40.	 	75	 Ibid.	
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Conclusion		 	 The	official	narratives	that	were	created	according	to	Deng’s	dictum,	“It	is	better	to	be	vague	than	meticulous,”	have	been	increasingly	less	effective	since	the	1990s.	Because	 official	 Party	 History	 cannot	 meet	 the	 social	 demand	 for	 historical	interpretations,	 the	 substitute	 for	 it—quasi-official	 Party	 History—has	 attracted	more	and	more	public	interest.	Quasi-official	Party	historiography	seems	to	lack	a	direct	connection	with	 the	political	 reality	of	contemporary	China,	as	 its	subjects	typically	 are	 events	 that	 took	 place	 long	 ago,	 and	 its	 writers	 are	 in	 many	 ways	unlike	 Party	 historians	 in	 the	 ordinary	 sense.	 The	 discussion	 above	 has	 shown,	however,	 that	 quasi-official	 Party	 History	 contains	 even	 more	 hidden	 meanings	that	must	be	decoded	than	did	the	official	Party	History	written	by	the	CROPH.		 	 The	emergence	of	quasi-official	Party	historiography	is	the	result	of	the	Party’s	evasive	attitude	towards	sensitive	historical	issues.	Despite	this	deliberate	evasion,	there	are	 increasingly	 stronger	demands	 to	 reinterpret	 these	 issues,	 both	on	 the	part	of	Party	elites	and	ordinary	citizens.	Quasi-official	Party	History	has	provided	an	 alternative	 set	 of	 historical	 interpretations	 to	meet	 these	 demands.	 Once	 the	Chinese	people	find	that	the	official	 interpretations	that	they	have	been	taught	in	school	and	in	study	sessions	in	danwei	(單位,	work	units)	are	unreliable,	they	turn	to	 quasi-official	 interpretations,	which	 are	 novel,	 powerful,	 and	 comprehensible.	This	 kind	 of	 historiography,	 however,	 prevents	 both	 scholars	 and	 the	 reading	public	from	learning	about	and	understanding	the	CCP’s	history.	On	the	one	hand,	quasi-official	historiography	 further	prevents	academic	scholars	 from	conducting	research	on	sensitive	issues	concerning	Party	History.	Scholars’	accounts	about	the	potential	 danger	 of	 discussing	 sensitive	 issues	 that	were	presented	 in	 Chapter	 5	are	 evidence	 of	 this.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 quasi-official	 Party	 History	 constrains	readers’	 concerns	 within	 certain	 frameworks,	 thus	 preventing	 them	 from	achieving	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 about	 China’s	 modern	 history.	 Thus,	quasi-official	Party	History	functions	as	a	wall	that	separates	academic	historians	and	ordinary	readers.	In	the	case	of	the	WRA,	official	Party	historiography	neither	discusses	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 the	 CCP,	 nor	 the	relationship	between	Zhang	Xueliang	and	the	Party.	These	 important	 issues	have	been	 simplified	 and	 misinterpreted	 by	 the	 Party	 for	 decades.	 Actually,	 in	 the	abstract	sense,	questions	the	Party	avoids	are,	“Why	did	the	CCP	take	over	national	power?,”	and	“What	did	the	CCP	bring	to	China	and	what	will	it	bring	in	the	future?”	
		
226	In	this	sense,	the	CCP’s	official	Party	historiography	created	in	the	Mao	Era	is	still	powerful,	because	it	offers	not	only	interpretations	of	historical	events,	but	also	a	way	for	people	to	look	at	the	Party’s	history.	 		 	 In	 the	meantime,	 quasi-official	 Party	 historiography	 has	 also	 caused	 problems	for	 the	 Party.	 The	 Party’s	 complex	 internal	 arguments	 about	 how	 it	 should	articulate	its	history	now	have	already	offered	one	set	of	difficult	questions	since	the	late	1970s.	In	the	early	21st	century,	the	external	arguments	and	demands	for	new	interpretations	of	historical	issues	have	only	complicated	the	historical	issues	further.	As	the	debates	are	too	fierce	and	the	demands	are	too	significant	to	evade,	the	Party	Center	has	chosen	to	categorize	all	narratives	that	might	evoke	conflicts	as	“historical	nihilism”	in	order	to	silence	the	debates,	rather	than	to	create	a	new	official	Party	History.	 		 	 The	 Xi	 regime	 prefers	 to	 apply	 Deng’s	 method	 of	 dealing	 with	 historical	problems.	The	current	 situation,	however,	 is	different	 from	 that	which	Deng	and	his	colleagues	faced	some	thirty	years	ago.	The	most	important	difference	is	that,	at	 the	time,	many	 first	generation	revolutionaries	were	alive,	and	the	majority	of	them	supported	Deng’s	principle	of	avoiding	conflict	and	reducing	heated	debates	on	 historical	 problems.	 Second,	 in	 the	 late	 1970s,	 the	 “Gang	 of	 Four”	 was	 a	convenient	target	and	by	condemning	them,	the	Party	leadership	was	able	to	unify	the	majority	of	cadres	and	other	people.	It	worked	not	only	in	the	political	domain,	but	 also	 in	 the	 cultural	 field,	 and	 the	 academic	 world,	 with	 the	 criticism	 of	“innuendo	 historiography,”	which	was	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 5,	 as	 an	 example.	 It	was	 under	 these	 special	 circumstances	 that	 Deng’s	 method	 of	 dealing	 with	historical	 problems	 had	 some	 effect	 and	 helped	 to	 balance	 conflicting	 views	 on	controversial	 issues.	 However,	 with	 greater	 pressure	 and	 a	 more	 complicated	situation,	 the	 current	 Party	 leadership	 has	 no	 chance	 to	 achieve	 its	 goals	 by	applying	Deng’s	method.	In	the	near	future,	we	might	see	even	more	quasi-official	narratives,	and	even	fiercer	debates	on	historical	issues	between	different	factions.	As	such,	the	issue	of	the	WRA	is	far	from	being	resolved.	 	
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	 		Fig.	6-1	The	majority	of	comments	on	an	interview	about	the	WRA	that	was	posted	on	Gongshi	wang 共識網	 (www.21ccom.net,	last	visited	on	August	24,	2015)	advocates	the	interpretation	that	attributes	the	WRA’s	defeat	 to	 Mao	 Zedong’s	 conspiracy.	 A	 Chinese	 idiom	 that	 these	commenters	use	here	is	“jiedao	sharen”	(借刀殺人,	to	kill	a	person	with	a	borrowed	knife)	.	 		
		Fig.	 6-2	 The	 front	 cover	 and	 back	 cover	 of	
Lantai	gaocun	(photo	by	author	on	August	1,	2013).	 	 	 		 Fig.	 6-3	 A	 pamphlet	 privately	printed	 by	 retired	 researcher	Geng	 Zhonglin	 (photo	 by	author	on	August	1,	2013).	
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	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		Fig.	6-4;	6-5	Geng	Zhonglin	 charged	Zhu	Yu	with	 “having	 committed	 crimes”	 in	his	 privately	 printed	 pamphlet	 “Bolao	 zazhi”	 (photo	 by	 author	 on	 August	 1,	2013).	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		Fig.	6-6;	6-7	Two	monographs	that	respectively	represent	the	points	of	view	of	the	 “pro-Mao	 faction”	and	 the	 “Mao	detractors”	were	 published	 in	Hong	Kong	(photo	by	author	on	August	1,	2013).	
		
229		 	
			
		Fig.	 6-8;	 6-9	 Screen	 shots	 of	 Feiyang	 junshi	 luntan.	 The	 user	 named	“TwoStones”	 in	 the	 upper	 picture	 is	 Zhou	 Jun.	 Zhou	 is	 arguing	 with	another	 user	 “楚囚”,	who	 Zhou	 believes	 is	Xia	 Yuli’s	 screen	name.	 (Xia	denies	this.)	In	the	lower	picture	a	user	named	“雨客”	is	refuting	Zhou’s	accounts	about	the	WRA	(last	visited	on	August	24,	2015).	
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Chapter	7:	The	Western	Route	Army	at	the	Local	Level:	
Commemoration	and	Propaganda	
Introduction	Party	historiography	at	 the	 local	 level	 is	related	to,	but	also	distinct	 from,	 that	at	the	central	level.	At	the	local	level,	the	local	Party	History	Research	Offices	(PHROs)	are	 in	 charge	 of	 researching	 and	 propagandizing	 local	 Party	 history	 under	 the	direct	 supervision	 of	 local	 Party	 Committees.	 Their	 research	 outcomes	 are	disseminated	 primarily	 in	 the	 form	 of	 internal	 publications,	 but	 in	 recent	 years,	they	 have	 become	 more	 and	 more	 interested	 in	 sponsoring	 or	 assisting	 other	media	productions	 (documentaries,	TV	 series,	picture-story	books,	 etc.).	 Further,	they	 also	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 constructing	 and	 managing	 memorial	 sites,	including	 monuments,	 cemeteries,	 memorial	 halls,	 and	 old	 battlefields,1	 making	use	of	these	vehicles	to	display	their	interpretations	of	the	CCP’s	history.	 		 	 Although	the	writing	of	local	Party	History	and	relevant	propaganda	at	the	local	level	plays	a	crucial	role	in	Party	historiography,	there	is	little	research	in	this	area,	except	for	a	small	number	of	articles	written	by	officers	to	summarize	their	work	and	 share	 their	 experiences.	 Because	 “red	 tourism”	has	 flourished	 in	 China	 over	the	 past	 ten	 years,	 much	 research	 on	 red	 tourism	 has	 been	 published	 both	 in	Chinese	and	in	English.	Most	of	this	research	focuses	on	policy	documents	and	the	construction	of	exhibitions	in	the	Party’s	holy	lands,	with	few	discussions	on	local	leaders	and	local	official	agencies’	activities	in	this	field.		 	 This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 motivations	 of	 local	 governments,	 agencies,	 and	researchers	 in	 propagandizing	 Party	 history,	 and	 the	 approaches	 they	 have	adopted.	The	first	section	traces	the	work	of	 local	official	agencies	 in	writing	and	propagandizing	the	WRA’s	history	during	the	first	two	decades	of	the	Reform	Era,	analyzing	the	reasons	why	they	faced	a	crisis	in	the	1990s	after	having	just	enjoyed	a	golden	era	during	the	1980s.	With	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	we	will	see	that	this	crisis	 in	 local	 Party	 historiography	was	 indeed	 a	 turning	 point.	 Since	 then,	 local	officials	 have	 attempted	 to	 change	 their	 strategies.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 they	 have	been	successful	in	finding	new	focuses	for	their	narratives.	On	the	other	hand,	they	have	 grasped	 the	 opportunity	 created	 when	 the	 Party	 Center	 encouraged	 local																																																									1	 These	 memorial	 sites	 are	 usually	 jointly	 managed	 by	 local	 propaganda	 departments,	 civilian	affairs	bureaus	and	tourism	bureaus.	
		
232	governments	to	develop	red	tourism.	The	next	two	subsections	of	this	chapter	deal	with	the	two	processes	above.	The	second	section	investigates	memorial	sites	for	the	 WRA,	 and	 the	 third	 section	 discusses	 the	 narratives	 of	 the	 WRA	 in	 local	researchers’	 publications,	 local	 government	 propaganda,	 exhibitions,	 and	 oral	interpretations	at	memorial	sites.	 		 	 This	 chapter	 focuses	on	Zhangye,	 a	municipal	borough	of	Gansu.	Among	 those	counties	 that	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 WRA,2	 I	 have	 chosen	Zhangye	because	 two	counties	 in	 its	 jurisdiction,	Gaotai	and	Linze,	were	 those	 in	which	 the	WRA	 suffered	 crushing	defeats;	 consequently,	 Zhangye	has	 one	of	 the	highest	concentrations	of	memorial	sites	to	the	WRA.3	 	
7.1	From	a	Golden	Era	to	a	Crisis	(the	1980s	and	the	1990s)		 	 The	onset	of	 local-level	Party	historiography	originated	in	the	early	1950s.	Not	long	after	the	CCP	took	power,	nationwide	education	in	Party	history	began,	and	so	did	the	practices	of	collecting	and	studying	Party	history	at	provincial,	municipal,	and	 lower	 levels.4	 In	 July	1951,	 the	Party	Center	 issued	a	notice	about	collecting	Party	history	materials,	according	to	which	a	number	of	provincial	institutions	for	Party	 history	 research	 were	 established.	 In	 some	 provinces,	 these	 county-level	PHROs	became	a	part	of	the	county-level	committees	of	the	CCP.5	 The	collection	of	materials	 about	 the	WRA	began	 in	Gansu	during	 this	 time,	but	only	on	a	 limited	scale.	The	golden	era	of	 local	Party	history	research	did	not	come	about	until	the	early	1980s,	when	the	Party	Center	again	urged	local	governments	to	collect,	or	in	the	CCP’s	words	 “to	save”	 (qiangjiu	 搶救)	primary	historical	materials	 that	were																																																									2	 More	 than	 twenty	 counties	 in	 Gansu,	 Qinghai	 and	 Xinjiang	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 writing	 and	propagandizing	the	WRA’s	history.	All	the	battles	that	the	WRA	took	part	in	happened	in	Gansu,	but	after	they	were	defeated	the	remaining	400	troops	stayed	in	Xinjiang	for	months,	and	some	of	the	captured	 troops	were	sent	 to	Qinghai	 to	do	heavy	 labour.	Therefore,	apart	 from	Gansu,	 there	are	also	places	 that	 are	 related	 to	 the	WRA’s	history	 in	Xinjiang	and	Qinghai.	These	places	have	also	become	memorial	sites	in	recent	years.	 	3	 This	 chapter	 relies	 on	 public	 and	 internal	 materials	 mostly	 compiled	 by	 the	 Zhangye	 Party	History	 Research	 Office,	 as	 well	 as	 interviews	 and	 on-site	 observation,	 while	 also	 referencing	relevant	 data	 about	 other	 regions,	 both	 within	 and	 outside	 Gansu	 Province.	 The	 data	 and	observations	that	form	the	foundation	of	this	chapter	were	collected	in	July	2013.	4 	 There	 is	 little	 research	 on	 local	 Party	 historiography,	 and	 there	 are	 some	 popular	misunderstandings	 on	 this	 issue.	 For	 example,	 Geng	 Huamin	 of	 Renmin	 University	 argued	 that	before	the	Cultural	Revolution	“there	were	almost	no	local	Party	history	agencies	in	China”,	which	is	not	 true.	 See	Geng	Huamin	 耿化敏,	 “Gaige	kaifang	qian	Zhonggong	zhongyang	bianxie	dangshi	jiaokeshu	de	shexiang	 改革開放前中共中央編寫黨史教科書的設想”	(The	CCP	Central	Committee’s	plans	of	compiling	Party	history	textbooks	in	the	pre-reform	era),	Zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	 中共
黨史研究,	2014(2),	pp.	35-44.	5	 Fujian	Province	is	an	example.	See	“Cheng	Xu	tongzhi	de	jianghua	 程序同志的講話”	(A	speech	of	Comrade	Cheng	Xu),	Dangshi	yanjiu	yu	jiaoxue	 黨史研究與教學,	1981(12),	pp.	1-10.	
		
233	scattered	all	over	the	country.	These	two	subsections	deal	with	local	WRA	research	and	propaganda	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	respectively.	 	
7.1.1	Local	WRA	Research	and	Propaganda	in	the	1980s		 	 The	 turning	 point	 in	 the	 Party’s	 new	 emphasis	 on	 collecting	 Party	 history	materials	at	the	local	level	can	be	traced	precisely	to	May	1980,	when	the	Central	Committee	for	Soliciting	Party	History	Materials	(Zhongyang	dangshi	ziliao	zhengji	
weiyuanhui	 中央黨史資料徵集委員會)	was	 established	 and	 the	General	Office	 of	the	CCP	Central	Committee	(Zhongyang	bangong	ting	 中共中央辦公廳)	issued	two	documents	that	instructed	local	governments	to	devote	themselves	to	research	on	Party	 history.6	 At	 the	 time,	 the	 Party	 Center,	 led	 by	Deng	 Xiaoping,	was	 using	 a	top-down	approach	to	try	to	reinterpret	the	Party’s	past	and	create	a	new	version	of	 the	 resolution	 on	 several	 essential	 historical	 issues	 in	 order	 to	 maintain	intra-Party	stability	and	rebuild	confidence	in	the	Party	among	the	people.	In	doing	so,	the	Party	Center	realized	that	its	historical	legacy	at	the	local	level	was	equally	worth	 exploiting.	 Consistent	 with	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 directives,	 Soliciting	 Party	History	Materials	Offices	(Dangshi	ziliao	zhengji	bangongshi	 黨史資料徵集辦公室,	hereafter,	SPHMO)	at	the	provincial,	municipal,	and	county	levels	were	established	in	 1981.7	 Locals	 regarded	 the	 WRA’s	 180	 days	 of	 fighting	 in	 Gansu	 as	 a	 “red	historical	resource,”	and	therefore,	the	newly	established	SPHMOs	began	to	collect	WRA	materials	located	in	Gansu	and	Qinghai	counties	straight	away.	
	 	 Collecting	Historical	Materials	about	the	WRA		 	 In	 the	1980s,	 the	main	 job	of	 local	SPHMOs	at	various	 levels	was	 twofold.	One	major	task	was	to	find	important	facts	and	details	about	the	operations	of	the	Party	and	 its	 armies	 in	 particular	 regions.	 The	 outcomes	 of	 their	 studies	 focused	 on	topics	 that	 differed	 from	 those	 of	 researchers	 in	 central	 institutions.	 In	 general,	local	 SPHMO’s	 research	 on	 the	 WRA	 along	 the	 Hexi	 Corridor	 fell	 into	 three																																																									6	 These	two	documents	were	the	No.11	and	the	No.33	Documents	issued	in	1981.	As	a	result,	1982	witnessed	a	series	of	 large-scale	meetings	on	history	material	collection,	 including	National	Work	Conference	for	Party	History	Materials	Collection	(全國黨史資料徵集工作會議,	August	10-20,	1982,	Beijing),	Work	 Conference	 for	 Party	History	Materials	 Collection	 in	 the	 Five	 Provinces	 in	Middle	and	 Southern	 China	 (中南五省黨史資料徵集工作會議,	March	 1982,	 Changsha),	Work	 Conference	for	Party	History	Materials	Collection	in	the	Seven	Provinces	in	Eastern	China	(華東七省市黨史資
料徵集會議,	 March	 1982),	 Work	 Conference	 for	 Party	 History	 Materials	 Collection	 in	 the	 Four	Provinces	in	Southwestern	China	(西南四省區黨史資料徵集工作會議,	October	1982,	Chengdu),	etc.	7	 Zhang	Qihua	 張啟華,	“Nuli	kaichuang	dangshi	ziliao	zhengji	gongzuo	xin	jumian	 努力開創黨史資
料徵集工作新局面”	(Let	us	work	hard	to	collect	Party	history	materials),	Zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	
中共黨史研究,	2007(1),	pp.	4-15.	 	
		
234	categories.	The	 first	 addressed	 the	WRA’s	operations,	which	were	 sorted	 further	into	three	topics:	battles,	casualties,	and	the	WRA’s	off-battlefield	practices,	such	as	recruiting,	securing	food,	and	establishing	 local	Soviet	regimes.	 In	contrast	 to	the	concise	narratives	in	official	Party	History	books	mentioned	in	previous	chapters,	these	offices	explored	much	more	detailed	historical	facts,	such	as	the	exact	onset	of	 a	 certain	 battle	 and	 the	 route	 the	 WRA	 took	 through	 a	 certain	 village.	 The	reclamation	of	such	historical	details	relied	to	a	great	degree	on	the	recollections	of	 local	 people.	 The	 second	 category	 concerned	 the	 assistance	 that	 local	 people	provided	 the	WRA,	 including	 accommodation,	 guides,	 food,	 and	 clothes	 when	 it	was	fighting	against	the	local	warlords’	troops,	as	well	as	medical	treatments	and	shelters	after	the	WRA	was	defeated.	The	final	category	focused	on	the	experiences	of	those	former	WRA	soldiers	who	spent	the	remainder	of	their	lives	in	the	place	where	they	fought	because	they	were	wounded	or	had	lost	contact	with	the	army.		 	 From	 a	 historiographical	 perspective,	 the	 materials	 that	 local	 officials	 and	researchers	 collected	 during	 this	 period	 are	 valuable,	 because	 they	 might	 have	made	 it	possible	 to	 rebuild	 the	WRA’s	narratives	 in	a	way	 that	differed	 from	the	Party’s	 official	 narratives.	 Although	 Party	 history	 researchers	 might	 lead	interviewees	to	answer	questions	within	the	Party’s	official	historical	framework,	these	WRA	soldiers	or	witnesses’	recollections	still	might	be	useful	in	addressing	a	number	of	unexplored	topics,	such	as	the	relationship	between	the	Red	Army	and	the	Muslim	 people	 in	 Gansu	 and	 Qinghai,	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 short-lived	 Soviet	regimes	in	Gansu,	and	the	Communists’	activities	in	Muslim	warlords’	prisons.	As	I	discovered	 in	 my	 fieldwork	 in	 2013,	 however,	 by	 then,	 most	 primary	materials	were	still	kept	in	storage	by	the	local	governments,	having	not	been	processed	or	published.8	 One	reason	 for	 this	 is,	 in	part,	 the	nationwide	crisis	 concerning	 local	Party	 history	 research	 that	 I	 will	 discuss	 later.	 In	 addition,	 there	 are	 two	 other	essential	reasons.	First,	because	the	Party’s	official	narratives	were	ambiguous	and	simplified,	it	was	difficult	for	local	researchers	to	fit	their	detailed	findings	into	the	official	Party	History	framework.	Second,	from	the	Party	Center’s	perspective,	such																																																									8	 In	the	1980s	local	officials	compiled	some	materials	into	internal	publications.	For	instance,	from	1984	to	1990,	the	Zhangye	PHRO	compiled	seven	columns	of	Historical	Materials	of	the	WRA	(Hong	
Xilujun	shiliao	 紅西路軍史料);	 in	1980	 the	CCP	History	Research	Unit	of	 the	Politics	Department,	Qinghai	 Ethnic	 Institute	 (青海民族學院政治系中共黨史教研室)	 edited	 Compilation	 of	 Materials	
about	the	WRA’s	Activities	in	Qinghai	(Hong	Xilujun	zai	Qinghai	youguan	qingkuang	diaocha	cailiao	
huibian	 紅西路軍在青海有關情況調查材料彙編).	 But	 only	 a	 small	 part	 of	materials	 that	 officials	had	collected	were	included	in	these	compilations	and	these	compilations	were	disseminated	only	within	a	limited	community.	
		
235	local-level	 research	 had	 more	 political	 than	 academic	 value:	 the	 fact	 that	 local	agencies	had	interviewed	WRA	survivors	was	an	achievement	in	itself.	Whether	or	not	these	oral	histories	would	provide	new	evidence	or	lead	to	new	arguments	did	not	concern	the	Party	Center	greatly.	 		 	 In	addition	to	collecting	oral	history	materials,	the	local	SPHMO’s	other	task	was	to	solicit	historical	items	to	provide	evidence	that	could	represent	the	Party’s	past	in	 the	 region.	 The	 items	 that	 the	 Party	 Center	 ordered	 local	 SPHMOs	 to	 collect	included	 historical	 documents,	 photos,	 letters,	 etc.,9	 but	 in	 the	 WRA’s	 case,	 the	SPHMO	officials	managed	 to	 collect	only	 some	ordinary	weapons	and	equipment	that	 the	 soldiers	 had	 used.	 In	 part	 because	 of	 this	 situation,	 the	 WRA	 soldiers’	remains	became	the	most	 important	 items	to	collect,	which	I	will	discuss	 later	 in	this	chapter.	 	
	 	 Benefiting	the	Local	Governments	 		 	 In	the	CCP’s	bureaucratic	system,	the	local	institutions	that	took	charge	of	Party	history	research	were	subordinate	to	 local	Party	committees.	Therefore,	 they	not	only	 had	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 tasks	 that	 the	 Party	 Center	 assigned	 to	 them,	 such	 as	collecting	primary	materials	and	conducting	research	on	the	Party’s	operations	in	a	 certain	 region,	 they	 also	 had	 to	 serve	 the	 local	 Party	 committees	 and	 local	governments.	The	way	 in	which	 local	 authorities	benefited	 from	SPHMOs,	which	were	 units	 that	majored	 in	 studying	 history,	 as	well	 as	 other	 related	 units,	 was	unique.	 Specifically,	 historical	 research	 was	 used	 to	 prove	 that	 a	 certain	 region	contributed	to	the	CCP’s	revolutionary	career,	which,	in	turn,	brought	extra	income	to	the	local	governments,	either	directly	or	indirectly.	 		 	 Since	the	establishment	of	the	PRC,	the	central	government	has	adopted	a	series																																																									9	 Following	 is	 a	 list	 of	 the	 historical	 materials	 that	 were	 to	 be	 collected:	 (1)	 documents	 and	telegrams	 concerning	 the	 CCP	 and	 its	 local	 branches’	 establishment;	 (2)	manuscripts,	 notes	 and	letters	 written	 by	 Party	 leaders;	 (3)	 documents	 about	 the	 organizations	 for	 workers,	 peasants,	women,	youths	and	students	that	were	led	by	the	CCP;	(4)	documents	about	military	and	political	activities	 of	 the	 CCP’s	 armies	 and	 other	military	 forces	 led	 by	 the	 CCP;	 (5)	 documents	 about	 the	“people’s	regimes”	(人民政權)	that	were	led	by	the	CCP	in	the	revolutionary	bases;	(6)	notes,	letters	written	by	 evolutionary	martyrs,	 heroes,	 and	other	 regressive	people;	 these	people’s	 photos	 and	items	that	were	used	by	them;	(7)	diaries,	letters	and	articles	kept	by	senior	cadres	that	reflect	the	Party’s	history;	(8)	photos	concerning	the	Party’s	revolutionary	history;	(9)	important	Party	related	materials	 that	 have	 been	 kept	 outside	 the	 Party,	 including	 by	 those	 hostile	 to	 the	 Party;	 (10)	materials	 about	 the	 Party’s	 history	 that	 have	 been	 published	 in	 progressive	 journals;	 and	 (11)	photos	or	records	of	revolutionary	items	or	revolutionary	relics.	See	“Zhonggong	zhongyang	ziliao	zhengji	weiyuanhui	guanyu	Zhonggong	dangshi	ziliao	zhengji,	zhengli	he	bianzuan	shinian	guihua	
中共中央資料徵集委員會關於中共黨史資料徵集、整理和編纂十年（1985-1994）規劃”	(The	Central	Committee	 for	 Soliciting	 Party	 History	Materials’	 plan	 for	 collecting	 and	 compiling	 Party	 history	materials	 in	 the	 following	 ten	 years)(Document	 [1985]	 No.	 40),	 Beijing	 dangshi	 北京黨史 ,	1985(28),	pp.	9-12.	
		
236	of	policies	designed	deliberately	to	foster	the	development	of	those	regions	where	the	Party	and	its	army	once	built	revolutionary	bases.	The	Party	established	Offices	for	Supporting	the	Old	Regions	(fuzhi	laoqu	bangongshi	 扶植老區辦公室)	in	every	province,	and	they	were	in	charge	of	evaluating	the	historical	positions	of	former	revolutionary	bases	and	deciding	the	amount	of	appropriation	that	should	be	used	to	help	these	regions.	A	large	number	of	counties	have	benefited	from	this	policy	and	 historical	 research	 has	 played	 an	 indispensible	 role	 in	 it.10	 West	 Gansu,	however,	 is	 far	 from	 the	Party’s	major	 revolutionary	bases	 that	 flourished	 in	 the	early	1930s.	Throughout	 the	Republican	period,	Muslim	warlords	controlled	 this	region,	and	the	CCP	organizations	had	not	done	well	there	before	1949.	Because	of	the	trivial	position	that	West	Gansu	occupied	in	Party	history,	the	WRA	was	almost	the	 only	 historical	 resource	 that	 the	 local	 governments	 there	 could	 use	 to	demonstrate	 their	 relationships	 with,	 and	 contributions	 to,	 the	 Party’s	revolutionary	 career.	 During	 the	 1980s,	 however,	 there	 was	 no	 policy	 that	guaranteed	 that	 local	 governments	 in	 the	 Hexi	 Corridor	 would	 receive	appropriations	from	the	central	government	simply	because	the	WRA	once	fought	in	 those	 regions.	 Displaying	 their	 initiative,	 these	 local	 governments	made	 good	use	 of	 the	WRA’s	 history	 to	 build	 connections	 with	 the	 top	 leadership,	 thereby	benefiting	from	this	practice.	 		 	 Sunan	County’s	 肅南縣	 celebration	of	the	30th	anniversary	of	its	establishment	in	1984	is	a	good	example.	As	one	of	the	main	arrangements	for	the	anniversary,	the	government	dispatched	an	official	to	Beijing	to	make	contact	with	former	WRA	commanders,	Li	Xiannian	and	Xu	Xiangqian.	This	official	did	not	meet	either	Li	or	Xu	as	he	had	expected,	 but	he	obtained	 couplets	personally	 inscribed	by	both	Li	and	 Xu,	 successfully	 using	 their	 secretaries	 as	 intermediaries.	 Undoubtedly,	 the	WRA	was	the	only	connection	between	Sunan	County	and	these	two	leaders,	which	Li	Xiannian’s	 couplet	proved:	 “[Let	us]	 carry	on	and	 improve	 the	Western	Route	Army’s	 revolutionary	 spirit,	 which	 encouraged	 it	 to	 fight	 bravely;	 [let	 us]	 work	
																																																								10	 For	instance,	in	the	1980s,	Yingshan	County	 應山縣	 of	Hubei	Province	submitted	a	report	to	the	provincial	government	with	historical	evidence,	arguing	that	Yingshan	was	a	former	revolutionary	region	 (geming	 laoqu	 革命老區).	 Consequently,	 Yingshan	 received	 a	 budget	 appropriation	 of	 0.8	million	 yuan	 per	 year	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 county,	 which	 definitely	 was	 a	 large	 amount	money	at	the	time.	Li	Guoqing	 李國慶,	“Xianji	dangshi	bumen	de	gongzuo	zhineng	ji	danfu	de	zeren	
縣級黨史部門的工作職能及擔負的責任”	 (Responsibilities	 of	 county-level	 Party	 history	 organs),	
Dangshi	tiandi	 黨史天地,	2008(4),	pp.	50-52.	
		
237	hard	 to	 construct	 socialist	 modernization	 in	 the	 Qilian	 region.”11 	 Given	 Li’s	position	 as	 the	 President	 of	 the	 PRC,	 this	 couplet	 added	most	 effectively	 to	 the	prestige	 of	 Sunan’s	 30th	 anniversary.	 The	 official	 newspaper	 of	 the	 Gansu	Committee	of	the	CCP	published	Li’s	couplet	and	the	officer	who	went	to	Beijing	for	the	correspondence	received	praise	as	“having	made	a	great	contribution	to	Sunan	County.”12	
	 	 Memorial	Sites	of	the	WRA	in	the	1980s		 	 Not	coincidentally,	a	number	of	memorial	sites	to	the	WRA	were	built	along	the	Hexi	Corridor	during	the	1980s.	Almost	all	were	initiated	with	the	involvement	of	top	leaders.	In	the	case	of	Sunan	County,	the	Sunan	Committee	of	the	CCP	decided	to	build	a	monument	to	the	WRA	immediately	after	the	anniversary	celebrating	the	county’s	establishment,	and	to	put	Li	Xiannian’s	inscription	on	it.	This	decision	was	understandable,	 because	 erecting	 a	 monument	 was	 one	 of	 the	 best	 ways	 to	embody	 and	 perpetuate	 the	 attention	 a	 local	 regime	 received	 from	 the	 top	leadership.	 With	 similar	 purposes	 and	 through	 similar	 processes,	 by	 the	 early	1990s,	 every	 county	 that	 the	 WRA	 once	 marched	 through	 had	 at	 least	 one	memorial	 site	 to	 commemorate	 this	 historical	 event,	 every	 one	 of	 which	 had	 Li	Xiannian’s	 or	 Xu	 Xiangqian’s	 couplet	 on	 its	 entrance	 or	 monument.	 The	 top	leadership’s	 attention	 not	 only	 provided	 the	 local	 governments	with	 impetus	 to	build	monuments	and	cemeteries	for	the	WRA,	but	also	brought	investments	that	helped	them	extend	these	memorial	sites	further.13	 		 	 Specialists	 on	 Chinese	 memorial	 sites	 have	 noticed	 that	 the	 majority	 of	revolutionary	memorial	halls	and	monuments	were	built	in	the	1980s.	Some	have	attributed	this	phenomenon	to	the	Party	Center’s	new	propaganda	principles	after	the	 Cultural	 Revolution.14	 Several	 scholars	 attributed	 “the	 restoration	 of	 old	exhibitions	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	 revolutionary	 history	museums	 in	 the	post-Mao	period”	as	serving	in	general	to	“restore	the	Party’s	image	in	the	wake	of	
																																																								11	 In	Chinese	Li’s	 inscriptions	 is	 “Jicheng	 fayang	Hong	Xilujun	yuxue	 fenzhan	de	geming	 jingshen,	wei	Qilian	shanqu	de	shehuizhuyi	xiandaihua	jianshe	shiye	er	nuli	fendou	 繼承發揚紅西路軍浴血
奮戰的革命精神，為祁連山區的社會主義現代化建設事業而努力奮鬥”.	12	 Guo	Menglin	 郭夢林,	Xilujun	xuezhu	fengbei	 西路軍血鑄豐碑	 (The	blood-made	monuments	for	the	Western	Route	Army).	Lanzhou:	Gansu	renmin	chubanshe	 甘肅人民出版社,	2006,	pp.	369.	13	 For	 instance,	 senior	 commander	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 Hong	 Xuezhi	 visited	 the	 Gaotai	Cemetery	in	1988.	After	that	Hong	persuaded	some	organizations	in	Beijing	to	donate	400,000	RMB	for	the	cemetery.	Guo	Menglin,	2006,	pp.	269.	14	 An	 Tingshan	 安廷山,	 Zhongguo	 jinianguan	 gailun	 中國紀念館概論	 (Introduction	 of	 Chinese	memorials).	Beijing:	Wenwu	chubanshe	 文物出版社,	1996,	pp.	204.	
		
238	the	Cultural	Revolution	and	to	legitimize	the	authority	of	the	Deng	regime.”15	 Both	of	the	arguments	above	reveal	certain	aspects	of	the	construction	of	memorial	sites	in	the	1980s.	However,	 the	result	of	 investigations	of	WRA	memorial	sites	shows	another	 dimension	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 memorials	 in	 the	 Reform	 Era.	 Local	governments	built	monuments	not	 only	 to	 fulfill	 the	 tasks	 assigned	by	 the	Party	Center,	but	also	to	confirm	and	emphasize	their	relationships	with	authorities	and	to	gain	more	financial	and	political	benefits.		 	 During	 the	1980s,	 in	addition	 to	memorial	sites	built	by	 local	authorities,	 local	people	in	Gansu	also	built	or	maintained	a	number	of	memorial	sites	voluntarily	to	commemorate	 the	WRA.	A	 stele-style	monument	on	 the	old	 site	 of	 the	Liyuanku	Battle	 is	an	example	 [Figs.	7-1,	7-2].	According	 to	 local	officials,	by	 the	middle	of	the	1980s,	 people	 in	 the	 region	had	become	 richer	due	 to	 the	policies	 of	 reform	and	 opening	 up.	 At	 the	 time,	 some	 local	 people	 proposed	 that	 because	 they	 had	received	benefits	from	the	Party,	they	should	dedicate	some	money	to	pay	homage	to	 revolutionary	martyrs.	 In	 the	 end,	 they	 decided	 to	 build	 such	 a	monument.16	Their	 behavior	 can	 be	 explained	 as	 a	 search	 for	 a	 sense	 of	 security	 during	 the	Reform	Era	by	showing	respect	to	the	dominant	hierarchy’s	revolutionary	history.	After	decades	of	totalitarianism	had	come	to	an	end,	and	especially	when	the	free	market	 economy	 replaced	 the	 former	 collective	 and	 planned	 economy,	 scholars	were	 not	 surprised	 to	 find	 that	 people	 attempted	 to	 incorporate	 symbols	 of	 the	state	as	a	type	of	protection	for	their	own	religious	or	financial	interests.17	 In	this	sense,	what	these	locals	did	was	not	unique.	What	I	want	to	emphasize	here	is	that,	in	 addition	 to	 the	 local	 agencies	 that	 built	memorial	 sites	 for	 their	 own	 reasons,	ordinary	people	who	had	been	considered	indiscriminately	to	be	passive	receivers	of	 political	 education	 also	 were	 active	 participants,	 a	 fact	 that	 should	 not	 be	overlooked.	
7.1.2	The	Nationwide	Crisis	in	Local	Party	History	Research	in	the	1990s		 	 Given	the	above-mentioned	achievements	 in	collecting	historical	materials	and	drawing	the	Party	Center’s	attention	to	them	in	order	to	benefit	local	governments,	
																																																								15	 Kirk	A.	Denton,	“Museums,	Memorial	Sites	and	Exhibitionary	Culture	in	the	People’s	Republic	of	China”,	The	China	Quarterly,	Vol.	183	(September	2005),	pp.	565-586.	16	 Zhang	Yan	 張雁,	interview,	Linze,	July	15,	2013.	17	 Gao	Bingzhong 高丙中,	“Minjian	de	yishi	yu	guojia	de	zaichang	 民間的儀式與國家的在場”	(Folk	rituals	and	state	presence),	Beijing	daxue	xuebao	(zhexue	shehui	kexue	ban)	 北京大學學報（哲學社
會科學版）,	2001(1),	pp.	42-50.	
		
239	it	 is	 not	 an	 exaggeration	 to	 say	 that	 the	 1980s	was	 a	 golden	 era	 for	 local	 Party	history	 research	 and	 propaganda.	 This	 era,	 however,	 was	 brief.	 Since	 the	 late	1980s,	both	relevant	local	institutions	and	memorial	sites	have	been	in	crisis.	The	most	 obvious	 manifestation	 of	 this	 crisis	 was	 that	 local	 PHROs	 lost	 their	independent	position	in	the	CCP’s	bureaucratic	system.18	 This	situation	made	local	Party	 history	 researchers	 confused	 about	 their	 future,	 and	 they	 hesitated	 to	continue	 their	 research. 19 	 Another	 difficulty	 that	 local	 Party	 research	 and	memorial	sites	had	been	facing	since	the	late	1980s	was	a	lack	of	funds.20	 Due	to	financial	difficulties	since	the	late	1980s,	staff	of	some	memorial	sites	had	to	visit	local	 enterprises	one	by	one	 to	persuade	 them	 to	donate	money	 to	maintain	 the	sites.21		 	 Why	 did	 these	 organs,	 which	 seemed	 to	 operate	 so	 smoothly	 in	 the	 1980s,	suddenly	 encounter	 such	 a	 crisis?	 Most	 officers	 who	 devoted	 themselves	 to	performing	 research	 on	 local	 Party	 history	 attributed	 the	 difficulties	 they	 were	facing	 primarily	 to	 inattention	 on	 the	 part	 of	 local	 leadership.	 In	 the	 CCP’s	bureaucracy,	the	extent	to	which	leaderships	recognize	the	significance	of	a	certain	field	determines	to	a	considerable	degree	how	much	support	this	field	will	receive,	both	 politically	 and	 financially.	 A	 further	 question	 is	 why	 local	 leaderships	 no	longer	cared	about	writing	 local	Party	History.	This	 is	worthy	of	discussion	 from	two	 perspectives.	 As	 was	 analyzed	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 from	 the	 Party	 Center’s	perspective,	 when	 the	 new	 leadership	 under	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 encouraged	 senior																																																									18	 Since	1988	SPHMOs	were	successively	disbanded	and	 their	role	was	 taken	over	by	 local	Party	History	 Research	 Offices.	 See	 Zhang	 Qihua,	 2007.	 The	 local	 PHROs,	 unfortunately,	 did	 not	 have	independent	positions	either.	In	a	large	proportion	of	municipal	and	county-level	Party	committees,	PHROs	were	simultaneously	editorials	for	local	chronicles,	which	meant	that	staff	members	had	to	record	local	“great	events”	as	well	as	local	leaders’	day-to-day	agendas	rather	than	studying	Party	history.	In	some	cases,	PHROs	were	asked	to	work	under	the	supervision	of	the	local	Department	of	Organization,	 in	 charge	 of	 persuading	 university	 graduates	 to	 work	 in	 local	 governments	 and	enterprises.	 Now	 the	 majority	 of	 local	 PHROs	 have	 regained	 their	 position	 as	 individual	 organs	directly	supervised	by	the	local	committee	of	the	CCP.	19	 Li	Chuanhua	 李傳華,	“Dangshi	gongzuo	de	duofangmian	zhankai	 黨史工作的多方面展開”	(The	infolding	of	Party	history	works	)	in	“Sanshi	erli:	jinian	Zhongyang	dangshi	yanjiushi	chengli	sanshi	zhounian	bitan	 三十而立——紀念中央黨史研究室成立三十週年筆談”	(The	first	thirty	years	of	the	CPHRO),	Bainian	chao 百年潮,	2010(7),	pp.	4-19.	20	 Some	 of	 local	 Party	 history	 organs	 had	 no	 travelling	 allowance	 to	 collect	 materials	 in	 other	counties	 while	 some	 could	 not	 even	 afford	 to	 make	 phone	 calls.	 Shen	 Liang	 沈亮	 and	 Zhang	Xiangyu	 張翔宇,	“Dangshi	yao	shihua	shishuo,	guanfang	cuidong	disanci	rechao:	shouci	zuigao	guige	
dangshi	huiyi	zhaoshi	zhizhengdang	qiangdiao	‘lishi	caifu’	 黨史要實話實說，催動第三次熱潮：首次
最高規格黨史會議昭示執政黨強調‘歷史財富’”	 (Party	 history	 must	 be	 told	 as	 it	 is;	 fostering	 the	third	 wave	 of	 Party	 history	 research:	 the	 first	 high-level	 Party	 history	 conference	 reflects	 the	Party’s	emphasis	on	“historical	treasures”),	Nanfang	zhoumo	 南方週末,	July	30,	2010.	http://www.infzm.com/content/48248	(last	visited	on	June	10,	2015).	21	 Zhang	Yan,	interview.	
		
240	cadres	 to	 record	 their	 experiences,	 and	 organized	 thousands	 of	 people	 from	different	 fields	 to	 discuss	 historical	 issues,	 its	 major	 purpose	 was	 not	 to	 study	historical	 facts,	 but	 to	 maintain	 intra-Party	 stability	 and	 exploit	 the	 Party’s	revolutionary	 past	 in	 order	 to	 fill	 the	 ideological	 vacuum	 after	 the	 Party	 Center	negated	 the	Cultural	Revolution.	 In	 the	second	half	of	 the	1980s,	when	historical	issues	were	 no	 longer	 the	 leadership’s	major	 concern,	 the	 Party	 Center	 showed	diminishing	enthusiasm	in	urging	local	authorities	to	write	Party	History.	Because	local	 leaderships	 were	 sensitive	 to	 this	 shift	 in	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 focus,	 they	invested	less	and	less	in	Party	history	research.	 	 	 	 	
  The	 local	 leaderships	 had	 another	 reason	 to	 neglect	 the	 units	 in	 charge	 of	writing	Party	History.	During	the	first	half	of	the	1980s,	many	senior	cadres	visited	or	expressed	concerns	about	the	regions	where	they	once	fought	or	worked	before	1949.	 At	 this	 time,	 research	 by	 relevant	 units	 helped	 local	 authorities	 build	connections	with	senior	cadres.	In	the	second	half	of	the	1980s,	when	research	on	the	Party’s	practices	before	1949	was	almost	complete,	according	to	the	work	plan	made	by	the	Party	Center,	local	Party	history	research	and	propaganda	needed	to	focus	on	the	Party	organizations’	work	in	particular	regions	after	1949.	The	local	leaderships	 discovered	 that	 this	 new	 emphasis	 would	 neither	 bring	 financial	support	 from	 the	 central	 government,	 nor	 attract	 the	 attention	 of	 senior	 cadres.	Thus,	 performing	 research	 on	 Party	 history	 was	 not	 as	 beneficial	 for	 local	leaderships	as	it	had	been	a	few	years	before.	
  In	 this	 regard,	 if	 local	 Party	 history	 research	 organs	 wanted	 to	 rescue	themselves	 from	 their	 predicament,	 exploring	 historical	 events	 and	 figures	 that	were	 prominent	 in	 Party	 history	 before	 1949	 and	 making	 good	 use	 of	 these	resources	to	benefit	the	local	authorities	seemed	the	best,	if	not	the	only,	approach.	A	popular	phrase	in	the	field	of	local	Party	history	research	is	a	concise	and	subtle	expression	of	this	idea:	“only	by	taking	appropriate	action	can	one	secure	the	right	position”	 (youwei	cai	youwei	 有為才有位).	Starting	 from	this	point	of	view,	since	the	late	1990s,	local	Party	history	officers	all	over	China	have	tried	in	a	variety	of	ways	to	improve	their	situation.	
	 	 “Taking	Appropriate	Action” 	 	 As	 the	 Party	 Center	 advanced	 a	 new	 theory	 that	 research	 on	 Party	 history	should	 be	 used	 to	 “provide	 advice	 to	 authorities	 and	 to	 educate	 people”	 (see	Chapter	 5),	 some	 local	 officials	 tried	 to	 improve	 their	 status	 in	 the	 CCP	
		
241	bureaucracy	by	using	Party	History	to	provide	evidence	or	advice	to	 inform	local	leaderships’	 decisions.	 Specifically,	 these	 officers	 attempted	 to	 “work	 as	consultants	 who	 provide	 theoretical	 and	 informative	 guidance	 to	 the	decision-makers”	 and	 to	 “help	 the	 leaders	 by	 drawing	 lessons	 from	 Party	history.”22 Some	even	argued	that	they	might	sell	relevant	information	and	advice	to	local	leaders	in	order	to	increase	funding	for	further	research.	However,	there	is	no	evidence	 that	 any	 local	PHRO	profited	by	 selling	 information	 related	 to	Party	history.	 Actually,	 the	 most	 effective	 way	 to	 advance	 the	 status	 of	 Party	 history	research	 units	 is	 to	 attract	 direct	 funding	 from	 senior	 government	 agencies.	 An	event	that	took	place	in	Huidong	County	in	Guangdong	is	a	typical	example	of	the	way	in	which	they	secured	such	funding.	 		 	 The	CCP	 established	 a	 Soviet	 regime	 in	Huidong	 in	 the	 1930s.	 Before	 the	 70th	anniversary	of	this	regime,	Huidong’s	PHRO	suggested	that	the	county	committee	of	the	CCP	hold	a	celebration	ceremony.	Initially,	the	county	leadership	hesitated,	but	 they	 changed	 their	 minds	 after	 the	 PHRO	 received	 funds	 from	 senior	government	agencies	 to	 rebuild	 roads	 in	 the	county	 in	honor	of	 the	anniversary.	Through	a	series	of	activities	planned	and	managed	by	PHRO	officials,	the	county	leadership	 realized	 that	 the	history	of	 the	Huidong	Soviet	Region	was	a	valuable	resource	 that	 deserved	 further	 exploitation. 23 	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 local	 PHRO	succeeded	 in	 initiating	 a	 long-term	 project,	 because	 once	 the	 significance	 of	 a	historical	event	has	been	identified,	 it	will	be	commemorated	annually	in	various	ways,	 which	 means	 that	 the	 event	 will	 bring	 continuous	 benefits	 to	 the	 local	authorities	and	PHRO	officials.	 		 	 Similarly,	the	local	units	responsible	for	Party	history	research	along	the	WRA’s	route	attempted	to	advance	their	status	by	promoting	the	WRA’s	history.	However,	a	 serious	 obstacle	 has	 prevented	 them	 from	 achieving	 this	 goal—continued	sensitivity	about	the	WRA’s	history.	In	the	late	1980s,	the	Zhangye	PHRO	compiled	a	collection	of	the	WRA	survivors’	memoirs,	but	the	government	censors	rejected	the	work.	Officials	went	to	Beijing	to	argue	their	case,	but	were	unsuccessful.	Once																																																									22	 Wang	Zhuguo	 王柱國,	“Dangshi	gongzuo	yao	zhidao	fuwu	yu	shichang	jingji	 黨史工作要指導服
務於市場經濟”	 (Party	history	work	must	 instruct	and	serve	marketing	economy),	Beijing	dangshi	
yanjiu	 北京黨史研究,	1995(5),	pp.	25-26.	Wang	Zhuguo	works	 in	PHRO	of	Zhangjiachuan	County	
張家川縣	 in	Gansu	Province.	 	23	 Chen	 Hongjun	 陳弘君,	 “Dangshi	 gongzuozhe	 de	 kunhuo	 yu	 chulu	 黨史工作者的困惑與出路”	(The	confusion	of	Party	history	workers	and	the	solution),	Guangdong	dangshi	 廣東黨史,	1998(4),	pp.	34-36.	
		
242	again,	they	had	to	rely	on	interventions	on	the	part	of	old	cadres.	After	the	People’s	
Daily	published	the	preface	for	the	collection	of	memoirs	written	by	Wu	Xiuquan	
伍修權	 (1908-1997),	a	senior	cadre,	censors	had	no	choice	but	to	allow	the	book	to	be	published	in	1991.24	 Having	experienced	such	difficulties,	the	Zhangye	PHRO	realized	that	the	WRA	was	not	only	a	historical	resource,	but	was	also	a	sensitive	issue	 that	 could	 engender	 conflict.	 Accordingly,	 officials	 began	 to	 look	 for	 an	alternative	way	to	commemorate	the	WRA	without	triggering	political	trouble.	 		 	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	WRA,	 this	 twofold	 pressure—financial	 and	 political—forced	local	PHRO	officials	to	look	for	new	approaches	to	their	work;	it	was	under	these	circumstances	 that	 they	paid	 increasing	attention	 to	building	memorial	 sites	and	created	 the	 current	 local-level	 WRA	 historiography,	 which	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	detail	in	the	next	two	sections.	 	
7.2	Building	Local	Memorial	Sites		 	 Compared	to	written	material,	memorial	sites	are	much	more	obvious	vehicles	with	 which	 to	 exhibit	 history.	 Local	 official	 agencies	 today	 consider	 promoting	memorial	sites	a	priority,	and	have	invested	more	effort	in	this	activity.	In	addition	to	the	monuments	built	 in	the	1980s	and	mentioned	in	the	last	section,	there	are	also	a	number	of	cemeteries	in	which	WRA	martyrs	are	buried.	Almost	all	of	these	memorial	sites	underwent	renovation	in	the	first	decade	of	the	21st	century.	Now	they	 have	 become	 commemorative	 venues	 that	 not	 only	 function	 as	 modern	museums,	 but	 also	 bear	 local	 characteristics.	 This	 section	 discusses	 the	construction	 or	 renovation	 of	 these	memorial	 sites,	 exploring	 how	 they	 became	localized,	 and	how	 they	were	 incorporated	 into	 the	WRA’s	 historiography	 at	 the	local	level.		 	 The	first	subsection	takes	the	construction	of	Gaotai	Memorial	Hall	for	the	WRA	(Gaotai	Xilujun	 jinianguan	 高台西路軍紀念館,	 hereafter,	GMW)	as	an	example	 to	examine	the	origins	of	existing	memorial	halls	for	the	WRA.	GMW	is	the	largest	and	most	famous	of	all	the	WRA	memorial	sites	to	date.	Yet	 its	 large	scale	alone	does	not	 make	 it	 worthy	 of	 particular	 attention.	 There	 is	 another	 reason.	 Its	predecessors,	 GMW	 and	 Gaotai	 County	 Cemetery	 for	 Martyrs	 (Gaotai	 xian	 lieshi	
lingyuan	 高台縣烈士陵園),	represent	revolutionary	memorial	halls	in	the	Reform	Era	 and	 those	 in	 the	Mao	Era,	 respectively;	 therefore,	 taking	 a	 close	 look	 at	 this																																																									24	 Ma	Kun	 麻琨,	interview,	Lanzhou,	July	5,	2013.	
		
243	example	will	help	us	understand	the	evolution	of	the	CCP’s	revolutionary	memorial	sites.	 	 		 	 The	second	subsection	analyzes	the	layouts	and	exhibitions	of	the	current	WRA	memorial	halls.	This	subsection	will	argue	that	there	are	three	stakeholder	groups	for	these	memorial	sites:	the	central	regime,	 local	authorities,	and	the	subjects	of	these	memorial	 halls,	 which	 include	 the	WRA	martyrs	 and	 survivors,	 as	well	 as	their	 families.	 Each	 stakeholder	 group	 has	 its	 corresponding	 constructions	 or	installations.	Presenting	the	WRA’s	history	to	visitors	is,	of	course,	a	major	activity	of	a	memorial	hall,	but	an	equally	essential	task	is	to	demonstrate	the	relationship	between	each	of	these	three	stakeholder	groups	properly.	 	
7.2.1	Constructing	a	Memorial	Hall	 		 	 There	was	a	lengthy	lobbying	and	negotiation	process	before	the	renovation	of	the	Gaotai	County	Cemetery	for	Martyrs	into	a	memorial	hall.	From	2002	to	2004,	two	retired	cadres	who	had	been	employees	in	Zhangye	government	agencies	kept	trying,	by	different	means,	 to	persuade	the	Gansu	leadership	to	build	a	memorial	hall	for	the	WRA.25	 Only	later,	however,	did	it	transpire	that	the	Gansu	leadership	had	no	intention	to	build	such	a	hall.26	 At	the	time,	the	provincial	leadership	might	have	 considered	 two	 factors.	 First,	 after	 the	 Tiananmen	 Massacre	 in	 1989,	 the	Party’s	control	over	 ideology	had	become	tighter.	Given	 these	circumstances,	 the	Gansu	leadership	did	not	want	to	run	the	risk	of	committing	any	“political	mistake”	(zhengzhi	 cuowu	 政治錯誤).	 This	was	 quite	 possible,	 given	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	subject	of	the	WRA.	Second,	to	build	a	memorial	hall	 involved	building	roads	and	other	facilities	for	electricity,	water	supply,	and	waste	treatment,	etc.,	which	would	require	 both	 human	 and	 financial	 resources.	 The	 first	 round	 of	 lobbying	 ended	unsatisfactorily.	 The	 advocates	 persisted	 and	 conducted	 lobbying	 in	 2005	 on	 an	even	 larger	 scale.	 On	 this	 occasion,	 the	 lobbying	 no	 longer	 involved	 just	 two	individuals	 trying	 to	 persuade	 a	 provincial	 government;	 lobbyists	 had	 turned	 to																																																									25	 They	 contacted	 former	 WRA	 soldiers	 in	 Beijing,	 asking	 them	 to	 write	 to	 Gansu	 leaders,	 and	succeeded	 in	submitting	their	proposal	 for	constructing	a	 large	memorial	hall	 for	 the	WRA	in	 the	form	of	a	bill	to	the	Gansu	People’s	Congress.	Li	Wenxin	 李文信,	ed.,	Zhongguo	gongnong	hongjun	
Xilujun	 jinianguan	 jianshe	 dianshu	 中國工農紅軍西路軍紀念館建設典述	 (The	 construction	 of	 a	memorial	hall	for	the	Western	Route	Army).	Lanzhou:	Gansu	renmin	chubanshe	 甘肅人民出版社,	2012,	pp.	29,	32-33.	 	26	 “Zhonggong	Gansu	 shengwei	 xuanchuanbu	dui	sheng	 shijie	yici	huiyi	398	hao	 jianyi	 (yi’an)	de	dafu	 中共甘肅省委宣傳部對省十届一次會議第 398 號建議（議案）的答覆”	 (A	 reply	 from	 the	Propaganda	Department	of	 the	Gansu	Committee	of	 the	CCP	about	the	398th	Proposal	of	 the	First	Plenum	of	the	10th	Provincial	Congress),	in	Li	Wenxin,	2012,	p.	49.	
		
244	the	 Zhangye	 municipal	 government	 associated	 with	 the	 Gansu	 PHRO.	 We	 will,	however,	 never	 know	what	might	 have	 happened	 in	 the	 face	 of	 such	 large-scale	lobbying,	 because	 a	 decision	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 central	 government	 suddenly	changed	 everything.	 In	 2006,	 the	 Gaotai	 Cemetery	 for	 Martyrs	 was	 nominated	officially	as	a	“Classic	Red	Tourism	Spot”	(hongse	lüyou	jingdian	jingqu	 紅色旅遊經
典景區).	 As	 one	 of	 the	 few	 memorial	 sites	 in	 Gansu	 that	 had	 received	 such	 an	honor	 and	 the	 only	 one	 dedicated	 to	 the	WRA,27	 this	 cemetery	 drew	 immediate	attention	from	the	provincial	leadership.	Being	designated	a	“Classic	Red	Tourism	Spot”	signified,	on	 the	one	hand,	 that	 the	WRA	as	a	sensitive	historical	 issue	had	gained	sufficient	legitimacy	to	be	commemorated,	and	on	the	other	hand,	that	the	central	 government	would	 support	 this	 site	preferentially	 in	 the	 following	years.	This	explains	why	the	Gansu	leadership	suddenly	changed	its	cautious	attitude	on	the	 issue	and	became	eager	to	enlarge	the	cemetery	and	renovate	 it	 to	become	a	memorial	hall.	Three	years	 later,	 in	2009,	with	 ten	million	yuan	of	appropriation	funds	from	Beijing,	as	well	as	millions	of	yuan	in	donations	from	the	PLA	Lanzhou	Military	Region,	the	enlargement	project	was	finished.	 	
	 	 The	Construction	of	the	Gaotai	Memorial	Hall	for	the	WRA28		 	 In	the	1950s,	the	CCP	built	a	considerable	number	of	cemeteries	for	martyrs	all	over	 the	 country	 to	 commemorate	 deceased	 Party	 members,	 commanders,	 and	soldiers.	The	Gaotai	County	Cemetery	for	Martyrs,	built	in	1955,	was	one	of	these.	These	 cemeteries	 were	 supposed	 to	 be	 permanent	 resting	 places	 for	 the	 WRA	soldiers	whose	 remains	were	unearthed	 in	 various	 regions,	while	 also	providing	local	 students	 with	 places	 to	 receive	 revolutionary	 education.	 Compared	 to	revolutionary	 memorial	 sites	 built	 after	 the	 1990s,	 the	 function	 that	 these	cemeteries	 assumed	 was	 simple,	 as	 reflected	 in	 the	 layout	 and	 the	 Chinese	traditional	decorations	for	graves	that	they	adopted.		 	 Before	renovation,	the	entrance	of	the	Gaotai	Cemetery	was	a	gate-like	building	with	a	heavy	roof	and	open	passageway	[Fig.	7-3].	Behind	the	entrance,	a	sculpture	of	 figures,	 a	museum,	 and	a	 tomb	 lay	on	 the	 axis	 of	 the	 cemetery.	The	 sculpture	was	 named,	 “Fighting	 in	 Gaotai	 County”	 (Xuezhan	 Gaotai	 血戰高台).	 It	 included	such	 figures	 as	 WRA	 commanders,	 junior	 soldiers,	 and	 nurses,	 as	 well	 as	 local	people	who	came	to	assist	the	WRA	[Fig.	7-4].	The	museum	was	constructed	in	the																																																									27	 Although	this	cemetery	did	not	contain	“the	WRA”	in	its	name,	the	majority	of	martyrs	that	were	buried	in	it	were	WRA	commanders	and	soldiers.	28	 Discussions	in	this	section	relate	to	the	status	of	the	Memorial	as	in	July	2013.	
		
245	form	 of	 a	 Chinese-style	 building	 guarded	 by	 two	 golden	 lions,	 which	 in	 Chinese	culture	 symbolize	 dignity	 [Fig.	 7-5].	 The	 tomb	 for	 the	 Fifth	 Army,	which	was	 in	charge	of	occupying	Gaotai,	and	lost	half	of	its	troops	there,	was	a	larger	version	of	traditional	 Chinese	 tombs—a	 black	 stele	 erected	 in	 front	 of	 a	 round	 mound.	 In	addition	 to	 these	main	 buildings	 on	 the	 axis,	 there	were	 also	 four	 Chinese-style	pavilions	at	the	four	corners	of	the	cemetery,	two	of	which	displayed	inscriptions	written	by	leaders	and	veterans.	The	other	two	were	memorial	pavilions	for	Dong	Zhentang	 and	 Yang	 Keming	 楊克明 	 (1905-1937), 29 	 two	 high-ranking	 WRA	commanders	killed	in	Gaotai	[Fig.	7-6].		 	 The	 renovation,	which	began	 in	2008	and	was	 completed	 in	2009,	 constituted	the	transformation	of	a	cemetery	 into	a	memorial	hall.	 In	comparing	monuments	and	memorials,	W.	Scott	Howard	argued	that	the	major	distinction	between	them	lies	in	whether	they	have	more	to	do	with	the	present	and	the	future	than	with	the	past;	 this	 distinction	 also	 applies	 to	 other	 memorial	 landscapes.	 As	 a	 place	 for	mourning,	a	cemetery	“strives	toward	historical	closure.”	 In	contrast,	a	memorial	hall	“concerns	the	ongoing	struggles	of	the	living	who	confront	losses	that	have	yet	to	 reach	 points	 of	 resolution.”30	 As	 will	 be	 discussed	 later,	 memorial	 halls	 that	concern	 the	 Party’s	 revolutionary	 history,	 usually	 express	 this	 “resolution”	 as	 a	desire	 to	 inherit	 the	 spirit	 of	 the	 revolutionaries	 and	 work	 hard	 for	 the	 Party’s	interests.	 	 	 	 		 	 The	 2008-2009	 renovation	 incorporated	 three	major	 changes:	 first,	 a	modern	gate	replaced	the	gate-like	entrance.	The	new	exterior	employs	strong	symbolism	that	embodies	pain	and	suffering.	Second,	the	old	museum	was	demolished	and	the	new	 space	 was	 reconstructed	 as	 a	 square	 on	 which	 a	 monument	 was	 erected.	Third,	a	new	modern	museum	was	built	behind	the	tomb.	The	twofold	process	of	destroying/altering	old	structures	and	expanding/creating	new	buildings	signified	a	shift	from	a	place	of	mourning	to	a	memorial	site	for	representation,	exhibition,	and	narration.	As	a	result,	the	meaning	of	this	memorial	site	was	renewed.	 		 	 In	 2009,	 Gaotai	 Cemetery	 was	 renamed	 “The	 Gaotai	 Memorial	 Hall	 for	 the	Western	Route	Army”	(GMW)	and	became	the	largest	memorial	site	for	the	WRA.	Today,	 the	main	entrance	of	GMW	is	80	meters	wide,	 three	times	wider	than	the	previous	one.	In	the	middle	of	the	entrance	is	the	memorial	hall’s	name,	written	in																																																									29	 Yang	Keming	was	the	Director	of	Political	Department	 政治部主任	 of	the	Fifth	Army.	30	 W.	 Scott	 Howard,	 “Landscapes	 of	 memorialization”,	 in	 I.	 Robertson	 and	 P.	 Richards,	 eds.,	
Studying	Cultural	Landscapes.	London:	Hodder	Arnold,	2003,	pp.	47-70.	
		
246	Mao’s	calligraphic	style.	Next	to	the	entrance	is	a	45-meter-wide	relief	wall,	which	depicts	 scenes	of	 the	WRA	 fighting	 [Fig.	7-7].	 Standing	between	 two	parts	of	 the	relief	wall	is	a	sculpture	of	a	young	soldier	holding	a	dead	female	comrade-in-arms	[Fig.	7-8].	Grieved	and	indignant,	this	young	soldier	is	the	most	striking	feature	of	the	 exterior	 of	 GMW,	 and	 delivers	 a	 strong	 message	 to	 visitors	 that	 they	 are	entering	a	sacred	place	where	they	will	confront	a	painful	history.		 	 Once	through	the	gate,	visitors	find	themselves	at	the	beginning	of	a	200-meter	path	 [Fig.	7-9].	A	comparison	with	 the	 former	 layout	shows	that	 the	path	behind	the	entrance	 is	 significantly	 longer.	Before	presenting	any	more	 information,	 the	memorial	hall	allows	visitors	to	walk	straight	along	the	path,	thereby	creating	an	atmosphere	of	worship.	The	monument	stands	at	the	end	of	the	path	in	the	middle	of	a	square.	 		 	 The	 square	 is	 a	 newly	 created	 space.	 Its	 painstaking	 imitation	 of	 Tiananmen	Square—the	heart	of	the	CCP’s	regime—is	obvious.	First,	on	the	axis	of	this	square,	in	sequence,	 lie	 the	monument	and	the	tomb	for	martyrs—a	structure	consistent	with	 that	 in	 Tiananmen	 Square.31	 Second,	 the	 design	 of	 the	monument	 uses	 the	Monument	 to	 the	 People’s	Heroes	 as	 a	model.32	 In	 the	 same	way	 that	 the	 latter	was	 built	 as	 a	 “‘monumental	medium’	 for	Mao’s	 inscription,”33	 this	monument’s	major	function	is	to	display	Li	Xiannian’s	calligraphy—“the	martyrs	of	the	Western	Route	Army	of	Workers’	and	Peasants’	Red	Army	of	China	will	 live	 in	our	hearts	forever”34[Fig.	7-10].	 		 	 Behind	the	monument	lies	a	huge	tomb	for	martyrs	of	the	Fifth	Army.	The	old,	Chinese-style	stele	was	moved	into	the	new	museum,	and	now	there	is	a	modern	stele	 in	 front	 of	 the	 round	 mound.	 Walking	 around	 the	 tomb,	 visitors	 then	encounter	 the	 largest	 building	 in	 the	 memorial	 hall—the	 museum,	 which	reportedly	 was	 built	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 an	 ancient	 beacon	 in	 northwestern	 China	(although	 it	 did	 not	 give	 me	 that	 impression),	 implying	 that	 “the	 WRA’s	 spirit	keeps	 burning	 like	 a	 flame”	 [Fig.	 7-11].	 Inside	 the	 museum,	 the	 exhibition	 is	arranged	in	a	way	standard	to	CCP	revolutionary	museums:	eight	exhibition	units	represent	 the	WRA’s	 history	 chronologically;	 historical	 documents,	 pictures,	 and																																																									31	 The	Monument	to	the	People’s	Heroes	and	the	Memorial	Hall	for	Chairman	Mao	are	on	the	axis	of	the	Tiananmen	Square.	32	 Information	on	GMW	information	board.	33	 Wu	Hung,	Remaking	Beijing:	Tiananmen	Square	and	the	Creation	of	a	Political	Space.	Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2005,	p.	18.	34	 In	Chinese:	“Hong	Xilujun	lieshi	yongyuan	huo	zai	women	xinzhong	 紅西路軍烈士永遠活在我們
心中”.	
		
247	items	are	displayed	in	cabinets;	modern	representation	techniques,	such	as	the	use	of	 light,	audio,	and	video	are	used	 to	create	a	 feeling	of	dignity	and	misery	 [Figs.	7-12,	 7-13,	 7-14].	 The	 narrator	 of	 the	 on-site	 oral	 interpretation	 reads	 from	 a	manuscript,	 ensuring	 the	 presentation	 of	 a	 standardized	 narration	 of	 the	WRA’s	history.	The	contents	of	the	exhibition	and	the	oral	interpretation	are	discussed	in	the	next	section,	which	focuses	on	the	local	narratives	of	the	WRA.	 		 	 In	summary,	although	this	memorial	site	retains	some	of	the	original	structures,	since	 the	 renovation,	 it	 is	no	 longer	a	 cemetery.	Many	essential	 components	of	a	typical	 revolutionary	 memorial,	 such	 as	 a	 monument,	 and	 an	 exhibit	 with	chronological	 narratives	 have	 been	 added.	 Almost	 all	 cemeteries	 in	 Gansu	 have	undergone	similar	renovations	in	recent	years.	Reconstructions	of	some	memorial	sites	are	still	in	progress,	but	from	reports	by	local	media,	we	know	that	they	will	combine	 components	 of	 both	 a	 cemetery	 and	 a	 memorial	 hall.	 The	 reason	 the	designers	 prefer	 such	 a	 mixed	 style	 might	 be	 that	 they	 need	 to	 endow	 their	constructions	with	more	meaning	 and	 implications,	while	 still	 relying	 on	 certain	traditional	 buildings,	 such	 as	 tombs,	 to	 demonstrate	 their	 concrete	 connection	with	 the	 Party’s	 revolutionary	 history.	 Therefore,	 the	 combination	 of	 the	components	of	a	cemetery	and	a	memorial	hall	can	satisfy	official	agencies,	both	at	the	 central	 and	 local	 level,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 historical	 event	simultaneously.	The	next	subsection	will	argue	this	point	in	detail.	 	
7.2.2	Presenting	Three	Stakeholder	Groups	in	Memorial	Sites	for	the	WRA		 	 Those	buried	 in	 the	 cemeteries	built	 in	 the	1950s	generally	were	 identified	as	“martyrs.”	This	title	alone	indicated	the	Party’s	positive	assessment	of	these	people,	but	 the	 title	 had	 little	 to	 do	 with	 the	 Party’s	 official	 interpretations	 of	 relevant	historical	events.	By	constructing	cemeteries	for	martyrs,	the	Party	led	visitors	to	commemorate	 its	 revolutionary	 history	 as	 a	 whole,	 rather	 than	 paying	 much	attention	 to	particular	 events.	 Since	 the	Mao	Era,	 neither	 surviving	 veterans	nor	martyrs’	families	had	the	power	to	interpret	history.	Local	official	agencies	merely	played	 a	 role	 in	 maintaining	 the	 cemeteries,	 having	 no	 role	 or	 motivation	 to	represent	history	from	their	perspective.	However,	this	situation	began	to	change	in	 the	 early	 1980s.	When	 the	 local	 governments	 built	 the	 first	 of	 several	 official	monuments	 to	 display	 the	 top	 leadership’s	 praises	 of	 the	 WRA,	 their	 decision	marked	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 active	 attempts	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 design	 and	construction	 of	memorial	 sites	 and	 consequently,	marked	 their	 intention	 to	 take	
		
248	part	in	interpreting	the	Party’s	history	as	well.	In	the	following	twenty-odd	years,	not	 only	were	 the	 central	 authority’s	 assessments	 introduced	 into	 the	memorial	sites	through	various	means,	but	some	new	stakeholders	as	well	were	allowed	to	express	themselves	through	these	commemorative	places.		 	 Generally,	the	current	design	of	memorial	sites	for	the	WRA	reinforces	in	three	ways	their	interconnected	significance	as	officially	sanctioned	venues	for	an	event	in	the	Party’s	history.	First,	the	design	represents	the	WRA	as	an	inseparable	part	of	 the	Party’s	victory	and	 its	contribution	to	the	nation.	Second,	 it	represents	the	local	 governments	 and	 veterans’	 offspring	 as	 successors	 to	 the	 Party’s	 historical	legacy.	 Third,	 it	 symbolizes	 that	 the	 central	 authority	 has	 endorsed	 these	representations.	 	
	 	 The	Central	Authority		 	 Since	the	1950s,	when	the	Party	renovated	most	of	the	traditional	constructions	in	a	new	style,	a	ready-made	model	for	the	construction	of	revolutionary	memorial	sites	has	 formed	gradually.	From	the	perspective	of	Party	 leaders,	 this	new	style	could	 represent	 the	new	China	and	 the	Party’s	new	power	over	 the	nation.	That	most	memorial	sites	were	renovated	or	built	in	such	a	“new	traditional”	style	could	be	seen	as	the	result	of	 the	central	authority’s	 influence.	Specifically,	monuments	and	squares,	most	of	which	were	built	in	the	Reform	Era,	are	symbols	of	the	Party	Center	in	Beijing.	 		 	 In	a	memorial	hall,	 the	monument	usually	represents	a	certain	historical	event	and	its	position	in	history.	As	the	monument	conveys	the	official	evaluation	of	that	historical	event,	it	works	as	a	symbol	of	central	authority	in	the	memorial	hall.	In	this	respect,	no	matter	the	scale	of	a	memorial	hall,	a	monument	is	necessary.		 	 Often	 built	 as	 a	 column,	 a	 monument	 provides	 limited	 space	 to	 convey	information.	 Designers	 of	 the	 memorial	 sites	 for	 the	WRA	 have	 fully	 developed	these	monuments’	potential	for	storytelling	and	have	imbued	them	with	symbolic	significance.	 First,	 designers	 use	 certain	 components,	 such	 as	 height,	 shape,	 and	the	number	of	steps,	 to	 indicate	basic	 information	about	 the	monument’s	subject	[Fig.	7-15].	Second,	the	inscription	on	the	front	of	a	monument	is	always	the	most	concise	evaluation	of	an	historical	event.	Third,	the	inscription	on	the	back,	which	usually	is	written	in	the	name	of	local	governments,	often	cites	narratives	in	official	Party	 History	 and	 emphasizes	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 event	memorialized	and	the	local	population.	 	
		
249		 	 In	most	 cases,	monuments	are	built	 in	 squares.	 Squares	are	not	only	places	 to	exhibit	 the	 monuments,	 but	 also	 venues	 for	 rituals.	 At	 every	 anniversary	 of	communist	historical	events,	public	commemorative	rituals	are	held	 in	memorial	halls	 and	 cemeteries	 by	 local	 propaganda	 departments.	 Local	 administrative	leaders	always	attend	these	rituals,	showing	their	 loyalty	 to	 the	Party,	while	also	expecting	 benefits	 for	 red	 tourism	 marketing	 by	 capturing	 the	 attention	 of	 the	media.	 	  
  There	is	also	a	considerable	number	of	small-scale	rituals	held	on	ordinary	days.	People	who	attend	 these	 rituals	 fall	 into	 two	categories.	One	 category	of	 visitors	includes	 those	 organized	 by	 their	 work	 units	 and	 forced	 to	 receive	 political	education	 at	 the	 CCP’s	 historical	 sites.	 In	 China,	 employees	 of	 all	 official	 organs,	schools,	 and	 state-owned	 enterprises	 are	 required	 to	 receive	 political	 education,	and	 in	 recent	 years,	 visiting	 commemorative	 sites	 and	 attending	 rituals	 has	become	one	 of	 the	major	means	 of	 political	 education.	 Party	members	 are	 often	required	 to	 stand	 in	 front	 of	 a	monument	with	 their	 clenched	 right	 hands	 lifted	beside	their	right	ears	and	repeat	the	oath	they	made	when	they	joined	the	Party.	People	recently	approved	as	Party	members	are	also	brought	there	to	swear	their	oath	to	the	Party	for	the	first	time.	These	types	of	rituals	in	particular	demonstrate	the	function	of	monuments	and	squares	as	symbols	that	represent	the	Party	or	the	central	 authority.	 Another	 category	 of	 visitors	 goes	 to	 these	memorial	 sites	 in	 a	private	 capacity,	 but	 due	 to	 their	 identities—usually	 as	 family	members	 of	WRA	veterans—this	also	requires	the	performance	of	rituals	[Fig.	7-16]. 
	 	 Martyrs,	Veterans,	and	Their	Families	
	 	 (1)	Graves	and	tombs		 	 Graves	 and	 tombs	 usually	 take	 up	 considerable	 space	 at	WRA	memorial	 sites.	Nominally,	they	are	places	where	martyrs	were	buried,	but	actually,	they	are	more	often	symbols	to	connect	veterans	and	their	families	with	these	memorial	sites.	 		 	 Through	decades	of	research	on	the	WRA’s	history,	relying	on	primary	materials	and	oral	history,	local	researchers	have	determined	many	of	the	details	about	the	WRA	commanders’	deaths	in	battles.	Few	of	these	commanders’	corpses,	however,	were	recovered.	After	1949	(in	some	cases	after	the	1980s)	numerous	bodies	were	unearthed,	 but	 it	 was	 impossible	 to	 identify	 them	 because	 they	 were	 buried	quickly	 after	 each	 battle.	 Therefore,	 a	 common	 problem	 the	 memorial	 sites	confront	 is	 that	martyrs’	 identities	 and	 the	 remains	do	not	match.	 Local	 officials	
		
250	have	adopted	two	methods	to	resolve	this	problem.	One	is	to	build	rows	of	steles	for	high-ranking	and	middle-ranking	commanders	who	were	killed	there,	without	the	martyrs’	remains	[Fig.	7-17].	Another	is	to	build	a	collective	tomb	and	bury	all	unidentified	remains	 there.	 In	 this	way,	 these	memorial	 sites	provide	all	 families	who	were	involved	in	the	WRA	with	places	to	pay	respect	to	their	loved	ones.	 		 	 Because	 after	 1937,	 the	 burial	 sites	 for	WRA	 troops	 remained	 unmarked	 and	unattended,	 some	 of	 them	 faded	 from	 public	 memory	 as	 time	 passed.	 To	 date,	some	sites	still	have	not	been	found.	Due	to	the	symbolic	significance	of	martyrs’	remains,	 some	 newly	 established	 memorial	 sites	 invest	 considerable	 effort	 in	collecting	 unfound	 remains,	 relying	 primarily	 on	 the	 locals	 to	 provide	 clues.	 In	2009,	 Jingyuan	 County	 initiated	 a	 project	 of	 establishing	 a	 “Park	 for	 the	 West	March”	(xizheng	gongyuan	 西征公園)	to	commemorate	a	WRA	battle.	Local	media	reported	that	it	took	the	government	several	years	to	collect	the	remains	of	these	Red	 Army	 martyrs.	 In	 the	 end,	 they	 found	 four	 WRA	 soldiers’	 remains	 and	constructed	a	large-scale	cemetery	in	2012	to	rebury	them.	By	doing	so,	this	newly	built	 “park”	 has	 created	 a	 direct	 connection	 with	 the	 WRA.35	 In	 other	 cases,	searching	for	and	reburying	martyrs’	remains	has	become	a	regular	ritual;	tombs	are	 designed	 to	 be	 easy	 to	 reopen,	 so	 that	 under	 specific	 circumstances,	ceremonies	to	settle	newfound	remains	can	be	held	[Figs.	7-18,	7-19].36		 	 (2)	Sculptures		 	 In	 addition	 to	 tombs	 and	 graves,	 another	 way	 to	 represent	 martyrs	 is	 with	sculptures.	 Just	 as	 a	 martyr’s	 position	 determines	 whether	 s/he	 could	 be	represented	by	a	single	stele	or	should	be	buried	in	a	collective	tomb,	sculptures	at	memorial	 sites	 are	 also	 divided	 into	 two	 categories:	 statues	 for	 certain	high-ranking	commanders,	and	collective	sculptures	that	portray	ordinary	soldiers.	In	 addition	 to	 rank	 and	 position,	 his/her	 statue	 also	 represents	 the	 official	assessment	made	of	an	historical	figure.	Zhang	is	the	most	obvious	example.	In	the	Stele	 Forest	 for	 Commanders	 of	 the	 Sichuan	 and	 Shaanxi	 Soviet	 Region	(Chuan-Shaan	suqu	jiangshuai	beilin	 川陝蘇區將帥碑林)	in	Bazhong	County	 巴中
縣,	in	Sichuan	Province,	statues	for	Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao,	Wang	Shusheng,																																																									35	 Xinhua	wang	 新華網	 (Xinhua	News	Agency	Online)	 	http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2012-08/08/c_123551197.htm	(last	visited	on	July	30,	2015).	36	 The	 Linze	 government	 reburied	 remains	 of	 some	 1000	WRA	 soldiers	 in	 1988.	 (Guo	Menglin,	2006,	 p.	 358.)	 Since	 then	 several	 remains	 have	 been	 unearthed	 every	 year,	 so	when	 the	 county	government	 built	 a	 new	 collective	 tomb	 in	 2012,	 a	 special	 “gate”	was	designed	 so	 that	 the	 tomb	could	be	reopened	when	necessary.	 	
		
251	and	 Li	 Xiannian	 enjoy	 a	 prominent	 position	 on	 a	 platform	 that	 faces	 north.	 The	statues	for	other,	lower-ranking	commanders	stand	in	two	rows	slightly	lower	on	two	sides	of	the	platform.	The	statue	for	Zhang	is	the	only	one	that	faces	south,	and	is	almost	a	full	meter	lower	than	the	statues	of	his	juniors.	According	to	the	official	introduction	of	this	layout,	“the	statue	[of	Zhang	Guotao]	faces	a	different	direction	showing	 that	 he	held	different	 opinions	 [from	 the	other	 leaders],”	while	 the	 low	position	 of	 the	 statue	 “symbolizes	 his	 experience	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 his	 life	 [after	 he	defected	in	1938]”	[Fig.	7-20].37		 	 At	 the	WRA	memorial	 sites,	 most	 sculptures	 portray	 collective	 figures	 rather	than	 a	 single	 soldier.	 In	 contrast	 to	 those	 statues	 of	 individual	 figures	 chosen	 to	represent	the	appearance	of	martyrs,	collective	sculptures	usually	adopt	similarity	as	 their	design	principle.	The	most	 famous	 relief	 sculpture	 in	China—the	one	on	the	Monument	 to	 the	People’s	Heroes—portrays	170	 figures	with	 the	 same	 face.	Many	 memorial	 halls	 have	 borrowed	 this	 method	 to	 imply	 the	 anonymity	 of	Chinese	revolutionaries.	For	example,	in	a	sculpture	in	the	Gao	Jincheng	Memorial	Hall	 (Gao	 Jincheng	 jinianguan	 高金城紀念館)	 in	Zhangye,	 the	 faces	of	 eight	male	and	 one	 female	 soldier	 are	 exactly	 the	 same	 [Fig.	 7-21].	 These	 figures	 therefore	represent	 the	 WRA	 collectively,	 without	 revealing	 anything	 about	 the	 figures’	names	and	lives.		 	 Overall,	while	tombs	mark	the	closure	of	martyrs’	lives,	sculptures	enable	these	lives	 to	 be	 re-imagined.	 When	 high-ranking	 commanders	 achieved	 their	posthumous	assessments	by	being	“buried”	properly	and	portrayed	as	convincing	individuals,	 those	 collective	 tombs	 and	 sculptures	 represent	 the	 anonymity	 of	common	soldiers.	The	combination	of	the	two—of	death	and	life,	the	leaders	and	the	rank-and-file—constitutes	a	comprehensive	representation	of	the	WRA.	 		 	 (3)	Others		 	 Since	 the	 1990s,	 the	 children	 of	 veterans	 and	 senior	 cadres—the	 “second	generation	reds”—have	become	an	important	power	that	influences	the	writing	of	Party	 History.	 From	 their	 perspectives,	 the	 portrayal	 of	 their	 forebears	 in	memorial	 sites	 is	 as	 important	 as	 is	 their	 assessment	 in	 official	 Party	 History	publications.	In	recent	years,	many	“second	generation	reds”	have	become	keen	to	“retrace	the	routes	of	their	forebears”	(chongzou	xianbei	lu	 重走先輩路),	a	kind	of																																																									37	 The	 website	 of	 Stele	 Forest	 for	 Commanders	 of	 the	 Sichuan	 and	 Shaanxi	 Soviet	 Regime	http://www.cssqjsbl.com/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=66	(last	visited	on	July	12,	2015).	
		
252	activity	 during	 which	 they	 journey,	 usually	 by	 car,	 sometimes	 by	motorcycle	 or	bicycle,	 along	 some	 of	 the	 famous	 routes	 in	 Party	 history.	 Memorial	 halls,	cemeteries,	and	old	battlefields	are	must-see	landmarks.38	 		 	 As	 mentioned	 previously,	 in	 the	 1980s,	 many	WRA	 veterans	 revisited	 Gansu,	bringing	 local	 governments	 some	 substantial	 benefits.	 Some	 thirty	 years	 later,	their	offspring	began	 to	do	similar	 things,	 trying	 to	contribute	 to	 the	 locales	 in	a	variety	of	ways,39	 and	their	visits	and	donations	always	attract	the	attention	of	the	local	media.	 		 	 Visitors	 to	 the	WRA	memorial	 sites	 today	 can	 easily	 observe	 the	 influence	 of	“second	 generation	 reds”	 as	 new	 stakeholders,	 because	 certain	 things	 represent	their	concerns	for	the	WRA.	This	is	evident	in	such	items	as	inscribed	stones	set	in	courtyards,	donated	trees,	baskets	of	flowers	inside	the	museums,	etc.	[Fig.	7-22].	Through	 stories	 published	 in	 local	media	 and	 items	 at	 the	memorial	 sites,	 these	veterans’	offspring	play	a	double	role:	as	visitors	to,	and	stakeholders	in,	memorial	sites.	 Thus,	 they	 have	 become	 what	 Foucault	 has	 characterized	 as	 “observed	spectators.”40	 		 	 In	 their	 research	 on	 memorials,	 scholars	 often	 divide	 monuments	 into	 two	categories	according	to	their	materials.	One	includes	constructions	that	are	located	precisely	 and	 constructed	 from	 concrete	 physical	 materials,	 while	 the	 other	includes	 monuments	 that	 are	 comparatively	 short-lived	 and	 goal-specific.41	 The	items	that	these	offspring	donate	belong	to	the	second	category,	because	they	are	easy	 to	 remove	 or	 relocate.	 This	 unstable	 position	 also	 reflects	 this	 stakeholder	group’s	position	in	Party	historiography.	These	children	of	senior	cadres	began	to																																																									38	 As	analyzed	in	the	previous	chapter,	many	offspring	of	the	first	generation	of	revolutionaries	and	a	 considerable	 number	 of	 ordinary	 people	 in	 China	 firmly	 believe	 that	 only	 by	 going	 back	 to	 its	early	history	and	exploiting	its	original	ideology	can	the	Party	have	a	bright	future.	“Retracing	the	routes	of	their	forebears”	is	one	of	their	ways	for	the	offspring	to	express	their	belief	in	communist	ideology.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 a	 behavior	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 the	 Red	 Guard	 pilgrimages	 to	 Beijing	during	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	 Culture	 Revolution	 as	 Rudolf	 G.	 Wagner	 described	 in	 his	 article	“Reading	the	Chairman	Mao	Memorial	Hall	 in	Peking:	The	Tribulations	of	the	Implied	Pilgrim”	(in	Susan	Naquin	and	Chün-fan	Yü,	eds.,	Pilgrims	and	Sacred	Sites	in	China.	Berkeley	and	Los	Angeles,	CA:	University	of	California	Press,	1992,	pp.	378-423.).	39	 There	 are	 several	 examples.	 For	 instance,	 the	 daughter	 of	 Wang	 Shushing,	 the	 deputy	 chief	commander	of	the	WRA,	in	2011	persuaded	the	Chinese	Disabled	Persons’	Federation	(CDPF,	 中國
殘聯)	to	donate	500,000	yuan	to	build	a	special	school	in	Zhangye.	Zhangye	Hong	Xilujun	jingshen	yanjiuhui	 張掖紅西路軍精神研究會	 (Zhangye	Association	of	WRA	Spirit	Studies),	ed.,	Hong	Xilujun	
zhuanti	 紅西路軍專題	 (Research	on	the	WRA),	internal	publication,	Volume	3,	2012,	p.	148.	40	 Michel	Foucault,	The	Order	of	Things:	An	Archaeology	of	the	Human	Sciences.	London:	Tavistock	Publications	Ltd.,	1970,	p.	312.	41	 Paul	Virilio	(translated	by	Daniel	Moshenberg),	The	Lost	Dimension.	New	York:	Semiotextle,	1991,	p.	22.	
		
253	take	part	 in	writing	Party	History	as	 late	 as	 the	1990s.	Now,	 in	 the	21st	 century,	they	 have	 become	 increasingly	 interested	 in	 influencing	 or	 commenting	 on	 the	writing	of	Party	History.	However,	no	one	can	guarantee	that	they	will	continue	to	take	part	in	these	kinds	of	activities	in	the	future.	How	long	will	their	influence	last?	Will	the	third	or	fourth	generation	reds	continue	to	play	a	similar	role	in	the	future?	The	answers	to	these	questions	will	lead	directly	to	changes	in	certain	installations	in	memorial	halls. 
	 	 Local	Authorities		 	 The	role	that	local	governments	are	playing	in	memorial	sites	is	equally	worthy	of	 discussion.	 By	 examining	 these	 local	 leaders’	 words	 and	 decisions,	 we	 can	conclude	that	the	major	impetus	for	them	to	establish	and	maintain	memorial	sites	is	to	build	a	connection	between	the	victory	of	the	Chinese	Communists’	revolution	and	 their	 governance	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 A	 couplet	 at	 an	 old	 WRA	 battlefield	provides	an	apt	illustration	of	this:	You	 sacrificed	 your	 lives	 for	 our	 country	 and	 overthrew	 the	 “three	mountains”42—	your	loyalty	has	been	recorded	in	History.	 	Creating	 prosperity	 for	 the	 local	 people	 and	 fulfilling	 martyrs’	wishes—we	will	continue	your	great	works.43	
為國捐軀推翻三座山，留得丹心照汗青	
造福鄉里實現先烈願，繼承大業有後人.		 	 While	the	first	line	refers	to	the	WRA,	and	also	to	the	CCP’s	history	before	1949,	the	 second	 line’s	 subject	 is	 the	 local	 government,	 which	 is	 a	 part	 of	 the	 CCP’s	governance	 of	 China	 since	 1949.	 The	 former	 is	 the	 nominal	 subject	 of	commemoration,	but	the	latter	is	what	they	actually	intend	to	praise.	 		 	 To	highlight	the	close	link	between	the	Party’s	revolutionary	history	and	its	role	in	 local	 governance,	 these	 local	 governments	not	 only	play	 a	 role	 as	 sponsors	of	memorial	 sites,	 but	 also	 present	 themselves	 as	 exhibition	 subjects.	 Almost	 all	exhibitions	 to	 the	WRA	conclude	with	 a	unit	presenting	 the	 achievements	of	 the	local	 government,	 emphasizing	 how	 prosperous	 the	 county	 has	 become	 in	 the	Reform	Era.	They	always	attribute	these	achievements	to	the	inspiration	of	“WRA	spirit”	 (this	 concept	 will	 be	 analyzed	 in	 7.3.2).	 To	 summarize,	 these	 exhibitions	demonstrate	that	the	local	governments	have	inherited	the	WRA’s	spiritual	legacy																																																									42	 “Three	mountains”	refer	to	imperialism,	feudalism	and	bureaucratic	capitalism.	43	 This	couplet	is	inscribed	in	Gancheng	village	of	Gansu.	
		
254	and	applied	it	to	serve	the	local	people	and	develop	the	local	economy	[Fig.	7-23].	Due	to	the	existence	of	the	above	aspect	of	the	exhibitions,	 the	memorial	halls	to	the	WRA	 are	 not	 merely	 commemorations	 of	 the	 past,	 but	 also	 are	 vehicles	 by	which	to	display	the	Party’s	present	governance.		 	 Every	 county	 that	 has	 some	 connection	 with	 the	 WRA	 has	 built	 at	 least	 one	memorial	site	to	commemorate	that	history.	Actually,	because	of	the	similarity	of	the	content	of	exhibitions,	most	have	not	added	anything	 to	 the	WRA	narratives.	Nevertheless,	 these	 sites	 are	 essential	 for	 the	 local	 authorities	 and	 people,	 not	because	 they	represent	history,	but	because	of	 the	central-local	and	present-past	relationships	they	convey.	 	
7.3	Creating	Local	Narratives	 		 	 Similar	 to	 the	memorial	 sites	mentioned	above,	historical	narratives	 also	have	undergone	 renovation	 since	 the	 1990s.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 local	 officials	 and	researchers	avoid	discussing	and	displaying	controversial	aspects	of	the	WRA.	By	reading	 information	boards	at	memorial	 sites	or	propaganda	materials	 compiled	by	 local	 organs,	 one	 learns	merely	 that	 the	WRA’s	 establishment	 and	operations	were	in	accordance	with	the	Party	Center’s	directives,	and	that	the	WRA’s	goal	was	to	 open	 the	 “international	 route.”	 Those	 controversial	 questions	 around	 which	debates	still	rage	(see	Chapter	6)	receive	no	space	here.	On	the	other	hand,	 local	officials	and	researchers	at	this	level	have	created	three	new	themes	with	which	to	tell	 the	 WRA’s	 stories.	 By	 promoting	 these	 local	 narratives,	 local	 organs	 have	broken	the	barriers	to	discussing	sensitive	historical	 issues,	and	publications	and	mass	media	have	already	disseminated	these	local	narratives	widely.	 	
7.3.1	The	“WRA	Spirit”		 	 When	local	Party	history	researchers	found	that	historical	facts	about	the	WRA	were	too	sensitive	to	discuss,	they	turned	to	research	on	the	so-called	“WRA	Spirit”	(Xilujun	 jingshen	 西路軍精神).	 Today,	 this	 concept	 has	 become	 the	 core	 of	 local	research	 on,	 and	 propaganda	 about,	 the	WRA.	 This	 shift	 in	 research	 focus	 from	historical	facts	to	“spirit”	has	allowed	local	researchers	to	continue	their	work.	On	the	one	hand,	“WRA	Spirit”	 is	an	abstract	 topic	one	can	discuss	without	 touching	upon	the	sensitive	aspects	of	this	historical	issue,	such	as	the	reasons	for	its	failure.	On	the	other	hand,	in	contrast	to	research	that	deals	with	historical	facts,	research	on	 such	 concepts	 as	 abstract	 as	 “revolutionary	 spirit”	 is	more	 likely	 to	 serve	 the	
		
255	immediate	 needs	 of	 local	 governments	 and	 other	 official	 agencies,	 such	 as	enhancing	 morale	 among	 PLA	 soldiers,	 and	 educating	 ordinary	 people	 to	 work	hard	for	the	country,	and	so	forth.		 	 The	CCP’s	“Red	Spirit”		 	 The	 “WRA	Spirit”	did	not	appear	out	of	 thin	air;	 actually,	 it	 is	 an	aspect	of	 the	CCP’s	 “Red	 Spirit”	 (hongse	 jingshen	 紅色精神).	 “Red	 Spirit”	 is	 considered	 a	spiritual	power,	and	by	 learning	about	 it,	people	will	be	able	 to	 “fully	 realize	 the	value	 of	 hard-won	 revolutionary	 victory	 and	 the	 significance	 of	 socialist	construction,	and	therefore	acknowledge	that	our	socialist	career	is	respectful	and	wonderful.”44  	 	 It	 is	a	common	practice	for	both	ordinary	people	and	ruling	elites	to	dissociate	an	 historical	 figure	 or	 event	 from	 its	 background,	 simplifying	 the	 causal	relationship	 and	 transforming	 a	 complicated	 subject	 into	 a	 relatively	 abstract	symbol,	 in	order	 to	 serve	 current	goals.45	 By	doing	 so,	with	 the	passage	of	 time,	the	 context	or	 relevant	 facts	deemed	no	 longer	useful	 in	 serving	 the	present	 are	stripped	away	gradually.		 	 The	 “Red	 Spirit”	 promoted	 by	 the	 CCP	 includes	 a	 variety	 of	 themes.	 Every	historical	period	before	1949	has	been	assigned	its	corresponding	spirit.46	 Model	figures	 propagandized	 widely	 after	 1949	 are	 also	 considered	 to	 convey	 specific	spirits	to	the	Chinese	people.47	 Local	propaganda	departments	are	responsible	for	interpreting	 these	 spirits.	Although	 they	enjoy	 some	degree	of	 autonomy	on	 this																																																									44	 Zhang	 Ruimin	 張瑞民,	 Gansu	 sheng	 wenhua	 chanye	 fazhan	 baogao	 甘肅省文化產業發展報告	(Report	 on	 the	 development	 of	 cultural	 industry	 in	 Gansu).	 Lanzhou:	 Gansu	 renmin	 chubanshe,	2011,	p.	152.	45 	 For	 instance,	 scholars	 in	 Taiwan	 and	 Mainland	 China	 examined	 the	 representation	 and	identification	 of	 two	 famous	 military	 commanders	 in	 China’s	 dynastic	 history	 and	 found	 that	modern	states	tended	to	“look	at	these	two	heroes	from	a	perspective	of	eternal,	universal	ethical	models	and	paradigmatic	personalities”.	Huang	Kewu	 黃克武,	 “Shi	Kefa	yu	 jindai	Zhongguo	 jiyi	 ji	rentong	 de	 bianqian	 史可法與近代中國記憶及認同的變遷”	 (Shi	 Kefa	 and	 the	 transformation	 of	memory	and	identity	in	modern	China),	in	Wang	Di	 王笛,	ed.,	Shijian,	kongjian,	shuxie	 時間，空間，
書寫	 (Time,	space	and	writing).	Hangzhou:	Zhejiang	renmin	chubanshe,	2006,	pp.	245-271.	Huang	Donglan	 黃東蘭	 and	Sun	Jiang	 孫江,	“Yue	Fei	xushu,	gonggong	jiyi	yu	guozu	rentong	 岳飛敘述、公
共記憶與國族認同”	 (The	narratives	of	Yue	Fei,	public	memory	and	national	 identity),	Ershiyi	 shiji	
二十一世紀,	2004(12),	pp.	88-100.	That	a	king	 in	ancient	China,	Guojian	 勾踐	 (about	4th	century	BC	 )	 was	 symbolized	 in	 various	ways	 in	 different	 historical	 periods	 is	 another	 example.	 Paul	 A.	Cohen,	Speaking	to	History:	the	Story	of	King	Goujian	in	Twentieth-Century	China.	LA:	University	of	California	Press,	2009.	46	 “Jinggang	Mountain	Spirit”	(Jinggangshan	jingshen	 井岡山精神),	“Yan’an	Spirit”	(Yan’an	jingshen	
延安精神),	“Xibaipo	Spirit”	(Xibaipo	jingshen	 西柏坡精神),	“Soviet	Region	Spirit”	(suqu	jingshen	 蘇
區精神),	etc.	47	 “Lei	Feng	Spirit”	(Lei	Feng	jingshen	 雷鋒精神),	“Jiao	Yülu	Spirit”	(Jiao	Yülu	jingshen	 焦裕祿精神)	and	“Kong	Fansen	Spirit”	(Kong	Fansen	jingshen	 孔繁森精神)	are	the	best-known	examples.	
		
256	issue,	 local	 governments’	 and	 researchers’	 interpretations	 of	 such	 “spirits”	 align	closely	with	a	number	of	 concepts	 that	 the	Party	Center	has	been	promoting	 for	decades,	such	as	“being	resolute	of	 faith”	(jianding	xinnian	 堅定信念),	“truly	care	for	 the	masses”	 (xinxi	 qunzhong	 心繫群眾),	 “seek	 truth	 from	 facts”	 (shishi	 qiushi	
實事求是)	 and	 “struggle	 against	 adversity”	 (jianku	 fendou	 艱苦奮鬥).	 In	 most	cases,	local	governments’	innovation	lies	merely	in	rearranging	these	fixed	phrases	or	changing	certain	words.48	
	 	 Creating	the	“WRA	Spirit”	
  There	 is	 no	 official	 definition	 of	 the	 “WRA	 Spirit.”	 Since	 2005,	 researchers	 in	Gansu	 provincial	 institutions,	 officials	 of	 the	 Lanzhou	 Military	 Region,	 and	members	of	the	Zhangye	Association	of	WRA	Spirit	Studies	have	created	dozens	of	definitions	of	the	“WRA	Spirit.”	Despite	the	large	number	of	definitions,	there	is	no	essential	 distinction	 between	 them,	 because	 they	 all	 share	 similar	ideas—attempting	 to	 prove	 that	 the	 WRA	 shared	 values	 common	 to	 those	prominent	events	in	the	Party’s	history	that	have	been	praised	explicitly	by	central	authorities,	 while	 also	 being	 determined	 to	 identify	 some	 revolutionary	 traits	unique	to	the	WRA.	 	
  The	 “Long	 March	 Spirit”	 is	 recognized	 officially	 as	 the	 epitome	 of	 the	 “Red	Spirit.”49	 Because	of	the	Long	March’s	irreplaceable	position	in	Party	History,	quite	a	number	of	Gansu	local	researchers	have	constructed	their	definition	of	the	“WRA	Spirit”	 based	 on	 the	 official	 evaluation	 of	 the	 “Long	 March	 Spirit.”	 Hu	 Jintao’s	
																																																								48	 Take	 one	 of	 the	 CCP’s	most	 important	 revolutionary	 holy	 lands,	 the	 Jinggang	Mountain,	 as	 an	example.	The	Jinggang	Mountain	period	(1927-1929)	was	a	turning	point	for	the	Party,	because	it	was	 in	 this	 period	 that	 the	 Party	 Center	 changed	 the	 strategy	 of	 seizing	 big	 cities	 and	 started	occupying	 the	 countryside.	 The	 Vice-director	 of	 the	 Jinggang	 Mountain	 Cadres’	 Institute	(Jinggangshan	 ganbu	 xueyuan	 井岡山幹部學院),	 Li	 Xiaosan,	 summarized	 the	 so-called	 “Jinggang	Mountain	 Spirit”	 as	 following:	 A	 spirit	 of	 seeking	 truth	 from	 facts	 and	 daring	 to	 explore	 new	methods	(實事求是，敢闖新路的精神);	a	spirit	of	keeping	the	faith	and	never	wavering	in	loyalty	(堅定信念，矢志不移的精神);	a	spirit	of	struggling	against	adversity	and	self-reliance	(艱苦奮鬥、
自力更生的精神);	a	spirit	of	relying	on	the	masses	and	daring	to	be	victorious	(依靠群眾、勇於勝利
的精神).	See	Li	Xiaosan	 李小三,	“Jinggangshan:	Zhongguo	gongchandang	ren	yongyuan	de	jingshen	jiayuan	 井岡山：中國共產黨人永遠的精神家園”	 (The	 Jinggang	 Mountain:	 Chinese	 Communists’	spiritual	homeland),	Guangming	ribao	 光明日報,	November	6,	2010,	p.	5.	49	 Former	 Chief	 Secretary	 of	 the	 CCP,	 Hu	 Jintao	 described	 it	 as	 “the	 highest	 embodiment	 of	 the	Chinese	 national	 spirit	 with	 patriotism	 as	 the	 core”.	 Hu	 Jintao	 胡錦濤 ,	 “Zai	 jinian	 Hongjun	Changzheng	shengli	70	zhounian	dahui	shang	de	jianghua	 在紀念紅軍長征勝利 70週年大會上的講
話”	(A	speech	at	the	Conference	for	the	70th	Anniversary	of	the	Victory	of	the	Long	March),	Xinhua	
wang	 新華網	 (Xinhua	News	Agency	Online)	http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/22/content_5235987.htm	 (last	 visited	 on	 July	 20th	2015).	
		
257	authoritative	 interpretation	 of	 the	 “Long	 March	 Spirit”	 in	 2005,50	 on	 the	 70th	anniversary	 of	 the	 end	of	 the	 Long	March,	 has	 become	 their	model.	 Researchers	believe	that	because	the	WRA	consisted	of	troops	who	had	just	finished	the	Long	March,	the	WRA	undoubtedly	inherited	all	the	elements	of	the	Long	March	Spirit.	In	addition	to	these	elements,	they	also	contend	that	“the	WRA	Spirit	contains	even	more	and	richer	content:” [The	WRA	displayed]	heroic	characteristics	by	fighting	their	enemies	to	the	end	and	[also	displayed]	revolutionary	mettle	by	not	yielding	even	 when	 lives	 were	 threatened;	 they	 never	 abandoned	comrades-in-arms	 even	 under	 very	 difficult	 conditions	 and	 they	were	 always	 ready	 to	 contribute,	 [displaying	 a]	 spirit	 of	 mutual	assistance;	 they	 bravely	 and	 cleverly	 protected	 themselves	 and	returned	 undaunted	 to	 the	 revolutionary	 camp	 [displaying]	 a	maverick	 spirit;	 they	 endured	 sufferings	 and	 never	 gave	 up	 their	faith,	and	through	a	 lifetime	of	revolutionary	words	and	deeds	they	showed	their	loyalty	to	the	Party	and	Chinese	people.51 	 	 Here,	the	“WRA	Spirit”	is	actually	a	summarized	history	of	the	WRA.	In	this	sense,	the	 “WRA	 Spirit”	 is	 more	 a	 new	 narrative	 approach	 to	 telling	 the	 story	 of	 the	WRA’s	history	rather	than	the	addition	of	any	new	content.	
	 	 A	Vehicle	of	Ideological	Indoctrination		 	 Distilling	the	WRA’s	“spirit”	is	not	the	ultimate	goal	of	propagandizing	the	WRA.	In	fact,	the	“Red	Spirit”,	with	the	“WRA	Spirit”	as	a	part	of	 it,	 is	merely	a	medium	with	 which	 to	 link	 revolutionary	 history	 that	 occurred	 decades	 ago	 to	 political	education	 in	 today’s	China.	Examining	 the	Party’s	propaganda	of	 the	 “Red	Spirit”	reveals	 a	 tendency	 to	 obscure	 the	 relationship	 between	 historical	 facts	 and	 the	corresponding	 “spirit.”	 There	 is	 also	 a	 tendency	 to	 emphasize	 the	 connections	between	an	abstract	“spirit”	and	people’s	work	and	daily	life.	An	article	written	by	the	Commander	of	the	PLA	Lanzhou	Military	Region,	Wang	Guosheng,	reflects	this																																																									50	 Hu	said:	“[The	Long	March	Spirit]	is	to	put	the	fundamental	interests	of	the	Chinese	people	and	the	 Chinese	 nation	 ahead	 of	 anything	 else,	 to	 firmly	 uphold	 revolutionary	 ideals	 and	 beliefs,	believing	that	a	righteous	cause	must	be	victorious.	[The	Long	March	Spirit]	is	to	give	up	everything	to	 save	 our	 country	 and	 the	 people,	 not	 sparing	 any	 hardness.	 [The	 Long	 March	 Spirit]	 is	 to	cooperate	with	the	masses	closely,	overcoming	difficulties	together.”	Ibid. 51	 Dong	 Hanhe	 董漢河,	 “Xilujun	 geming	 jingshen	 de	 fengfu	 neihan	 西路軍革命精神的豐富內涵”	(The	WRA	contains	rich	content	of	revolutionary	spirit),	Gansu	lilun	xuekan	 甘肅理論學刊,	2010(6),	pp.	5-11.	
		
258	tendency.	Wang	 summarized	 six	 aspects	 of	 the	WRA’s	 spirit,	 but	 he	 emphasized	taking	advantage	of	these	aspects	to	educate	PLA	soldiers.	Take	as	an	example	one	of	 the	 six	aspects	 that	Wang	promoted—“a	political	quality	of	arduous	struggle.”	For	 a	 reader	 who	 is	 familiar	 with	 the	 Party’s	 political	 discourse	 and	 the	WRA’s	history,	 what	 the	 nine	 Chinese	 characters	 above	 refer	 to	 is	 obvious—the	 WRA	endured	 extreme	 difficulties	 and	 survived	without	 food	 and	medicine.	 However,	even	 if	 a	 PLA	 soldier	 has	 no	 idea	 how	 the	 WRA	 “arduously	 struggled,”	 the	educational	 value	would	not	be	 reduced	 in	 the	 slightest,	 because	Wang	used	 the	WRA	 merely	 as	 an	 analogy,	 while	 his	 arguments	 are	 focused	 on	 the	 Lanzhou	Military	Region.	Wang	argued,	“We	are	facing	harsh	natural	conditions,	inefficient	social	 supports	 and	 the	 challenging	 tasks	 of	 maintaining	 the	 stability	 of	 the	boundary	regions.”	In	this	respect,	learning	from	the	WRA	is	necessary:	We	should	carry	forward	the	WRA’s	revolutionary	spirit	of	arduous	struggle	 and	 selfless	 dedication	 [to	 the	 Party’s	 cause].	 We	 should	advance	in	the	face	of	known	difficulties,	encounter	those	difficulties	head-on	as	we	move	forward,	and	treat	hardship	as	an	honor	and	a	pleasure.	We	 should	 rely	 on	 the	 available	military	 facilities	 to	 win	battles	and	creatively	resolve	problems	on	the	battlefield.	We	should	be	 frugal	 and	 oppose	 luxury	 and	 waste.	 In	 hardship,	 we	 should	reveal	 our	 spirit,	 seek	 development	 and	 have	 outstanding	achievements.52	In	this	way,	the	medium	of	the	so-called	“WRA	Spirit”	has	transformed	the	WRA’s	history	into	official	directives.	 		 	 In	 addition	 to	 publishing	 articles,	 other,	more	 concrete	 approaches	 have	 been	applied	to	propagandize	the	“WRA	Spirit.”	For	example,	several	“exhibition	rooms	for	the	WRA	Spirit”	have	been	built	in	military	units	in	Gansu	and	serve	as	a	means	of	political	education.	As	scholars	have	pointed	out,	propaganda	helps	maintain	the	CCP	 and	 its	 control	 over	 the	military.53	 Propaganda	materials	 use	 the	 history	 of																																																									52	 Wang	 Guosheng	 王國生,	 “Xuexi	 liaojie	 jicheng	 Xilujun	 geming	 jingshen,	 dali	 peiyang	 dangdai	geming	junren	hexin	jiazhiguan	 學習了解繼承弘揚西路軍革命精神，大力培養當代革命軍人核心價
值觀”	 (To	 study,	 understand,	 inherite	 and	 promote	 the	 WRA’s	 revolutionary	 spirit,	 in	 order	 to	cultivate	 essential	 values	 of	 contemporary	 revolutionary	 soldiers),	 in	 Tiexue	 zhengcheng	 qilian	
fengbei	 鐵血征程，祁連豐碑	 (A	hard	and	bloody	march,	like	a	monument	in	the	Qilian	Mountains)	,	internal	publication,	2011,	pp.	1-20.	53	 Wang	 Juntao	 and	Anne-Marie	 Brady,	 “Sword	 and	 pen:	 the	 propaganda	 system	 of	 the	 People’s	Liberation	Army”,	in	Anne-Marie	Brady,	ed.,	China’s	Thought	Management.	OX:	Routledge,	2012,	pp.	
		
259	the	Party,	especially	its	military	history,	extensively.	 		 	 As	well	as	among	the	PLA	troops,	the	“WRA	Spirit”	is	also	a	common	subject	of	study	 in	 official	 agencies,	 schools,	 and	 in	 private	 enterprises	 in	 Gansu.	 Cadres,	students,	and	staff	are	asked	to	connect	the	“WRA	Spirit”	 to	their	work	and	daily	life.	Campaigns	of	writing	and	making	speeches	about	 the	WRA	are	common	and	they	reinforce	the	outcomes	of	such	political	education.	These	means	have	resulted	in	much	more	 intense	and	wide	dissemination	of	 the	“spirit”	 than	historical	 facts	could	 have	 accomplished.	 History	 definitely	 was	 degraded	 into	 a	 vehicle	 of	ideological	indoctrination	in	this	case.	 	
7.3.2	Displaying	Suffering	 		 	 In	 exhibitions	 at	 WRA	 memorial	 sites	 and	 in	 local	 publications,	 the	 WRA’s	bravery	 and	 suffering	 occupy	 the	most	 space.	 Unlike	 the	 so-called	 “WRA	 Spirit”	created	 to	 conduct	 political	 education,	 the	masses	 see	 the	WRA’s	 suffering	more	informally	or	unofficially.	Consequently,	in	contrast	with	the	“WRA	Spirit,”	which	is	discussed	 primarily	 in	 official	 organs,	 in	 the	 PLA	 and	 in	 schools,	 the	 WRA’s	suffering	is	well	known.	 		 	 The	WRA’s	suffering	lies	firstly	in	its	serious	defeat.	While	research	and	debates	at	 the	 central	 level	 still	 focus	 on	 the	 WRA’s	 mission	 and	 its	 establishment,	exhibitions	and	propaganda	at	the	local	level	have	exposed	a	wealth	of	details	and	images	 of	 the	 WRA’s	 miserable	 experience	 on	 the	 battlefields	 and	 during	 the	period	after	their	capture.	Some	of	these	accounts	and	images	are	quite	shocking.	In	publications	by	local	researchers,	episodes	such	as	the	following	are	common:	 	Ma	Ping’an	(a	middle-ranking	commander	in	the	Ma	brothers’	army)	bound	a	captured	WRA	soldier	to	a	tree,	cut	his	belly	open	to	get	his	gallbladder	 and	 then	 ate	 it.	 Li	 Gui	 (another	 commander)	 killed	 six	people	 and	 dipped	 a	 steamed	 bun	 in	 their	 blood	 before	 he	 ate	 the	bun.	Li	 also	got	 two	 captives’	hearts	 and	used	a	 frying	pan	 to	 cook	them.54	 		 	 Visual	measures	are	more	effective	in	representing	the	WRA’s	suffering,	as	well	as	 their	 enemies’	 brutality	 and	 inhumanity.	 Striking	 images	 are	 exhibited	 at	memorial	 sites,	 some	 obviously	 too	 gruesome	 for	 young	 audiences.	 After	 the																																																																																																																																																																			122-145.	54	 Feng	 Yaguang	 馮亞光,	 Xilujun	 shengsi	 dang’an	 西路軍生死檔案	 (The	 lives	 and	 death	 of	 the	Western	Route	Army).	Xi’an:	Shanxi	renmin	chubanshe	 陝西人民出版社,	2009,	p.	19.	
		
260	Communists	took	over	Gansu	in	1949,	they	captured	some	photos	of	WRA	soldiers’	corpses	 taken	 and	 kept	 by	 Ma	 Bufang	 and	 Ma	 Buqing’s	 officials.	 Now	 every	memorial	site	exhibits	 these	photos,	which	have	become	the	most	representative	images	of	the	WRA.	One	of	these	famous	photos	displays	the	decapitated	heads	of	three	WRA	commanders	[Fig.	7-24],	while	another	image	highlights	the	leader	of	a	WRA	medical	team	being	crucified	on	a	tree	in	Gaotai	County	[Fig.	7-25].	The	GMW	not	only	exhibits	the	second	photo,	but	a	model	tree	as	well	[Fig.	7-26].	 		 	 One	distinguishing	 feature	of	 the	WRA	compared	to	other	branches	of	 the	Red	Army	is	the	considerable	number	of	female	troops	in	its	ranks.	Due	to	their	lower	combat	 capability,	 many	 were	 captured	 by	 the	 Ma	 brothers’	 troops.	 Official	accounts	of	Party	History	avoid	this	point,	but	it	has	been	the	focus	of	interest	for	some	Gansu	researchers.	Publications	and	exhibitions	 in	memorial	halls	describe	the	suffering	of	these	female	captives,	which	included	rape	and	torture,	vividly.	A	documentary	entitled	“The	WRA	Female	Soldiers”	(Xilujun	nü	zhanshi	 西路軍女戰
士),	produced	in	2005	by	the	Women’s	Association	of	Gansu	to	celebrate	the	70th	anniversary	of	the	Long	March,	focuses	on	this	topic,	and	reveals	several	shocking	details	[Fig.	7-27].  
  Wang	Quanyuan’s	Story 
  To	exemplify	the	WRA’s	suffering,	Wang	Quanyuan’s	 王泉媛	 (1913-2009)	case	is	 mentioned	 most	 often.	 Wang	 was	 a	 female	 commander	 married	 to	 a	high-ranking	 Party	 leader.	 She	 was	 “abandoned”	 by	 the	 Party	 later,	 and	 her	dramatic	experience	includes	almost	all	of	the	attractive	components	of	the	WRA’s	suffering.	Wang	was	once	the	head	of	 the	Women’s	Independent	Regiment	of	 the	WRA,	 so	media	 cite	 her	 recollections	of	 the	WRA’s	 fighting	 frequently.	 The	most	popular	part	of	Wang’s	story,	however,	is	about	her	life	after	the	WRA’s	defeat.	By	narrating	 this	 part	 of	 her	 experience	 repeatedly,	Wang	 has	 been	 portrayed	 as	 a	committed	 and	 unyielding	 Communist.	 Here	 is	 the	 most	 common	 version	 of	Wang’s	experience	following	her	capture:	A	commander,	Ma	 Jinchang,	 chose	Wang	Quanyuan	 from	numerous	female	captives	to	be	his	concubine.	At	the	time	Wang	had	made	up	her	mind	that	as	long	as	she	were	still	alive	she	would	have	a	chance	to	 escape	 [so	 she	 agreed	 to	 be	Ma’s	 concubine].	 She	 did	 not	 find	 a	chance	to	get	away	until	March	1939	when	she	disguised	herself	as	a	man	 and	 went	 out	 through	 a	 window.	 After	 running	 90	miles	 she	
		
261	reached	the	main	road	toward	Lanzhou.	Unfortunately,	she	went	to	the	 CCP’s	 agency	 in	 Lanzhou	 only	 to	 find	 out	 that	 she	 could	 not	return	to	the	revolutionary	ranks	because	of	the	Party’s	regulations.	The	Party	welcomed	cadres	who	had	lost	contact	with	the	Party	for	less	than	a	year,	while	refusing	those	who	had	disappeared	for	more	than	three	years.	As	for	those	who	had	been	away	for	two	years,	the	Party	needed	to	investigate	them	before	it	could	be	decided	whether	they	 should	 be	 accepted.	 Wang	 Quanyuan’s	 situation	 was	 more	complicated	than	just	being	captured	or	losing	contact	with	the	Party	for	 three	 years;	 she	 was	 also	 accused	 of	 being	 Ma	 Jinchang’s	concubine.	The	Party	agency	in	Lanzhou	gave	Wang	five	dollars	and	sent	her	out.	Wang	had	no	choice	but	to	go	back	to	her	hometown	in	Jiangxi,	 to	where	 she	again	needed	 to	walk	along	 the	Long	March’s	route,	 however	 this	 time	 in	 reverse.	 She	managed	 to	 get	 home	 by	begging	all	the	way.	Since	then	she	has	been	living	an	ordinary	life	in	the	 countryside,	 not	 daring	 to	mention	 her	 experience	 to	 anybody.	Fifty	 years	 later,	 Wang	 Quanyuan	 was	 identified	 as	 a	 Red	 Army	veteran	 and	 finally	 had	 a	 chance	 to	 meet	 her	 husband,	 then	Vice-chairman	 of	 the	 Chinese	 People’s	 Political	 Consultative	Conference,	Wang	Shoudao.	Wang	Shoudao	said:	I	waited	for	you	in	Yan’an	 for	 three	 years	 [before	 I	 married	 again].	 Wang	 Quanyuan	cried	loudly.	 55	 		 	 Wang	Quanyuan’s	 story	 is	 classic	 and	 contains	many	 components	 of	 the	WRA	narratives—fighting	bravely,	escaping	from	captors	cleverly,	being	refused	by	the	Party,	 and	 spending	 the	 rest	 of	 her	 life	 in	 loneliness,	 accompanied	 merely	 by	memories	 and	 suffering.	 Referencing	 other	 materials,	 however,	 we	 can	 easily	discover	 fabrications	 in	 Wang’s	 standard	 biography.	 First,	 the	 story	 of	 Wang	suffering	among	Ma	Bufang’s	 troops	 is	questionable,	because	other	sources	show																																																									55	 This	 paragraph	 is	 a	 summary	 of	 a	 report	 published	 in	 Nanfang	 zhoumo	 南方週末:	 “Zhuixun	nazhi	 xiaoshi	 de	 hongjun	 追尋那隻消失的紅軍”	 (In	 search	 of	 the	 branch	 of	 the	 Red	 Army	 that	disappeared)	(November	23,	2006).	Similar	content	can	also	be	found	in	several	other	articles	and	books.	In	Dong	Hanhe’s	 董漢河	 book	Xilujun	nüzhanshi	mengnan	ji	[西路軍女戰士蒙難記	 (Female	soldiers	 of	 the	 WRA	 in	 danger).	 Beijing:	 Jiefangjun	 wenyi	 chubanshe	 解放軍文藝出版社,	 1989],	Wang	Quanyuan’s	stories	occupy	one	chapter.	In	1998,	a	biography	for	Wang	was	published.	Wang	Xia 王霞,	 Monan:	 Xilujun	 nü	 Hongjun	 tuanzhang	 de	 chuanqi	 磨難：西路軍女紅軍團長的傳奇	(Sufferings:	legends	of	a	female	regimental	commander	of	the	WRA).	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	
解放軍出版社,	1998.	
		
262	that	she	might	have	played	an	infamous	role	in	helping	her	enemies	supervise	her	sisters-in-arms.	 According	 to	 the	 CCP’s	 criterion,	 this	 behavior	 was	 definitely	 a	betrayal	 to	 the	 Party.	 Even	 if	 one	 discounts	 this,	Wang	 also	 betrayed	 her	 fellow	female	soldiers	and	friends,	who	did	not	forgive	her.56	 This	personal	betrayal	also	disqualifies	Wang	as	a	model	figure.	Second,	after	Wang	returned	to	her	hometown,	her	 life	might	not	have	been	as	 “ordinary”	as	 she	claimed.	Some	evidence	shows	that	 she	 held	 a	 position	 in	 the	 local	 government	 and	 maintained	 contact	 with	high-ranking	 cadres	 in	 Beijing,	 presumably	 because	 of	 her	 marital	 relationship	with	Wang	Shoudao.57	 Despite	 the	contradictions	above,	Chinese	media	continue	to	portray	Wang	as	 a	 committed	Party	member	 and	Red	Army	 soldier,	who	was	unswerving	in	her	loyalty	to	the	Party	even	though	she	had	suffered	while	trying	to	pursue	the	Party’s	goals.	 		 	 Since	the	early	1990s,	the	media	has	not	only	disseminated	Wang’s	story	widely,	but	Wang	herself	has	also	told	it	repeatedly.	Her	home	in	Jiangxi	became	a	regular	venue	 for	 conducting	 political	 education	 and	 promoting	 red	 tourism.	 Every	 day,	Wang	sat	in	her	yard,	where	reporters,	students,	soldiers,	and	other	visitors	from	all	over	 the	country	 interviewed	and	 listened	 to	her	until	 she	died	 in	2009	at	96	years	 of	 age	 [Fig.	 7-28].	 Since	 then,	Wang	 has	 remained	 a	 representative	 of	 the	WRA	and	especially	of	its	suffering.	 	
  Political	Correctness	and	Narratives	of	Suffering		 	 One	of	the	CCP’s	major	principles	of	propagandizing	its	own	history	is	political	correctness.	 In	 previous	 decades,	 the	 prominence	 of	 this	 principle	 was	unchallenged.	In	the	words	of	a	senior	official,	the	Party	today	still	needs	to	ensure	the	correct	political	 framing	of,	and	guarantee	 the	correct	representation	of,	 “the	truth	 of	 the	 communist	 revolution	 history	 in	 a	 comprehensive	 and	 politically	correct	way.”58	 The	 narratives	 about	 the	WRA’	 s	 suffering,	 however,	 reveal	 that																																																									56	 Sun	Shuyun	reported	in	her	book,	The	Long	March,	that	in	the	Gansu	provincial	archives	she	read	a	series	of	statements	by	Mao	Gelin,	the	former	Commander	of	the	Special	Task	Force	of	the	Mas,	which	said	Wang	Quanyuan	not	only	slept	with	Ma	Gelin	but	also	worked	with	him	to	manage	the	130	 women	 prisoners.	 Sun	 wrote	 that	 there	 were	 also	 other	 references	 to	 Wang	 with	 similar	accusations.	Sun	Shuyun,	2006,	p.	221.	57	 Wang’s	 contact	with	 senior	 cadres	 in	Beijing	 deliberately	 failed	 to	 be	mentioned	 in	 almost	 all	exhibitions	and	media	reports.	The	only	exception	 is	 the	Gao	 Jincheng	Memorial	Hall	 in	Zhangye,	where	a	photo	of	Wang	and	then	Health	Minister	Zhang	Qinqiu	taken	in	the	1950s	is	exhibited.	58	 Shao	Qiwei	 邵琪偉,	“Qianghua	renshi,	wenbu	tuijin,	quebao	hongse	lüyou	chixu	jiankang	fazhan	
強化認識，穩步推進，確保紅色旅遊持續健康發展”	(To	strengthen	understanding	and	to	advance	stability,	 in	 order	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 red	 tourism	 will	 sustain	 healthy	 development),	 Zhonghua	
renmin	 gongheguo	 guojia	 lüyouju	 wangzhan	 中華人民共和國國家旅遊局網站	 (Website	 of	 China	National	Tourism	Administration	)	
		
263	although	guaranteeing	the	political	correctness	of	propaganda	is	still	claimed	to	be	a	priority,	the	meaning	of	this	principle	has	already	changed	in	two	ways.		 	 First,	the	Party	forbade	discussion	of	some	aspects	of	its	history	previously,	but	those	restrictions	have	now	been	 lifted.	During	 the	Mao	Era,	 the	Party	portrayed	its	 army	 as	 invincible.	 As	 a	 result,	 defeats	 as	 serious	 as	 that	 of	 the	 WRA	 were	deemed	 inappropriate	 for	 propaganda	 purposes.	 In	 recent	 years,	 although	 the	Party	 Center	 has	 continued	 to	 direct	 ideological	 organs	 primarily	 to	 praise	 the	Party’s	 victories—in	 the	 Party’s	 official	 words,	 to	 present	 “our	 Party’s	 glorious	history	 and	 the	 lofty	 spirit	 and	 heroic	 vestiges	 of	 the	 old	 generation	 of	revolutionaries”59—the	WRA’s	failure	is	no	longer	a	taboo	subject.	  	 	 Second,	some	narrative	approaches	the	Party	criticized	previously	have	become	popular	in	recent	years.	 In	the	Party’s	propaganda	system,	emphasizing	the	price	paid	by	 the	Communists	and	 their	 families	 in	 the	pursuit	of	 revolution	was	once	considered	 to	 be	 “distorting	 elder	 revolutionaries’	 thought	 and	 emotions,”	“distorting	the	image	of	revolutionary	martyrs’	families,”	and	“promoting	capitalist	individualism	 and	 the	 capitalist	 theory	 of	 human	 nature.”60 	 Thus,	 the	 Party	forbade	writers	 to	 put	 an	 individual’s	well-being	 above	 the	 revolutionary	 cause,	much	 less	 to	 attribute	 the	 loss	 of	 well-being	 to	 conflicts	 within	 the	 Party.	Investigations	of	the	narratives	of	the	WRA,	however,	indicate	that	these	narrative	approaches	 that	 the	Party	 criticized	previously	 are	now	applied	widely.	 Is	 this	 a	violation	 of	 the	 Party’s	 directives?	 Official	 Party	 accounts	 issued	 in	 recent	 years	show	 that	 it	 primarily	 has	 a	 twofold	 expectation	 for	 the	 outcomes	 of	 its	propaganda	on	Party	History.	One	is	that	it	will	educate	the	people,	and	the	other	is	
																																																																																																																																																																		http://www.cnta.gov.cn/html/2008-6/2008-6-2-18-20-11-619_1.html	 (last	 visited	 on	 May	 24,	2015).	59	 Li	 Shenglin	 李盛霖,	 “Tuijin	 hongse	 lüyou	 quanmian	 fazhan	 推進紅色旅遊全面發展”	 (To	work	for	the	development	of	red	tourism),	Renmin	ribao	 人民日報,	April	3,	2005,	cited	in	the	website	of	China	Red	Tourism	http://www.crt.com.cn/news2007/News/quanwei/2006-5/30/00008969.html	 (last	 visited	 on	July	26,	2015).	 	 	60	 For	example,	writer	Wang	Yuanjian	 王願堅	 published	a	novel	titled	The	Beloved	(Qinren	 親人)	in	the	1960s.	This	novel	tells	a	story	about	a	general’s	sharing	the	same	name	as	a	particular	martyr,	leading	to	the	martyr’s	father	mistaking	the	general	for	his	son.	In	the	end,	the	general	decided	to	treat	the	martyr’s	father	as	his	own	father.	At	first	this	novel	was	well	received	and	was	included	in	some	 textbooks	 for	 middle	 school	 students.	 However,	 later	 it	 was	 seriously	 criticized	 and	 was	charged	 with	 having	 committed	 all	 the	 errors	 listed	 here.	 See	 Hu	 Yanlin	 胡艷琳,	 “Cong	 geming	huiyilu	dao	jiti	jiyi	de	yinggou:	jianlun	Wang	Yuanjian	de	geming	lishi	xiaoshuo	chuangzuo	 從革命
回憶錄到集體記憶的營構：簡論王願堅的革命歷史小說創作”	(From	revolutionary	memoirs	to	the	construction	of	 collective	memory:	 a	brief	discussion	of	Wang	Yuanjian’s	 revolutionary	historical	novels),	Hunan	wenli	xueyuan	xuebao	 湖南文理學院學報,	2007(4),	pp.	102-105.	 	
		
264	that	 it	 will	 make	 the	 masses	 advocate	 for	 the	 Party.61 	 Compared	 to	 these	seemingly	 clear	 goals,	 the	method	 to	 achieve	 them	 is	 ambiguous.	Both	 the	Party	Center	and	Party	Committees	at	the	local	level	have	no	clear	understanding	about	what	 kind	 of	 propaganda	 is	 good	 for	 the	 Party’s	 image.	 Directed	 by	 ambiguous	principles,	the	local	agencies	have	chosen	to	focus	their	narratives	of	the	WRA	on	its	tragic	experience.	It	is	a	safe	option,	because	both	the	advocates	of	the	orthodox	interpretation	of	the	WRA	and	those	who	advocate	the	new	interpretation	have	to	admit	that	the	WRA	suffered	terribly.	As	long	as	these	narratives	avoid	discussing	the	 question	 of	who	 caused	 these	 sufferings	 and	who	 should	 be	 blamed	 for	 the	WRA’s	 tragic	 experience,	 the	 narrators	 and	 their	 supervisors	 are	 able	 to	 regard	them	 as	 politically	 correct	 materials	 to	 educate	 the	masses	 and	 to	 promote	 the	Party’s	image.	 	
7.3.3	Local	Anecdotes	and	Legends		 	 Writing	 history	 is	 never	 the	 exclusive	 privilege	 of	 a	 select	 group	 of	 experts.	While	 historians	 and	 official	 writers	 are	 producing	 academic	 or	 official	 History,	ordinary	people	are	also	recording	history	and	telling	stories	in	their	own	way.	The	history	of	the	CCP’s	revolutions	is	no	exception—in	addition	to	official	narratives	and	the	different	accounts	of	participants	in	historical	events,	the	locals	also	create	and	disseminate	 stories.	These	often	 focus	on	 certain	 aspects	with	which	official	narratives	 do	 not	 concern	 themselves,	 yet	 they	 often	 also	 contradict	 the	 official	narratives.	
	 	 Local	Anecdotes		 	 These	local	stories	fall	into	two	categories	depending	upon	whether	they	contain	supernatural	 elements.	 One	 category	 has	 no	 supernatural	 elements,	 and	 in	 this	thesis,	 they	 are	 called	 “local	 anecdotes.”	 Local	 anecdotes	 concerning	 the	 Party’s	history	usually	praise	the	Communists’	bravery,	dedication	to	the	nation,	and	their	affection	for	and	willingness	to	help	the	local	people.	These	themes	are	consistent	with	 the	 Party’s	 propaganda	 principles	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 have	 become	 an	inseparable	part	 of	 the	Party’s	 historical	 narratives.	Because	of	 their	 storytelling	quality	 and	 variety,	 these	 local	 anecdotes	 supplement	 official	 Party	 History																																																									61	 As	 the	 then	deputy	director	of	 the	National	Development	and	Reform	Commission	Li	 Shenglin	said,	 “The	 glorious	 history	 of	 the	 CCP	 and	 the	 heroic	 deeds	 of	 Chinese	Communists	 are	 precious	materials	 for	 our	 ideological	 and	 political	 education.	 They	 can	 help	 our	 citizens,	 especially	 the	younger	generation	to	understand	that	the	CCP	and	the	socialist	polity	is	the	only	correct	choice	for	the	 Chinese	 nation,	 to	 form	 a	 wise	 worldview	 and	 personal	 philosophy	 and	 to	 consolidate	confidence	in	socialism.”	Li	Shenglin,	2005.	
		
265	effectively	and	thus,	the	Party	has	disseminated	them	widely,	especially	during	the	past	decade,	when	“red	tourism”	has	flourished	with	the	central	government	as	its	main	 sponsor.	 In	 the	 Hexi	 Corridor,	 anecdotes	 about	 the	 WRA	 focus	 on	 the	relationship	 between	 soldiers	 and	 civilians.	 The	 story	 about	 Old	 Wang	 and	 the	Little	Sichuanese	is	an	example.	 	
	 	 Wang	jia	dun,	Old	Wang,	and	the	Little	Sichuanese	 		 	 In	the	1930s,	people	in	Gansu	lived	in	houses	called	“dun”	(墩),	which	were	built	of	mud	and	straw.	The	WRA	troops	borrowed	these	houses	to	serve	as	fortresses.	The	 Wang	 jia	 dun	 (汪家墩,	 “the	 Wang	 family	 mud	 house”)	 was	 one	 of	 a	 few	remnant	 houses	 occupied	 by	 the	 WRA.	 At	 the	 time,	 more	 than	 one	 hundred	soldiers	stayed	in	this	house,	which	belonged	to	the	Wang	family,	 for	two	weeks,	until	most	of	them	died,	with	a	few	survivors	breaking	through	the	enemy’s	siege.	The	 fighting	 was	 extremely	 fierce,	 but	Wang	 jia	 dun	 is	 famous	 not	 just	 for	 its	battles.	There	are	two	more	anecdotes	concerning	this	mud	house	that	took	place	after	 the	WRA’s	 defeat,	 and	 they	 are	 even	 more	 popular	 than	 are	 the	 accounts	about	the	fighting	that	occurred	in	1937.		 	 The	first	story	concerns	an	event	that	occurred	in	the	1980s.	One	day,	when	the	Wang	family	was	farming	around	Wang	jia	dun,	they	dug	up	a	human	skeleton.	The	father	 identified	 it	 immediately.	When	 the	WRA	was	 there,	 the	 father	was	 still	 a	young	boy.	He	and	a	young	Sichuanese	soldier	of	his	age	spent	a	great	deal	of	time	together	and	became	close	friends.	Unfortunately,	this	young	soldier	died	in	battle	and	was	 buried	 quickly.	 As	 time	 passed,	 the	Wang	 boy	 grew	up	 to	 become	 “Old	Wang,”	but	he	never	forgot	his	friend,	the	“Little	Sichuanese.”	When	Old	Wang	saw	the	 human	 skeleton,	 he	 knew	 instantly	 that	 it	 was	 the	 little	 Sichuanese.	 With	sadness	and	respect,	the	Wang	family	solemnly	reburied	him.		 	 The	other	event	took	place	ten	years	later,	when	Old	Wang	lay	on	his	deathbed.	His	son	tried	to	close	his	 father’s	eyes,	but	was	unable	to	do	so.	The	son	realized	that	his	 father	must	still	be	concerned	about	 the	Little	Sichuanese,	so	he	went	 to	burn	spirit	money	in	front	of	the	latter’s	grave.	When	the	son	returned	home,	his	father	had	passed	away	peacefully.62		 	 The	 case	 of	Wang	 jia	 dun	 reflects	 the	 endless	 changing	 and	 updating	 of	 local	anecdotes.	 Naturally,	 new	 stories	 are	 told	 with	 the	 passage	 of	 time,	 but	 their	emergence	is	also	the	result	of	the	local	officials’	assiduous	enquiry	and	collection.																																																									62	 Guo	Menglin,	2006,	p.	311.	
		
266	Now,	 the	Wang	 jia	dun	 stands	as	 it	was	80	years	ago	and	has	become	one	of	 the	WRA	memorial	sites.	Old	Wang’s	son	is	living	in	a	new	house	next	to	Wang	jia	dun,	and	is	in	charge	of	taking	care	of	the	old	house,	which	has	been	awarded	the	title	“county-level	 cultural	 relic	 unit.”	 Besides	 its	 original	 site,	Wang	 jia	 dun	was	 also	duplicated	 in	 the	Liyuankou	Battle	Memorial	Hall,	where	 the	anecdote	about	 the	“Little	 Sichuanese,”	 as	 well	 as	 other	 stories	 about	 Old	 Wang,	 have	 become	indispensible	features	of	the	narrators’	job.	[Figs.	7-29,	7-30]	 	
	 	 Local	Legends		 	 The	other	category	of	local	stories,	referred	to	as	“local	legends,”	contains	those	that	 incorporate	 supernatural	 elements.	 Although	 local	 anecdotes	 are	 more	numerous,	 local	 legends	 are	 more	 noteworthy,	 because	 belief	 in	 supernatural	power	 in	 historical	 processes	 deviates	 from	 Marxist	 historical	 materialism.	 The	local	 legends	 about	 the	WRA	have	 two	 themes—supernatural	 power,	 and	death,	each	of	which	can	be	divided	further	into	several	motifs.	
	 	 Supernatural	Power		 	 The	 most	 important	 motif	 in	 Red	 Army	 legends	 is	 that	 the	 Communists	possessed	supernatural	powers.63	 Although	 the	defeat	of	 the	WRA	was	 the	most	serious	military	failure	in	the	CCP’s	history,	there	are	still	such	legends	concerning	the	WRA	in	Gansu.	According	to	one	story:	 	The	WRA	had	run	out	of	bullets,	and	many	of	the	troops	were	injured,	with	enemy	bullets	in	their	bodies.	At	this	moment,	Xu	Xiangqian	and	the	Red	Army	soldiers	swung	themselves	over	and	suddenly	all	 the	bullets	came	out	of	their	bodies.	Xu	and	his	troops	used	these	bullets	to	shoot	their	enemies,	 finally	winning	the	battle.	 It	 turned	out	that	all	 the	WRA	soldiers	were	 invulnerable	and	no	sword	or	gun	could	hurt	them.64		 	 By	portraying	the	WRA	as	troops	with	supernatural	powers,	such	legends	imply	that	the	Party	and	the	Red	Army	were	destined	to	be	victorious.	Sharing	the	same	implication,	 some	 legends	 claim	 that	 local	 animals	 had	 the	 ability	 to	 distinguish	good	people	from	bad.	Because	of	this	ability,	these	animals	helped	the	WRA	defeat																																																									63	 Chen	Zhengping	 陳正平,	 “Chuan	Shaan	geming	genjudi	de	hongjun	 jiangshuai	chuanshuo	 川陝
革命根據地的紅軍將帥傳說”	 (Legends	 about	 Red	 Army	 commanders	 in	 the	 Sichuan-Shaanxi	revolutionary	base),	Chuandong	xuekan	(shehui	kexue	ban)	 川東學刊（社會科學版）,	1997(7),	pp.	4-10.	64	 Guo	Menglin,	2006,	p.	368.	
		
267	its	enemy.	A	story	about	a	wild	horse	submitting	itself	to	a	WRA	commander	is	one	example.65	 Similarly,	 inanimate	 landscapes	 are	 also	 anthropomorphized;	 in	 one	story,	a	spring	helped	the	WRA	while	punishing	the	Ma	brothers’	troops.66		 	 Sacrifice	and	Death		 	 Because	of	the	WRA’s	serious	defeat,	sacrifice	and	death	have	become	the	most	popular	themes	of	local	legends,	and	blood	and	spirit	are	the	two	common	motifs	within	this	theme.		 	 There	are	many	legends	concerning	WRA	soldiers’	blood.	For	example,	after	the	WRA	suffered	a	disastrous	defeat	in	Gaotai	County,	local	people	buried	the	corpses	of	Red	Army	soldiers	in	a	remote	place	and	named	it,	the	“red	lump”	(hong	geda	 紅
疙瘩).	 The	 people	 said	 that	 every	 spring,	 bloody	 water	 oozed	 out	 of	 the	 soil,	turning	the	land	red.	People	also	said	that	flowers	would	bloom	from	the	Red	Army	soldiers’	 corpses	 and	 attract	 swarms	 of	 butterflies.67	 The	 Danxia	 (danxia	 丹霞)	landform	in	Zhangye	is	famous	for	its	red-colored	sandstones	and	conglomerates.	It	is	a	unique	type	of	petrographic	geomorphology,	but	local	people	also	connect	it	with	 the	WRA,	arguing	 that	 the	 land	became	red	because	of	 the	WRA’s	blood.	 In	addition	 to	 oral	 dissemination,	 local	 official	 agencies	 also	 exhibit	 some	 of	 these	legends	 implicitly.	 For	 example,	 the	 Danxia	 landform	 is	 interpreted	 in	 the	Liyuankou	Battle	Memorial	Hall	as	“a	magical	landscape	that	has	been	colored	into	red	by	the	martyrs’	blood.”		 	 Another	 motif	 related	 to	 sacrifice	 and	 death	 is	 the	 immortality	 of	 spirits.	 As	Communists	do	not	believe	that	people	can	assume	other	forms	after	their	death,	these	 stories	 obviously	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 Party’s	 propaganda	 principles.	Ironically,	official	agencies,	in	fact,	do	disseminate	a	considerable	number	of	these	“superstitious”	stories.	At	almost	all	of	 the	memorial	sites	 to	 the	WRA,	especially	old	battlefields	and	cemeteries,	visitors	have	an	opportunity	to	hear	stories	about	the	ghosts	of	WRA	martyrs	said	to	haunt	the	area	still.	Administrators	claim	that	they	 often	 hear	 WRA	 soldiers	 singing	 songs	 together	 at	 midnight	 and	 doing	exercises	 in	 the	morning.	A	narrator	 in	Linze	County	described	a	dream	she	had	when	 she	 started	 her	 job	 several	 years	 before.	 Although	 she	 was	 recalling	something	unreal—a	dream—it	 apparently	 contained	elements	 that	 featured	 the	immortality	of	the	WRA	martyrs:																																																									65	 Ibid.,	p.	366.	66	 Ibid.,	p.	368.	67	 Ibid.,	p.	258.	
		
268	 When	 I	 had	 just	 started	my	 job	 as	 a	 narrator	 in	 this	 cemetery,	my	colleagues	 and	 I	 were	 collecting	 the	WRA’s	 martyrs’	 remains.	 One	night	 I	 had	 a	 dream.	 In	 my	 dream	 a	 couple	 of	 the	 WRA	 soldiers	crawled	out	of	 their	graves	and	talked	with	me.	They	said	they	had	two	 wishes	 for	 me—one	 was	 that	 I	 would	 try	 my	 best	 to	propagandize	 the	 WRA,	 making	 more	 people	 know	 that	 the	 WRA	served	 a	 great	 cause;	 the	 other	 wish	 was	 that	 civil	 administration	agencies	would	deal	with	 their	 remains	properly.	My	elder	brother	works	 in	 the	County	Civil	Administration	Bureau,	so	they	asked	me	to	convey	their	second	wish	to	him.68	 		 	 The	worship	of	ghosts	has	been	a	part	of	 folk	belief	 in	China	 for	 thousands	of	years,	and	stories	about	communicating	with	spirits	abound.	Spirits	that	appear	in	dreams	and	make	requests	 is	also	a	common	theme	in	Chinese	classical	and	folk	literature.	When	the	old	motifs	of	spirits	and	“appearing	in	dreams”	(tuomeng	 托
夢)	was	mixed	with	new	themes,	such	as	serving	the	Party’s	cause	and	meeting	the	needs	of	the	old	generation	revolutionaries,	a	new	“red	legend”	was	created.	The	narrator	who	had	the	dream	above	said	that	during	the	past	decade,	she	had	been	inspired	by	this	dream	a	great	deal	and	continued	to	tell	the	story	to	visitors	from	all	over	China	in	order	to	explain	her	enthusiasm	for	her	job.	Unconsciously,	that	may	be	so,	but	she	was	also	producing	red	legends.	
	 	 Exploring	“Party	Elements”	in	Local	Legends		 	 In	contrast	 to	 local	anecdotes—the	content	and	 forms	of	which	are	consistent	with	the	Party’s	propaganda	principles—the	Party	criticizes	supernatural	legends	explicitly.	 For	 example,	 the	 National	 Travel	 Bureau	 has	 stated	 repeatedly,	“superstitious	messages	are	incompatible	with	the	values	and	norms	advocated	in	red	 tourism,”	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 people	 should	 avoid	 presenting	 these	messages.69	These	 regulations,	 however,	 not	 only	 conveyed	 the	 Party’s	 insistence	 on	 a	materialist	 view	 of	 history,	 but	 also	 indicated	 the	 existence,	 and	 even	 the	prevalence	 of,	 such	 “superstitious	 messages.”	 “Superstitious	 interpretations”	 of	the	 Party’s	 revolutionary	 history	 are	 particularly	 common	 in	 the	 hometowns	 of	Party	leaders,	where	tour	guides	tend	to	“focus	on	the	fengshui	of	leaders’	former	residences,	 rather	 than	on	 their	great	careers	and	how	they	struggled	arduously																																																									68	 Zhang	Yan,	interview.	69	 Shao	Qiwei,	2008.	
		
269	for	China’s	liberation.”	For	example,	guides	tell	visitors	that	there	were	auspicious	signs	 in	 the	 sky	 when	 great	 figures	 were	 born,	 or	 that	 certain	 supernatural	phenomena	 occurred	 when	 political	 incidents	 took	 place	 at	 the	 central	 level.70	Some	 of	 these	 unorthodox	 interpretations	 have	 evolved	 naturally,	 or	 have	 led	consciously	to,	idolatry.	Mao’s	birthplace,	Shaoshan	 韶山,	is	a	typical	example.	As	described	by	Yu	Luo	Rioux,	quasi-legendary	mysteries	are	quite	common	there.71	 		 	 Unlike	 the	 situation	 in	 Shaoshan,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 WRA,	 there	 are	 neither	legends	concerning	idolatry	of	the	CCP	leaders,	nor	has	there	been	any	attempt	to	pursue	 personal	 interest	 by	 paying	 respect	 to	 the	WRA.	 This	 is	 because	 such	 a	military	 defeat	 has	 nothing	 to	 do	with	 personal	 interest,	 such	 as	 promotion	 and	becoming	 rich.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	WRA,	 however,	we	 can	 see	 clearly	 that	 official	agencies	 consciously	 transformed	 “superstitious	messages”	 that	 emerged	 among	local	people	into	propaganda	materials.	By	explaining	legends	in	a	more	acceptable	way,	the	Party	has	integrated	them	into	the	official	propaganda	system	to	promote	the	 WRA’s	 history.	 A	 good	 example	 is	 the	 legend	 of	 the	 “Red	 Army	 poplars”	(hongjun	yang	 紅軍楊).	A	type	of	poplar	in	northwestern	China,	its	branches	have	a	five-pointed	star	shape	when	cut	open	in	cross	section,	and	local	people	explain	this	poplar’s	uniqueness	by	connecting	it	with	the	WRA.	One	explanation	is	that	the	enemy	 forced	 captured	 WRA	 soldiers	 to	 plant	 trees.	 The	 brutal	 Ma	 brothers	threatened	that	if	any	of	the	trees	died,	they	would	execute	all	of	the	prisoners;	as	a	result,	 the	 WRA	 soldiers	 watered	 the	 trees	 with	 their	 own	 blood,	 which	consequently	left	a	red	star	inside	them.72	 An	official	of	Zhangye	PHRO	interpreted	such	a	legend	in	a	less	magical	way:	Gradually	 I	 understood	 that	 this	 beautiful	 legend	 is	 actually	 [a	reflection	 of]	 local	 people’s	 memories	 and	 recollections	 about	 the	Red	Army...I	do	know	that	 [the	existence	of	 the	so-called	Red	Army	poplars]	is	only	a	coincidence	[rather	than	a	miracle].	Nevertheless,																																																									70	 Zhang	 Dongbin	 張冬斌,	 “Hongse	 lüyou	 buyi	 datan	 fengshui	 紅色旅遊不宜大談風水”	 (It	 is	inappropriate	to	talk	about	fengshui	in	red	tourism	sites),	Qianjin	luntan	 前進論壇,	2007(2),	p.	48;	Wang	 Xuejiang	 王學江,	 “Mo	 rang	 hongse	 lüyou	 bianwei	 莫讓紅色旅遊變味”	 (Do	 not	 lead	 red	tourism	astray),	Zhenggong	yanjiu	dongtai	 政工研究動態,	2005(11),	p.	9.	 	71	 Yu	Luo	Rioux,	“Pilgrim	or	Tourist?	The	Transformation	of	China’s	Revolutionary	Holy	Land”,	In	Tim	Oakes	 and	Donald	 S.	 Sutton,	 eds.,	Faiths	 on	Display:	 Religion,	 Tourism,	 and	 the	 Chinese	 State.	Lanham:	The	Rowman	&	Littlefield	Publishing	Group,	2010.	72	 Han	 Xiaodong	 韓曉東,	 “Feng	 Yaguang:	 Lishi	 yongzhi	 buwang	 馮亞光：歷史永誌不忘”	 (Feng	Yaguang:	 never	 forget	 the	 history),	 Zhonghua	 dushu	 bao	 中華讀書報,	 April	 29,	 2009,	 p.	 5;	 Guo	Menglin,	2006,	pp.	240-242.	
		
270	 deep	inside	my	heart	I	would	rather	believe	that	[the	core	of	the	Red	Army	 poplar]	 is	 really	 the	 Red	 Army	 soldiers’	 blood	 and	 the	WRA	soldiers’	 spirits.	 [Inside	 the	 poplars]	 is	 also	 the	 faith	 that	 Zhangye	people	never	gave	up	during	the	past	seventy-odd	years.73		 	 According	to	the	best-known	definition	of	legend,	one	essential	element	is	that	it	is	 “believed”	 by	 its	 bearers,	 that	 although	 it	 deals	with	 supernatural	 events,	 it	 is	believed	 to	 pertain	 to	 the	 real	 world	 of	 the	 narrator	 and	 his	 audience.74	 Thus,	although	sometimes	a	tale	is	obviously	unreal,	people	believe	it	to	be	true,	and	this	belief	makes	the	tale	a	legend.	In	the	case	of	the	“Red	Army	poplar,”	the	official	of	Zhangye	PHRO	admitted	 the	 story	was	unreal,	 but	by	doing	 so,	he	 explained	 the	legend	according	to	the	Party	Center’s	propaganda	principles.	 		 	 Indeed,	it	has	become	a	new	practice	for	Party	History	officials	at	the	local	level	to	collect	anecdotes,	legends,	or	other	materials	from	local	people,	and	then	revise	or	reinterpret	them	in	a	way	that	they	believe	is	helpful	to	the	Party’s	reputation.	A	number	 of	 local	 officials	 have	 shared	 such	 experiences	 at	 conferences	 and	 in	articles.	 In	 one	 of	 these	 articles,	 a	 local	 official	 in	 Guangxi	 province	 referred	 to	“Party	elements”	(dangxing	yaosu	 黨性要素)75	 as	those	elements	in	local	legends	that	are	helpful	for	propaganda	and	for	educating	the	masses.	He	said:	 	 	There	are	numerous	“Party	elements”	in	local	Party	history	materials	that	 reflect	 local	 people’s	 love	 of	 the	 country,	 of	 the	 Party	 and	 of	socialism.	 These	 “Party	 elements”	 are	 the	 soul	 of	 Party	 history	materials,	 and	 they	 need	 Party	 history	 researchers	 to	 discover	(faxian	 發現),	 process	 (jiagong	 加工)	 and	 rationally	 shape	 (heli	
suzao	 合理塑造)	them.76	 	Through	 the	 investigation	 of	 legends	 concerning	 the	WRA,	 we	 can	 see	 both	 the	results	 and	 the	 process	 of	 discovering,	 processing,	 and	 shaping	 so-called	 “Party																																																									73	 Li	 Gang	 李綱,	 “Xunzhao	 hongjun	 yang	 尋找紅軍楊”	 (Searching	 for	 Red	 Army	 poplars),	 in	Zhangye	hong	Xilujun	jingshen	yanjiuhui	 張掖紅西路軍精神研究會	 (Zhangye	Association	of	WRA	Spirit	Studies),	ed.,	Zhonggong	Zhangye	shi	ziliao	Hong	Xilujun	zhuanti	 中共張掖史資料紅西路軍專
題	 (Materials	of	CCP’s	history	in	Zhangye:	the	Western	Route	Army)	,	internal	publication,	2012,	pp.	139-141.	74	 Heda	Jason,	“Concerning	the	‘Historical’	and	the	‘Local’	Legends	and	Their	Relatives”,	The	Journal	
of	American	Folklore,	Vol.	84,	No.	331	(January-May	1971),	pp.	134-144.	75	 Two	definitions	of	Chinese	words	dangxing	have	been	analyzed	in	Chapter	5.	 	76	 Wei	Lifu	 韋禮夫,	“Difang	dangshi	gongzuo	jianchi	dangxing	yuanze	he	kexue	jingshen	de	tongyi	de	 sikao	 地方黨史工作堅持黨性原則和科學精神的統一的思考”	 (Local	 Party	 history	work	 should	insist	on	both	Party	spirit	and	the	principle	of	scientificity),	Chuancheng	 傳承,	2012(15),	p.	66.	
		
271	elements.”	 Actually,	 from	 the	 “WRA	 Spirit”	 and	 the	 WRA’s	 sufferings,	 to	supernatural	 legends,	 all	 the	 local	 narratives	 about	 the	 WRA	 discussed	 in	 this	section	contain	content	that	seems	unsuitable	for	official	propaganda.	Nonetheless,	local	 official	 agencies,	 the	 PHROs	 in	 particular,	 make	 use	 of	 materials	 that	 they	collected	from	the	people	to	convey	the	values	that	the	Party	Center	is	promoting.	In	 this	 way,	 local	 people’s	 memories	 and	 the	 Party	 Center’s	 requirements	 are	connected.	
Conclusion		 	 There	 have	 been	 two	 periods	 during	 the	 Reform	 Era	 to	 date	 when	 the	 Party	Center	felt	it	necessary	for	local	governments	to	exploit	revolutionary	history.	The	first	 was	 during	 the	 early	 1980s,	 when	 the	 Party	 leadership’s	 enthusiasm	 for	writing	a	comprehensive	Party	History	that	incorporated	certain	new	perspectives	caused	relevant	research	at	 the	 local	 level	 to	 flourish.	When	the	Party	 leadership	reduced	 its	 emphasis	 on	 this	 field,	 however,	 some	 organs	 faced	 a	 crisis.	 After	almost	 a	 decade,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 21st	 century,	 the	 Party	 leadership	 once	again	 has	 realized	 the	 significant	 role	 that	 local	 organs	 play	 in	 promoting	 the	history	of	the	Party	and	in	enhancing	the	Party’s	image.	This	time	the	Party	Center	has	 advanced	 development	 in	 this	 field	 by	 sponsoring	 so-called	 “red	 tourism,”	while	 also	 encouraging	 local	 governments	 to	 exploit	 tourist	 resources	 related	 to	Party	history.	 		 	 During	both	of	these	periods,	the	local	leaderships	have	been	enthusiastic	about	propagandizing	 the	 WRA’s	 history.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 by	 doing	 this,	 they	 have	strengthened	their	own	authority	and	legitimacy	as	inheritors	of	the	“red	spirit”	of	the	 Party’s	 first	 generation	 of	 revolutionaries,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 have	manifested	their	loyal	to	the	Party	and	willingness	to	serve	the	Party	Center.	 		 	 One	of	the	reasons	the	Party	Center	directed	and	encouraged	local	governments	to	exploit	Party	history	is	that	the	leadership	believes	in	the	irreplaceable	role	of	Party	History	as	an	essential	 instrument	to	integrate	its	regime	ideologically.	The	local	governments’	response	to	these	directives	and	encouragement	demonstrates	that	 achieving	 ideological	 integration	 by	 studying,	 writing,	 and	 propagandizing	Party	history	is	not	only	the	goal	of	the	Party	Center,	but	of	the	local	governments	as	well.	The	local	leaderships	also	expect	to	build	closer	ideological	connections	to	the	 Party	 Center	 and	 enhance	 their	 political	 status	 through	 activities	 related	 to	
		
272	Party	history.	Since	1978,	the	reformation	of	the	relationship	between	the	central	and	 local	 governments	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 decentralization	 of	 power,	 especially	financial	 power. 77 	 In	 this	 situation,	 the	 two-way	 process	 that	 results	 from	attempts	by	both	local	and	central	government	to	achieve	ideological	integration	is	significant.		 	 Both	the	form	and	content	of	local	Party	historiography	differ	from	that	found	at	the	central	level.	In	the	WRA’s	case,	there	is	little	academic	research	in	Gansu,	but	there	are	many	stories.	The	content	of	these	stories	does	not	include	details	about	the	 top	 leadership’s	 decisions	 and	 the	 WRA’s	 operations.	 Instead,	 these	 stories	focus	on	ordinary	soldiers	and	 local	people’s	 lives.	Local	people	created	many	of	these	 stories	originally,	 after	which	 local	officials	 collected	 them.	This	process	of	producing	Party	historical	 narratives	 also	differs	 from	 the	process	 at	 the	 central	level.		 	 Although	 they	 focus	 on	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 WRA’s	 history,	 the	 local	narratives	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter	 do	 not	 challenge	 or	 destabilize	 the	 official	narratives,	 because,	 despite	 the	 huge	 differences	 between	 them,	 there	 are	 also	common	links.	All	of	the	stories	told	by	local	people	and	officials,	whether	logical	or	 illogical,	 advocate,	 praise,	 or	 express	 affection	 for	 the	 Party,	 sometimes	 in	 a	more	direct	 and	 simple	way	 than	do	narratives	produced	by	 central	 agencies.	 In	fact,	 today,	 these	 local	 stories	 serve	 as	 the	 CCP’s	 new	myths.	While	many	 of	 the	previously	unquestionable	myths	have	become	diluted	gradually,	these	new	myths	are	 increasingly	 important	 to	 the	 Chinese	 state.	 Moreover,	 as	 this	 chapter	 has	shown,	 local	Party	historiography	 is	more	 flexible,	 as	both	 the	 content	 and	 form	can	 always	 be	 changed	 in	 response	 to	 immediate	 exigencies.	 In	 this	 sense,	 local	memorial	 sites	 and	 narratives	 about	 the	 Party’s	 revolutionary	 history—which	seem	 to	 show	 obedience	 to	 the	 CCP’s	 standard	 way	 to	 propagandize	 Party	history—strengthen	the	ideological	functions	of	local	agencies.
																																																								77	 Lok	Wai	Kin,	“The	Relationship	Between	Central	and	Local	Governments	Under	the	Unitary	State	System	of	China”,	in	J.	C.	Oliveira	and	P.	Cardinal,	eds.,	One	Country,	Two	Systems:	Three	Legal	Orders	
Perspectives	of	Evolution.	Berlin:	Springer,	2009,	pp.	527-540.	
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		 	 	 	 		Fig.	7-3	The	entrance	of	 the	Gaotai	Cemetery	for	 Martyrs	 before	 the	 renovation	 in	 2008	(from	 Gansu	 National	 Defense	 Online,	http://www.gscn.com.cn,	downloaded	on	July	24,	2015).	
		Fig.	 7-4	 “Fighting	 in	 Gaotai	 County”	sculpture	 	(photo	by	author	on	July	16,	2013).	
		Fig.	 7-1	 A	 monument	 for	 the	Liyuankou	 Battle	 built	 by	 locals	 in	the	1980s	(photo	by	author	on	July	15,	2013).	
		Fig,	 7-2	 The	 reverse	 side	 of	 the	monument	 (photo	 by	 author	 on	July	15,	2013).	
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		Fig.	 7-5	 The	 museum	 in	 Gaotai	 Cemetery	 for	Martyrs	before	renovation	(from	 Gansu	 National	 Defense	 Online,	downloaded	on	July	24,	2015).	 		Fig.	 7-6	 The	 memorial	 pavilion	 for	Dong	Zhentang	 	(photo	by	author	on	July	16,	2013).	
		Fig.	7-7	Entrance	of	GMW	and	reliefs	 	(from	 http://forum.china.com.cn,	 downloaded	on	July	24,	2015).	
		Fig.	7-8	Sculpture	between	two	parts	of	reliefs	 	(photo	by	author	on	July	16,	2013).	
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		Fig.	7-9	Path	towards	the	monument	 	(photo	by	author	on	July	16,	2013).	
		Fig.	7-10	The	monument	is	in	middle	of	the	square	 	(photo	by	author	on	July	16,	2013).	
		Fig.	7-11	Museum	in	GMW	 	(photo	from	http://www.gthryx.com,	downloaded	on	July	24,	2015).	
		Fig.7-12	 In	 order	 to	 recreate	 a	 living	scene	 of	 the	 WRA	 fighting	 in	 Gaotai,	the	 museum	 installed	 a	 multimedia	device	(photo	by	author).	
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Fig.	 7-15	 The	 monument	 in	Jingyuan	 County	 靖 遠 縣	(photo	 by	 author	 on	 July	 6,	2013)	The	monument	 is	15.36	meter	high.	 The	 number	 “15.36”	implies	 the	 fact	 that	 the	WRA	was	 established	 in	 1936,	 the	15th	year	of	the	CCP.	The	main	body	 of	 the	 monument	consists	 of	 three	 trapezoids,	respectively	 representing	 the	Fifth	Amy,	the	Ninth	Army	and	the	 Thirtieth	 Army.	 The	 base	of	the	monument	is	2.18	meter	high,	 representing	 the	 21800	troops	 of	 the	WRA.	 There	 are	in	total	eleven	steps	in	front	of	the	monument.	This	alludes	to	the	fact	that	the	WRA	marched	through	 eleven	 counties	 in	Gansu.	
	 	 	 	 			 	 	 	 	 Fig.	7-13,	7-14	Inside	the	museum	(photo	by	author	on	July	16,	2013).	
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		Fig.	7-16	Visitors	bowing	to	the	monument	in	Gaotai	WRA	Memorial	Hall	(photo	by	author	on	July	16,	2013).	
	 	 	 		 Fig.	7-17	A	row	of	steles	for	martyrs	in	Liyuankou	Battle	Memorial	Hall	of	Linze	(photo	by	author	on	July	15,	2013).	
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	 	 		 Fig.7-18,	7-19	Collective	tomb	at	the	old	battlefield	of	Liyuankou	battle,	built	in	2012;	the	back	side	of	the	tomb	is	easily	reopened	(photo	by	author	on	July	15,	2013).	
		Fig.	7-20	The	statue	of	Zhang	Guotao	(right)	is	located	one	meter	lower	than	statues	of	other	commanders	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	 	(from	 the	website	of	 the	 Stele	Forest	 for	Commanders	 of	 the	Sichuan	 and	Shaanxi	 Soviet	 Regime:	 http://www.cssqjsbl.com,	 downloaded	 on	 July	 24,	2015).	
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		Fig.	7-21	A	sculpture	in	the	Memorial	Hall	for	Gao	Jincheng	(Zhangye)	 	(photo	by	author	on	July	12,	2013).	
	
		Fig.	 7-22	 A	 tree	 donated	 by	offspring	of	the	WRA	soldiers	(photo	 by	 author	 on	 July	 16,	2013).	
		Fig.	 7-23	 An	 exhibition	 board	 in	GMW	 about	 the	 agricultural	 and	economic	development	of	Gaotai	 	(photo	by	author	on	July	16,	2013).	
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	 	 	 	 		Fig.	 7-25	 (left)	 One	 of	 the	most	 widely	 disseminated	 photos	 of	 the	WRA:	 a	WRA	soldier’s	body	was	crucified	on	a	tree	(from	www.crt..com.cn	)	Fig.	7-26	(right)	A	model	of	the	tree	in	GMW	(photo	by	author	on	July	16,	2013).	
	 	 	 	 	 		 Fig.	7-24	One	of	the	most	widely	disseminated	photos	of	the	WRA:	heads	of	three	WRA	commanders	(from	www.dwnews.com,	downloaded	on	July	24,	2015).	
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	 	 	 	 		 Fig.	 7-27	 WRA	 soldier	 Wu	 Qingxiang	 吳清香 	 is	 relating	 her	 tragic	experiences	 in	 the	 documentary	 “The	 WRA	 Female	 Soldiers”	 (from	www.youku.com,	downloaded	on	July	24,	2015).	
	 	 	 	 	 	 		 Fig.	7-28	Wang	Quanyuan	interviewed	by	visitors	 	(from	China	Red	Tourism	Online,	www.crt.com.cn,	 downloaded	 on	 July	 24,	2015).	
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	 	 		 Fig.	 7-29	 Now	Wang	 jia	 dun	 is	 a	 “cultural	 relic	 unit	 under	 at	 the	country	level”	(photo	by	author	on	July	15,	2013).	
	 	 		 Fig.	 7-30	 Narrator	 Zhang	 Yan	 is	 telling	 the	 story	 about	 the	 Little	Sichuanese	and	Old	Wang	at	the	original	site	of	Wang	jia	dun	(photo	by	author	on	July	15,	2013).	
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Conclusion	Creating	 history	 is	 a	 long-running	 process	 in	 which	 many	 contributors	 play	different	roles.	Although	Party	History	concerns	the	CCP,	making	this	history	is	not	simply	an	affair	internal	to	the	Party.	Ironically,	the	deep	involvement	of	the	Party	leadership	in	producing	historical	interpretations,	particularly	that	of	the	two	most	prominent	 leaders,	 Mao	 Zedong	 and	 Deng	 Xiaoping,	 has,	 until	 quite	 recently,	discouraged	 serious	 investigation	 into	 the	 real	process	of	 creating	Party	History.	Instead,	a	complicated	process	was	simplified	and	presented	as	one	controlled	by	a	few	people.		 	 The	 ferment	over	 the	history	of	 the	CCP	 that	has	swept	across	China	 in	recent	years,	however,	urges	us	to	examine	the	ways	in	which	the	narratives	of	its	history	that	are	popular	today	were	produced.	This	is	because	these	fierce	debates	about	Party	history	are	due,	in	large	measure,	to	deep	disagreement	about	the	extent	to	which	popular	historical	 interpretations	are	consistent	with	historical	 facts.	Only	by	identifying	the	real	process	of	the	creation	of	these	interpretations	is	it	possible	to	place	current	developments	in	context	and	understand	China’s	fascination	with	her	recent	past.	 	
The	Creation	of	Party	History		 	 Five	Watershed	Periods	and	Four	Groups	of	People		 	 Throughout	the	eighty-plus	years	during	which	Party	History	was	created,	there	were	 five	 watershed	 periods	 that	 no	 research	 about	 Party	 historiography	 can	afford	to	ignore.	Their	significance	is	two-fold:	first,	changes	in	the	assessment	of	historical	 events	 and	 figures	 typically	 occurred	 in	 each	 of	 these	 five	 periods.	Second,	Party	historiography	as	 a	whole	underwent	 changes	or	progress	 in	 each	period,	 as	 new	 groups	 of	 people	 participated	 in	 writing	 history,	 or	 as	 new	perspectives	emerged	about	that	history.	Thus,	each	period	had	a	direct	influence	in	shaping	what	we	call	Party	History	today.	 		 	 The	first	of	these	watersheds	was	from	the	early	1920s	to	the	late	1930s,	when	many	different	explanations	of	Party	history	coexisted	in	the	absence	of	a	genuine	“official”	 version.	During	 this	 period,	 usually	more	 than	 one	 explanation	 about	 a	certain	 event	 emerged	 when	 the	 event	 occurred	 or	 immediately	 after	 it	 ended.	These	 different	 explanations	 competed	 with	 each	 other,	 and	 although	 the	 Party	
		
		
284	Centre	supported,	or	even	approved,	some	to	varying	degrees,	neither	support	nor	approval	could	guarantee	that	those	explanations	would	not	be	challenged	or	even	reversed	 completely.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 first	 period	 was	 that	 in	 which	 original	narratives	and	interpretations	formed	gradually,	and	to	some	extent,	“freely.”		 	 The	 second	 crucial	 period	 was	 that	 from	 the	 late	 1930s	 to	 the	 early	 1940s.	During	 this	 period,	 Mao	 began	 to	 consolidate	 control	 over	 the	 writing	 of	 Party	History,	 and	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 period,	 in	 1945,	 after	 the	 Yan’an	 Rectification	Campaign,	Mao	finally	won	supreme	authority	over	writing	official	Party	History.	The	Party	produced	 two	 types	of	 historical	 narratives	during	 this	 time.	The	 first	addressed	 intra-party	 power	 struggles	 and	 education,	 while	 the	 other	 targeted	people	outside	the	Party	and	focused	on	the	Party’s	contributions	to	the	country.	 		 	 During	 the	 third	watershed,	 after	 the	 CCP	 became	 the	 ruling	 party	 in	 1949,	 it	combined	 the	 two	 forms	 of	 narratives	 above,	 which	 formed	 during	 the	 Yan’an	period,	to	create	an	official	Party	history	framework.	In	this	way,	in	the	first	decade	of	 the	 PRC,	 Mao	 and	 his	 Party	 historians	 finalized	 official	 Party	 History,	 which	became	an	element	indispensible	to	his	totalitarian	regime.		 	 The	fourth	noteworthy	period	was	the	first	decade	of	the	Reform	Era,	from	1978	to	the	end	of	the	1980s.	During	this	period,	rewriting	Party	History	played	a	pivotal	role	 in	 repackaging	 the	 CCP.	 Although	Deng’s	 new	Party	 leadership	 changed	 the	manner	 in	 which	 historical	 issues	 were	 addressed,	 it	 still	 tried	 to	 control	 the	writing	of	Party	History	firmly.	 		 	 The	fifth	watershed,	which	began	in	the	early	1990s,	is	ongoing.	In	this	present	era,	 we	 observe	 two	 apparently	 contradictory	 tendencies.	 First,	 the	 increasing	multiplicity	 of	 historical	 narratives	 is	 obvious,	 as	many	 aspects	 of	 Party	 history	excluded	 from	 propaganda	 materials	 during	 the	 Mao	 Era	 have	 now	 become	popular	topics.	Second,	a	 large	number	of	the	new	debates	about	history	actually	concern	“old	questions”	that	were	included	in	the	official	framework	of	the	Mao	Era.	While	the	first	tendency	reflects	a	shift	in	the	Party’s	focus	on	propaganda,	which	will	 be	 summarized	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 the	 second	 results	 from	 the	 continual	tension	 between	 various	 interest	 groups	who	 favor	 different	 explanations	 about	the	past	or	different	perspectives	about	the	future.		 	 Throughout	 these	 five	 periods,	 the	 following	 four	 groups	 of	 people	 played	prominent	 roles	 in	 creating	Party	History.	The	CCP	 leadership	and	 senior	 cadres	
		
		
285	who	were	involved	deeply	in	the	history	of	the	Party	have	played	important	roles	in	making	Party	History	since	the	very	beginning.	Today,	their	aides	and	offspring	have	 inherited	 their	 status	 as	 spokesmen	 of	 history	 to	 some	 extent.	 The	participation	 of	 the	 third	 group,	 professional	 historians,	 became	 crucial	 in	 the	1950s,	as	they	managed	to	integrate	narratives	that	had	been	previously	scattered,	into	a	framework	used	to	create	Party	history	textbooks.	The	division	of	this	group	of	 people	 in	 the	 1990s	 into	 those	who	 emphasized	 that	 Party	History	 should	 be	academic	 and	 those	 who	 advocated	 that	 it	 should	 “serve	 politics”	 reflects	 the	emergence	 of	 new	 tensions	 among	 professional	 historians.	 Nonprofessional	writers	 began	 to	 write	 Party	 History	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 those	 writings	 became	influential	in	the	1990s.	To	a	considerable	extent,	their	works	are	a	continuation	of	the	debates	among	different	interest	groups.	 	 		 	 Philosophers	of	history,	such	as	R.	G.	Collingwood	and	E.	H.	Carr,	asked	people	to	“study	the	historian”	before	studying	the	history.1	 Looking	at	such	people,	we	can	see	 clearly	 the	 interaction	 between	 their	 knowledge	 and	 social	 environment.	 As	individuals,	the	writers	of	history	were	also	products	of	history	and	society.	
	 	 Four	Patterns		 	 By	 investigating	 these	 five	 periods	 and	 four	 groups	 of	 people,	we	 can	 identify	four	patterns	by	which	historical	representation	relates	to	the	historical	realities	of	the	CCP.	 		 	 In	 the	 first,	 authors	 recorded	 and	 attempted	 to	 explain	 the	 history	 that	 they	experienced	personally.	They	might	have	written	these	materials	to	complete	tasks	assigned	by	their	superiors,	but	their	primary	goal	was	to	 justify	certain	theories	or	 ideas	 in	which	 they	believed.	To	 this	end,	 they	 sometimes	assessed	 their	own	behaviors	positively,	while	at	other	times	they	criticized	themselves,	depending	on	the	 main	 point	 that	 they	 tried	 to	 argue.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 fair	 to	 say	 that	 their	different	 interpretations	 of	 the	 past	 (or,	 in	 many	 cases,	 their	 different	interpretations	of	the	present	from	their	perspective)	could	be	both	true	and	false.	They	 were	 true	 because	 each	 interpretation	 recorded	 a	 fragment	 of	 the	 larger	picture	 of	 history	 that	 mirrored	 historical	 realities	 to	 some	 extent.	 They	 were,	however,	false	for	two	reasons.	First,	these	authors	experienced	only	a	small	part	of	history	personally,	and	therefore,	their	assessments	were	usually	biased.	Second,																																																									1	 E.	H.	Carr,	1985,	p.	23. 
		
		
286	to	 different	 degrees,	mainstream	 Party	 interpretations	 influenced	 these	 authors.	Indeed,	with	the	passage	of	time,	their	narratives	might	have	focused	increasingly	on	 official	 interpretations	 that	 they	 had	 accepted,	 rather	 than	 on	 objective	observations	 and	 personal	 memories.	 Halbwachs	 asserted	 that	 all	 personal	memories	 form	 and	 are	 organized	 in	 collective	 contexts,	 because	 society	 always	provides	the	framework	for	 individual	beliefs.2	 This	 is	especially	true	in	the	field	of	Party	history.	 		 	 The	 second	 pattern	 that	 emerged	 did	 not	 focus	 on	 individual	 events,	 but	was	designed	to	build	a	grand	narrative	about	a	long-term	historical	process,	in	which	events	that	were	selected	and	narrated	purposefully	functioned	as	the	bricks	in	a	massive	building.	With	a	 large	portion	of	manmade	concepts,	 the	History	created	in	this	way	reflects	not	realities,	but	the	ideological	situation	and	power	structure	of	the	time	when	the	History	was	written.	This	type	of	endeavor	on	the	part	of	the	CCP	 began	 during	 the	 Yan’an	 period	 and	 concluded	 in	 the	 1950s,	 when	 a	Mao-centered	 framework	was	 established.	 The	 rewriting	 of	 Party	 History	 in	 the	1980s	 that	Deng	 directed	 also	 adopted	 this	 pattern.	 The	 difference	was	 that	 the	changes	in	the	assessment	of	Mao	and	his	era	led	to	renewed	versions	of	narratives	about	individual	events.	 		 	 According	to	the	third	pattern,	interpretations	of	the	Party’s	past	are	connected	explicitly	to	its	future	political	choices.	Thus,	before	explaining	what	happened	in	the	 past,	 the	 writers	 already	 held	 certain	 ideas	 about	 the	 future.	 In	 order	 to	develop	 these	 ideas	 they	 first	had	 to	share	 their	 ideas	of	 the	past.	Today,	we	are	witnessing	an	ongoing	wave	of	debates	about	Party	history	and	the	proper	way	in	which	 to	 look	 at	 it.	 These	 debates,	 which	 center	 on	 the	 ambiguous	 concept	 of	“historical	nihilism,”	are	 the	 latest	examples	of	 the	 third	pattern	of	Party	History	creation.	This	pattern	does	not	develop	explanations	of	history.	Instead,	it	creates	certain	relationships	between	the	explanations	of	history	and	the	Party’s	present	and	future.	There	is	no	more	obvious	example	of	the	topic	of	using	history	to	serve	explicit	 present-day	 purposes	 than	 the	 radical	 historiography	 of	 the	 Cultural	Revolution.	 In	 this	 age	 of	 extremes,	 Party	 history	 was	 rewritten	 arbitrarily,	forsaking	 historical	 realities	 altogether.	 In	 recent	 years,	 because	 the	 Party	leadership	 seems	 to	 have	 invested	 more	 effort	 in	 maintaining	 certain	 official																																																									2	 Maurice	 Halbwachs,	 translated	 by	 Lewis	 A.	 Coser,	On	 Collective	Memory,	 University	 of	 Chicago	Press,	1992.	
		
		
287	narratives	 that	 are	 obviously	 untrue,	 some	 intellectuals	 have	 warned	 against	 a	return	 of	 the	 Cultural	 Revolution.	 Given	 that	 the	 CCP	 led	 by	 Xi	 Jinping	 has	 been	increasingly	 emphasizing	 this	 third	 pattern	 of	 writing	 Party	 history,	 there	 are	serious	grounds	for	these	intellectuals’	concern.	 		 	 The	 fourth	 pattern	 concerns	 academic	 objectivity,	 in	 which	 historians	 uphold	objectivity	 in	 historical	 research.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 advocates	 of	 this	 pattern	 set	boundaries	with	the	third	pattern	and	emphasize	their	aloofness	from	politics.	On	the	other	hand,	they	differentiate	themselves	from	the	practitioners	of	the	second	pattern,	and	focus	on	writing	source-oriented	history.	In	order	to	claim	an	interest	in	 “pure	 academic”	 research,	 historians	 emphasize	 their	 detachment	 from	present-day	politics.	Some	historians	have	been	working	on	this	pattern	since	the	early	1990s,	but	bringing	discipline	to	Party	history	remains	a	work	in	progress.		 	 Before	 the	Party	established	 the	official	 framework	of	 its	history	 in	 the	1950s,	two	types	of	conflict	existed	concerning	how	to	explain	the	history	of	the	CCP.	The	first	 concerned	 different	 interpretations	 of	 history,	 all	 of	 which	 belonged	 to	 the	first	 pattern.	 The	 second	 existed	 between	 the	 first	 and	 second	 patterns,	 and	reflected	 the	 tension	 between	 the	 endeavor	 to	 maintain	 individual	 historical	accounts,	and	the	tendency	to	fit	all	historical	narratives	into	an	official	framework.	 		 	 Since	the	1950s,	the	second	and	third	patterns	have	held	the	dominant	position	in	 turn.	Today,	on	 the	one	hand,	 the	Party	maintains	 the	official	version	of	Party	History	that	was	created	according	to	the	second	pattern,	while	on	the	other	hand,	it	adopts	the	third	pattern	to	assign	new	meanings	to	the	orthodox	narratives.	As	“academic	 Party	 history	 research”	 grows	 more	 and	 more	 appealing	 to	 some	scholars,	 we	 are	 likely	 to	 witness	 more	 conflicts	 between	 the	 third	 and	 fourth	patterns	in	the	future.	 	
	 	 Party	Historiography	and	Chinese	Historiography		 	 Although	 this	 thesis	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 creation	 of	 Party	 History,	 it	 is	 also	necessary	 to	 situate	 Party	 historiography	 in	 the	 context	 of	 modern	 Chinese	historiography.		 	 From	the	 late	19th	century	 to	 the	1940s,	Chinese	historiography	experienced	a	transformation	 that	 led	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 modern,	 academic	 historical	discipline	 that	stands	next	 to	and	separate	 from	philosophy	and	politics.3	 Before																																																									3	 Brian	Moloughney	 and	Peter	 Zarrow,	 “Making	History	Modern:	 The	Transformation	 of	 Chinese	
		
		
288	1949,	 different	 views	 of	 history	 and	 historiography	 coexisted,	 with	 Marxists’	Historical	Materialism	School	as	one	example.	Whereas	other	historians	 (such	as	Hu	 Shi	 and	 Fu	 Sinian)	 preferred	 to	 re-evaluate	 China’s	 past	 with	 the	 help	 of	modern	 scientific	 methods	 or	 relied	 on	 various	 aspects	 of	 China’s	 traditional	culture	to	define	the	core	of	the	Chinese	nation	(such	as	Qian	Mu	and	Chen	Yinque),	Marxist	 historians	 stipulated	 that	 history	 is	 driven	 by	 the	 development	 of	 the	forces	of	production	and	characterized	by	a	linear	progress	towards	the	next	mode	of	 production.	 From	 the	 late	 1930s	 to	mid-1940s,	when	 these	 academic	 schools	worked	hard	to	develop	themselves,	another	greatly	different	historiography	was	created	 in	 a	 relatively	 academically	 isolated	 region—Yan’an.	 This	 historiography	also	claimed	that	Marxist	theory	was	the	theoretical	basis	for	history	studies,	but	that	 it	 was,	 in	 fact,	 a	 product	 of	 Maoism.	 This	 Maoist	 historiography	 provided	extremely	 simplified	 explanations	 of	 history	 and	 bundled	 them	 with	 the	 rulers’	authority,	 indoctrinating	 the	 people	 through	 administrative	 and	 educational	systems.	 The	 standard	 explanations	 of	 the	 CCP’s	 history	 constituted	 the	 core	contents	of	this	historiography.		 	 The	 conflicts	between	Marxist	 and	non-Marxist	historiography	 continued	after	1949.	The	tension	between	them	is	a	key	to	understanding	Chinese	historiography	during	 the	 first	 seventeen	 years	 of	 the	 PRC.	 Party	 historiography,	 however,	 is	difficult	to	fit	into	this	picture	because	from	the	Maoists’	perspectives,	both	Marxist	and	 non-Marxist	 historiography	 needed	 to	 be	 revised	 according	 to	 the	model	 of	Party	 historiography.	 Since	 1949,	 two	 forces	 have	 profoundly	 shaped	 the	historiographical	 landscape.	 The	 first	 attempts	 to	write	 all	 history	 following	 the	way	 in	which	official	Party	History	was	written.	The	other	searches	 for	historical	principles,	rules,	and	regularities,	and	tends	to	pull	all	history	research,	 including	highly	politicized	fields,	such	as	Party	history,	onto	the	academic	track.		 	 In	 the	 1960s,	 when	 the	 new	 generation	 of	 historians	 who	 were	 raised	 under	Mao’s	 red	banner	and	were	backed	vigorously	by	him,	became	 the	 successors	of	the	senior	generation	of	historians,	 the	sinicized	Marxism—Mao	Zedong	Thought	was	accepted	finally	as	the	sole	guidance	for	historical	research.	This	was	a	victory																																																																																																																																																																			Historiography,	 1895-1937”,	 in	 Brian	Moloughney	 and	 Peter	 Zarrow,	 eds.,	Transforming	 History:	
The	Making	of	a	Modern	Avademic	Discipline	 in	Twentieth-Century	China.	Hong	Kong:	The	Chinese	University	Press,	2012,	pp.	1-45.	Axel	Schneider	and	Stefan	Tanaka,	“The	Transformation	of	History	in	China	and	Japan”,	in	Stuart	Macintyre,	Juan	Maiguashca	and	Attila	Pók	eds.,	The	Oxford	History	of	
Historical	Writing	(1800-1945)	Vol.	4.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011,	pp.	491-519.	
		
		
289	for	the	Maoist	historiography	that	had	originated	in	the	CCP’s	Yan’an	period,	rather	than	a	victory	of	Marxist	historiography.		 	 Since	 1978,	 Chinese	 historiography	 has	 become	 a	more	 diversified,	 open,	 and	uncontrollable	 field.	 Nevertheless,	 while	 social	 and	 economic	 history,	 and	 other	fields	 of	 specialized	 historiography	 are	 gaining	 momentum,	 and	 oral	 history	circumvents	 the	 CCP	 and	 respective	 state	 organs’	 close	 control	 of	 archives	 and	sources,	 Maoist	 historiography	 continues	 to	 play	 a	 pivotal	 role.	 This	 point	 is	evidenced	in	the	analysis	of	Party	historiography	presented	in	this	thesis.	 	
A	Transformation		 	 The	 case	 of	 the	WRA	not	 only	 allows	us	 to	 investigate	 the	 process	 of	 creating	Party	 History	 systematically,	 but	 also	 provides	 a	 different	 perspective	 on	 the	current	leadership’s	control	over	historiography.	One	question	this	thesis	has	tried	to	answer	is	the	extent	to	which	the	CCP	still	controls	the	writing	and	propaganda	of	Party	history	and	by	which	methods	it	manages	to	do	so.	 		 	 Holding	or	Losing	Control	over	Party	Historiography?		 	 Scholars	 have	 almost	 reached	 a	 consensus	 that	 the	 manipulation	 of	 History,	including	Party	History,	played	a	critical	role	 in	the	CCP’s	gaining	national	power	and	 controlling	 the	 political	 system	 throughout	 the	 Mao	 Era.	 This	 argument	 is	generally	 true,	 but	 it	 claims	 too	 often	 that	 the	 Party	 leadership	 could	 easily	 tell	stories	 in	 its	preferred	way.	As	this	thesis	has	indicated,	even	after	Mao	obtained	the	supreme	position,	he	still	could	not	persuade	his	colleagues	and	subordinates	to	accept	his	version	of	history	until	he	adopted	various	means	of	education,	fraud,	and	intimidation.		 	 This	 consensus	 claims	 stereotypically	 that	 over	 the	past	 two	decades,	 the	CCP	has	 lost	 control	 in	 creating	 Party	 History.	 Although	 since	 the	 early	 1990s,	propaganda	 as	 a	 traditional	 instrument	 of	 control	 has	 “atrophied	 and	 eroded	considerably	 over	 time,”4 	 Party	 history,	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 subjects	 of	 its	propaganda	 system,	 has	 continued	 to	 exert	 influence	 on	 Chinese	 people	 in	 both	traditional	and	new	ways.	We	can	illustrate	this	in	three	ways.		 	 First,	although	the	official	historical	narratives	created	in	the	Mao	Era	and	in	the	early	years	of	the	Reform	Era	have	been	challenged	repeatedly	and	have	begun	to																																																									4	 David	 Shambaugh,	 China’s	 Communist	 Party:	 Atrophy	 and	 Adaptation,	 University	 of	 California	Press,	2008,	p.	3.	
		
		
290	lose	influence,	the	official	Party	history	framework	continues	to	rule,	both	in	name	and	in	fact.		 	 Second,	 an	 explosion	 of	 new	 information	 gave	 people	 the	 impression	 that	 the	propaganda	 about	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Party	 was	 declining,	 but	 if	 we	 take	 into	account	local	level	propaganda,	it	is	fair	to	say	that	this	is	not	the	case,	and	that,	if	anything,	it	has	increased.	A	considerable	portion	of	propaganda	content	has	been	revised	 according	 to	 a	 “softer”	 style.	 For	 example,	 through	 attractive	 plots	 and	close	 connections	 with	 local	 people,	 some	 revamped	 narratives	 give	 people	 the	impression	that	those	stories	are	more	about	local	history	rather	than	that	of	the	Party.	 	 		 	 Third,	with	respect	to	narrative	style,	certain	well-defined	stories	have	gradually	replaced	 the	 former	 chronicle-like	 historical	 writings.	 A	 parallel	 process	 is	 that	those	messages	 of	 revolutionary	 class	 struggle	 have	 lost	 their	 position	 and	been	replaced	by	more	humanistic	themes,	such	as	suffering,	friendship,	and	love.	 	
	 	 Highlighting	the	Glorious	Past		 	 In	addition	to	these	three	points,	there	is	a	more	essential	reason	to	claim	that	Party	 history	 still	 occupies	 center	 stage:	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 CCP’s	 propaganda	 has	shifted	 from	 portraying	 a	 bright	 future	 to	 highlighting	 a	 glorious	 past.	 In	 Mao’s	time,	the	CCP	built	its	ideology	on	the	promise	of	a	communist	society.	Due	to	the	urgent	 need	 to	 claim	 that	 Marxist	 theory	 concerning	 the	 five	 types	 of	 social	structures5	 was	applicable	to	China,	historians	had	to	resolve	a	series	of	problems	about	 the	 development	 of	 “modes	 of	 production”	 in	 Chinese	 history,	 such	 as	whether	 and	 when	 slave-based	 societies	 once	 existed	 in	 China.	 The	 answers	 to	these	 questions	 related	 directly	 to	 the	 primary	 question	 concerning	 whether	 a	communist	 society—the	 ideal	 social	 form	 demonstrated	 by	 Marxists—would	 be	realized	in	China.	This	explains	why	the	landscape	of	PRC	Marxist	historiography	from	1949	to	1966	was	dominated	by	five	main	topics,	or	the	“five	golden	flowers,”	as	Chinese	historians	called	them,	referring	to	a	famous	Chinese	film.6		 	 The	 promise	 to	 build	 a	 utopia,	 however,	 has	 disappeared	 from	 the	 Party’s	propaganda.	 Now,	 the	 Chinese	 revolution	 is	 framed	 consistently	 as	 a	 nationalist																																																									5	 Primitive	communism,	slave	society,	feudalism,	capitalism,	and	communism	(with	socialism	as	its	early	stage).	6	 These	five	topics	are	historical	periodization,	the	origin	of	the	Chinese	nation,	peasant	rebellions,	the	vicissitudes	of	feudal	landownership,	and	the	emergence	of	the	so-called	“capitalist	sprouts”	in	late	imperial	China.	
		
		
291	revolution,	 and	 the	 key	 theme	 of	 propaganda	 is	 the	 contribution	 that	 the	 Party	made	in	its	“great,	glorious	and	correct”	history.	Thus,	while	the	Party	used	to	base	its	legitimacy	on	the	future,	it	now	bases	it	on	the	past.		 	 This	transformation	in	the	theme	of	propaganda	reflects	the	flexibility	inherent	in	the	CCP’s	ideology.	Compared	to	other	examples	in	which	the	CCP	consolidated	its	control	over	ideology	by	creating	new	slogans	or	concepts,	such	as	“the	primary	stage	 of	 socialism”	 (shehui	 zhuyi	 chuji	 jieduan	 社會主義初級階段)	 and	 “four	civilizations”	(sige	wenming	 四個文明),7	 mining	the	Party’s	revolutionary	past	is	a	more	consistent	and	enduring	method,	because	it	helps	produce	new	myths	from	within	 the	 existing	 ideological	 system,	 rather	 than	 having	 to	 introduce	 new	 and	relatively	strange	discourses.	In	the	case	of	the	WRA,	we	can	see	that	after	officials	of	 ideological	 work	 largely	 abandoned	 the	 myth	 that	 Mao	 represented	 the	 only	correct	political	line	within	the	Party,	new	myths	about	the	WRA’s	persistence	and	bravery	 became	 ever	 more	 popular.	 These	 new	 myths	 are	 imperative	 for	 the	Chinese	 state,	 as	 many	 of	 the	 previously	 unquestionable	 and	 unshakable	 myths	have	gradually	been	diluted	in	the	minds	of	the	Chinese	people.		 	 As	 for	 the	 motivation	 behind	 the	 CCP’s	 ideological	 shift,	 many	 analysts	 have	explained	 it	 as	 a	 response	 to	 an	 ideological	 crisis	 during	 the	 post-Tiananmen	period.8	 This	 thesis,	 however,	 asserts	 that	 this	 shift	 is	 indeed	 part	 of	 the	 policy	transformation	 that	 began	 in	 the	 late	 1970s.	 Because	 Deng	 was	 determined	 to	achieve	 two	 contradictory	 aims	 simultaneously—to	 change	 the	 economic	 system	of	 the	 Mao	 Era	 dramatically,	 while	 maintaining	 Maoism	 as	 the	 orthodox	ideology—he	 had	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 avoid	 the	 issue	 of	 realizing	 Communism	 and	shift	the	focus	of	propaganda	instead	towards	the	Party’s	revolutionary	history.	In	this	sense,	 it	 is	not	 far-fetched	 to	say	 that	 this	shift	was	actually	an	aspect	of	 the	dynamics	of	China’s	reform.	 		 	 Thus,	 we	 can	 summarize	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 CCP’s	 new	 narrative	 as	 follows:	 the																																																									7	 For	more	 about	 these	 two	 slogans,	 see	 the	 following	 research:	Alan	R.	Kluver,	Legitimating	 the	
Chinese	Economic	Reforms:	A	Rhetoric	 of	Myth	and	Orthodoxy.	Now	York:	 State	University	of	New	York	Press,	1996,	p.	77.	Nicholas	Dynon,	“Four	Civilizations’	and	The	Evolution	of	Post-Mao	Chinese	Socialist	Ideology”,	The	China	Journal,	No.	60	(July	2008),	pp.	83-109.	8 	 For	 example:	 Zhao	 Suisheng.	 “Chinese	 Intellectuals'	 Quest	 for	 National	 Greatness	 and	Nationalistic	Writing	 in	 the	1990s”,	The	China	Quarterly,	No.	152	(December	1997),	pp.	725–745.	Tony	Saich,	“Discos	and	Dictatorship:	Party-State	and	Society	Relations	in	the	People's	Republic	of	China”,	in	Jeffrey	N.	Wasserstrom	and	Elizabeth	J.	Perry,	eds.,	Popular	Protest	and	Political	Culture	in	
Modern	China.	Boulder:	Westview	Press,	1994,	pp.	246-68.	
		
		
292	Party	paid	a	high	price	for	the	victory	of	its	revolution;	as	a	result,	it	is	reasonable	to	 allow	 this	 Party	 to	 rule	 the	 country.	 In	 September	 2015,	 after	 Wang	 Qishan	admitted	in	front	of	dozens	of	foreign	leaders	and	scholars	that	“the	CCP	gained	its	legitimacy	 from	 history”	 this	 idea	 has	 no	 longer	 been	 tacit,	 but	 is	 now	 an	authorized	statement.	It	is	easy	for	this	idea	to	gain	the	support	of	certain	interest	groups,	 such	as	 the	 “second	generation	 reds.”	Actually,	many	 “second	generation	reds”	 have	 expressed	 similar	 ideas	 in	 the	 past	 few	 years	 in	 order	 to	 emphasize	their	connection	to	the	CCP	regime.	This	is	quite	understandable	because,	as	long	as	 one	 considers	 that	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 current	 political	 power	 is	 the	 decades	 of	revolution	before	1949	and	the	victory	in	1949,	the	offspring	of	senior	cadres	have	a	reason	to	ask	for	a	share	of	the	power.	For	Chinese	people,	relating	the	current	regime	 to	 the	 history	 of	 assuming	 national	 power	 is	 a	 familiar	 way	 of	 thinking.	There	is	a	Chinese	saying:	Whoever	seizes	political	power	by	force	should	assume	the	ruling	position	(da	jiangshan,	zuo	jiangshan	 打江山,	 坐江山).	Therefore,	when	Wang	Qishan	 stated	 that	 the	CCP	gained	 its	 legitimacy	 from	history,	 although	he	adopted	the	Western	concept,	“legitimacy,”	he	was	actually	talking	about	a	Chinese	idea	concerning	the	relationship	between	seizing	power	and	being	in	a	position	to	exercise	that	power.	
	 	 Loving	the	Motherland	or	Loving	the	Party?		 	 A	side	effect	of	portraying	the	CCP	as	the	savior	of	China	is	that	the	distinction	between	the	concepts	of	“the	Party,”	“the	PRC,”	and	“China”	has	to	a	great	degree	been	blurred.	As	a	result,	the	following	argument	has	become	quite	common:	If	you	love	 the	 motherland—China—you	 should	 support	 the	 CCP.	 For	 some	 scholars,	because	the	CCP	no	longer	offers	an	inspiring	vision	of	China’s	future,	the	Party	is	increasingly	 “seen	 by	 many	 groups	 and	 individuals	 in	 society	 as	 being	 largely	irrelevant	 in	 their	daily	 lives.”9	 In	 fact,	 to	 the	extent	 that	 the	Party	has	become	a	synonym	 for	 “the	nation,”	 it	 has	become	even	more	 indispensible.	Therefore,	we	should	not	underestimate	the	Chinese	people’s	emotional	attachment	to	the	CCP. 	 	 It	is	not	far-fetched	to	argue	that,	to	date,	the	CCP	has	been	able	to	remain	at	the	helm	due	in	large	part	to	its	success	in	making	Chinese	people,	in	the	main,	take	its	rule	for	granted,	and	to	a	lesser	extent,	due	to	its	delivery	of	economic	goods.	This	
																																																								9	 Richard	 Baum,	 “China’s	 Road	 to	 ‘Soft	 Authoritarian	 Reform’”,	 US–China	 Relations	 and	 China’s	
Integration	with	the	World,	Vol.	19,	No.	1	(2004),	pp.	15-20.	 	
		
		
293	does	 not,	 however,	 mean	 that	 everyone	 in	 China	 has	 been	 persuaded,	 and	therefore	believes	 the	ruling	party	represents	 the	Chinese	nation.	Since	 the	early	1980s,	there	has	been	a	discussion	about	the	relationship	between	“loving	China”	and	 “loving	 the	 Party”	 (or	 “being	 loyal	 to	 the	 Party”).10	 Recently,	 official	 media	claimed	 that	 these	 two	 concepts	 are	 identical,11	 but	 the	 prevalence	 of	 a	 new	rhetoric	 of	 irony	 about	 “the	 people	 of	 family	 Zhao”	 (Zhao	 jia	 ren	 趙家人)12	represents	resistance	to	false	patriotic	propaganda	and	indicates	that	the	tension	between	 confusing	 the	 concepts	 of	 “China”	 and	 “the	 Party”	 and	 defining	 them	clearly	will	definitely	continue.		 	 As	 has	 been	 discussed	 in	 this	 thesis,	 the	 case	 of	 the	 WRA	 has	 a	 number	 of	unusual	 features.	 For	 example,	 theoretically	 speaking,	 a	 serious	 military	 defeat	does	not	deserve	propaganda,	not	to	mention	the	superstitious	elements	found	in	the	narratives.	However,	the	shift	in	the	Party’s	focus	on	propaganda	and	ideology	explains	 all	 of	 these	 features.	 When	 the	 Party	 portrayed	 the	 realization	 of	communism	as	its	highest	ideal	and	ultimate	goal,	all	of	the	sacrifice	was	accepted.	Moreover,	as	a	Party	that	would	lead	the	Chinese	people	to	communism,	it,	and	its	army,	had	to	be	invincible.	Because	of	their	loss,	the	WRA	could	only	be	a	target	of	criticism,	rather	than	a	propaganda	tool.	In	contrast,	to	highlight	its	contribution	to	the	 past,	 the	 CCP	 now	 tends	 to	 talk	 about	 the	 sacrifice	 and	 failures	 of	 Chinese	Communists,	repeating	the	stories	about	how	the	Party	members	suffered	in	order	to	 achieve	 the	 victory	 of	 the	 revolution.	 By	 emphasizing	 the	 content	 above,	 the																																																									10	 For	example,	in	1981,	a	Chinese	writer,	Bai	Hua	 白樺	 (1930-	),	was	criticized	by	Deng	Xiaoping	because	 his	 film	 script	 expressed	 a	 view	 of	 patriotism	 “as	 simple	 love	 of	 country,	 having	 no	necessary	relationship	to	the	Communist	Party	and	socialism”.	Paul.	A.	Cohen,	2009,	pp.	188-189.	11	 “Sheping:	Bixu	dizhi	ba	aiguo,	aidang	duili	qilai	 社評：必須抵制把愛國、愛黨對立起來”	(Editorial:	The	practices	of	putting	 “loving	China”	and	 “loving	 the	CCP”	 in	opposite	positions	must	be	 firmly	forbidden),	Huanqiu	wang	 環球網	 (Global	Times	Online),	September	10,	2014.	http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2014-09/5126337.html	(last	visited	on	November	20,	2015).	Chen	Xiankui	 陳先奎,	“Aiguo	he	aidang	zai	Zhongguo	shi	yizhi	de	 愛國和愛黨在中國是一致的”	(In	China	 “loving	 China”	 are	 the	 same	 with	 “loving	 the	 CCP”),	Huanqiu	 wang,	 September	 10,	 2014.	http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_china/2014-09/5132838.html	 (last	visited	on	November	20,	2015)	12	 “Zhao	jia	ren”	or	“Zhao	family”	resurfaced	in	late	2015	as	a	disparaging	term	for	China’s	rich	and	politically	well-connected.	“Zhao	family”	derives	from	Lu	Xun’s	celebrated	novella	“The	True	Story	of	Ah	Q”.	Ah	Q	is	from	a	poor	rural	family.	He	bullies	those	weaker	than	himself	while	currying	favor	with	 the	 powerful,	 who	 despise	 him.	 When	 Ah	 Q	 cheers	 with	 the	 Zhaos,	 a	 rich	 landlord	 family	whose	son	has	just	passed	the	imperial	examination,	the	Zhao	patriarch	slaps	him	and	asks:	“Do	you	think	you	are	worthy	of	 the	name	Zhao?”	 (Ni	ye	pei	 xing	Zhao?	 你也配姓趙？)	This	 sentence	has	been	frequently	cited	as	rhetoric	with	an	implication	that	some	rich	and	powerful	families	control	the	power	and	wealth	of	China.	Netizens	also	use	“their	country”	to	refer	to	China,	which	reflects	a	deliberate	separation	of	the	“China”	where	they	are	living	and	the	“China”	of	patriotic	propaganda.	
		
		
294	Party	 is	 indeed	conveying	a	message	that	 it	deserves	to	rule.13	 In	this	respect,	as	long	as	a	story	can	 tell	people	how	much	hardship	 the	CCP	endured,	even	 if	 that	hardship	 came	 from	 intra-Party	 power	 struggles,	 the	 story	 can	 still	 be	 used	 for	propaganda.	Similarly,	as	 long	as	a	story	 tells	people	how	much	the	Chinese	 love	the	CCP,	even	if	it	is	illogical	or	superstitious,	it	benefits	the	Party.	 		 	 This	shift	 in	 the	 focus	of	propaganda	helps	explain,	but	does	not	eliminate,	 the	peculiarities	in	current	popular	historical	narratives.	The	CCP	is	still	trying	to	use	its	monopoly	on	power	to	suppress	open	debates	of	history,	but	it	seems	that	the	officials	of	ideology	and	propaganda	do	not	have	an	overall	plan	about	their	official	versions	 of	 historical	 narratives,	 much	 less	 a	 plan	 about	 how	 to	 promote	 them.	When	the	authorities	need	to	achieve	more	than	one	purpose,	 they	usually	 tailor	propaganda	 plans	 for	 each,	 and	 are	 less	 concerned	 about	 the	 contradiction	between	 those	 plans.	 The	 latest	 example	 is	 the	 commemoration	 of	 former	 CCP	leader,	Hu	Yaobang,	in	November	2015.14	 Similar	to	the	case	of	the	WRA,	the	Party	leaders	also	 conveyed	ambiguous	and	seemingly	 contradictory	attitudes	 towards	Hu	 and	 his	 reforms.	 The	 Party	 leadership	 reminded	 its	 people	 of	 the	 WRA’s	sufferings	 and	 loyalty	 to	 the	 Party,	 while	 attempting	 to	 stop	 debates	 about	 the	history	of	the	WRA	because	it	has	been	used	as	a	piece	of	evidence	in	discussions	of	the	Party’s	future	political	choices.	Similarly,	the	leadership	also	wants	people	to	remember	Hu’s	contributions	to	the	reforms,	and	how	they	loved	him,	yet	it	tries	simultaneously	 to	 prevent	 people	 from	 connecting	 Hu	 and	 Zhao	 Ziyang	 to	 the																																																									13	 To	 some	 extent,	 this	 tactic	 of	 propaganda	 has	 been	 successful.	 As	 Timothy	 Cheek	 points	 out,	“even	 though	 various	 people	 in	 China	 today	 dismiss	 the	 extreme	 claims	 of	 revolutionary	correctness	or	question	the	gaps	in	official	Party	histories,	the	CCP	is	broadly	credited	with	saving	China	from	imperialism,	warlords,	and	poverty.	For	many	in	China,	the	greatest	achievement	of	the	CCP,	 for	which	Mao	 is	 the	 embodiment,	 is	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Chinese	 nation-state	 and	 the	restoration	 of	 order	 in	 1949.	 The	 many	 sins	 committed	 by	 Mao	 and	 the	 CCP	 since	 then	 have	not-yet-utterly	overshadowed	this	singular	achievement.”	Timothy	Cheek,	Living	with	Reform	China	
since	1989.	Nova	Scotia:	Fernwood	Publishing,	2006,	p.	43.	14	 In	1987,	Hu	Yaobang	was	 removed	 from	 the	post	of	Party	General	 Secretary.	Two	years	 later,	Hu’s	 death	 led	 to	 the	 Tiananmen	 Square	 protests	 of	 1989.	 After	 the	 Tiananmen	 Massacre,	 Hu’s	successor	Zhao	Ziyang	was	purged	and	placed	under	house	arrest	until	his	death.	 Since	 then,	Hu	and	Zhao’s	names	became	taboo	in	Mainland	China.	In	November	2015,	quite	surprisingly	for	many	people,	Xi	Jinping	and	other	CCP	leaders	held	a	large-scale	meeting	to	commemorate	the	centenary	of	 the	birth	of	Hu	Yaobang.	Some	people	felt	encouraged	by	this	meeting,	because	they	thought	 it	was	 a	 prelude	 to	 the	 rehabilitation	 of	 Hu	 Yaobang,	 Zhao	 Ziyang	 and	 the	 Tiananmen	 Incident.	 A	couple	of	days	later,	in	a	documentary	produced	by	the	Chinese	Central	TV	station	for	the	centenary	of	the	birth	of	Hu,	when	an	edition	of	People’s	Daily	with	the	names	and	photos	of	all	those	members	of	the	CCP	Politburo’s	standing	committee	was	displayed,	audience	found	that	Zhao	Ziyang’s	name	was	 removed	 and	 Zhao’s	 photo	was	 replaced	with	 a	 photo	 of	 another	 leader.	 This	 raised	 a	 new	round	of	speculation	about	Xi’s	attitude	towards	Party	history.	 	
		
		
295	question	of	whether	the	Party	needs	political	reforms.	 	
To	Take	History	Back		 	 As	 previously	 discussed,	 some	people	 stipulate	 that	 the	 current	 Party	 leaders’	manipulation	of	 its	history,	especially	 the	campaign	 that	has	criticized	“historical	nihilism”	since	2013,	is	a	response	to	a	legitimacy	crisis.	In	fact,	because	there	is	no	free	 public	 sphere	 where	 the	 ruled	 can	 express	 their	 disapproval	 of	 the	government,	it	is	difficult	to	identify	such	a	crisis	in	China.15	 In	this	respect,	rather	than	 struggling	 with	 this	 legitimacy	 issue,	 which	 has	 a	 methodological	 pitfall,	perhaps	 we	 should	 raise	 more	 questions	 from	 other	 perspectives.	 One	 such	question	is	what	role	historians	can	play	in	the	field	of	Party	history.	This	question,	of	 course,	has	no	 standard	answers.	Nevertheless,	 few	people	 can	afford	 to	deny	that	 contemporary	 China	 requires	 professional	 historians	 to	 act	 vigorously	 to	present	a	more	comprehensive	and	complete	picture	of	the	Party’s	history.		 	 Rarely	has	a	generation	in	China	had	the	same	opportunity	as	the	current	cohort	of	educated	people	to	be	able	to	rethink	the	relationship	between	the	CCP’s	history	that	they	learnt	in	school	and	historical	reality.	With	the	release	of	more	and	more	new	 materials	 over	 the	 past	 thirty	 years,	 new	 narratives	 and	 some	 seemingly	disparate	 interpretations	 presented	 themselves	 all	 at	 once.	 In	 this	 environment,	conflicts	between	different	explanations,	and	disagreements	about	how	to	assess	orthodox	 and	 well-accepted	 interpretations,	 have	 taken	 center	 stage	 in	 public	discussion.	 		 	 This	thesis	focused	on	the	production	of	History,	rather	than	its	reception,	so	it	did	not	present	any	systematic	research	on	public	acceptance	of	the	official	version	of	 Party	 History	 and	 the	 various	 new	 interpretations.	 Based	 on	 observations	 in	everyday	conversations	and	online	comments	of	political	coverage,	I	 found	that	a	considerable	 number	 of	 Chinese	 have	 become	 trapped	 in	 a	 sort	 of	 historical	ambivalence.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	 idea	 that	 “history	 is	written	by	 the	victors”	 is	well	 accepted.	 This,	 however,	 is	 not	 a	 positive	 and	 scientific	 attitude	 towards	history,	 because	 although	 it	 reveals	 the	 difference	 between	 historical	interpretations	 and	 facts,	 and	 admonishes	 people	 about	 the	 possible	 political	attention	 that	 influences	 the	 creation	 of	 History,	 it	 also	 tends	 to	 rule	 out	 the																																																									15	 Ding	 Xueliang,	 The	 Decline	 of	 Communism	 in	 China:	 Legitimacy	 Crisis,	 1977-1989.	 New	 York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1994,	p.	4	
		
		
296	existence	of	any	objective	history	at	all.	It	amounts	to	total	skepticism,	that	History	is	 fabricated	 in	 a	way	 similar	 to	 that	 accomplished	by	 the	 “Ministry	 of	 Truth”	 in	George	Orwell’s	 dystopian	novel	1984,	 such	 that	 nothing	 in	History	 is	 true.16	 By	claiming	 that	 the	 CCP,	 the	 “victors,”	 produced	 or	 even	 fabricated	 History,	 many	people	seem	to	have	abandoned	the	pursuit	of	that	aspect	of	history	that	the	great	nineteenth-century	German	historian,	Leopold	von	Ranke,	summarized	as	finding	out	 “what	really	happened.”	On	 the	other	hand,	when	 these	same	people	have	 to	comment	 on	 history,	 they	 tend	 to	 retell	 the	 stories	 that	 they	 learnt	 from	official	Party	 History—those	 of	 the	 Mao	 Era	 and	 of	 the	 Reform	 Era—and	 sometimes	 a	mixture	of	the	two.	 		 	 China	has	been	compared	to	the	Soviet	Union	often	during	the	past	twenty-plus	years.	Western	scholars	and	observers	at	first	expected	to	witness	the	collapse	of	another	socialist	regime,	but	later	tried	to	determine	the	CCP’s	secrets	of	survival.	Considering	people’s	full	and	ruthless	assessment	of	the	past	as	one	factor	related	closely	to	real	change	in	a	communist	party	and	a	country,	Pulitzer	Prize	winner,	David	Remnick,	recorded	the	responses	of	various	people	in	the	Soviet	Union,	from	soldiers	and	 intellectuals	 to	ordinary	people,	 to	 the	explosion	of	brutality	during	the	Stalin	Era.	According	to	Remnick,	when	the	empire,	which	Stalin	created	as	a	vast	 room	with	 “its	 door	 locked”	 and	 “its	windows	 shuttered,”	was	 exposed	 in	 a	return	 of	 historical	 memory,	 many	 people	 felt	 deceived,	 and	 the	 entire	 country	dissolved	 “in	 a	 state	 of	 mass	 disorientation.”17	 Similar	 to	 the	 Soviets,	 Chinese	people	have	been	blinded	for	decades,	and	have	now	become	aware	of	the	gaps	in	official	Party	History.	 In	recent	social	news,	we	can	already	see	a	kind	of	anxiety	and	confusion	concerning	the	historical	assessments	of	the	Party	and	certain	of	its	leaders.18	 This,	then,	is	an	era	in	which	historians	should	play	their	proper	role.	I																																																									16	 In	fact,	in	the	2000s,	the	Central	Propaganda	Department	was	often	mentioned	as	the	Zhenli	bu	(真理部,	the	“Ministry	of	Truth”)	by	Chinese	netizens.	But	now	this	word	is	among	the	blacklisted	keywords	that	the	Chinese	government	considers	to	be	politically	sensitive.	 	 	 	17	 David	 Remnick,	 Lenin’s	 Tomb:	 The	 Last	 Days	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Empire.	New	 York:	 Random	House,	1993.	For	Russian’s	response	to	the	explosion	of	history	in	the	late	1980s,	see	the	first	part	of	his	book:	“By	the	Right	of	Memory”.	18	 It	 is	 common	 to	 find	 Chinese	 people	 quarrelling	 about	 how	 to	 assess	 some	 first	 generation	leaders,	 such	 as	 Mao	 Zedong	 and	 Zhou	 Enlai.	 In	 some	 cases,	 people	 found	 that	 only	 physical	conflicts	 could	 solve	 their	 problem.	 The	 following	 news	 item	 relates	 how	 two	 factions	 of	 laid-off	workers	fought	with	each	other	and	got	hurt	because	of	their	different	opinion	on	the	assessment	of	Mao	Zedong.	Zhengsheng	wang	 正聲網	http://www.redzs.com/UpFile/template/contentpage/zsw_tylm/item.aspx?id=40128&p=0	 (last	visited	on	February	29,	2016).	
		
		
297	am	not	 saying	 that	 by	 rewriting	 history,	 historians	 should	 lead	 China	 to	 a	 social	and	 political	 transformation	 similar	 to	 that	 experienced	 by	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 in	1991,	 or,	 that	 historians	 should	 prevent	 this	 kind	 of	 transformation	 from	 taking	place	in	China.	My	point	is	simply	that	historians	should	work	on	and	challenge	the	myths	 that	 they	 themselves	have	disguised	as	 “history.”	As	an	alternative	way	of	“knowing”	 the	 past,	 myth	 is	 in	 constant	 tension	 with	 historians’	 reconstructive	work.19	 In	 the	 words	 of	 the	 eminent	 British	 historian,	 Michael	 Howard,	 the	disillusion	brought	about	by	exposing	myths	“is	a	necessary	part	of	growing	up	in	and	belonging	to	an	adult	society.”20		 	 Whether	it	be	challenging	the	prevalent	myths	or	bringing	discipline	to	the	field	of	 Party	 history,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 basic,	 if	 not	 the	 most	 important,	 job	 for	 the	historian	 is	 “to	 discreetly	 investigate	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 prevalent	 historical	interpretations,	as	well	as	the	formation	of	the	primary	materials	based	on	which	these	 interpretations	were	created.”21	 As	 this	 thesis	has	shown,	 the	 formation	of	prevalent	 interpretations	 of	 Party	 history	 is	 a	 dual	 process	 of	 creation	 and	concealment.	 		 	 As	 this	 history	 was	 rewritten	 repeatedly,	 new	 narratives	 were	 continuously	created,	 replacing	 previous	 ones.	 However,	 every	 “layer”	 of	 historical	representation	 conveys	 certain	 historical	 facts.	 In	 discussing	 ways	 to	 discover	ancient	 Chinese	 myths,	 historian	 Gu	 Jiegang	 顧頡剛 	 (1893-1980)	 wrote:	“Although	 we	 cannot	 tell	 the	 exact	 condition	 of	 these	 mythical	 events,	 we	 can	discover	 their	 earliest	 forms.”22	 Thus,	 rather	 than	 comparing	different	 historical	accounts	 to	decide	which	 is	 truer	 than	are	 the	others,	Gu	suggested	 investigating	how	Chinese	history	was	presented	at	different	times.	This	“stratification	theory”	is	applicable	to	ancient	history	and	to	modern	Chinese	history	as	well.	 		 	 At	 the	same	time,	 the	Party	concealed	narratives	 incompatible	with	 the	official	version	of	its	History,	and	these	became	similar	to	what	Prasenjit	Duara	referred	to	as	“dispersed	histories.”23	 Only	by	exploring	how	complex	historical	realities	were																																																									19 	 Paul	 A.	 Cohen,	 China	 Unbound:	 Evolving	 Perspectives	 on	 the	 Chinese	 Past,	 New	 York:	RoutledgeCurzon,	2003,	p.	200.	20	 Michael	Howard,	The	Causes	of	Wars	and	Other	Essays.	Harvard	University	Press,	1962,	p.	190.	21	 Ishikawa	Yoshihiro,	2015.	22	 Gu	 Jiegang	 顧頡剛,	Gushibian	 zixu	 古史辨自序	 (The	 Author’s	 Preface	 for	 Critiques	 of	 Ancient	History).	Shijiazhuang:	Hebei	jiaoyu	chubanshe	 河北教育出版社,	2000,	p.	4.	23	 Prasenjit	 Duara,	 Rescuing	 History	 from	 the	 Nation:	 Questioning	 Narratives	 of	 Modern	 China.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1995.	
		
		
298	appropriated	or	concealed,	can	we	recover	the	concealed	parts	and	so	establish	a	“bifurcated”	Party	History.	 		 	 R.	G.	Collingwood	stated,	that	the	past	the	historian	studies	is	not	dead	but	is	“a	past	 which	 in	 some	 sense	 is	 still	 living	 in	 the	 present.”24	 If	 we	 look	 at	 this	argument	from	the	perspectives	of	Gu	and	Duara,	we	may	say	that	the	past	is	not	dead,	but	one	that	in	some	sense	lives	in	each	and	every	“bifurcated”	“present.”	By	discovering	and	investigating	layer	after	layer	of	the	relics	and	“dispersed”	aspects	of	the	CCP’s	past,	not	only	can	we	contest	the	one-sided,	even	false,	histories	in	the	public	domain,	but	we	also	can	approach	(although	never	restore	completely)	the	knowledge	of	what	really	happened.	
																																																								24	 Robin	George	Collingwood,	An	Autobiography.	Oxford	University	Press,	1939,	p.	97.	
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Appendix:	Selected	Telegrams	 	
Cable	1:	“Zhongyang	dui	Si	fangmianjun	zhanlue	fangzhen	de	zhishi	dian	 中央對四方面軍戰略方針
的指示電（1935 年 11 月 12 日）”	 (The	 Party	 Centre’s	 directive	 to	 the	 Fourth	 Front	 Army	 on	strategies,	on	November	12,	1935),	in	Zhongguo	gongnong	hongjun	disi	fangmianjun	zhanshi	ziliao	
xuanbian,	Changzheng	 shiqi	 中國工農紅軍第四方面軍戰史資料選編·長征時期	 (Selected	materials	on	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Front	Army	 in	 the	 Chinese	Red	Army	of	Workers	 and	Peasants,	 the	Long	March	period,	hereafter	SMHF).	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	1992,	pp.	267.	 	Cable	2:	 “Zhang	Guotao	yi	 ‘Dang	tuan	zhongyang’	mingyi	zhi	Peng	Dehuai,	Mao	Zedong	deng	dian	
張國燾以「黨團中央」名義致彭德懷、毛澤東電等（1935 年 12 月 5 日）”	(Zhang	Guotao’s	cable	to	Peng	Dehuai,	Mao	 Zedong	 and	 other	 comrades	 on	 the	 behalf	 of	 “Party	 Centre	 and	 Central	 Youth	League”,	on	December	5,	1935),	in	SMHF,	p.	286.	Cable	3:	“Lin	Yuying	guanyu	weihu	dangnei	tuanjie,	yizhi	fandui	diren	deng	wenti	zhi	Zhang	Guotao	dian	 林育英關於維護黨內團結、一致反對敵人等問題致張國燾電（1935 年 12 月 22 日）”	 (Lin	Yuying’s	cable	to	Zhang	Guotao	on	unifying	the	Party	and	opposing	the	enemies,	on	December	22,	1935),	 in	 Zhongguo	 renmin	 jiefangjun	 junshi	 kexue	 yuan	 中國人民解放軍軍事科學院 	 (PLA	Military	 Science	 Academy)	 and	 Zhongyang	 dang’an	 guan	 中央檔案館	 (Central	 Archives),	 eds.,	
Hongjun	Changzheng	wenxian	 紅軍長征·文獻	 (Reference	on	the	Red	Army’s	Long	March,	hereafter	RRAL).	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	1995,	p.	845.	 	Cable	4:	“Zhang	Guotao	yi	‘di’er	zhongyang’	mingyi	zhi	guoji	daibiao	Lin	Yuying	dian	 張國燾以「第
二中央」名義致國際代表林育英電（1936 年 1 月 16 日）”	(Zhang	Guotao’s	cable	on	behalf	of	the	“alternative	Party	Centre”	to	the	representative	of	the	Comintern	Lin	Yuying,	on	January	16,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	331.	Cable	5:	 “Lin	Yuying	guanyu	Gongchan	guoji	wanquan	tongyi	Zhonggong	zhongyang	de	 luxian	zhi	Zhang	Guotao,	Zhu	De	dian	 林育英關於共產國際完全同意中共中央的路線致張國燾、朱德電（1936
年 1月 24日）”	(Lin	Yuying’s	cable	to	Zhang	Guotao	and	Zhu	De	that	the	Comintern	fully	agrees	with	the	CCP	Party	Centre’s	line,	on	January	24,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	328.	 	Cable	6:	“Zhongyang	wei	dangnei	tongyi	jiejue	dang	de	zuzhi	wenti	zhi	 ××	 dian	 中央為黨內統一
解決黨的組織問題致××電”	 (The	 Party	 Centre’s	 cable	 to	 somebody	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 Party’s	organization,	 on	 January	 24,	 1936),	 in	 SMHF,	 p.	 329.	 (The	 name	 of	 the	 receiver	 is	missed	 in	 the	cable	copy.	The	compiler	of	SMHF	says	the	receiver	might	be	Zhu	De.)	Cable	7:	 “Zhang	Guotao	 zhuzhang	 yi	 guoji	 daibiao	 tuan	 zan	dai	 Zhongyang	 zhi	 Lin	Yuying,	 Zhang	Wentian	dian 張國燾主張以國際代表團暫代中央致林育英、張聞天電（1936 年 1 月 27 日）”	(Zhang	Guotao’s	cable	to	Lin	Yuying	and	Zhang	Wentian	to	suggest	that	the	CCP	be	provisionally	managed	by	the	representative	group	in	the	Comintern,	on	January	27,	1936),	in	SMHF,	pp.	331-332.	
		
		
300	Cable	8:	“Lin	Yuying,	Zhang	Wentian	er	tongzhi	zhi	Si	fangmianjun	dian	 林育英、張聞天二同志致四
方面軍電（1936 年 2 月 14 日）”	(A	cable	by	Comrade	Li	Yuying	and	Comrade	Zhang	Wentian	to	the	Fourth	Front	Army,	on	February	14,	1936),	in	SMHF,	pp.	371-372.	Cable	9:	“Mao	Zedong	guanyu	Si	fangmianjun	guanxi	ji	diqing	bianhua	wenti	zhi	Peng	Dehuai	dian	
毛澤東關於四方面軍關係及敵情變化問題致彭德懷等電（1936 年 5 月 29 日）”	(Mao	Zedong’s	cable	to	Peng	Dehuai	on	the	relationship	with	the	Fourth	Front	Army	and	enemies’	situations,	on	May	29,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	525.	Cable	 10:	 “Zhang	 Guotao	 jianchi	 yi	 Guoji	 daibiaotuan	 daibiao	 Zhongyang	 he	 jiang	 Zhongyang	 gai	cheng	 Beifangju	 zhi	 Lin	 Yuying	 dian	 張國燾堅持以國際代表團代表中央和將中央改稱北方局致林
育英電（1936 年 5 月 30 日）”	(Zhang	Guotao’s	cable	to	Lin	Yuying	to	insist	that	the	Representative	Delegation	 in	 the	 Comintern	 should	 replace	 the	 Party	 Centre	 and	 the	 Party	 Centre	 should	 be	renamed	as	the	North	Bureau,	on	May	30,	1936),	in	RRAL,	p.	869.	Cable	11:	“Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	deng	guanyu	Er	Liu	 juntuan	yu	Si	 fangmianjun	zai	Ganzi	shengli	huishi	zhi	Zhongyang	he	Yi	fangmianjun	shouzhang	dian	 朱德、張國燾等關於二、六軍團與四方面
軍在甘孜勝利會師致中央和一方面軍首長電（1936 年 6 月 27 日）”	(Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao’s	cable	to	the	Party	Centre	and	top	commanders	of	the	First	Front	Army	on	the	union	of	the	Fourth	Front	Army	and	the	Second	and	Sixth	Army	Corps	in	Ganzi,	on	June	27,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	545.	Cable	12:	“Zhongyang	guanyu	Er	Si	fangmianjun	xunsu	chu	Gannan	zhi	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao,	Ren	Bishi	dian	 中央關於二、四方面軍迅速出甘南致朱德、張國燾、任弼時電（1936 年 7 月 22 日）”	(The	Party	Centre’s	 cable	 to	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	Ren	Bishi	 that	 the	Second	Front	Army	and	 the	Fourth	Front	Army	should	march	to	Gannan	quickly,	on	July	22,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	580.	 	Cable	 13:	 “Zhong	 ge	 junwei	 xunwen	 Er	 Si	 fangmianjun	 xingdong	 qingkuang	 zhi	 Zhu	 De,	 Zhang	Guotao,	Ren	Bishi	dian	 中革軍委詢問二、四方面軍行動情況致朱德、張國燾、任弼時電（1936 年7 月 28 日）”	(The	Central	Military	Committee’s	cable	to	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	Ren	Bishi	about	the	Second	Front	Army	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	operations,	on	July	28,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	581.	Cable	 14:	 “Zhu	 De,	 Zhang	 Guotao,	 Ren	 Bishi	 guanyu	 Er	 Si	 fangmianjun	 xiang	 Tao,	 Min,	 Xi,	 Gu	xingdong	 zhi	 zhongyang	 dian	 朱德、張國燾、任弼時關於二、四方面軍向洮岷西固行動致中央電
（1936年8月1日）”	(Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	Ren	Bishi’s	cable	to	the	Party	Centre	on	the	Second	Front	Army	and	 the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	movement	 to	Tao,	Min,	Xi	and	Gu	regions,	on	August	1,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	611.	Cable	 15:	 “Zhongyang	wei	 relie	 huanying	Er,	 Si	 fangmianjun	beishang	 zhi	 Zhu	De,	 Zhang	Guotao,	Ren	Bishi	dian	 中央為熱烈歡迎二、四方面軍北上致朱德、張國燾、任弼時電（1936 年 8 月 3 日）”	(The	 Party	 Centre’s	 cable	 to	 Zhu	 De,	 Zhang	 Guotao	 and	 Ren	 Bishi	 to	welcome	 the	 Second	 Front	Army	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	decision	of	marching	north,	on	August	3,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	621.	Cable	16:	“Zhonggong	zhongyang	lingdaoren	guanyu	jinhou	zhanlue	fangzhen	de	jianyi	zhi	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao,	Ren	Bishi	dian	 中共中央領導人關於今後戰略方針的建議致朱德、張國燾、任弼時電
（1936年 8月 12日）”	(A	cable	by	the	CCP	leaders	to	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	Ren	Bishi	on	future	strategies,	 on	 August	 12,	 1936),	 in	 Zhongguo	 renmin	 jiefangjun	 lishi	 ziliao	 congshu	 shenbian	
		
		
301	weiyuanhui	 中國人民解放軍歷史資料叢書審編委員會 	 (Committee	 for	 compiling	 historical	materials	of	the	PLA),	Gonggu	he	fazhan	Shaan	Gan	suqu	de	junshi	douzheng	 鞏固和發展陝甘蘇區
的軍事鬥爭	 (Consolidate	 and	 develop	 the	military	 struggles	 in	 the	 Shaanxi-Gansu	 Soviet	 Region,	hereafter	CDMS)，Volume	1.	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	1999,	pp.	597-599.	 	Cable	17:	“Zhongyang	guanyu	Hongjun	xingdong	fangzhen	zhi	Wang	Ming	dian	 中央關於紅軍行動
方針致王明電（1936 年 8 月 25 日）”	(A	cable	by	the	Party	Centre	to	Wang	Ming	on	the	Red	Army’s	strategies,	on	August	25,	1936	),	in	SMHF,	pp.	661-662.	Cable	18:	“Gongchan	guoji	shuji	chu	guanyu	tongyi	zhanling	Ningxia	quyu	he	Gansu	xibu	jihua	zhi	Zhongyang	 dian	 共產國際書記處關於同意佔領寧夏區域和甘肅西部計劃致中央電（1936 年 9 月11 日）”	 (A	 cable	 by	 the	 Comintern	 Secretariat	 to	 the	 CCP	 Party	 Centre	 to	 agree	 the	 Red	 Army	occupy	Ningxia	and	west	Gansu,	on	September	11,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	693.	Cable	19:	“Zhongyang	guanyu	zhanling	Ningxia	de	bushu	zhi	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao,	Ren	Bishi	dian	
中央關於佔領寧夏的部署致朱德、張國燾、任弼時電（1936 年 9 月 14 日 18 時）”	(The	Party	Centre’s	cable	 to	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	Ren	Bishi	on	arrangements	of	 taking	over	Ningxia,	at	6pm	on	September	14,	1936),	in	RRAL,	pp.	1124-1125.	Cable	20:	“Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao,	Chen	Changhao	guanyu	Jingning,	Huining	zhanyi	gangling	zhi	Xu	Xiangqian	dian	 朱德、張國燾、陳昌浩關於靜寧、會寧戰役綱領致徐向前電	（1936 年 9 月 18 日）”	(Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	Chen	Changhao’s	cable	to	Xu	Xiangqian	on	the	“Outline	of	the	Jingning	and	Huining	Campaign”,	on	September	18,	1936),	in	RRAL,	pp.	1132-1133.	Cable	21:	“Mao	Zedong,	Zhou	Enlai,	Peng	Dehuai	guanyu	jizhong	xian	zhanling	Ningxia	wenti	fu	Zhu	De	deng	dian	 毛澤東、周恩來、彭德懷關於集中先佔領寧夏問題復朱德等電（1936 年 9 月 19 日）”	(A	 cable	 by	 Mao	 Zedong,	 Zhou	 Enlai,	 Peng	 Dehuai	 to	 Zhu	 De	 on	 concentrating	 on	 taking	 over	Ningxia	and	other	issues,	on	September	19,	1936),	in	RRAL,	pp.	1134-1135.	Cable	22:	“Zhang	Guotao,	Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	guanyu	Wu	jun	renwu	zhi	Dong	Zhentang,	Huang	 Chao	 dian	 張國燾、徐向前、陳昌浩關於五軍任務致董振堂、黃超電（1936 年 9 月 22 日22 時）”	(A	cable	by	Zhang	Guotao,	Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	to	Dong	Zhentang	and	Huang	Chao	on	the	Fifth	Army’s	task,	at	10pm	on	September	22,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	714.	Cable	 23:	 “Zhang	 Guotao,	 Xu	 Xiangqian,	 Chen	 Changhao	 guanyu	 Si	 fangmianjun	 cong	 Xunhua	Yongjing	duhe	xijin	zhi	Zhong	ge	junwei	dian	 張國燾、徐向前、陳昌浩關於四方面軍從循化永靖渡
河西進致中革軍委電（1936年 9月 22日）”	(A	cable	by	Zhang	Guotao,	Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	to	the	Central	Military	Committee	on	the	Fourth	Front	Army’s	plan	of	crossing	the	Yellow	River	in	Xuhua	and	Yongjing,	on	September	22,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	715.	Cable	24:	“Peng	Dehuai	bu	tongyi	Zhang	Guotao	xijin	zhi	Mao	Zedong,	Zhou	Enlai	dian	 彭德懷不同
意張國燾西進致毛澤東、周恩來電（1936 年 9 月 26 日 12 時）”	(Peng	Dehuai’s	cable	to	Mao	Zedong	and	Zhou	Enlai	to	disagree	with	Zhang	Guotao	on	marching	westward,	at	12pm	on	September	26,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	721.	Cable	25:	“Zhonggong	zhongyang	shujichu	guanyu	sange	fangmian	jun	huihe	hou	de	tongyi	zuozhan	zhihui	jueding	zhi	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	bing	ge	fangmianjun	lingdaoren	dian	 中共中央書記處關於
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三個方面軍會合後的統一作戰指揮決定致朱德、張國燾並各方面軍領導人電（1936 年 10 月 10 日20 時）”	(The	CCP	Central	Secretariat’s	cable	to	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	leaders	of	front	armies	on	the	three	front	armies’	united	command	after	union,	at	8pm	on	October	10,	1936),	in	CDMS,	p.	777.	Cable	26:	“Zhongyang	ji	Junwei	guanyu	shi	yuefen	zuozhan	gangling	zhi	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	bing	Er,	Si	fangmianjun	dian	 中央及軍委關於十月份作戰綱領致朱德、張國燾並二、四方面軍電（1936
年 10 月 11 日）”	(A	cable	of	the	Party	Centre	and	the	Central	Military	Committee	to	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	the	Second	Front	Army	and	the	Fourth	Front	Army	on	the	military	plan	 for	 the	tenth	month,	on	October	11,	1936),	in	SMHF,	pp.	813-814.	Cable	27:	“Mao	Zedong	guanyu	anzhao	shiyue	zuozhan	gangling	zuo	hao	ge	xiang	zhunbei	zhi	Peng	Dehuai	dian	《毛澤東關於按照十月作戰綱領做好各項準備致彭德懷電（1936年 10月 13日 17時）”	(Mao	 Zedong’s	 cable	 to	 Peng	 Dehuai	 on	 making	 preparations	 for	 the	 military	 plan	 of	 the	 tenth	month,	at	5pm	on	October	13,	1936),	in	CDMS,	pp.	783-784.	Cable	28:	 “Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	guanyu	wanquan	 tongyi	 shi	yuefen	zuozhan	gangling	he	 junshi,	zhengzhi,	waijiao	zhishi	zhi	Dang	zhongyang	ji	Junwei	dian	 朱德、張國燾關於完全同意十月份作戰
綱領和軍事、政治、外交指示致黨中央及軍委電（1936 年 10 月 14 日）”	(Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao’s	cable	to	the	Party	Centre	and	the	Military	Committee	to	fully	agree	with	the	‘Outline	of	the	Military	Plan	for	October	and	other	military,	political	and	diplomatic	orders	of	the	Party	Centre,	on	October	14,	1936),	in	RRAL,	p.	1186.	Cable	29:	“Mao	Zedong	guanyu	tongyi	Peng	Dehuai	Ningxia	zhanyi	jihua	zhi	Peng	Dehuai	bing	Zhu	De,	 Zhang	 Guotao	 deng	 dian	 毛澤東關於同意彭德懷寧夏戰役計劃致彭德懷並朱德、張國燾等電
（1936 年 10 月 24 日 24 時）”	(Mao	Zedong’s	cable	to	Peng	Dehuai,	Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao	to	agree	with	Peng’s	plan	of	taking	over	Ningxia,	at	0am	on	October	24,	1936),	in	CDMS,	p.	800.	 	 	Cable	30:	“Mao	Zedong,	Zhou	Enlai	guanyu	jipo	nanmian	zhi	di	de	bushu	zhi	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao,	Peng	Dehuai	bing	Er	Si	fangmianjun	lingdaoren	dian	 毛澤東、周恩來關於擊破南面之敵的部署致朱
德、張國燾、彭德懷並二、四方面軍領導人電（1936 年 10 月 25 日）”	(Mao	Zedong	and	Zhou	Enlai’s	cable	 to	 Zhu	 De,	 Zhang	 Guotao,	 Peng	 Dehuai	 to	 commanders	 of	 the	 Second	 Front	 Army	 and	 the	Fourth	 Front	 Army	 on	 fighting	 the	 enemies	 in	 south	 areas,	 on	 October	 25,	 1936),	 in	 CDMS,	 pp.	804-805.	Cable	31:	 “Zhongyang	 junwei	guanyu	Sanshi	 jun,	 Jiu	 jun	duhe	hou	de	xingdong	wenti	 zhi	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao,	Peng	Dehuai	dian	 中央軍委關於三十軍、九軍渡河後的行動問題致朱德、張國燾、
彭德懷電（1936 年 10 月 26 日 1 時半）”	(The	Central	Military	Committee’s	cable	to	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	Peng	Dehuai	on	the	Thirtieth	and	Ninth	Army’s	operation	after	they	crossed	the	Yellow	River,	at	1:30am	on	October	26,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	842.	Cable	32:	“Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	guanyu	yin	di	yu	Lanzhou	chizhi	Hui,	Ding	diren	zhi	bingli	bushu	zhi	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao,	Peng	Dehuai	dian	 徐向前、陳昌浩關於引敵於蘭州遲滯會、定敵
人之兵力部署致朱德、張國燾、彭德懷電（1936 年 10 月 26 日）”	(Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao’s	cable	 to	 Zhu	De,	 Zhang	Guotao	 and	Peng	Dehuai	 on	 attracting	 enemies	 to	 Lanzhou	 and	 stopping	enemies	in	Hui	and	Ding	regions,	on	October	26,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	843.	
		
		
303	Cable	33:	“Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	guanyu	chu	yi	guohe	zhi	Sanshi	jun,	Jiu	jun	wai	qiyu	budui	tingzhi	guohe	zhi	Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	bing	Zhongyang	junwei	dian	 朱德、張國燾關於除已過河之
三十軍、九軍外其餘部隊停止過河致徐向前、陳昌浩並中央軍委電（1936 年 10 月 27 日 5 時）”	(Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao’s	cable	to	Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	and	the	Central	Military	Committee	that	armies	apart	from	the	Thirtieth	and	the	Ninth	Army	should	stop	crossing	the	river,	at	5am	on	October	27,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	845.	Cable	34:	“Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	dui	shixian	Ningxia	zhanyi	jihua	ji	budui	duhe	zhi	yijian	zhi	Zhongyang	 junwei	 dian	 徐向前、陳昌浩對實現寧夏戰役計劃及部隊渡河之意見致中央軍委電	
（1936年10月27日）”	(Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao’s	cable	to	the	Central	Military	Committee	about	 their	 opinions	on	 the	Ningxia	Campaign	Plan	and	 letting	 troops	 cross	 the	Yellow	River,	 on	October	27,	1936),	in	SMHF,	pp.	846-847.	Cable	35:	 “Zhonggong	zhongyang	 ji	Zhongyang	 junwei	guanyu	sange	 fangmianjun	 jinkao	zuozhan	zhengqu	shengli	zhi	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao,	Peng	Dehuai	deng	dian	 中共中央及中央軍委關於三個
方面軍緊靠作戰爭取勝利致朱德、張國燾、彭德懷等電（1936 年 10 月 28 日 12 時）”	(The	Party	Centre	and	the	Central	Military	Committee’s	cable	to	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	Peng	Dehuai	on	the	cooperation	of	the	three	front	armies,	at	12pm	on	October	28,	1936),	in	CDMS,	pp.	812-813.	Cable	 36:	 “Zhu	De,	 Zhang	 Guotao	 guanyu	 Sanshiyi	 jun	 ying	 chengji	 duhe	 zhi	 Xu	 Xiangqian,	 Chen	Changhao	bing	Zhongyang	junwei	dian	 朱德、張國燾關於三十一軍應乘機渡河致徐向前、陳昌浩並
中央軍委電（1936年10月28日16時）”	(A	cable	by	Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao	to	Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	and	the	Central	Military	Committee	that	the	Thirty-first	Army	should	cross	the	river,	at	4pm	on	October	28,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	848.	Cable	37:	“Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	guanyu	sange	fangmianjun	xie	jian	Hu	di	zhi	xingdong	bushu	 朱德、
張國燾關於三個方面軍協殲胡敵之行動部署（1936 年 10 月 28 日 19 時）”	 (Zhu	 De	 and	 Zhang	Guotao’s	 arrangements	 on	 the	 cooperation	 of	 the	 three	 front	 armies	 to	 annihilate	 Hu	 Zongnan’s	troops,	at	7pm	on	October	28,	1936),	in	CDMS,	p.	815.	Cable	 38:	 “Zhu	 De,	 Zhang	 Guotao	 guanyu	 quanjun	 bushu	 yijian	 zhi	 Zhongyang	 junwei	 ji	 Xu	Xiangqian,	 Chen	 Changhao	 dian	 朱德、張國燾關於全軍部署意見致中央軍委及徐向前、陳昌浩電
（1936 年 10 月 28 日 19 時 15 分）(A	cable	by	Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao	to	 the	Central	Military	Committee	 and	 Xu	 Xiangqian,	 Chen	 Changhao	 on	 arrangements	 of	 the	 Red	 Army,	 at	 7:15pm	 on	October	28,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	849.	Cable	 39:	 “Zhu	De,	 Zhang	 Guotao	 guanyu	 zai	 Haiyuan	 yinan	 xiaomie	Hu	 di	 xiantou	 budui	 zhi	 Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	deng	dian	 朱德、張國燾關於在海原以南消滅胡敵先頭部隊致徐向前、
陳昌浩等電（1936 年 10 月 28 日 20 時）”	(Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao’s	cable	to	Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao	on	the	plan	of	annihilating	Hu	Zongnan’s	troop	in	the	area	south	of	Haiyuan,	at	8pm	on	October	28,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	851.	Cable	40:	“Zhongyang	junwei	guanyu	Sanshiyi	jun	keyi	liji	duhe	dian	 中央軍委關於三十一軍可以立
即渡河電（1936 年 10 月 29 日 12 時）”	 (The	 Central	 Military	 Committee’s	 cable	 to	 order	 the	Thirty-first	Army	to	cross	the	river	immediately,	at	12pm	on	October	29,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	853.	
		
		
304	Cable	 41:	 “Zhu	 De,	 Zhang	 Guotao	 guanyu	 Wu	 jun	 renwu	 ji	 duhe	 shiyi	 zhi	 Xu	 Xiangqian,	 Chen	Changhao	dian	 朱德、張國燾關於五軍任務及渡河事宜致徐向前、陳昌浩電（1936 年 10 月 29 日15 時）”	 (A	 cable	by	Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao	 to	Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao	on	 the	Fifth	Army’s	task	and	arrangements	to	cross	the	river,	at	3pm	on	October	29,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	853.	Cable	42:	 “Zhongyang	 junwei	guanyu	zhansheng	Hu	di	xingdong	bushu	zhi	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	dian	 中央軍委關於戰勝胡敵行動部署致朱德、張國燾電（1936年10月30日）”	(The	Central	Military	Committee’s	cable	to	Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao	on	the	operations	against	Hu	Zongnan’s	troops,	on	October	30,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	855.	Cable	43:	“Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	guanyu	yi	Yi	Er	fangmianjun	zhuli	ji	Sanshiyi	jun	jijie	Machengbao	fujin	xiaomie	tujin	zhi	di	zhi	Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	dian	 朱德、張國燾關於以一、二方面軍
主力及三十一軍集結麻城堡附近消滅突進之敵致徐向前、陳昌浩電（1936 年 10 月 30 日 10 時半）”	(A	 cable	by	Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao	 to	Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao	on	 the	 arrangements	that	major	forces	of	the	First	and	Second	Front	Armies	and	the	Thirty-first	Army	will	gather	around	Machengbao	and	annihilate	enemies,	at	10:30am	on	October	30,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	856.	Cable	44:	“Peng	Dehuai	guanyu	zai	Haida	dadao	yibei	xunji	jiandi	zhi	Mao	Zedong,	Zhou	Enlai	dian	
彭德懷關於在海打大道以北尋機殲敵致毛澤東、周恩來電（1936年11月1日）”	(Peng	Dehuai’s	cable	to	 Mao	 Zedong	 and	 Zhou	 Enlai	 on	 annihilating	 enemies	 in	 north	 areas	 to	 the	 Haida	 road,	 on	November	1,	1936),	in	CDMS,	p.	827.	Cable	 45:	 “Gongchan	 guoji	 shujichu	 ji	Wang	Ming,	 Chen	 Yun	 guanyu	 gaibian	 yuanzhu	 fangfa	 zhi	Zhongyang	shujichu	dian	 共產國際書記處及王明、陳雲關於改變援助方法致中央書記處電	（1936
年 11月 3日）”	(A	cable	of	the	Comintern	Secretariat	and	Wang	Ming	and	Chen	Yun	to	the	CCP	Party	Centre	Secretariat	on	changing	methods	of	providing	assistance,	on	November	3,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	862.	Cable	 46:	 “Zhang	Wentian,	 Mao	 Zedong,	 Zhou	 Enlai	 deng	 guanyu	 zuozhan	 xin	 jihua	 zhi	 Zhu	 De,	Zhang	Guotao,	Peng	Dehuai	deng	dian	 張聞天、毛澤東、周恩來等關於作戰新計劃致朱德、張國燾、
彭德懷等電（1936 年 11 月 8 日）”	(Zhang	Wentian,	Mao	Zedong	and	Zhou	Enlai’s	cable	to	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	Peng	Dehuai	on	the	new	military	arrangements,	on	November	8,	1936),	in	CDMS,	pp.	840-841.	Cable	47:	“Zhongyang	ji	Junwei	guanyu	zuzhi	Xilujun	ji	qi	lingdao	jigou	de	bianling	 中央及軍委關於
組織西路軍及其領導機構的電令（1936 年 11 月 11 日 10 時）”	(The	Party	Centre’s	directive	on	the	establishment	of	the	Western	Route	Army	and	its	 leadership,	at	10am	on	November	11,	1936),	 in	SMHF,	p.	878.	Cable	48:	“Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	guanyu	Xilujun	qingkuang	zhi	Zhongyagn	junwei,	Zongbu	dian	 徐向前、陳昌浩關於西路軍情況致中央軍委、總部電（1936 年 11 月 12 日）”	(Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao’s	cable	to	the	Central	Military	Committee	and	the	Red	Army	Headquarters	on	the	Western	Route	Army’s	situations,	on	November	12,	1936),	in	SMHF,	pp.	881-882.	 	Cable	49:	“Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	guanyu	Xilujun	xu	duli	wancheng	datong	yuanfang	renwu	zhi	Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	bing	Zhongyang	junwei	dian	 朱德、張國燾關於西路軍須獨立完成打通
遠方任務致徐向前、陳昌浩並中央軍委電（1936 年 11 月 14 日）”	(Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao’s	cable	
		
		
305	to	Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	and	the	Central	Military	Committee	that	the	Western	Route	Army	should	connect	with	the	Soviet	Union	independently,	on	November	14,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	884.	Cable	 50:	 “Xu	 Xiangqian,	 Chen	 Changhao	 guanyu	 jinzhan	 Yongchang	 Ganzhou	 zhengqu	 xiuzheng	buchong	zhi	Zhongyang	ji	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	dian	 徐向前、陳昌浩關於進佔永昌甘州爭取休整
補充致中央及朱德、張國燾電（1936 年 11 月 19 日 9 時）”	(Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao’s	cable	to	the	Party	Centre	and	Zhu	De	and	Zhang	Guotao	on	occupying	Yongchang	and	Ganzhou,	at	9am	on	November	19,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	889.	Cable	51:	“Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	guanyu	Xilujun	jin	yue	lai	jianyuan	qingkuang	ji	dui	xingshi	fenxi	zhi	Zhongyang	bing	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	dian	 徐向前、陳昌浩關於西路軍近月來減員情況及
對形勢分析致中央並朱德、張國燾電（1936 年 11 月 21 日）”	(Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao’s	cable	to	the	Party	Centre	and	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	on	depletion	of	numbers	of	the	Western	Route	Army	and	their	analiysis	on	the	situations,	on	November	21,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	894.	Cable	52:	 “Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	guanyu	Sishilipu	zhankuang	deng	zhi	Zhongyang	 junwei	dian	 徐向前、陳昌浩關於四十里鋪戰況等致中央軍委電（1936年 11月 23日 20時）”	(Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	 Changhao’s	 cable	 to	 the	 Central	 Military	 Committee	 on	 situations	 in	 Sishilipu,	 at	 8pm	 on	November	23,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	897.	 	Cable	53:	 “Xu	Xiangqian,	 Chen	Changhao	guanyu	diwo	qingkuang	 zhi	 Zhu	De,	 Zhang	Guotao	bing	Zhongyang	dian	 徐向前，陳昌浩關於敵我情況致朱德、張國燾並中央電（1936 年 11 月 24 日）”	(Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao’s	cable	to	Zhu	De,	Zhang	Guotao	and	the	Party	Centre	on	situations	of	the	Western	Route	Army	and	the	enemies,	at	11pm	on	November	24,	1936),	in	SMHF,	pp.	899-900.	 	Cable	54:	“Mao	Zedong	dui	Xilujun	zuozhan	bushu	zhi	Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	dian	 毛澤東對
西路軍作戰部署致徐向前、陳昌浩電	 （1936 年 11 月 25 日 24 時）”	 (Mao	 Zedong’s	 cable	 to	 Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao	on	the	Western	Route	Army’s	operations,	at	the	0am	on	November	25,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	902.	Cable	55:	“Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	deng	guanyu	Xilujun	kuochong	hongse	qibing	zhi	ge	jun	ji	Zhongyang	junwei	dian	 徐向前、陳昌浩等關於西路軍擴充紅色騎兵致各軍及中央軍委電（1936 年12月 4日）”	(Xu	Xiangqian	and	Chen	Changhao’s	cable	to	armies	of	the	Western	Route	Army	and	the	Central	Military	Committee,	on	December	4,	1936),	in	SMHF,	p.	904.	Cable	56:	 “Xu	Xiangqian,	Chen	Changhao	guanyu	ge	 jun	xingdong	qingkuang	 ji	 jiaqiang	 Jiu	 jun	zhi	cuoshi	 zhi	 zhongyagn	 dian	 徐向前、陳昌浩關於各軍行動情況及加強九軍之措施致中央電（1936
年 12 月 9 日）”	 (Xu	 Xiangqian	 and	 Chen	 Changhao’s	 cable	 to	 the	 Party	 Centre	 on	 each	 army’s	operation	and	managing	the	Ninth	Army,	on	December	9,	1936),	in	SMHF,	pp.	909-910.	Cable	 57:	 “Zhou	 Enlai,	 Bo	 Gu	 guanyu	 Yu	 jun	 xu	 jinli	 shou	 Lanzhou	 bubian	 fenbing	 xi	 gu	 zhi	Zhongyang	 dian	 周恩來、博古關於于軍須集力守蘭州不便分兵西顧致中央電（1936 年 12 月 15
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lishi	shang	de	ruogan	zhongda	shifei	wenti	 走什麼路：關於中國近現代歷史上的若干重大是
非問題	 (Which	 is	 our	 road:	 on	 several	 crucial	 issues	 in	 modern	 Chinese	 history).	 Jinan:	Shandong	renmin	chubanshe	 山東人民出版社,	1997.	Shen	Zhihua	 沈志華.	Sikao	yu	xuanze:	cong	zhishi	fenzi	huiyi	dao	fan	youpai	yundong	 思考與選擇：
從知識分子會議到反右派運動 	 (Thinking	 and	 making	 choices:	 from	 the	 intellectual	conference	to	the	Anti-rightist	Movement).	Hong	Kong:	The	Chinese	University	of	Hong	Kong	Press	 香港中文大學出版社,	2008.	Sheng	 Xueren	 盛學仁	 ed.	 Zhang	 Guotao	 wenti	 yanjiu	 ziliao	 張國燾問題研究資料	 (Materials	 for	studies	 on	 Zhang	 Guotao	 issue).	 Chengdu:	 Sichuan	 renmin	 chubanshe	 四川人民出版社,	1982.	Shi	Zhongquan	 石仲泉.	Wo	guan	dangshi	 我觀黨史	 (My	opinions	on	Party	historiography).	Jinan:	Jinan	chubanshe	 濟南出版社,	2001,	pp.	——Wo	guan	dangshi	er	ji	 我觀黨史二集	 (My	opinions	on	Party	historiography,	Volume	2).	Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	2008.	——“Wo	shi	de	xueshu	dianjiren	Hu	Sheng	 我室的學術奠基人胡繩”	(One	of	the	founders	of	CPHRO,	Hu	Sheng),	Bainian	chao	 百年潮,	2010(7),	pp.	15-16.	Shinaide	 施耐德	 (Axel	Schneider)	(translated	by	Guan	Shan	 關山	 and	Li	Maohua	 李貌华).	Zhenli	
yu	lishi:	Fu	Sinian,	Chen	Yinque	de	shixue	sixiang	yu	minzu	renting	 真理與歷史：傅斯年、陳寅
恪的史學思想與民族認同	 (Truth	and	history:	two	Chinese	historians	in	search	of	a	modern	identity	for	China).	Beijing:	Shehui	kexue	chubanshe	 社會科學出版社,	2008.	Shuang	Shi	 雙石.	Fuqu	lishi	de	chen’ai:	Xilujun	wenti	zai	kaobian	 拂去歷史的塵埃：西路軍問題再考
辯	 (Reinvestigating	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 WRA).	 Hong	 Kong:	 Dafeng	 chubanshe	 大風出版社,	2013.	Song	Renqiong	 宋任窮.	Song	Renqiong	huiyilu	 宋任窮回憶錄	 (Memoirs	of	Song	Renqiong).	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	1994.	Song	 Xueqin	 宋學勤.	 Zhonggong	 dangshi	 xue	 gailun	 中共黨史学概论	 (An	 outline	 of	 the	 CCP	historiography).	Beijing:	Zhongguo	renmin	daxue	chubanshe	 中國人民大學出版社,	2012.	Su	Weimin	 蘇維民.	Yang	Shangkun	 tan	 xinzhongguo	 ruogan	 lishi	wenti	 楊尚昆談新中國若干歷史
問題	 (Yang	 Shangkun’s	 recollection	 and	 opinion	 on	 several	 historical	 issues).	 Chengdu:	Sichuan	renmin	chubanshe	 四川人民出版社，2010.	Tian	 Jujian 田居儉.	 “Qizhi	 xianming	 fandui	 lishi	 xuwu	 zhuyi	 旗幟鮮明反對歷史虛無主義”	 (Firmly	
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oppose	historical	nihilism),	Qiushi	 求是,	2013(19),	pp.	44-46.	Wang	 Ming	 王明	 (translated	 by	 Xu	 Xiaoming	 徐小明).	 Zhonggong	 wushi	 nian	 中共五十年	 (The	fifty-year	history	of	the	CCP).	Beijing:	Dongfang	chubanshe	 東方出版社,	2003.	Wang	Qiang	 王強.	“Zhonggong	lingdaoren	yu	Xilujun	wenti	de	boluan	fanzheng	 中共領導人與西路
軍問題的撥亂反正”	 (CCP	 leaders	 and	 the	 rehabilitation	 of	 the	 WRA).	 MA	 Dissertation,	Tianjin	University,	2010.	Wang	Xia	 王霞.	Monan:	Xilujun	nü	hongjun	tuanzhang	de	chuanqi	 磨難：西路軍女紅軍團長的傳奇	(Sufferings:	 legends	 of	 a	 female	 regimental	 commander	 of	 the	 WRA).	 Beijing:	 Jiefangjun	chubanshe	 解放軍出版社,	1998.	Wang	 Xuedian	 王學典.	 20	 shiji	 hou	 banqi	 Zhongguo	 shixue	 zhuchao	 20 世紀後半期中國史學主潮	(Major	currents	in	Chinese	historiography	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century).	Jinan:	Shandong	daxue	chubanshe,	1996.	——“Yujing,	zhengzhi	yu	lishi:	Yihetuan	yundong	pingjia	50	nian	 語境、政治與歷史：義和團運動
評價 50 年”	(Discourse,	politics,	and	history:	fifty	years	of	debates	on	the	Boxer	movement),	
Shixue	yuekan	 史學月刊,	2001(3),	pp.	13-24.	——“Sixiang	 shi	 shang	de	bashiniandai:	 xinshiqi	Li	 Shu	ceji	 思想史上的八十年代——新時期黎澍
側記”	(The	1980s	in	intellectual	history:	a	portrayal	of	Li	Shu	in	the	new	era),	Xueshujie	 學術
界,	2002(1),	pp.	236-253.	——“	‘Bashi	niandai’	shi	zenyang	bei	‘chonggou’	de?	「八十年代」是怎樣被「重構」的？”	(How	was	the	 1980s	 reconstructed:	 brief	 comments	 on	 several	 works),	 Kaifang	 shidai	 開放時代,	2009(6),	pp.	44-58.	
——Liangshi	de	mingyun	 良史的命運	 (The	fate	of	good	history).	Beijing:	Shenghuo,	dushu,	xinzhi	sanlian	shudian	 生活讀書新知三聯書店,	2013.	Wang	 Yan	 王焰,	 ed.	Peng	Dehuai	 nianpu	 彭德懷年譜	 (Chronological	 biography	 of	 Peng	Dehuai).	Beijing:	Renmin	chubanshe	 人民出版社,	1998.	Wang	Zhongqing	 王仲清,	ed.	Zhonggong	dangshi	xue	gailun 中共黨史学概论	 (An	outline	of	the	CCP	historiography).	Hangzhou:	Zhejiang	renmin	chubanshe	 浙江人民出版社,	1991.	Wu	 Zhijun	 吳志軍.	 “Yijiu	 wuyi	 nian:	 jiandang	 sanshi	 zhounian	 ‘wenben	 jinian’	 huodong	 de	 lishi	huigu	yu	fansi	–	yi	dui	zhonggong	dangshi	de	xuanchuan	wei	xushu	zhongxin	 一九五一年：建
黨三十週年「文本紀念」活動的歷史回顧與反思——以對中共黨史的宣傳為敘述中心”	(The	year	of	1951:	review	and	reflection	on	‘text	commemoration’	activities	in	memory	of	the	30th	anniversary	of	 the	establishment	of	 the	Party:	 take	propaganda	on	the	CCP’s	history	as	the	narrative	center),	Dangshi	yanjiu	yu	jiaoxue	 黨史研究與教學,	2008(3),	pp.	49-57.	——“Xueshu	hua	chuantong	de	shengcheng:	Ershi	shiji	bashi	niandai	tou	sannian	de	dangshi	yanjiu	
學術化傳統的生成：二十世紀八十年代頭三年的黨史研究”	(The	creation	and	development	of	academic	 tradition:	 Party	 history	 research	 in	 the	 first	 three	 years	 of	 1980s),	 Zhonggong	
dangshi	yanjiu	 中共黨史研究,	2012(4),	pp.	49-60.	Xia	 Yuli	 夏宇立 .	 Shi	 shuo	 Changzheng	 史說長征 	 (The	 Long	 March).	 Hong	 Kong:	 Qianfang	chubanshe	 前方出版社,	2010.	
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——(with	 penname	 “Yuan	 Lishi	 原立是”)	Xuese	 liming:	 Zhongguo	 gongnong	 hongjun	 Xilujun	 jishi	
血色黎明：中國工農紅軍西路軍紀實	 (Bloody	dawn:	the	true	story	of	the	WRA).	Hong	Kong:	Jinling	shushe	chuban	gongsi	 金陵書社出版公司,	2002.	Xiao	Donglian	 蕭冬連.	Lishi	de	zhuangui:	cong	boluan	fanzheng	dao	gaige	kaifang	(1979-1981)	 歷
史的轉軌：從撥亂反正到改革開放（1979-1981）(A	transformation	of	history:	from	setting	wrong	 things	 to	 right,	 to	 reforms	 and	 opening	 Up,	 1979-1981).	 Hong	 Kong:	 Xianggang	Zhongwen	daxue	dangdai	Zhongguo	wenhua	yanjiu	zhongxin	 香港中文大學當代中國文化研
究中心,	2008.	Xu	 Jilin	 許紀霖 .	 Zhongguo	 zhishifenzi	 shi	 lun	 中國知識份子十論 	 (Ten	 essays	 on	 Chinese	intellectuals).	Shanghai:	Fudan	daxue	chubanshe	 復旦大學出版社,	2003.	Xu	 Xiangqian	 徐向前.	 Lishi	 de	 huigu	 歷史的回顧	 (Looking	 back	 on	 history)	 (three	 volumes).	Beijing:	Jiefangjun	chubanshe,	1984-1987.	 	Yan’an	 zhongyang	 dangxiao	 zhengfeng	 yundong	 bianxiezu	 延安中央黨校整風運動編寫組(Compiling	team	on	the	rectification	studies	in	the	Yan’an	Central	Party	School),	ed.	Yan’an	
zhongyang	 dangxiao	 de	 zhengfeng	 xuexi	 延安中央黨校的整風學習 	 (The	 Rectification	Studies	 in	 the	 Yan’an	 Central	 Party	 School)	 (Volume	 1).	 Beijing:	 Zhonggong	 zhongyang	dangxiao	chubanshe	 中共中央黨校出版社,	1988.	Yang	Kuisong	 楊奎松.	“Sulian	da	guimo	yuanzhu	zhongguo	hongjun	de	yici	changshi	 蘇聯大規模援
助中國紅軍的一次嘗試”	 (An	Attempt	of	 the	Soviet	Union	to	Provide	the	Chinese	Red	Army	Large-scale	Assistance),	Jindaishi	yanjiu	 近代史研究,	1995(1),	pp.	254-269.	——“Wushi	nian	lai	de	zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	 五十年來的中共黨史研究”	(Party	historiography	in	the	past	fifty	years),	Jindaishi	yanjiu	 近代史研究,	1999(5),	pp.	178-202.	——Mao	 Zedong	 yu	 Mosike	 de	 en’en	 yuanyuan	 毛澤東與莫斯科的恩恩怨怨 	 (Gratitude	 and	resentment	between	Mao	Zedong	and	Moscow).	Nanchang:	Jiangxi	renmin	chubanshe	 	 江西
人民出版社,	1999.	——Xi’an	shibian	xintan:	Zhang	Xueliang	yu	zhonggong	guanxi	zhi	yanjiu	 西安事變新探——張學良
與中共關係之研究	 (The	Xi'an	Incident	revisited:	a	study	of	the	relationship	between	Zhang	Xueliang	and	the	CCP).	Nanjing:	Jiangsu	renmin	chubanshe	 江蘇人民出版社,	2010.	——“Guanyu	 zhonggong	 dangshi	 yanjiu	 de	 teshuxing	 關於中共黨史研究的特殊性 ”	 (The	particularity	of	Party	history	research),	Jiaoxue	yu	yanjiu	 教學與研究,	2001(5),	p.	9.	——Guomindang	de	“lian	Gong”	yu	“fan	Gong”	 國民黨的「聯共」與「反共」	 (Kuomintang:	unity	with	Communists	 and	 anti-communism).	Beijing:	 Shehui	 kexue	wenxian	 chubanshe	 社會科學文
獻出版社,	2008.	——Shiqu	de	jihui?	Kangzhan	qianhou	guo	gong	tanpan	shilu	 失去的機會？抗戰前後國共談判實錄	(A	 lost	 opportunity?	 A	 record	 of	 the	 negotiations	 between	 the	 Nationalists	 and	 the	Communists	before	and	after	the	Anti-Japanese	War).	Beijing:	Xinxing	chubanshe	 新星出版
社,	2013.	Yang	Shangkun	 楊尚昆.	“Guanyu	zhengji	dangshi	junshi	ziliao	he	bianzhuan	junshi	shiliao	congshu	de	 jige	 wenti	 關於徵集黨史軍史資料和編纂軍事史料叢書的幾個問題”	 (Several	 issues	 on	
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the	 selection	 of	 military	 history	materials	 and	 the	 compilation	 of	 military	 history	 books),	
Zhonggong	dangshi	yanjiu	 中共黨史研究,	1990(5),	pp.	1-5.	Yang	 Shengqun	 楊勝群,	 Yan	 Jianqi 閆建琪	 and	 Jiang	 Yongqing	 蔣永清.	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 nianpu	
(1904-1974)	 鄧小平年譜（ 1904-1974） (Chronological	 biography	 of	 Deng	 Xiaoping,	1904-1974).	Beijing:	Zhongyang	wenxian	chubashe	 中央文獻出版社,	2009.	Yao	 Jinguo	 姚金果 	 and	 Su	 Hang	 蘇杭 .	 Zhang	 Guotao	 zhuan	 張國燾傳 	 (Biography	 of	 Zhang	Guotao).	Xi’an:	Shaanxi	renmin	chubanshe	 陝西人民出版社,	2000.	Ye	Xinyu	 葉心瑜.	“Guanyu	Xilujun	wenti	de	ziliao	xuanbian	 關於西路軍問題的資料選編”	(Selected	materials	on	the	issue	of	the	WRA),	Dangshi	cankao	ziliao	 黨史參考資料,	1981,	pp.	2-110.	Yin	 Baoyun	 尹保雲.	 “Yao	 jingti	 shenmeyang	 de	 lishi	 xuwu	 zhuyi	 要警惕什麼樣的歷史虛無主義”	(What	kind	of	historical	nihilism	should	we	pay	attention	to),	Yan-Huang	chunqiu	 炎黃春秋,	2014(5),	pp.	29-34.	Yu	 Jinan	 于吉楠.	 Zhang	 Guotao	 he	 "Wode	 huiyi"	 張國燾和《我的回憶》	 (Zhang	 Guotao	 and	 his	memoirs).	Chengdu:	Sichuan	renmin	chubanshe	 四川人民出版社,	1982.	Yu	 Yingshi	 余英時 .	 Shixue	 yu	 chuantong	 史學與傳統 	 (Historiography	 and	 tradition).	 Taipei:	Shibao	wenhua	chuban	gongsi	 時報文化出版公司,	1982.	Zarrow,	 Peter	 (translated	by	Hung	Ching-yi	 洪靜宜).	 “Xifang	 xuejie	 yanjiu	 Zhongguo	 jindaishi	 de	zuixin	 Dongxiang	 西方學界研究中國近代史的最新動向”	 (Some	 trends	 in	 recent	 Western	scholarship	on	modern	Chinese	history),	Guoji	hanxue	 國際漢學,	Vol.	22,	No.	4	(November,	2003),	pp.	1-22.	Zhang	Guotao	 張國燾.	Wode	huiyi	 我的回憶	 (My	memoirs).	Beijing:	Dongfang	chubanshe	 東方出
版社,	2004.	Zhang	 Jiafang	 張家芳	 and	 Wang	 Xianjun	 王先俊.	 “Dui	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 ‘yicu	 buyi	 xi’	 yuanze	 de	kaobian	 對鄧小平宜粗不宜細原則的考辨”	 (Research	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 “it	 is	 better	 to	 be	vague	than	meticulous”),	Beijing	dangshi	 北京黨史,	2003(3),	pp.	23-25.	Zhang	 Jingru	 張靜如	 and	 Tang	Manzhen	 唐曼珍,	 eds.	 Zhonggong	 dangshi	 xue	 shi	 中共黨史學史	(Party	 historiography).	 Beijing:	 Zhongguo	 renmin	 daxue	 chubanshe	 中國人民大學出版社,	1990.	Zhang	 Peisen	 張培森,	 ed.	Zhang	Wentian	 nianpu	 張聞天年譜	 (Chronological	 biography	 of	 Zhang	Wentian),	Volume	1.	Beijing:	Zhongyang	dangshi	chubanshe	 中央黨史出版社,	2000.	Zhang	 Wentian	 張聞天.	 Zhang	 Wentian	 xuanji	 張聞天選集	 (Selected	 works	 of	 Zhang	 Wentian),	Volume	2.	Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	1993.	 	Zhangye	hong	Xilujun	jingshen	yanjiuhui	 張掖紅西路軍精神研究會	 (Zhangye	Association	of	WRA	Spirit	Studies),	 ed.	Zhonggong	Zhangye	 shi	 ziliao	hong	xilujun	zhuanti	 中共張掖史資料紅西
路軍專題 	 (Materials	 of	 CCP’s	 history	 in	 Zhangye:	 the	 Western	 Route	 Army),	 internal	publication,	2012.	Zheng	 Hui	 鄭惠,	 Yao	 Hong	 姚鴻,	 eds.	 Simu	 ji:	 huainian	 Hu	 Sheng	 wenji	 思慕集：懷念胡繩文輯	(Commemorating	Hu	Sheng).	Beijing:	Shehui	kexue	wenxian	chubanshe	 社會科學文獻出版
社,	2003.	
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Zheng	Ziwen	 鄭子文.	“Xilujun	zai	hexi	zao	ma	fei	zuji	de	kaocha	 西路軍在河西遭馬匪狙擊的考察”	(Investigation	on	the	Western	Route	Army’s	failure	in	West	Gansu),	Gansu	shehui	kexue	 甘肅
社會科學	 (Gansu	Social	Science),	1980(3),	pp.	68-73.	Zhong	Yanlin	 鍾延麟.	 “Deng	Xiaoping	zai	1957	nian	Zhonggong	zhengfeng,	 ‘fan	youpai’	zhong	zhi	juese	 鄧小平在1957年中共整風、「反右派」中之角色”	(Deng	Xiaoping’s	role	and	activities	in	the	Rectification	and	Anti-Rightist	Campaign	of	1957),	Zhongguo	dalu	yanjiu	 中國大陸研究,	Vol.	50,	No.	4	(December	2007),	pp.	87-116.	——“Deng	Xiaoping	zai	‘Gao	Rao	shijian’	zhong	zhi	juese	yu	zuowei	 鄧小平在「高饒事件」中之角
色與作為”	 (Deng	 Xiaoping’s	 roles	 and	 activities	 in	 the	 Gao	 Gang-Rao	 Shushi	 Incident),	
Renwen	 ji	 shehui	 kexue	 jikan	 人文及社會科學集刊,	 Vol.	 22,	 No.	 4	 (December	 2010),	 pp.	521-562.	Zhonggong	Gansu	sheng	Zhangye	diwei	dangshi	ziliao	zhengji	bangongshi	 中共甘肅省張掖地委黨
史資料徵集辦公室	 (Party	Historical	Materials	Collection	Office	of	Zhangye	Committee	of	the	CCP),	 ed.,	 Hong	 Xilujun	 shiiao	 紅西路軍史料	 (Historical	 materials	 on	 the	 WRA)	 (Internal	publication,	5	volumes),	1984-1988.	Zhonggong	Gansu	shengwei	dangshi	ziliao	zhengji	yanjiu	weiyuanhui	 中共甘肅省委黨史資料徵集
研究委員會 	 (Committee	 for	 Collecting	 Party	 Historical	 Materials	 of	 the	 CCP	 Gansu	Committee),	 ed.	 Beizhuang	 de	 zhengcheng	 悲壯的征程	 (A	 tragic	 march).	 Lanzhou:	 Gansu	renmin	chubanshe,	1991.	Zhonggong	 zhongyang	 bangongting	 中共中央辦公廳 	 (The	 General	 Office	 of	 the	 CCP	 Central	Committee),	“Guanyu	dangqian	yishixingtai	lingyu	qingkuang	de	tongbao	 關於當前意識形態
領域情況的通報 ”	 (Notification	 on	 the	 current	 situation	 of	 ideology),	 Mingjing	 明鏡 ,	2013(43),	pp.	86-92.	Zhonggong	zhongyang	dangshi	yanjiushi 中共中央黨史研究室	 (The	Central	Party	History	Research	Office).	Liangong	(bu),	gongchan	guoji	yu	zhongguo	suweiai	yundong	(1931-1937)	 聯共（布）、
共產國際與中國蘇維埃運動（1931-1937）(Communist	Party	of	the	Soviet	Union(Bolshevik),	the	Comintern	and	China’s	 soviet	movements,	1931-1937),	Volume	15.	Beijing:	Zhonggong	zhongyang	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共中央黨史出版社,	2007.	——Zhongguo	 gongchandang	 lishi	 diyi	 juan 中國共產黨歷史第一卷 	 (1921-1949)	 (The	 CCP’s	history,	 Volume	 1)	 (1921-1949).	 Beijing:	 Zhonggong	 dangshi	 chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	2011.	——Zhongguo	 gongchandang	 lishi	 di’er	 juan 中國共產黨歷史第二卷	 (1949-1978)	 (The	 CCP’s	history,	 Volume	 2)	 (1940-1978).	 Beijing:	 Zhonggong	 dangshi	 chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	2011.	
——Hongjun	 changzheng	 shi	 紅軍長征史	 (The	 History	 of	 the	 Red	 Army’s	 Long	 March).	Beijing:	Zhonggong	dangshi	chubanshe	 中共黨史出版社,	2006.	Zhonggong	 zhongyang	 wenxian	 yanjiushi	 中共中央文獻研究室 	 (The	 CCP	 Central	 Literature	Research	Center),	ed.	Laoyidai	gemingjia	lun	dangshi	yu	dangshi	yanjiu	 老一代革命家論黨史
與黨史研究	 (The	 revolutionists	 of	 senior	 generation’s	 talks	 about	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Party	
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